Category Archives: Global Analysis

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Asia-Pacific

Maritime Silk Road: Through a New Periscope

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It was the Maldives’s turn to receive a sermon on the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) from China. Chinese President Xi Jinping invited Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen to participate in the 21st Century MSR, expand cooperation in tourism, trade and infrastructure, and enhance maritime cooperation. Apparently Yameen assured Xi that his country would “respond to the Chinese initiative.” Ali Hameed, former vice foreign minister of the Maldives, too had stated that the MSR was of interest to the Maldives. Earlier, Xi had approached Sri Lanka to consider the MSR, and Colombo indicated that it would actively examine the proposal. The MSR was also raised during Indian Vice President Hamid Ansari’s visit to China a few months ago.

Unlike in Sri Lanka and the Maldives, the MSR has sent the Indian strategic community into a tizzy. A number of articles, commentaries, op eds, discussions and sound bites have concluded that the MSR is nothing but a Chinese ploy to get a naval ‘foothold’ in the Indian Ocean and reflects China’s creeping influence in the region. These reactions are quite natural given that China has aggressively pursued the agenda of building maritime infrastructure in friendly countries such as Pakistan (Gwadar), Sri Lanka (Hambantota) and now the Maldives – that are seen as bases/facilities to support People’s Liberation Army Navy’s future operations in the Indian Ocean and also the Chinese attempt to ‘encircle’ India.

However, it will be useful to examine the MSR through the prism of maritime infrastructure development and explore if India can leverage the MSR to its advantage. China has developed a sophisticated concept of marine economy that has been facilitated by its long coastline. Nearly 40 per cent of the Chinese population, 5 per cent of cities, 70 per cent of GDP, 84 per cent of direct foreign investment and export products are generated within 200 km of coast. In 1998, the Chinese government published a White Paper on marine economy which identified twenty different sectors for the development of the national economy. The China Ocean Information Center announced that the marine output in 2013 grew 7.6 per cent year on year to 5.43 trillion Yuan ($ 876 billion) accounting for 9.5 per cent of the national economy. In essence, the coastal provinces have contributed substantially to the overall national strength in terms of economic growth and play an important role in developing an export-oriented economy.

Today, China figures among the top countries in shipbuilding, ports (particularly container cargo), shipping, development of offshore resources, inland waterways, marine leisure tourism, and not to forget it is one of the top suppliers of human resources who are employed by international shipping companies.

mahinda-rajapakse-backs-chinas-maritime-silk-road-projectChina’s shipbuilding capacity is notable and is supported by plentiful of cheap labour and domestic ancillary industry which is endowed with exceptional engineering skills. Seven of the top ten global container ports are in China and the Chinese shipping fleet of 6,427 vessels ranks second behind Japan with 8,357 ships. Similar successes are seen in China’s fisheries production which is projected to reach about 69 metric tonnes by 2022 and it will continue to be top world exporter with 10 metric tonnes by 2022. Likewise, China ranked third as a tourist destination in 2012. The coastal regions are dotted with marinas, water sport parks and beach resorts and Sanya, Qingdao and Xiamen are home to the growing yacht and luxury boating industry.

These capabilities have been built over the past few decades and has placed China among the major maritime powers of the world and top Asian maritime powers – beating both Japan and South Korea. China is leveraging these capabilities and offering to develop maritime infrastructure in friendly countries that are willing to accept the offer – which at times makes an attractive investment opportunity, and can help these exploit the seas to enhance economic growth, and ensure food and energy security.

There is a sea change in the maritime strategic thinking of China and India. While the former has harnessed the seas to build its power potential, the latter needs to undertake a strategic evaluation of its maritime potential. India needs to make major policy changes to develop maritime infrastructure, offshore resources and exploit these on a sustainable basis. Although India is pursuing the path of building a modern three-dimensional navy with nuclear submarines, a new appreciation of the multifaceted maritime economic activity needs New Delhi’s attention.

India lacks maritime infrastructure and technology to exploit offshore marine organic, mineral and hydrocarbon resources that are critical to ensure sustained economic growth – which is high on the current government’s agenda. It would therefore be prudent to understand the MSR through the prism of an opportunity.

Dr Vijay Sakhuja is the Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Indian Navy or National Maritime Foundation. He can be reached at director.nmf@gmail.com. This article was cross-posted by permission and appeared in its original form at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. 

Asia-Pacific, Global Analysis

Piracy in the South China Sea: Petty Theft in Indonesia, Kidnapped Ships in Malaysia

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By Sarah Schoenberger

Armed with AK47s and equipped with GPS devices, modern pirates pose a serious non-traditional security threat to all seafaring nations, their people, and economies. In 2012, five crew members were killed in pirate attacks, 14 wounded, and 313 kidnapped; and the world economy lost about US$6 billion through disrupted maritime logistic chains, higher insurance premiums, and longer shipping times. While most associate piracy with hijacked ships and abandoned crews around Somalia, the area with the most pirate attacks in recent years has been the South China Sea. While the most severe attacks here occur primarily in Malaysia, 78 percent of the incidents in 2012 took place at Indonesian ports and concerned small cases of petty theft.

This analysis is based on data by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a UN specialized agency for maritime security. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines piracy as an illegal act of violence committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a ship or aircraft against another ship or aircraft on the high seas; the IMO extends this definition to include “armed robbery against ships”—pirate attacks within a state’s territorial sea.

According to the IMO, piracy worldwide has risen substantially since 1994 with incident peaks of about 470 and 550 in 2000 and 2011, respectively (see Figure 1). This is primarily due to the exponential increase of global shipping in the course of globalization—leading to 80 percent of world trade being shipped across oceans today—with which opportunities for piracy increased likewise. The real number of pirate attacks are thereby even higher: An estimated two-thirds of all pirate attacks remain unreported, as shipping companies skirt the bad publicity, higher insurance premiums, and investigation delays that come with reporting incidents.

With the exception of 2007 to 2012, when piracy in East Africa experienced a sharp increase, the South China Sea has been the most piracy-prone region in the world, with up to 150 attacks per year. Why? First, about 30 percent of global maritime trade passes through the region, so opportunities for attacks are plenty. Second, the area’s geographical features foster piracy, as the island chains and small rocks constitute ideal hiding places, while the narrow passages facilitate attacks. Third, unresolved territorial issues and lack of agreed jurisdiction, particularly around the Spratley and Paracel Islands, complicate maritime enforcement and patrols and thus facilitate illegal activities at sea.

While pirate attacks in the South China Sea are spread across the entire area, the majority happen around Indonesia: Of 85 incidents with a known location in 2012, 66 occurred in Indonesia, 10 in Malaysia, 3 in the Philippines, 2 in Singapore and 4 in Vietnam. Indonesia’s geographical features and the increased efforts of Malaysia and Singapore to combat piracy in the Strait of Malacca explain the predominance in Indonesia. Here, efforts to fight piracy are weak, cooperation of corrupt port officials is high, and punishment for piracy rather light.

In Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, most attacks occur at ports, whereas none happened in the Singaporean port. In Malaysia, the majority of incidents occurred on the high seas (see Figure 2). Taken together, this leads to a regional average of 67 percent ‘port-attacks’ in 2012, while only 13 percent happened on the high seas. In this regard, the South China Sea is distinct compared to the rest of the world, where more than a third of all pirate attacks are committed on the high seas.

To know more about the nature of the incidents in the different countries, the severity of the attacks can be calculated. Taking the four variables, (A) number of pirates taking part in an attack, (B) weapons used, (C) content stolen, and (D) amount of violence employed, the grade of severity is established by scaling the four variables appropriately (0.5A-2B-2C-3D), using them as axes in a four-dimensional coordinate plane and employing a point-distance formula of the point A/B/C/D to the origin.

Figure 1: Yearly statistics of piracy incidents worldwide since 1948. Source: IMO, 2012.
Figure 1: Yearly statistics of piracy incidents worldwide since 1948. Source: IMO, 2012.

Linking the severity with the location of attacks yields the map in Figure 3 (the larger the bubble, the more severe the attack; when several attacks of different severity took place in the same location, they are marked by black lines). While no hot spot is obvious, it is apparent that attacks in vicinity of Malaysia and Singapore were more severe (at an average severity of 37.5 and 34, respectively, on a scale from 8.5 to 59.5), while the mildest ones occurred in Indonesia at 24. The Philippines and Vietnam range in the middle at 29.5 and 26.7.

Comparing the severity with the area of attack in the different countries, two types of piracy become apparent. The first one is exemplified by attacks in Indonesia, which occur at ports and are not that severe. These are usually carried out by four pirates armed with knives, guns, or machetes; they target the crew’s personal belongings and the ship’s stores without employing much violence. These attacks can be characterized as low-profile piracy, which is generally conducted by un(der)employed fishermen or idle dock workers. As they lack resources, the attacks are ill-organized and opportunistic and exercised where security measures are low, law enforcement weak, and the concentration of shipping high.

Figure 2: Occurrences in the South China Sea according to country and area.
Figure 2: Occurrences in the South China Sea according to country and area.

In contrast, severe high-profile piracy occurs primarily on the high seas. It is carried out by well-organized international piracy syndicates, which have substantial means at their disposal and use modern techniques and equipment. In the South China Sea, this type of high-profile piracy is most evident in Malaysia. On average, these are carried out by 11 pirates armed with knives and guns; they hijack the ship and take the crew hostage or abandon it in life rafts.

The most self-evident explanation for the difference of low- and high-profile piracy in Indonesia and Malaysia is the disparity in living standards and wealth. In Indonesia, where the GDP per capita was US$5,100 in 2012, piracy attacks are much more likely to be motivated by poverty. Local fishermen do not have the means, or the motivation, to conduct high-profile attacks, but simply seek money and food—making Indonesian piracy less severe. In Malaysia, with a GDP per capita of US$17,200 in 2012, poverty is not as high and there is less necessity for fishers to conduct low-scale piracy attacks in order to survive. Instead, piracy attacks here are conducted by organized crime syndicates, entail much more criminal energy, and are more severe. Other factors that have an impact on the prevalent type of piracy include the amount of port security measures, the degree of law enforcement, and the strength of penalties.

Figure 3: The location and severity of piracy incidents in the South China Sea.
Figure 3: The location and severity of piracy incidents in the South China Sea.

Understanding the nature of piracy in the South China Sea leads to several implications for its combat. As most attacks happen in harbors, increased port and ship security measures would be highly effective in reducing the number of these incidents. In addition, stricter law regulation and enforcement mechanisms, as well as training for local port officials would be useful. Both these measures should be conducted in multilateral settings, like regional Piracy Law Dialogues or Conferences. They should include regional government officials, legal experts, representatives from the IMO and IMB, the shipping community, and other non-regional states with an interest in combating piracy in the South China Sea.

To address the cases on the high seas, any military mission patrolling the waters and accompanying ships (such as the successful NATO Operation Ocean Shield in the Gulf of Aden) would be highly controversial and inadvisable due to the possible escalation of territorial tensions. Instead, a joint coast guard system with common patrols could be much more effective.

For a country-specific course of action, the incidents in the respective country should be analyzed more closely, looking inter alia at the specific locations of the attacks with their surrounding circumstances and the general structure of criminality in the country. Nevertheless, based on the results of this analysis, piracy in the South China Sea in general can be much reduced if the root causes of unemployment and poverty in Indonesia are addressed. Through the depletion of resources, limitation of fishing grounds due to territorial tensions, and competition from large international fisheries that outclass them in the open sea, local fishermen can no longer sustain themselves by their livelihood. Facing a dearth of other employment opportunities, there is often little choice but to commit low-scale opportunistic crimes around harbors—and thereby become pirates.

Sarah Schoenberger is a postgraduate student of International Affairs at the London School of Economics and Political Science and Peking University in Beijing. Her focus is on security studies and East Asia. This article appeared in its original form at the Indo-Pacific Review and was republished by permission.

Middle East

Fluid Alliances and Unexpected Consequences: Philippine UNDOF Crisis

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RP-UNDOFThe recent crisis faced by Philippine Peacekeepers in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) highlights the fluid dynamics in alliances and the unexpected consequences that have precipitated in the wake of the Syrian Civil War.

On the morning of August 28th, approximately 75 Philippine Army troops of the 7th Contingent to UNDOF were surrounded by militant forces, some later identified as Al-Nusra Front fighters, and were ordered to surrender their arms. The Anti-Government Fighters focused their siege against strategic UN positions including Al-Quinaytirah,  the only crossing over the Golan Heights. The situation was exacerbated by the earlier capture of approximately 44 UN soldiers from Fiji manning posts on the Northern sector of the ceasefire zone. The rebels attacking the Philippine positions initially sent an English-speaking Fiji soldier to relay their surrender demands.

The peacekeepers, split into two units spread across the Filipino sector of responsibility, both refused the call to disarm. A fire-fight later ensued at their positions in Ar-Ruwayhinah, located in the southern portion of the Heights.  Despite being armed with only rifles and squad weapons, the Philippine unit was highly experienced – most of the UNDOF contingent belong to the 80th Infantry Battalion – which came fresh off anti-communist combat operations in Mindoro and run through a preparatory workup before deploying in the Golan. The militants arrived in technicals armed with anti-aircraft guns and besieged UNDOF Oupost 68 for several hours before being driven off. At one point, the rebel pick-up trucks started ramming the outpost gate to overrun the defenders and subjected the troops to mortar fire.

Some of the encircled troopers were eventually relieved and withdrawn to more secure positions by a combined Irish-Filipino Mobile Reaction Force equipped with armored personnel carriers from Camp Faroar on the Syrian side of the Heights. Outpost 68 was able to walk out on their own terms after a lull in the fighting and re-consolidated at Mission HQ in  Camp Ziouani near the Israeli border. What was notable is that the Al-Assad Syrian Army fired artillery rounds during the Outpost 68 firefight to help suppress the rebel assault. This may be a result of back-channel discussions stemming from then Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro’s mission to Damascus as early as 2009, when the Manila started contributing troops to the UN mission. But equally likely is the well-established “Cooperation and Coordination” aspect of UNDOF with the warring parties, which was finely-honed when the Mission was first established in the mid-1970s.  UNDOF Command closely communicates at an operational level with both Israeli Defense Force and Assad’s Syrian Army through liaisons. Additionally, this is a strong indicator that the Assad regime is not as unstable as the popular media narrative would indicate. The ability to quickly and effectively deliver indirect fire into the Area of Separation speaks to the existence of intact and professional Syrian Army elements despite the widespread Civil War.

This is not the first time Philippine forces in UNDOF have been under fire. In 2011, approximately 21 troopers and civilian workers were taken hostage but later freed without incident, and another soldier wounded by shellfire during the same year.

The assistance of the Syrian Government during this crisis is in direct contrast to current Western foreign policy, which seeks the unconditional removal of Assad’s regime. Collectively, all the stakeholders in the localized area of the Golan recognize the greater threat that the more militant spectrum of the Syrian rebellion represents, and can cooperate when necessary to achieve the common goal of maintaining stability within the area.

The dynamics of individual Peacekeeping Missions are also subject to the aspects of operational realities and unexpected consequences on the ground.

In the Outpost 68 firefight, the Anti-Government fighters were reportedly adamant about the Philippine troops surrendering their weapons before acceding to a cease-fire, as a matter of honor. It is likely that the rebels also saw this as a means of expanding their Table of Equipment.   Equally on the same point, as well as for more practical reasons, the Philippine troops refused to turn over their weapons, most of which was newly issued and the latest in terms of ordnance available to the country’s Armed Forces. The firefight may have been inevitable from a tactical viewpoint, but the supposed demand by UNDOF Mission Commander Lt. General Iqbal Singha of India that the Filipinos surrender to ensure the Fijians’ safety by “stacking arms” prompted a call for investigation by Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gregorio Catapang Jr. If the allegations have merit, it would be highly ironic given the UNDOF I-C’s very comments to the contingent during the October 2013 UN Day Parade that “Your job is to carry out your peacekeeping tasks and my job is to ensure your security.”

The back-channel discussions between SND Teodoro and the Assad government reflects multi-polar realpolitik. While the Philippines is generally seen as a supporter and beneficiary of US strategy and foreign policy in the Pacific, there is a small wealth of political capital that the Asian nation can use in other regions, where Filipinos are seen as a highly reliable source of skilled and unskilled labor, and generally not viewed as an enabler or facilitator of an increasingly divisive and unclear U.S. diplomatic approach.  Leveraging such capital at the right time and the right crisis can result in short-term gains without materially compromising key allies’ existing relationships nor overtly undermining their initiatives.

Another long-standing issue of concern is the inadequate force-protection capabilities of the peacekeepers themselves. In 2013, Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario met with UN officials to air concerns regarding relative troop strength in the Heights and to ensure that the necessary equipment for the “protection and defense of Filipino troops and other UNDOF” were procured by October of that year. The dilemma of adequately arming peacekeepers is well-known and understood, but given the circumstances of the raging Civil War, it is likely that the UN forces will continue to encounter more violent and zealous factions involved in  the turmoil, and must make sound decisions regarding practical limits of the  “Minimum Use of Force” directive.  A larger consideration must be made to enhancing force-protection measures while remaining true to the “peacekeeping” charter. This particular crisis pointed to several shortcomings; such as weapons inadequate to the higher threat level, better intelligence and monitoring of movement within the Area of Separation and a consistent Rules of Engagement  (one unit fought, the other did not) as well as contingency and scenario planning (one unit was relieved, the other had to egress independently  with no support). Otherwise the UN Peacekeeping Force will only perpetuate and not prevent conflicts, as blue-helmets are taken hostage for their political value and their equipment seized to further malicious actor goals.

As a corollary, there’s something to be said about gauging the quality of forces a nation contributes to UN Security Missions. Had it been a less experienced Philippine unit in place than the already-blooded 80th Infantry Battalion, the outcome might have been very different.  It is undoubtedly helpful that the troops had already “seen the elephant” in counter-insurgency operations when the militants started firing.

As a direct result of the deteriorating conditions in the Syrian Civil War, the Philippine Government has announced a complete withdrawal of forces until further notice to both the UNDOF and the UNMIL mission in Liberia, the latter due to the increased health risk of the Ebola outbreak. The Philippines had been contributing personnel to both missions since 2009 and 2003 respectively, and was the nation-in-command for UNDOF in 2012. This doesn’t bode well for many UN security missions – if nations start to withdraw because the global organization cannot effectively manage the numerous efforts underway (at last count 17 Missions world-wide and involving over 100,000 personnel), the spread of a regional crisis progressively engulfing larger portions of the globe could become a grim reality.

Juramentado is the pseudonym for Armando J. Heredia, a civilian observer of naval affairs. He is an IT Risk and Information Security practitioner, with a background in the defense and financial services industries. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, any particular nation’s government or related agency.

Events, Middle East

Hampton Roads September Social

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The Hampton Roads chapter is proud to announce the September meet-up, which will kick off at 6:30pm on Tuesday, September 9th and will be held in the Elizabeth River Room at Town Point Club in downtown Norfolk.

Butch Bracknell, CIMSEC member and author of the recent op-ed “Trimming Presidential War Powers,” will be addressing members on recent events in Iraq and Syria with an eye to their strategic and maritime implications.

All are welcome, but RSVPs are required (RSVP Here), as it will determine how much food is ordered for everyone. Please also note the dress code of business casual. Hope to see you for an evening of maritime discussion!

Town-Point-Club-Norfolk-VA-bar-grill-560x310_singleImage