All posts by Dmitry Filipoff

Flotilla SITREP: The Role of Command Responsibility and PME in Prioritizing Warfighting

By Dmitry Filipoff

This month the CIMSEC Warfighting Flotilla will be hosting sessions on the role of commanding officers in prioritizing warfighting for their units, and the role of PME in warfighting education. If you haven’t already, sign up through the form below to become a Flotilla member and receive the invites to our upcoming off-the-record November discussions. The full listings for these upcoming discussions are featured down below.

Feel free to visit the Flotilla homepage to learn more about this community, its activities, and what drives it.

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Upcoming November Sessions

The Role of Command in Prioritizing Warfighting

Commanding officers are well-placed to inculcate their commands with warfighting imperatives. COs can use their discretion and authority to set priorities for their staffs and crews. But COs may have their span of control limited by the requirements and priorities of their chain of command. What is the role of commanding officers in prioritizing warfighting for their units, and how much decision-making ability can they realistically wield? Join us to discuss these questions as we consider the role of command responsibility in prioritizing warfighting.

Read Ahead: “Warfighting Culture Starts with the CO,” by Capt. Jamie McGrath (ret.)
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The Role of PME in Warfighting Education

Professional Military Education offers major opportunities for servicemembers to enhance their understanding of warfighting. But the breadth of curricula and coursework may reflect a variety of requirements and electives that compete with a warfighting focus. What should be the role of PME in warfighter education? How should PME curricula balance warfighting with other areas of expertise? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider the role of PME.

Read Aheads:

Preparing the Fleet for the Next Fight: An Assessment of Navy and Marine Corps Command and Staff Courses,” by Major Maxwell Stewart, U.S. Marine Corps, Captain Louis Gilbertson, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, and Mason Ever

Driving The Dark Road To The Future: A Guide To Revitalizing Defense Planning And Strategic Analysis,” by Benjamin Jensen and Michael Rountree
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Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content and Community Manager of the Warfighting Flotilla. Contact him at [email protected].

Simulating Global Naval Warfare: Capt. Chris Narducci on Large Scale Exercise 2023

By Dmitry Filipoff

In Large Scale Exercise 2023, numerous naval forces from around the world engaged in simulated warfighting under one global scenario. CIMSEC had the opportunity to discuss LSE23 with lead exercise planner Capt. Chris Narducci. In this discussion, Capt. Narducci describes what makes LSE unique, what the Navy is looking to learn from the event, and how LSE prepares the fleet for conflict against strategic competitors.

Many terms can be used to define Navy exercises, such as rehearsals, certifications, experiments, and others. How would you define LSE and its objectives? 

LSE can definitely be classified as an “exercise,” however, it also included elements of experimentation. LSE was not a rehearsal for any specific operational plan, and no forces were certified during the exercise.

LSE’s end state objectives were to further refine Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), and the supporting concepts of Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE), and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) in order to build a more lethal force. LSE also sought to globally synchronize naval operations at the operational-to-tactical level of warfare. The exercise also sought to make naval forces better prepared to fight and win against strategic competitors through the use of a Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) training environment. 

How is LSE different and complementary to other large Navy exercises, such as COMPTUEX and Fleet Battle Problems? What unique aspects does LSE afford the fleet the opportunity to exercise?

Other Navy exercises do not compare in scope and scale to LSE.

COMPTUEX is designed to certify a single live Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or an Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) for deployment. The focus is at the tactical level from the 1-star staff down to the individual participating units. A COMPTUEX will typically include a second CSG or ARG staff participating virtually. A Fleet Battle Problem (FBP) typically involves a single live CSG or ARG. The FBP focus is also at the tactical level, while its purpose is to assess several elements of DMO and/or LOCE/EABO, as well as provide opportunity for experimentation.

LSE was unique in that it was able to stimulate the individual Sailor or Marine at the low tactical level all the way up to the 4-star fleet commanders at the high operational level of warfare. LSE participants were spread across 22 time zones and six geographic combatant command areas of responsibility. LSE had six CSGs (1 live, 5 virtual/constructive), four ARGs (virtual/constructive), as well as over a dozen additional ships and submarines participating live. LSE also provided the opportunity to assess many of the capabilities and elements of DMO and LOCE/EABO.

LSE included nine Navy Maritime Operations Centers (MOCs) operating as a Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) or as a numbered fleet commander.

The staffs included U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Africa, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Fifth Fleet, Sixth Fleet, Seventh Fleet, and Tenth Fleet. Marine Forces Pacific, Marine Forces Command, and Marine Forces Europe/Africa embedded within their respective JFMCC staffs and served as Deputy JFMCCs during the exercise. While we may see several MOCs participate in a large combatant command-level exercise, LSE is the only exercise that brings together all nine fleet MOCs into one global scenario.

While a majority of the tactical-level exercising we saw in LSE could also be executed in events like a COMPTUEX or FBP, LSE is the only event where participants are given the opportunity to exercise global maritime synchronization at the operational level of warfare.

A major objective of LSE23 was testing concepts like DMO and EABO. How did LSE illustrate the differences between these concepts and how the Navy operated in the past? 

The robust global threat scenario in LSE created an environment that required the participants (live or virtual) to operate using new operational concepts, like DMO and LOCE/EABO. The scenario forced participants to distribute and maneuver their forces while still remaining integrated across all warfare domains.

What was the role of the opposition force in stressing the concepts and servicemembers? How scripted versus free-play were the force-on-force events? 

The exercise control group designed the scenario such that the laydown of the opposition force (OPFOR) created dilemmas not only for the tactical units, but also for the operational staffs (MOCs). The OPFOR laydown challenged the MOCs to globally synchronize their efforts across multiple areas of responsibility. Additionally, the OPFOR team utilized tactics representative of our strategic competitors that required the individual Blue (friendly) tactical units to operate using the concepts of DMO and LOCE/EABO.

LSE utilized a combination of scripted and free-play actions from the OPFOR team. While certain engagements may have been scripted to occur on certain days or in certain time blocks in order to drive exercise objectives, the OPFOR team was free to utilize the tactics required in response to Blue actions. Other engagements were at the discretion of the OPFOR director. 

How would you describe the learning architecture surrounding the event? Whether in terms of feedback loops, analytic frameworks, data capture, or debriefings, how is the Navy gathering and processing the lessons learned? 

LSE was designed to provide real-time feedback during execution, as well as to observe and collect large amounts of data for post-execution assessment. There were over 100 personnel from multiple commands positioned at various locations across the globe to collect on and ultimately assess the exercise.

The Exercise Steering Group (ESG) was led by retired U.S. Navy Admiral Scott Swift, and consisted of four retired admirals and generals. The ESG was tasked to provide real-time feedback to the exercise control group during exercise execution. The ESG observed efforts from Exercise Control at the Naval Warfare Development Center (NWDC) in Norfolk, VA. They also participated in multiple daily video teleconferences (VTCs) with observers/assessors at each of the MOCs. If the ESG saw issues that could affect achievement of exercise objectives, or if they saw opportunities to improve exercise design or execution, they provided that feedback to Exercise Control.

An exercise “hotwash” VTC was conducted at the completion of LSE. The hotwash provided an opportunity for the exercise director, the ESG, higher headquarter role players (11 additional retired admirals and generals led by retired U.S. Navy Admiral James Foggo), and the JFMCC commanders to share their observations and lessons learned of both participant execution and the design of the exercise.

The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) is in the process of analyzing data that they and multiple other observers and assessors collected during execution. Data was collected from direct observation, electronic LVC playback, the hotwash, and the ESG. The CNA after-action report will include recommendations and lessons learned. The recommendations and lessons learned will support multiple feedback loops. Those loops include:

  • Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) updates/development
  • Training syllabus updates
  • Capability gap and future requirements identification in support of future budget requests
  • Exercise design for future LSEs

This is the second iteration of the Large Scale Exercise series, and the next is planned for 2025. How is the Navy linking the LSEs and their lessons learned over the arc of the series?

As mentioned, one of the feedback loops from LSE is the design of the exercise. The planning team took numerous exercise design lessons learned from LSE 2021 and incorporated them into the LSE 2023 design. We are in the process of analyzing initial LSE 2023 lessons learned, and additional lessons learned will be pulled from the final after-action report. The planning team will then determine which of those lessons we can action as we begin LSE 2025 planning in early 2024.

Capt. Chris Narducci is a 1996 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He has completed multiple tours as a P-3C Orion pilot. His additional assignments included action officer with the Joint Staff J6, command of the 33d Flying Training Squadron, Vance AFB, and as navigator on USS Harry S Truman. He has been serving as the LSE lead planner with U.S. Fleet Forces Command since August 2019.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image: ADRIATIC SEA (August 14, 2023) Aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) steams in formation alongside the Blue Ridge-class command and control ship USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20), the flagship of U.S. 6th Fleet. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Mario Coto)

Call for Articles: Short Story Fiction

Stories Due: November 20, 2023
Week Dates: December 4–8, 2023

Story Length: 1,5000-3,000 Words
Submit to: [email protected]

By Dmitry Filipoff

Fiction has long served as a powerful means for exploring hypotheticals and envisioning alternatives. In annual tradition, CIMSEC will be running a series of short stories looking to explore the nature of conflict and competition through fiction. 

Authors can explore the future and flesh out concepts for how potential clashes and warfighting challenges may play out. They can probe the past, and use historical fiction to explore alternative histories. Authors are invited to craft gripping narratives that illuminate the unforeseen and etch realistic detail into today’s visions of future conflict.

Send all submissions to [email protected].

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image: Futuristic warship art generated by Midjourney AI. 

Notes to the New CNO Week Concludes on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

For the past two weeks, CIMSEC featured short articles submitted in response to our Call for Notes to the New CNO. In this special series, authors conveyed their thoughts on what they believe are the most pressing issues for the U.S. Navy’s new top leader, Acting Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti.

Authors recommended new naval strategies and approaches to force design, as well as specific efforts to manage personnel retention issues. Authors also offered recommendations on how the Navy can become a better learning organization and seize opportunities posed by emerging capabilities. The U.S. Navy’s new leadership is confronting myriad challenges that could affect the Navy’s competitiveness for years to come.

The featured authors are listed below, and we thank them for their excellent contributions. This is an independent CIMSEC initiative and is not produced in partnership with any U.S. Navy organization or entity.

The United States Navy Needs an Operational Level of War Strategy to Inform Fleet Design,” by Steve Wills

“Admiral Lisa Franchetti should take the initiative to develop a comprehensive, operational level of war maritime strategy that will determine fleet missions, which will subsequently inform a specific fleet size and force design. Forging a stronger connection between warfighting strategy and force design will remain among the most pressing matters for the leadership of the United States Navy.”

Create a New Doctrine for Applying Learning Strategies to Warfighting Challenges,” by CDR Paul Nickell

“A revised NDP-1 will go beyond teaching warfare principles as an instrument of national power. Indeed, it would provide a timeless model for how to approach complex warfighting challenges with specific learning strategies and campaigns.”

Focus on Culture for Success in the AI Era,” by Harrison Schramm

“Successful AI culture is a departure from Navy norms. Military culture is based around assured success, but compared to aviation or weaponeering, AI requires far more failure before reaching success.”

Dusting Off the Z-Gram: Getting Real with Recruiting and Retention,” by Lt. Sam Strauss

“The traditional benefits of naval service – adventure, camaraderie, leadership experience, stable pay, and robust benefits – no longer match the costs associated with a sea-going career. While this may not be the case for every Sailor, personnel numbers indicate a strong correlation. So what do we do?”

Counter China’s Goal of Displacing American Command of the Sea,” by Robert C. Rubel

“To support its goals, China is creating a navy that it hopes can directly challenge the U.S. Navy for supremacy on the world ocean, something the USSR never aspired to do. The combination of China’s economic and industrial power, and its sweeping global objectives, presents the U.S. with a new and more difficult challenge that previous approaches to security will not properly address.”

Empowering Division Officers and Enhancing Sailor Stability,” by Lt. Upton Wallace

“These two areas of focus – empowering division officers and enhancing sailor stability – are interconnected. A more empowered division officer will better understand and address the unique needs of their sailors, including their need for stability. More content and stable sailors will be more responsive to their officers, creating a more trusting and effective chain of command.”

Revamp Force Design for Sea Control and Joint Integration,” by Commanders Andrew “Kramer” Tenbusch and Trevor “Mrs.” Phillips-Levine

“The Navy needs to divorce itself from its affinity of conceiving capability as a function of traditional naval platforms, such as surface combatants or range-hobbled carrier air wings, and pursue a more holistic concept.”

The Navy Must Rediscover its Roots and Recommit to Small Combatants,” by Victor Sussman

“The Navy must recommit to the vital role of small ships in meeting its obligations. A commitment to smaller combatants offers benefits for naval operations, the supporting industrial base, and for leadership development.”

Capitalize on Allied Capabilities to Succeed at Sea – A View from Spain,” by Gonzalo Vazquez

“With an increasingly complex strategic environment, and a fleet struggling to meet its many operational requirements, the next CNO must strive to find new ways to capitalize on allied naval capabilities to succeed at sea. Prominent options include strengthening naval cooperation with partners to ensure a permanent presence in all strategically relevant theaters, and bolstering the sharing of naval knowledge among allied naval war colleges.”

Rebalance the Fleet Toward Being a Truly Expeditionary Navy,” by Anthony Cowden

“Today we have a forward-based navy, not an expeditionary navy. This distinction is important for remaining competitive against modern threats and guiding force design.”

Organize Campaigns of Learning and Reshape the Defense Analysis Paradigm,” by John Hanley

“Whether it is maintenance and administration, training and education, at-sea exercises, engagement with adversaries and partners (e.g., FONOPS), or creating antifragile naval architectures, if the participants are simply box-checking rather than learning, the effort is falling short. The Navy must be more deliberate about being a learning organization and how it structures its campaigns of learning.”

Empowering Enlisted Sailors: The Imperative for Expanded Educational Opportunities in the U.S. Navy,” by Petty Officer 2nd Class Richard Rodgers

“In the pursuit of maritime superiority, the U.S. Navy must prioritize the education and empowerment of its enlisted Sailors. These dedicated individuals are the backbone of the U.S. Navy, and their success directly contributes to the U.S. Navy’s overall readiness and effectiveness. By reinforcing and expanding educational opportunities for enlisted Sailors, the U.S. Navy can ensure that they become full, active, and informed participants in the mission.”

Get Real Get Better about Digital HR for Sailors,” by Artem Sherbinin and Daniel Stefanus

“Consistent errors in their HR experience, often driven by these unreliable digital HR tools, push many Sailors out of the service. Sailors’ digital HR experience is not a quality of service or quality of life issue. Getting HR digital implementation right is a warfighting and readiness imperative.”

Down Select and Commit To Uncrewed Surface Systems,” by LCDR U.H. (Jack) Rowley (ret.)

“After almost a decade of demonstrating the capabilities of MUSVs, the Navy has been slow to establish programs of record to populate the fleet with these workhorses. The Navy should now shift its efforts from prototyping to serial production, given how these vessels have demonstrated their potential.”

Man The Fleet and Reduce Sailor Exhaustion,” by Capt. John Cordle (ret.)

“In the end, it comes down to setting firm priorities and making the tradeoffs. The best weapons in the world will fall short if they are manned by overworked and exhausted Sailors.”

Sailors Matter Most: Incentivize Education and Cultivate Learning Leaders,” by Sean F. X. Barrett, Mie Augier, and William F. Mullen, III

“All members of the sea services must help maintain and hone their intellectual edge. They must be able to out-think and out-learn any opponent, especially in dynamic and rapidly changing situations. This is their greatest advantage, but it is also perishable. If it is neglected due to other priorities, it will atrophy and wither away.”

Lead the Fight Against Climate Change and Transnational Crime in the Indian Ocean,” by Commander Amila Prasanga, Sri Lankan Navy

“Climate change is transforming the security landscape in the Indian Ocean. It is having a profound impact in fomenting transnational maritime crimes, particularly illegal fishing, human smuggling, drug trafficking, and piracy. Island states are specifically vulnerable to these crimes, which often exploit their maritime boundaries and limited capacity. Recognizing these strategic vulnerabilities and their potential to destabilize the region is paramount.”

Prototype the Bi-Modal Naval Force,” by Shelley Gallup

“The bi-modal fleet structure includes a combination of small, crewed, and autonomous systems working as a networked flotilla. The crewed LMACCs and uncrewed autonomous surface vessels can be built and armed for much lower costs and greater capability than the cost of building one or two more destroyers or frigates. In this systems view, it is the holistic flotilla network that is the capability, rather than the individual platform.”

Improve the Culture and Mechanisms of Naval Learning,” by Commander Art Valeri

“A key contributor to unit success includes the intentional creation of organizational and cultural environments conducive to learning. The ability to learn is arguably the main attribute with the potential to produce warfighting victory.”

Ask the Public for Material Sacrifice to Narrow the Civ-Mil Divide,” by Michael D. Purzycki

Even the people of a famously tax-averse country like the United States might accept financial sacrifice to help the troops. While today’s Americans do not have to sacrifice to nearly the extent the World War II generation did, direct requests for contribution to the armed services could help revive some of the spirit of America’s greatest military triumph.”

Be Mindful of JADC2’s Emission Risks,” by Richard Mosier

The Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept is totally dependent on radiofrequency (RF) communications to connect military assets across the space, air, land, and sea domains. This plethora of RF emissions from U.S. radars, communications systems, data links, and navigation aids presents a lucrative signals intelligence target that could undermine JADC2.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected]

Featured Image: WASHINGTON (Sep. 14, 2023) – Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lisa Franchetti answers questions from members of the Senate Armed Services Committee during her confirmation hearing at the Dirksen Senate Office Building. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Amanda R. Gray)