Category Archives: Capability Analysis

Analyzing Specific Naval and Maritime Platforms

Capability Analysis, North America

Why the Coast Guard Needs LRASM in Peacetime

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By Chuck Hill

The Coast Guard has a problem. It is not currently equipped to perform one of its missions, and it appears no other agency is prepared to cover the deficiency. The Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) may be a possible solution.

The Mission

One of the Coast Guard’s peacetime missions is Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security (PWCS).

“The PWCS mission entails the protection of the U.S. Maritime Domain and the U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS)…prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks… Conducting PWCS deters terrorists from using or exploiting the MTS as a means for attacks on U.S. territory, population centers, vessels, critical infrastructure, and key resources.”

The Shortfall

Implicit in this mission is that the service should have the capability to forcibly stop a non-compliant ship, any ship, of any size. If a crew is motivated by simple greed, a .50 caliber machine gun is probably enough to convince them to take their chances in court rather than resist, but if the crew is motivated by a fanatical, or even suicidal belief in a cause, they become much harder to stop.

Terrorist targets are limited only by their imagination. They might include something like the Mumbai attack, an assault on a bridge, an LNG tanker or facility, a nuclear power plant, a passenger ship, an SSBN departing on patrol, or they might use a vessel to bring in a nuclear weapon. 

The Coast Guard is an armed force at all times, but it is certainly not heavily armed. In fact, in terms of stopping a recalcitrant merchant ship, the Coast Guard seems relatively less capable now than they were eighty years ago.

This is because of the rapid growth in the size of merchant ships. Even the largest cutters with their 57 mm and 76 mm guns are far less capable of stopping today’s over 100,000 ton merchant vessels than the cutters of the 1930s, with their 5″ guns were against ships that were typically well under 10,000 tons.

Worse yet, the units that would actually be on scene to attempt to stop and board a ship suspected of being under the control of terrorists is unlikely to include any of the larger cutters because they seldom remain near harbor entrance. Rather, they are frequently sent well off shore. 

The Coast Guard simply does not have the capability to deal with a terrorist attack using a medium to large sized merchant ship, and it currently appears that there is no other organization capable of answering this threat in the 30 or more port complexes terrorists might find worthwhile targets.

Our Friends

Navy surface forces, in U.S. waters, are too geographically concentrated. Navy ships tend to be either in homeport, working up in specific geographic areas, deployed, or in transit to deploy. There are no Navy surface warships homeported in the Gulf of Mexico, on the East Coast north of the New Port News/Norfolk complex, in Alaska, or on the West coast between San Diego and Puget Sound with weapons equal to or better than those on cutters. For many ports, the nearest Navy surface vessel is hundreds of miles away.

Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Army Air are not on standby around the U.S. armed with anti-ship weapons. Of the Air Force, only some strategic aircraft are training for the anti-shipping mission. Fighters and attack aircraft do not. The author suspects the U.S. would not get a timely response from the Air Force to a no notice requirement to stop a maritime target. Units that are not trained for an anti-shipping role cannot be easily pressed into that mission.

A Possible Solution

LRASM, with an over 200 nautical mile range and the ability to strike selected locations on a target ship, could possibly provide an answer. If the U.S. fielded LRASM on all nine National Security Cutters (NSC) and 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) currently planned, its over 200 mile range could cover virtually all of these ports, and likely have a weapon on target within 20 minutes of launch.

[youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=etb_Vzl-9Dk&w=560&h=315]

How It Might Work

The Coast Guard is developing a Maritime Domain Awareness system. Most likely, it will tap into the Navy’s system and over the horizon radars.

When the maritime domain awareness system detects the approach of a suspicious vessel, a small patrol vessel (WPB or WPC) is assigned to intercept it and conduct a boarding to determine the vessel’s nature and intent.

When the patrol vessel is assigned the intercept, a larger cutter that may be at some distance, but within range, would be directed to provide support in the form of a LRASM launch if necessary.

The patrol craft will transmit video, position, course, and speed during its approach which will allow the start of mission planning for an LRASM launch should it become necessary. The results of the patrol craft’s attempt to board will allow determination of hostile intent.

Once a determination of hostile intent has been made, and deadly force authorized, the supporting cutter can launch its weapon. The patrol craft will continually update the supporting cutter before and during the flight of the LRASM. Navy, Joint, and/or Allied procedures would be used to call for a strike, and should also work with other service’s assets if they are available.

LRASM_TSL_Concept_Lockheed_Martin
LRASM topside launcher concept. The size and weight are comparable to launchers for Harpoon. Photo: Lockheed Martin.

Is It Affordable?

It is likely cutters could be equipped to carry eight missiles, but for peacetime purposes, two per ship would almost certainly meet the Coast Guard’s needs. Since some ships will always be in maintenance with ammunition removed, and others may be deployed where carrying the weapons would be counterproductive. The Coast Guard is unlikely to ever require more than about 50 missiles to meet its peacetime needs. A very rough estimate of LRASM unit cost would be something on the order of $2M to $5M each. That means the total cost of the missiles is likely between $100M and $250M. Adding launchers, control systems, and installations to cost would almost certainly be less than $500M. These costs would be spread over several years. This gives only an order of magnitude estimate, but it is several orders of magnitude less than the cost of other systems being deployed to protect the U.S. from attack.

Since the missiles, their launchers, and control systems are Navy type/Navy Owned equipment, the Navy would be responsible for paying for them. The cost of adding another four missiles per year for the Coast Guard to the Navy’s buy for LRASM could be lost in the rounding errors in the Navy budget.

For the Coast Guard, the program would probably require no more than 150 additional billets ashore and afloat. Not insignificant, but doable.

Conclusion

If the LRASM performs as advertised, its combination of range, warhead, and intelligent targeting may allow the Coast Guard’s small, but widely distributed force to effectively cover virtually the entire U.S. coast. 

 Chuck retired from the Coast Guard after 22 years service. Assignments included four ships, Rescue Coordination Center New Orleans, CG HQ, Fleet Training Group San Diego, Naval War College, and Maritime Defense Zone Pacific/Pacific Area Ops/Readiness/Plans. Along the way he became the first Coast Guard officer to complete the Tactical Action Officer (TAO) course and also completed the Naval Control of Shipping course. He has had a life-long interest in naval ships and history. Chuck writes for his blog, Chuck Hill’s CG blog.

Featured Image: USCG National Security Cutter BERTHOLF. Photo: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 

Capability Analysis, Strategic Outlook

Deception and the Backfire Bomber: Part Three

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The following article is part of our cross-posting partnership with Information Dissemination’s Jon Solomon. It is republished here with the author’s permission. It can be read it in its original form here.

Read part one and part two of this series. 

By Jon Solomon

The Great Equalizer: Backfire Raiders’ Own Use of Deception

The key to improving a Soviet maritime bomber raid’s odds of success appears to have been its own use of EW and tactical deception. Tokarev observes that SNAF doctrine developers closely monitored U.S. Navy carriers’ Combat Air Patrol (CAP) tactics and operational patterns, with particular interest on patrol cycle durations and aerial refueling periods, to identify possible windows of vulnerability that could be exploited in a large-scale attack (Tokarev, Pg. 69). He further observes that SNAF doctrine developers concluded U.S. Navy CAP crews were “quite dependent” upon direction by tactical controllers embarked in area air defense-capable surface combatants or E-2 Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. This meant

“…the task of the attackers could be boiled down to finding a way to fool those officers—either to overload their sensors or, to some degree, relax their sense of danger by posing what were to their minds easily recognizable decoys, which were in reality full, combat-ready strikes. By doing so the planners expected to slow the reactions of the whole air-defense system, directly producing the “golden time” needed to launch the missiles.” (Tokarev, Pg 75)

In practice, this entailed extensive use of chaff to clutter and confuse the E-2s’ and surface combatants’ radar pictures, not to mention to create ‘corridors’ for shielding inbound raiders from radar detection. This probably also involved using elements of the sacrificial reconnaissance-attack group mentioned earlier to draw attention away from the other penetrating pathfinders. Most interestingly, Tokarev mentions that the raid’s main attack group included a “demonstration group.” When combined with his statement that only seventy to eighty of the bombers in an air division-strength raid would be carrying missiles, this suggests some of the bombers might have been specifically intended to attract their opponent’s attention and then withdraw from contact—the very definition of a deceptive demonstration (Tokarev, Pg 73, 77). As a Backfire raid would be conducted from perhaps two or three attack axes, a demonstration group could hypothetically cause a significant portion of available CAP resources—not to mention the carrier group’s overall tactical attention—to be focused towards one sector while the main attack would actually come from other sectors. Any missiles launched by the CAP against the demonstration group (or the reconnaissance-attack group for that matter) would obviously no longer be available when the main attack group arrived on scene. In this way, enough of the main group might survive long enough to actually launch their missiles, and maybe longer still to escape homeward.

The reconnaissance-attack and demonstration groups might also have been used to induce the carrier group to break out of restrictive EMCON and thereby help clarify the situational picture for the rest of the bombers. Enticing warships to light off their air search radars—and for the pre-Aegis combatants, missile-directing radars—would have provided some high confidence indications of which contacts were surface combatants and which were not. A similar effect might result if the Soviet tactics resulted in U.S. and NATO warships ceasing radio-silence as the carrier group oriented itself to defend against the perceived inbound threat. Still, as the carrier and any carrier-simulating decoy ships present might refrain from radiating telltale radars or engaging in telltale radio communications even under these conditions, the raid’s deceptions would not necessarily help pinpoint the carrier. They would, though, reduce the number of contacts requiring direct visual identification by pathfinders—perhaps dramatically. They would also likely help the raid’s air defense suppression group designate targets for jamming or anti-radar missile attack.

None of this should be surprising to those who have read Tom Clancy’s Red Storm Rising. The novel’s famous first battle at sea begins with a Badger group lobbing target drones towards a NATO carrier task force from far outside the latter’s AEW radar coverage. Equipped with ‘radar blip enhancers’ that allow them to simulate bombers, the drones present themselves using a formation and flight profile that easily convinces the task force’s air defenses they are facing an actual raid. The resultant ruse fools the task force’s F-14 fighters into wasting their AIM-54 Phoenix long-range air-to-air missiles against these decoys, essentially denuding the task force of its outer defensive layer. This is readily exploited by a Backfire group approaching from a different axis, with disastrous consequences for the task force’s warships.

Nor should any of this be surprising to students of the first Gulf War. While U.S. Air Force F-117’s were rightly heralded as having penetrated all the way to Baghdad with impunity on Operation Desert Storm’s opening night, their ease in doing so was paved by a joint U.S. Air Force and Navy deception titled SCATHE MEAN. In this little-known mission that closely emulated Clancy’s fictional scenario, the two services launched BQM-74 target drones and ADM-141 Tactical Air Launched Decoys to distract Iraqi Very High Frequency surveillance radar operators from detecting the inbound F-117s, seduce the Iraqis into expending precious Surface to Air Missiles against the bait, and induce these SAM sites into exposing their search and fire control radars to U.S. anti-radar missile attacks.

In Part Four, the ingredients for countering such deceptions.

Jon Solomon is a Senior Systems and Technology Analyst at Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. in Alexandria, VA. He can be reached at [email protected]. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity on his own initiative. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency. These views have not been coordinated with, and are not offered in the interest of, Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. or any of its customers.

Capability Analysis

What Happens to Naval Innovation Deferred?

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By Roger Misso

So far this year, we have seen the effective termination of the CNO’s Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC) and the announced ending of the Strategic Studies Group (SSG). Recently, we have also learned that Navy Warfare Development Command’s (NWDC) popular site “Navy Brightwork” on the joint website MilSuite (which has +500,000 users) will cease to be supported by an official Navy command. 

We are more than one year from Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus’ “Task Force Innovation” announcements at the 2015 Sea-Air-Space conference. Nearly two dozen action memos have led to high-level documents on important topics such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), Robotics, and Big Data. They are an essential reading of the coverage while our service continues to pound away against ISIL at the line of scrimmage.

But sailors and civilians at the deckplate level have seen only a string of perceived losses this year. The concept of the CRIC, SSG, and Brightwork are exactly what our Navy needs. But rather than support, there seems to be a shopping-around for something newer and shinier, or an inability to stand up and fight for the things that will help us win the conflicts of tomorrow.

The end effect for sailors is an innovation and strategic communication shell game that heightens the barrier of entry into naval innovation communities. As soon as our sailors learn of such outstanding innovation communities like CRIC, Brightwork, and SECNAV’s “Hatch,” the pea has passed on, hiding elsewhere. It shouldn’t be a surprise then, when you see the same familiar faces showing up in innovation circles.

More importantly, what will happen to the dozens of junior enlisted and officers who were excited about CRIC, the 1,220 users of Navy Brightwork, and more broadly, the thousands of Navy officers, enlisted, and civilians with both the ideas and the drive to help us fight and win as a service? Are we alienating the very future innovators we seek to enable? Or are we onboarding them into successful communities of practice?

Who We Are

Sailors seem to come in three varieties when it comes to naval innovation:

  • The Uninterested
  • The Unknown
  • The Under-Utilized

Not much can be done with the folks in the first category; there will always exist a sizable population seeking to expend the minimum required effort to do their job and go home.

The highest potential for the Navy comes from Categories Two and Three. “The Unknown” sailors are those with great ideas, or a great deal of care, for the service, but who might not know where to pitch and refine their idea, or how to channel their fire.

“The Under-Utilized” sailors are those already active in the remaining innovation spaces, or those left behind by the dissolution of the CRIC and other such organizations. They are those who have pitched at ATHENA Project events, submitted white papers and project proposals, or have been members of various innovation cells and quasi-red teams.

These are sailors who have a more informed view of the lay-of-the-land when it comes to project management, requirements, Research, Development, and Acquisitions, and the like. These are sailors who work full-time day jobs, and in their spare time devote countless hours to projects they believe will make the Navy a better fighting force. These are sailors willing to go the extra mile for a good cause and committed leadership.

What We Need

In September 2001, days before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, then-Rear Admiral James Stavridis wrote that we must “[be] open to ideas and protective of those who advocate disruptive technologies.” More than platforms and payloads, our “Unknown” and “Under-Utilized” sailors are the Navy’s asymmetric advantage today.

To reach these sailors, the Navy must do two things:

  • Create innovation pathways that are simple and intuitive
  • Develop a strategic communications and outreach plan that is clear, cogent, concise, and backed by the highest level of leadership

First, pathways for innovative ideas and individuals are required today for our Navy to win tomorrow. When the enemy denies us use of multi-billion dollar platforms, systems, or satellites, the difference between victory and defeat will be those who can think, adapt, act, and inspire quickest. We cannot afford to build these pathways after the first strike; we must build this culture now.

Organizations like the CRIC leave such a gaping void because they allow sailors to practice both initiative and leadership. They are an empowering construct that clearly communicates trust between senior and junior leaders. They are a proving ground for new policies and technologies that would otherwise take us decades to bring to the Fleet. We need more outlets like this in our Navy, not less.

SAN DIEGO (Feb. 10, 2015) Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) Mike Stevens visits service members with the CNO's Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC) during the Western Conference and Exposition (WEST) 2015. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Martin L. Carey.
SAN DIEGO (Feb. 10, 2015) Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) Mike Stevens visits service members with the CNO’s Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC) during the Western Conference and Exposition (WEST) 2015. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Martin L. Carey.

Funding, however, is a constraint. Junior sailors do not have a hand in programming or budgeting decisions that will affect the forces they lead in the future. They cannot advocate before Congress the absolute necessity of robust pathways for innovation from the deckplates.

Yet, as they have been doing since before the days of the Naval Lyceum, committed sailors come together in the margins of our service to support one another and share ideas. Today, CRIC[x], the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum, and the Naval Constellation host a vibrant “shadow Navy” of officers, enlisted, and civilians of every rank, fleet area, and background.

In order to capitalize on the talent of these groups, the Navy must develop pathways for individuals to lead their own projects or actively influence policy throughout the fleet. If Congressional marks preclude us from funding organizations like CRIC, commands in DC, Millington, and every fleet concentration area should develop local innovation cells and red teams.

Precedence for these moves can be found in the first innovation cells started by Admiral Stavridis more than 20 years ago, and more recently, by Pacific Fleet’s “The Bridge” innovation group. These small pockets of dedicated sailors can be a command’s competitive advantage, helping adapt to both dynamic wartime circumstances and common-sense reform to improve quality of life for all sailors.

Second, we must define what we mean by “innovation,” communicate our intent, and back it all up.

Innovation is defined differently by different people. Sailors ask, “Do you want me to build something? Or think something?” As a service, our answer should be, “All of the above, if you can!” Whether it is a product, a policy, or inculcating a different way of thinking, we should seek to empower and connect those who boldly and constructively work to make our Navy better.

However, we need to communicate this in a way that sailors can recognize, remember, and repeat. Apple’s “Think Different” advertising campaign defined their brand in just two words; our Navy should be similarly brief. 

Despite the CNO’s call for “high velocity learning” in the force, rampant misunderstanding abounds. There are still commanding officers and staffs that snuff out or disparage innovators in their ranks.

One thing is clear: whether it comes from SECNAV or CNO, innovators need top-cover from the highest level to succeed. While many COs and mid-level staff officers are part of the solution, there are a significant number of officers, enlisted, and General Schedule workers who comprise the “frozen middle,” stultifying progress for any number of reasons. If we want to do things faster, and better, we need both leadership from the very top to “have our backs,” and the groundswell of energy from below that already exists.

Where We’re Going

These are not new ideas. In the same September 2001 Proceedings article, Admiral Stavridis advocated for the service to “[create] an idea factory on the sea service staffs,” “build a cadre of innovators,” “emphasize prototyping and leasing,” and “explore a ‘dual track’ procurement system,” among other recommendations.

Fifteen years has passed since his writing. Innovation from the deckplates is still imperative for the Navy. Yet we are stuck steaming in circles, instead of making way towards the horizon. We may be able to gap billets and programs, but we cannot gap ideas, and we cannot gap leadership.

We are a service of command by negation and, more recently, distributed lethality. Let us also innovate by negation, and distribute our ideas, trust, and ingenuity. If we fail to unfurl our sails as such and set a bold course, we may find ourselves asking:

What happens when naval innovation from the deckplates is deferred? “Does it dry up, like a raisin in the sun?”

LT Roger Misso is an E-2C Naval Flight Officer. He is currently working at the Pentagon, and in the shadows to advance naval innovation. You can find him on Twitter @rogermisso. The views express herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity on his own initiative. They do not reflect the official positions of the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Featured Image: U. S. Navy recruits study using electronic tablets (e-tablets) in the USS Hopper Recruit Barracks at Recruit Training Command (RTC).

Capability Analysis

U.S. Coast Guard at Sea: Aging Today With Visions Of Tomorrow

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By Michael A. Milburn

As the U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Boarding Team prepares to board a commercial tanker suspected of trafficking narcotics, the Combat Information Center operator monitors the situation intently. Sitting just behind the operator is the Commanding Officer, who is watching the full tactical situation as it develops and waiting for the opportune time to direct a Right of Visit boarding to determine the vessel’s nationality. Three thousand miles away, the Coast Guard Eleventh District Commander anxiously watches the live video feed to determine in real-time if his team pinpointed the correct vessel of interest. The Boarding Officer signals to his team that embarkation is approved. Immediately, six Coastguardsmen enter the ship and sweep the inside hull and topside. For the first time in history, a boarding team is relaying what they see, without saying a word. Two members discover an undocumented shipping container on the manifest and head in the direction marked. One team member discovers packages wrapped in similar fashion of known traffickers. All eyes watching the video cheer in triumph.

Keeping Current with Technology and the Community

The proliferation of advanced technology in the last decade, coupled with a renaissance  in electronic sensors, has amplified the situational awareness and effectiveness of command ships, command posts and combatant commanders tenfold. Despite these sophisticated tools, however, decision makers continue to wait in silence for minutes that feel like decades, all in hopes of receiving confirmation that the target is indeed of interest, carrying illicit narcotics, or smuggling illegal immigrants. What if they were able to see in real-time, though? What if the operation could unfold right before their very eyes? Hollywood exemplifies this notion in every secret agent movie and clandestine operation film. From society’s perspective, we have come to believe that this is the standard for all military operations. Although this may be a reality for some specialized subdivisions, it is not entirely true for the vast majority of operational units.  The filming of Osama Bin Laden’s death demonstrated to the world that U.S. Special Forces have the ability to relay live video feeds during their operations back to command posts, providing Situational Awareness (SA) for optimal information gathering and sharing for analysis, as well as real-time decision making to the commander[i]. More importantly, it provides the commander additional sets of eyes (staff) to help inform his or her decision. While the team is trained to enter, sweep, and detain the threat, a set of analysts can provide insight back to the team in real time. Notably, this is where the blended concept of communications and video feeds come into play. A concept that is nothing new for the Department of Defense (DoD)[ii], but an innovative concept to integrate into high-risk law enforcement evolutions for the U.S. Coast Guard. Relevantly, the Posse Comitatus Act [iii] and military policy strictly prohibit DoD personnel from directly engaging in law enforcement activities. In turn, the Coast Guard was designated the lead agency for the interdiction and apprehension of illegal drug traffickers on the high seas.

A Coast Guard Cutter Stratton boarding team investigates a self-propelled semi-submersible interdicted in international waters off the coast of Central America, July 19, 2015. The Stratton’s crew recovered more than 6 tons of cocaine from the 40-foot vessel. (Coast Guard photo courtesy of Petty Officer 2nd Class LaNola Stone)
A Coast Guard Cutter Stratton boarding team investigates a self-propelled semi-submersible interdicted in international waters off the coast of Central America, July 19, 2015. The Stratton’s crew recovered more than 6 tons of cocaine from the 40-foot vessel. (Coast Guard photo courtesy of Petty Officer 2nd Class LaNola Stone)

On an average day, the U.S. Coast Guard screens about 360 merchant vessels for potential security threats prior to arrival in U.S. ports, seizes 874 pounds of cocaine and 214 pounds of marijuana, interdicts 17 illegal migrants, conducts 24 security boardings in and around U.S. ports, executes 14 fisheries conservation boardings, and lastly, completes 26 safety examinations on foreign vessels[iv]. For as long as the Coast Guard has been conducting law enforcement missions, it has relied upon two primary principles : Communication and Accountability. In terms of communication, boarding teams are able to portray on-scene conditions to the operational commander via words. The commander must then visualize the mission by painting a portrait of it in his or her head. Secondly, accountability provides a detailed account of what happened and normally documented in the form of After Action Reports or Situation Reports. There are two significant and inherent risks present in every boarding situation – people and vessels. In any given situation, there are myriad factors the boarding team must take into account; however, what if the team missed a critical element because it simply was focused on the threat and not familiar with the associated information? Filling that gap, the law enforcement exploitation team onboard the unit, also known as the “snoopie team,” documents as much vital information as possible as it receives photography and video from the boarding team on-scene. In turn, this enables the boarding team to collectively build a complete case file on the apprehended suspects, which is critical during the prosecution phase.

Moving Ahead Without Borders

Imagine if snoopie teams could watch live video feed and relay information back to the intelligence community for real-time assessment. This would allow boarding teams to shift their focus from being an information relay to actually executing the boarding. In addition to saving time and energy, the intelligence community could now assist with building the case package from a remote location, which inarguably would result in better overall case packages. Prosecution and approval for boardings or seizures becomes nearly instantaneous as well, without any latency stemming from sluggish relays through the various layers of the law enforcement hierarchy. Case packages have fewer chances of missing critical information, and from a legal standpoint, cases have fewer chances of being dismissed in court due to evidence. Further, case packages are now synced between the district, joint commander, and the unit itself.   A Commanding Officer’s worst fear is a member of his or her team being ambushed or injured. While this situation is rare, there is  potential it could occur, which normally causes a change in tactics, procedures, or policy. Live video feeds have proven themselves useful and convenient for the military, and it is time for the Coast Guard to embrace it. They say a picture is worth a thousand words – if that is the case, what then is a video worth?

Members of a visit, board, search and seizure team assigned to USS Gettysburg (CG 64) and U.S. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Team South Detachment 409 detain suspected pirates after responding to a merchant vessel distress signal while operating in the Combined Maritime Forces area of responsibility in the Gulf of Aden May 13, 2009. The service members are conducting the operation in support of Combined Task Force 151, a multinational task force established to counter piracy operations and to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for all nations. (DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Eric L. Beauregard, U.S. Navy/Released)
Members of a visit, board, search and seizure team assigned to USS Gettysburg (CG 64) and U.S. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Team South Detachment 409 detain suspected pirates after responding to a merchant vessel distress signal while operating in the Combined Maritime Forces area of responsibility in the Gulf of Aden May 13, 2009. (DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Eric L. Beauregard, U.S. Navy/Released)

As the Coast Guard continues to follow the ever-evolving “cat and mouse game” between the U.S Government and transnational narcotics traffickers, they will have an endless need to position themselves ahead of the curve. While the Coast Guard remains intently focused on the war on drugs and its essential “Western Hemisphere Strategy,” there are needs not outlined in the strategy that would follow them world-wide[v]. Such a system could pave the way for adaptation of live-video feeds onto current airborne platforms and future UAV and cutter programs, presenting a worldwide capability where any District or Area Commander has the  full view and a complete operational picture when desired.

One of the many benefits of live video feed is improved training.  All professional sports teams “watch the tape” to better prepare for the next game. Similarly, boarding videos would provide the boarding team and trainees the ability to evaluate and critique their own performance in order to improve future evolutions. The days of “standard boardings” or training would be a thing of the past. Boarding teams on the frontline would now have the upper-hand and the opportunity to train and develop new techniques and tactics to better counter transnational narcotics trafficking and potential terrorist attacks. MSST and MSRT units training can relay the scenario back “live” to a control room where both trainers and decision makers can play through any scenario. Imagine taking a video feed from a high risk boarding today and streaming it to every boarding team tomorrow – the training benefit would be immeasurable.

A New World of Opportunity Awaits

Not only are members streamlining the safety and security process, but they are devising new reasons to challenge existing policy and improve it with lessons learned observed firsthand.  The motto, “Time Is of the Essence,” comes to mind time and again. Current tactics have teams using GoPros for boardings, which creates a review delay back onboard and throughout the chain of command. In this case, latency is a major concern. Imagine your team is granted five minutes to conduct a quick search.

SAN PEDRO, Calif. Ð A Border Enforcement Security Task Force boarding team conducts a boarding on a tanker vessel April 29 off the coast of Long Beach, Calif. The Los Angeles BEST is the nationÕs first seaport task force of its kind, bringing together multiple agencies including the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, California Border Patrol, Los Angeles County SheriffÕs Department, and Los Angeles and Long Beach Port Police. The BEST was created to enforce maritime laws and combat smuggling in the ports. (U.S. Coast Guard photo/Petty Officer 3rd Class Cory J. Mendenhall)
SAN PEDRO, Calif.) A Border Enforcement Security Task Force boarding team conducts a boarding on a tanker vessel April 29 off the coast of Long Beach, Calif.  (U.S. Coast Guard photo/Petty Officer 3rd Class Cory J. Mendenhall)

Admittedly, this may sound like fiction from a Hollywood movie, but it could be reality as early as tomorrow. Challenges will always present themselves (i.e., system integration, funding, legalities etc.), however, when the idea of live tactical video was presented to actual boarding team members, they were enthused and optimistic. Their reasons for wanting live tactical video were for enhanced situational awareness, improved focus on the actual boarding itself, and an improved flow of information up the chain of command.  As mentioned, there are always limitations and risks vs. gains ranging from use in operations and policy, up to the program level. Fortunately, proven systems exist today i.e. the Harris “Tactical Video System,”[vi] and require minimal testing and integration from the Coast Guard. These systems are the stepping stones needed for a 21st century Coast Guard operating in a multifaceted environment.  As the Coast Guard confronts counterintelligence and aggressive, evolving enemies, it must be optimally prepared to respond to any situation. By implementing an enhanced reconnaissance tool, the Coast Guard will be better suited to perform its missions and better protect the citizens of the United States.

Petty Officer Michael A. Milburn is a career cuttermen, with nearly 7 years of  experience aboard four different cutters, including commissioning two National Security Cutters. Petty Officer Milburn’s awards include the CG Achievement Medal, CG Commandant Letter of Commendation, two Coast Guard Unit Commendations, three Coast Guard Meritorious Unit Commendations and three Coast Guard Meritorious Team Commendations. He is currently enrolled in American Military University to pursue his Bachelor of Arts in Cyber Security.

[i] http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/web/05/02/bin.laden.video/

http://techland.time.com/2011/05/04/how-did-seal-team-6-feed-live-video-of-the-raid-to-obama/

[ii] http://www.streamingmedia.com/Articles/Editorial/Featured-Articles/Video-in-the-War-Zone-The-Current-State-of-Military-Streaming-101310.aspx

[iii] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posse_Comitatus_Act#Exclusion_applicable_to_U.S._Coast_Guard

[iv] https://www.uscg.mil/budget/average_day.asp

[v] http://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/docs/uscg_whem_2014.pdf

[vi] http://rf.harris.com/media/CSVehicle108B_tcm26-18150.pdf