On behalf of the Center for International Maritime Security, I would like to wish you all a very happy festive season and to thank you for being a member of the CIMSEC community and for your support and contributions this past year. 2022 has witnessed many international maritime security developments and challenges and we hope that you have enjoyed listening to our podcasts and reading our many articles analyzing these events and many other issues.
The team and myself are looking forward to what 2023 will bring as we continue to expand and develop the group. We have lots of exciting projects and developments on the horizon and will continue to engage with professionals, academics, and forward thinkers through our articles, forums, events, podcasts, and other platforms and content.
I would like to close with a personal message of thanks to all our volunteers and officers that willingly give up their time to help make CIMSEC such a great organization. It has been an honor to serve as President this year and I look forward to continuing to lead the group throughout 2023!
Once again we wish you and your families Happy Holidays!
Best Wishes,
Christopher J. Stockdale-Garbutt
President of the Center for International Maritime Security
Featured Image: Port de Grave Boat Lighting festival for Newfoundlanders to celebrate their Christmas. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)
Americans hear about countries such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran on a frequent basis, and for good reason. All have been intertwined in global affairs, politics at home, or both for most of this century so far. But in stark contrast, the United States has treated Latin America with “benign neglect.”1
Although Russia and Iran have exploited Latin America for their purposes and to the United States’ detriment—China’s inroads into the region are among the most significant threats to U.S. national security.2 China’s actions in the region reveal short and long-term plans to become the predominant superpower in the region.3 To do so, China’s influence has sowed its roots in two main areas: military and economic.4 But most importantly, this influence is not superficial—China’s actions seep through all levels of Latin American governments, even down to city halls.5 China is not simply a regional challenge; it is a global challenge as demonstrated in Latin America.6 To ignore Latin America is to ignore the critical inroads being developed by the United States’ chief competitor in its own backyard.
Military Influence
China’s military influence in Latin America is mainly through soft power, not physical presence.7 China has fostered significant military relationships through arms sales, exchange programs, and training engagements.8 China has found a fruitful market for arm’s sales in Latin America; in roughly the last eight years China has sold more than $615 million in weapons to Venezuela.9 Military sales may have started as simply small arms, but China’s expansion in this market now includes “aircraft, armored vehicles, and radars.”10 But these sales are not simply about the equipment; the sale is just the beginning of a relationship. Opportunities for training and maintenance follow each transaction—leading to greater interaction between these countries, their militaries, and China.11 As these deals continue to grow, Chinese personnel and military bases in the region could follow.
China has also made major inroads with Latin American militaries through professional military education (PME) programs and exchange officer programs of significant scale. These programs steep Latin American servicemembers in Chinese military and political doctrine and anti-U.S. sentiment, while creating stronger relationships between the respective country and China.12 To attract military talent to these programs, China has also offered perks to Latin American military personnel. China will pay for business-class travel for exchange students, provide five-star hotels, and pay for other expenses while they live in China.13 Since 2015, China has “trained more Latin American military officers than the United States, and the difference has grown every year since.”14
Venezuela’s Chinese-made, light-armored VN-4 “Rhinoceros” personnel carriers drive 5 March 2014 in a parade commemorating the death of Hugo Chavez in Caracas, Venezuela. (Photo by Xavier Granja Cedeño, Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry)
Recent SOUTHCOM commander Adm. Craig Faller noted in Congressional testimony that China was sending five times as many Latin American military officers to its war colleges compared to the United States.15 According to John Kreul, who was acting deputy secretary of defense for the Western Hemisphere, the feedback on these professional military exchange programs suggested they were “straight up recruitment and propaganda 24/7.”16 Once these personnel are educated in China and establish professional connections with China’s military, the United States may have to be weary of working with these personnel because of the potential operational security risks.17
Chinese Influence—Economic
Economic influence in Latin America is China’s main focus in the region. In 2000, China’s total trade value with Latin America was $12 billion. Today it is roughly $450 billion, and economists predict it could exceed $700 billion within the next 15 years.18 China is South America’s top trading partner and second only to the United States for all of Latin America.19 Underlying this trade is the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s ambitious $1 trillion trade and infrastructure program spanning across the globe.20 One portion of this program is a proposed transcontinental railway that can link South America’s Atlantic and Pacific coasts from Brazil to Chile.21
As it does elsewhere, trade naturally builds relationships and influence in the countries China builds in.22 China can then use its powerful economic leverage in pursuit of political goals, such as persuading regional countries to withhold recognition of Taiwan—which it has.23
China also engages in debt-trap diplomacy. Through deceptive trade and loan practices, China can manipulate and coerce countries that are unable to repay their loans.24 For example, China uses contractual language that allows it to cancel and demand repayment on one loan when a country defaults on a separate loan from a “different lender,” which is unusual for government loans.25 These contracts also allow China to cancel the loan if the “debtor country undertakes policy changes adverse” to China’s preferences.26
Loans from China have penetrated significant sectors of Latin America, including energy and mineral sectors, port infrastructure, and telecommunications.27 China is also willing to offer cheaper credit even to countries with poor track records of paying off debt, raising the likelihood that Latin American countries choose Chinese loans over competing loans from other countries.28 And with the acute economic and domestic pressures in the region, many developing countries may not effectively consider the long-term consequences that may stem from these loans.29
China has used these practices around the globe. Similar contracts forced Sri Lanka to hand over a major port to Beijing in 2017 when it could not pay off its debts.30 There is also concern that countries with Chinese debt could be pressured into denying support to U.S. forces, including logistical infrastructure, staging areas, and ports.31 In fact, China has loans attached to “three [of the] largest projects of port construction by cost” in Latin America.32
China’s focus and investment in telecommunication technologies in Latin America poses a major issue, too. Chinese companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, have created networks for governments and private sector telecommunications companies, while integrating local government staffs with Chinese personnel who have ties to the Chinese government.33 These companies are willing to accept lower profits for greater access in Latin America because of the access it provides the Chinese government and vice versa.34
To be sure, these countries do receive the benefit of modern technology and creating networks that can reach underserved rural citizens. However, China may use this new infrastructure to surveil and undermine Latin American citizens and apply its authoritarian philosophies on personal privacy against populations outside of China.35 Indeed, one nation has asked the United States “for assistance in disassembling and disinvesting in the Huawei Smart City program because of excessive Chinese monitoring.”36 But the more Latin American governments adopt this technology, the more difficult it will be for the United States to engage with them on national security issues.37
Conclusion
Latin America is critical to U.S. national security and great power competition. Not only is it the geographic neighbor of the U.S., but the U.S. also has strong economic, political, and cultural ties to the region. According to the White House’s recently released National Security Strategy, the “Western Hemisphere directly impacts the United States more than any other region,” which is predominately Latin America.38 But China is in Latin America to pursue long-term interests, and to ignore this reality threatens the stability of the region and the United States.
The Middle East has attracted most of the United States’ attention for the past two decades. Now, Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific have its attention. But the chief competitors in those regions are moving in next door. The muscular policies and military engagements that have been the hallmark of recent U.S. operations in the Middle East will not effectively compete in Latin America. The U.S. must use multifaceted soft power to combat China’s influence for the purposes of ensuring strong democratic governments and stability in the region.
Captain Steven Arango is a deputy staff judge advocate at Training and Education Command and currently working toward his LL.M. in national security and cybersecurity from the George Washington University School of Law. He was selected as a Regional Affairs Officer for Latin America. Prior to his time on active duty, Steven worked for the U.S. House of Representatives, the Department of Defense in the Office of General Counsel, International Affairs, and served as a federal law clerk for U.S. District Judge Fernando Rodriguez, who presides on the southern border.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Featured Image: Army commander of the Lanzhou Military Region of China Liu Yuejun shakes hands with Venezuelan defense minister Gen. Vladimir Padrino 17 April 2015 during a visit in Caracas, Venezuela. (Photo by Boris Vergara/Xinhua/Alamy Live News)
Canada has been conducting annual Pacific deployments of strategic import, including Westploy in 2016, Operation Poseidon Cutlass in 2017, and Operation Projection since 2018. These deployments highlight increasing Canadian naval presence and naval exercising with other China-concerned partners in the region. The particularly successful Operation Projection of 2022 has complemented Canada’s recently-released Indo-Pacific Strategy and its maritime provisions for the future.
Canada’s deployments use five Halifax-class frigates based at Maritime Forces Pacific headquartered at Esquimalt, British Columbia. Commissioned in the 1990s and later modernized in the 2010s, these general-purpose warships are mission tailored for anti-submarine warfare. Their deployments schedule is listed below:
2022: HMCS Vancouver and HMCS Winnipeg, August–December
In addition, three Victoria-class hunter-killer submarines (HMCSs Victoria, Corner Brook, and Chicoutimi) are also based at Esquimalt. The ships are of 1990’s provenance and not far off end of service, with troubled maintenance issues during the last decade. However, extension of service could be extended into the 2030s under the Victoria-Class Modernization Project. By nature, submarine deployments are secretive, literally below the waves.
Purpose
Westploy’s regional context is identified in the Canadian Navy release in 2016 of Leadmark 2050: Canada in a New Maritime World. The document emphasized the “growing importance of the Indian Ocean,” and presciently stated, “the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean is likely to be exceeded only by the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific” (p. 6). The document states that Canada needs to “project Canadian power to shape, and when necessary, restore order to the global system” (p. 12) through “a blue water navy, globally deployable and forward postured” (p. 57). Whether such Canadian assets on their own were enough to restore order is a moot question.
The Defence Departmentannouncement for Operation Poseidon Cutlass in 2017 stated, “this near six-month deployment of multiple warships signals the strategic importance of the Indo-Asia Pacific region to Canada and reinforces Canada’s commitment to the maintenance of regional peace and security” in that region. This indicated a shift from previous strategic terminology of the “Asia-Pacific” and brought in India and the Indian Ocean. The result in a general sense sought to “foster friendships, and ultimately trust,” which raises the questions of with whom and about whom?
A key rationale was presence: “importantly, warship deployments such as this also place sea-based capability ‘in-region,’ where it can provide options for the Government of Canada should a timely Canadian response be necessary.” This begs the question of responding to whom? Jeff Hutchinson, Commanding Officer of HMCS Winnipeg was “enthusiastic about the Royal Canadian Navy’s ‘generate forward’ concept” and “the opportunity for HMCSs Winnipeg and Ottawa to strengthen our partnerships with Indo-Asia Pacific nations.” This raised the question of which naval partnerships Canada was strengthening, once again in resonance with the question of with whom and where?
As Canada’s Operation Projection commenced in 2018, the Canadian Defence Departmentused similar rationales, “these deployments are tangible proof of Canada’s determination to have a persistent maritime presence, and to enhance Canada’s network of defense partnerships in the region.” Tony Williams, the Public Affairs Officer of HMCS Vancouver stated, “the mission will also demonstrate the Canadian Armed Force’s ability to project naval influence.” The rhetoric surrounding the 2022 Operation Projection was pointed. General Wayne Eyre, Chief of Defence Staff announced that the deployment “is a visible display of our continued commitment toward protecting regional security and maintaining a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific.” Anita Anand the Minister of National Defence stressed “the importance of the Indo-Pacific region to global stability and prosperity” whereby “through contributions like Operation Projection and Operation Neon, Canada will continue to work with allies and partners to bolster the rules-based international order in the region.”
Exercises
Pacific deployment patterns demonstrate modest Canadian unilateral outreach but exercising with other powers demonstrates some significant security convergences. Canada has participated in the U.S. led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) biannual exercises ever since they started in 1971. In addition, since 2016, Canada’s frigates participated in various new bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral naval exercise formats, alongside powerful allied contributions, and often with China tacitly in mind.
In the 2016 Westploy operation, having maintained Canadian participation in RIMPAC, HMCS Vancouver initiated participation in Australia’s Kakadu exercise. This included navies from Australia, Fiji, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Timor Leste, Tonga, U.S., and Vietnam. Vancouver activities included replenishment by the Australian tanker HMAS Success.
New exercise networks were added with Operation Poseidon Cutlass in 2017. HMCS Ottawa and HMCS Winnipeg conducted underwater, surface, and air warfare exercises with Australia’s frigate, HMAS Ballarat, in the South China Sea in April. A demonstration of Canada’s first bilateral exercise in these waters, wrought with excessive maritime claims by the People’s Republic of China. En route to Singapore, Ottawa operated with a French frigate, FNS Prairial, in the Malacca Strait. In May, Ottawa led a South Korean destroyer, ROKS Dae Jo Yeong, a Filipino offshore patrol boat, BRP Gregorio Del Pilar, a French frigate, FNS Prairial, and a U.S. destroyer, USS Sterett, in maneuvering and communication drills within the Singapore-organized Weapons Multilateral Sea Exercise (WMSX) in the South China Sea. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) organized this exercise and Canada has been an original member since its inception in 1988.
Next, Ottawa and Winnipeg participated in Pacific Guardian 17 – a new four-way multilateral exercise in the East China Sea in June, alongside a Japanese destroyer, JS Inazuma, a New Zealand frigate, RNZN Te Kaha, and a U.S. cargo ship, USS Wally Schirra. Winnipeg and Ottawa then carried out underwater, surface, air, and electronic warfare defense drills in late June with South Korean destroyers, ROKN Gang Gam Chan and ROKN YulgokYiOne. Winnipeg and Vancouver also participated in Kaedex (“Maple”) exercises during July of 2022 with Japanese destroyers, JS Umigiri and JS Abukama, in the Sea of Japan. After the Canadian frigates returned to base by August, HMCS Chicoutimi, a submarine, commenced a 197-day deployment from Esquimalt the next month in September via Pearl Harbor and Guam to Yokosuka and Sasebo in Japan – a first time public deployment there.
In 2018, Operation Projection served as the steppingstone for further and more frequent combined exercises. HMCS Vancouver participated in RIMPAC; later in the year HMS Calgary again participated in the previously mentioned Australian-led Kakadu exercise and the Kaedex exercise with Japan. Beyond this, Calgary initiated Operation Neon, which monitored UN sanctions against North Korea in the East China Sea. The Calgary then joined in, for the first time, the Keen Sword exercises involving extended anti-submarine drills with the U.S. and Japan to include: the aircraft carrier, USS Ronald Reagan and Japanese helicopter carrier JS Hyuga.
The 2019 Operation Projection deployment consisted of two phases, carried out by HMCS Regina and then HMCS Ottawa. Both performed Operation Neon duties in the East China Sea, both transited the Taiwan Strait, and both carried out Kaedex exercises with Japan. However, in a new setting, the Regina carried out Kaedex exercises in June with the Japanese Indo-Pacific Deployment group comprised of a helicopter carrier, JS Izumo, accompanied by her two Japanese destroyers, JS Akebono and JS Mursame, by Cam Rahn Bay, Vietnam. Ottawa carried out Kaedex exercise in October with two Japanese destroyers, JS Chokai and JS Shimakaze, off Yokosuka, Japan. In another new development, Regina initiated Canadian participation in the biannual U.S.-Australia Talisman Sabre 19 exercise, held in July off Queensland. She sailed alongside the U.S. Ronald Reagan Carrier Group and Australia’s helicopter dock ship HMAS Canberra.
In turn, Ottawa also initiated Canadian participation in the second Pacific Vanguard exercise off Guam (first held the previous May) in November. The Ottawa sailed alongside Australian, United States, and South Korean ships to include Australian destroyer, HMAS Hobart, Australian frigates, HMAS Parramatta and HMAS Stuart, a submarine, a South Korean destroyer, ROKS Choi Young, and U.S. cruiser, USS Chancellorsville. The Ottawa continued to push Canadian involvement in multinational exercises and initiated Canadian participation in the Japanese-led Annualex 19 exercise, alongside an Australian frigate, HMAS Parramatta, Japanese destroyer, JS Shiranui, and U.S. destroyer, USS Milius in the Philippine Sea.
Despite the scaled back itinerary in 2020 Operation Projection due to Covid, HMCS Winnipeg joined HMCS Regina for the Rimpac exercises. As Regina returned to Esquimalt, Winnipeg deployed further westwards and participated in Operation Keen Sword, alongside the Japanese (Escort Flotillas 1 and 4) and U.S. (Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group) navies in October through November near Japan.
PEARL HARBOR (June 28, 2022) – Onlookers hold up Canadian flags as Royal Canadian Navy frigate HMCS Vancouver (FFH 331) arrives at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam to participate in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2022, June 28. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Maria G. Llanos)
The following year the 2021 itinerary, though still affected by Covid restrictions, became more robust and introduced new exercise formats. After carrying out Operation Artemis anti-narcotics operations in the Arabian Sea and visiting the combined UK/US base at Diego Garcia, HMCS Calgary exercised in another trilateral format with a Japanese destroyer, JS Akebono, and Australian frigate, HMAS Anzac, in the East Indian Ocean, off Sumatra in April. Calgary then participated in a bilateral U.S.-Australian exercise, Talisman Sabre, held in Queensland in July. The Calgary participated in air and anti-submarine drills alongside an Australian frigate, HMAS Parramatta, a Japanese destroyer, JS Makinanmin, and a South Korean destroyer, ROKS Wang Geon.
As the Calgary returned to Esquimalt, HMCS Winnipeg took up the baton. Moving westwards, in September, the Winnipeg joined the new format and participated in Pacific Crown 21-3, operating alongside the U.K. (HMS Queen Elizabeth) and Japanese (JS Ise) carrier groups in the Sea of Japan. Again, in another new format, Winnipeg participated in a powerful three-way carrier operation in the Philippine Sea at the start of October. This three-way carrier operation involved the U.S. (USS Ronald Reagan, USS Carl Vinson), Japanese (JS Ise), and U.K. (HMS Queen Elizabeth) carrier groups. A New Zealand frigate, HMNZS Te Kaha, helped escort the combined carrier strike group as well. Winnipeg then sailed through the Taiwan Strait, with U.S. destroyer, USS Dewey, in mid-October. Afterwards in the Philippine Sea in late November, Winnipeg participated in Annualex 21 where she sailed alongside an Australian destroyer, HMAS Brisbane, an Australian frigate, HMAS Warramunga, a German frigate, FGS Bayern, Japanese Escort Flotilla 1, and U.S. Carl Vinson Carrier Group 1.
The recent 2022 Canadian deployment saw further continuity and change. In terms of continuity, HMCS Winnipeg and HMCS Vancouver participated in the RIMPAC exercises off Hawaii. Both vessels also participated in the powerful Keen Sword exercises in Japanese waters, alongside Japanese (20 ships) and the U.S. (10 ships) warships from 10–19 November. Australia (1 ship) and the UK (1 ship) also participated in this exercise as well. Earlier, Vancouver participated in the Pacific Vanguard exercise in the waters off Guam in late-August, alongside the Japanese Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD) group (helicopter carrier JS Izumo, destroyer JS Takanami, and submarine JS Takashio), South Korean destroyers (ROKN Sejong the Great and ROKN Munmu the Great), Australia frigates (HMAS Sydney and HMAS Perth) and a U.S. destroyer (USS Barry). The Vancouver accompanied another U.S. destroyer, the USS Higgins, through the Taiwan Strait on 20 September.
The Royal Canadian Navy Halifax-class frigate HMCS Vancouver transits the Taiwan Strait with guided-missile destroyer USS Higgins while conducting a routine transit. Higgins is forward-deployed to the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Donavan K. Patubo/US Navy)
Regarding further changes, new developments in the 2022 deployment consisted of participation by HMCS Vancouver in the U.S.-led Pacific Dragon 2022 missile defense exercise held off Hawaii from 8–14 August. Ships serving alongside Vancouver included an Australian frigate, HMAS Sydney, Japanese destroyer, JS Haguro, South Korean destroyer, ROKS Serjong the Great, and U.S. destroyers, USS Fitzgerald and USS William P. Lawrence. Vancouver participated in a trilateral exercise, Noble Raven 22, another new trilateral format, in the Philippine Sea from 30 August to 7 September. Ships serving alongside included the U.S. destroyer, USS Higgins, Japanese Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD) group, Japanese helicopter carrier, JS Izumo, and Japanese destroyer, JS Takanami. Winnipeg and Vancouver participated in further exercises in the Philippine Sea with the U.S. Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group, a U.S. amphibious warship, USS New Orleans, and Japanese destroyer, JS Kirisame, at the start of November.
The Canadian ships also participated in other iterative exercises in the South China Sea. Winnipeg participated in the Noble Raven 22-2 in the South China Sea from 23 September 23 to 1 October. Winnipeg participated alongside a U.S. destroyer, USS Higgins, a Japan’s Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD) group, helicopter carrier, JS Izumo, destroyer JS Takanami and submarine JS Takashio. The Winnipeg conducted a fuel specific replenishment at sea from the helicopter carrier JS Izumo. This event operationalized the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed between Canada and Japan in 2018.
Further bilateral exercises were carried out in the South China Sea by the Vancouver with the U.S. destroyer USS Higgins on 18 September followed by the Winnipeg on October 2. From 4–8 October, HMCS Winnipeg joined Australian destroyer, HMAS Hobart, Australian frigate, HMAS Arunta, Japanese destroyers, JS Suzutsuki and JS Kirisame, and U.S. destroyers USS Milius and USS Higgins in Noble Mist, where ships practiced surface, subsurface and air defense exercising. It marked the first time this Australia-Canada-Japan-U.S. format has exercised together in the South China Sea.
October 3, 2022 – Canadian frigate HMCS Winnipeg conducts a replenishment at sea with JS Izumo during an exercise. (JMSDF Photo)
People’s Republic of China Reaction (PRC)
Canadian relations with PRC have deteriorated in recent years. Canada made friendly port calls in 2017 to Shanghai and then in 2018 to Hong Kong. There have been no further ports calls to China since 2019 or afterwards. This change in port deployments reflects the post-2018 deterioration in Canadian-PRC relations catalyzed by the detention of the Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou and immediate counter arrest by the PRC of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig in December 2018. However, even without these catalyzing events, PRC-Canadian relations eroded due to larger and less tangible issues to include Canadian human rights criticisms of the PRC policy in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, as well as wider issues and concerns over the demonstrated PRC entanglement in G5 technology.
Canadian participation has grown in naval exercises that Beijing sees as anti-PRC. The PRC criticizedthe participation of HMCS Winnipeg in Annualex 2021, held in the Philippine Sea in late November, alongside Australian, German, Japanese and U.S. ships. The PRC also denouncedSea Dragon 22 anti-submarine drills around Guam in January 2022, where a Canadian CP-140 maritime patrol aircraft participated. Canadian Foreign Office criticism in July 2021 of “China’s escalatory and destabilizing actions in the East and South China Seas,” was immediately denounced by the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa. The PRC is further irritated by Canada’s increasing deployments into these waters. PRC criticisms over Canadian “provocative acts” by Winnipeg’s transit through the Taiwan Strait alongside U.S. destroyer, USS Dewey, in October 2021 were repeated with Chinese denunciations of another “provocative move.” A year later, HMCS Vancouver transited the Taiwan Strait alongside U.S. destroyer, USS Higgins, in September 2022.
Though Canada has not yet carried out any freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea (Taiwan strait transits are geographically confined to the East China Sea), Canadian unilateral and multinational exercises in the South China Sea remain a pressing concern for Beijing. These Canadian activities have increased in frequency and demonstrated by Ottawa’s and Winnipeg’s previous exercises in the South China Sea in 2016 with the Australian navy (HMAS Ballarat); then Regina’s exercises with Japan’s Indo-Pacific Deployment carrier group off Cam Rahn Bay in 2019. Recently in 2022, Vancouver and then Winnipeg separately participated in exercises in the South China Sea with U.S. destroyer, USS Higgins. Winnipeg stayed in these waters to participate in the Noble Raven 22-2 exercise with Japanese and U.S. warships followed by Noble Mist 22 exercise where the Winnipeg sailed alongside warships from Australia, Japan, and the U.S.
India and the Indian Ocean
Although the Canadian Navy now uses “Indo-Pacific” terminology for its operations, Canada has not really expanded its previous Asia-Pacific (i.e., the Pacific and South China Sea) focus into the Indian Ocean. Moreover, whereas active involvement has been seen with French, Australian, Japanese, South Korean, U.K., and U.S. naval forces in various exercise formats, there have been no similar military exercises with India.
In 2017, HMCS Winnipeg’s sojourn into the Indian Ocean consisted of a quick friendly port call over from Port Klang to Sri Lanka and Mumbai with no bilateral exercises followed by a hasty return to the South China Sea. There is coolness in Canada-India relations, in part hampered by Sikh pro-Khalistan currents in Canada. This makes Canada’s invocation of the Indo-Pacific skewed, as it remains focused on the “Pacific” part rather than the “Indo” part. Geography further compounds this political distancing from India and the Indian Ocean. Situated on the far Pacific Rim, India and the Indian Ocean are even further than the South and East China Sea from the Canadian Pacific shores. The “tyranny of distance” is even further complicated for Canadian projection into the Indian Ocean.
For Canada, the western Indian Ocean is more accessible from Canada’s Atlantic than from its Pacific. For example, Mumbai is 11,660 km from Canada’s Atlantic headquarters in Halifax, Nova Scotia but 12,328 km from Canada’s Pacific headquarters at Esquimalt, British Columbia.
Looking forward
On 5 December, Defense Minister Anita Anand welcomed home HMCSs Vancouver and Winnipeg back to Esquimalt. By then, Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (denounced by the PRC Foreign Ministry) promulgated by the government on 27 November robustly criticized China and also identified the need for “increasing the number of frigates deployed on Operation Projection, to protect navigation and overflight rights in the East and South China Seas.” Simultaneously, Anandannounced a C$369.4 million package for 2022–2026 “to increase our naval presence in the region”; whereby annually two frigates from Esquimalt would be joined by a third frigate from Halifax, for “boosting our presence, particularly in the Indian Ocean.” A further C$48.7 million was also allocated to increase Canadian military participation in regional exercises and to bolster military cooperation with Indo-Pacific countries.
A modest but increased Canadian naval presence is projected for the Indo-Pacific, but there are some deployment and partnership issues to keep an eye on. With regard to operations, amid rising pressure by China over Taiwan, will Canada carry out its stated aim to maintain and indeed increase its transit operations in the Taiwan Strait? Will Canada move from general exercising with other partners in the South China Sea, to carry out specific Freedom of Navigation Exercises (FONOPs) in the South China Sea around Chinese holdings? With regard to strategic partners, Canada’s strengthening naval cooperation with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. is set to continue, but how far can Canada overcome political frictions over the Khalistan issue to develop impactful and meaningful naval cooperation with India? An omission from current Canadian operations and strategy is naval cooperation with France in the Pacific and Indian Ocean. There is no obvious reason why this should not develop in the Indo-Pacific between these two NATO partners, but will it? Canada is clearly seeking a greater role in the Indo-Pacific, and the evolving nature of its operations and partnerships will merit close observation.
Dr. David Scott is an associate member of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies. He is a prolific writeron Indo-Pacific maritime geopolitics and can be contacted at[email protected].
Featured Image: HMCS Winnipeg, along with HNLMS Evertsen and RFA Tidespring, are shown in formation on Sept. 9 during Exercise Pacific Crown. (UK MOD Crown)
Happy holidays Shipmates! We’ve have put our heads together for our third annual Holiday Reading List. Below you’ll find a selection of books that we’ve read and enjoyed over the last year and some that we plan on enjoying in the future (and that we think you might enjoy, too). And of course, it should come as no surprise that we’ve interviewed more than a few of the authors we have recommended. Enjoy, and happy holidays from the CIMSEC team to all our readers and listeners!
The book that started it all, Freaks of a Feather led me down a rabbit hole of memoirs written by Marines. Tellessen, a Marine Corps machine gunner and the alleged only Marine to ever carry a .50-cal receiver the full 20 kilometers during the final hike at the School of Infantry, tells the story of his time in the Marine Corps. He was deployed twice to Iraq and saw significant combat during his first deployment. Tellessen’s relaxed tone and honesty make for an interesting read that grapples with the trials of combat, and its long-term impacts on the individual.
My favorite read this year, Guns Up! follows Johnnie Clark, a Marine Corps machine gunner in the famed 5th Marine Regiment, through the Tet Offensive in Vietnam. The book is a gripping testament to the courage, dedication, and grit displayed by Clark and his fellow Marines during the Tet Offensive – I could hardly put it down when I was reading it!
A Marine Corps and American Classic, With The Old Breed puts you in the shoes of E.B. Sledge aka “Sledgehammer” through his time in the Pacific during the Second World War. Sledgehammer served as a mortarman in the 5th Marine regiment. He chronicles the heroism, bravery, and sacrifice shown by Marines fighting in the Pacific, and the horrors and ravaging effects of war through his experiences at Peleliu and Okinawa.
If you are looking for a book on leadership in the military, look no further. 19 Stars documents the “military character and leadership” of generals George S. Patton, Jr., Dwight D. Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, and George C. Marshall. The book is informative and provides the reader with excellent templates on how to lead themselves.
Very excited to read this book given how recent the US withdrawal from Afghanistan occurred. Ackerman is a retired Marine and former CIA paramilitary officer who spent considerable time deployed to Afghanistan. He also played a significant role in the evacuation of Afghan nationals who helped the Coalition in Afghanistan. In the book, Ackerman documents this and other events that occurred in the week leading up to the U.S. withdrawal. The first part of the book sucked me right in – can’t wait to read the rest! Ackerman talked to us for Sea Control 247 about his recent book War in 2034.
This much-anticipated Kickstarter project is the author’s second book. Written to honor the crews of the Coast Guard’s most famous ships by connecting their efforts in a long blue line, this effort reflects on just how significant (and often overlooked) an impact each ship can have over the span of their operational service. Illustrated with the plucky sort of self-effacing humor that has endeared the author to Coasties everywhere, this book is nonetheless an extensively researched and smartly assembled account of relatable events given historical context. You won’t want to miss it, and we simply must have the author on the podcast once he or she is ready for a book tour!
This 2022 refresh to the highly regarded original has been well0received by maritime security professionals everywhere. Chock full of case studies and practical content, this is an excellent reference written by experts in their craft. Check out CIMSEC Sea Control Episode 293 to hear from Dr. Kessler and Dr. Diane Zorri on cyber threats and chokepoints.
Recommended to me by an academic well-versed in both engineering and legal disciplines, this New York Times Best-Seller is a journalist’s account of how a single conversation overheard by chance led her down a winding path of intrigue and strategic competition. This book promises to be an interesting read, and to give context to how we have arrived in an era of modern ‘bug bounty’ programs.
This book is a fictional account an Information Technology employee at a big business. You might not think this is for you at first blush, but it was recommended to me when asked IT professionals for a case study on successful ‘steering the boat’ of an enterprise’s security architecture to head in a new direction. If you’d like a pragmatic solution which gives you hope for your own organization’s security architecture challenges, you might want to read this book. Not to be confused with The Phoenix Program.
Recommended to me by a geopolitical analyst as “the best book for understanding Russia’s history of punishing Ukraine, and why Ukraine is fighting so hard to push them back.” An Economist best book of the year.
Walker Mills Sea Control Co-Host
CIMSEC Senior Editor
After starting with Kaplan’s book Monsoon about the Indian Ocean before a trip to Sri Lanka, I have become a huge fan of Kaplan’s style and read several more of his books. Kaplan’s blend of travel writing and geopolitical analysis make his work easy reading but leave the reader with lasting impressions of foreign lands. Asia’s Cauldron (2014) is just old enough to be prescient and a great place to start for anyone interested in learning more about the complex South China Sea region.
Zeihan is a self-professed geopolitical strategist and bestselling author. He writes in an easy-to-read bordering on flippant style that mask a barrage of data that will challenge your preconceptions on economics, geography, security and great power competition. While I didn’t love the style or agree with all of Zeihan’s conclusions, I have spent more time thinking about this book than any other I have read in the past year.
After having reread this book for a class at the Naval Postgraduate School, I am again recommending it to everyone I can. Originally written in the 1980s, it is not ground breaking historical research (Adam Tooze’s magisterial Wages of Destruction would be a better bet for that), but it makes abundantly clear the importance of energy, particularly oil, to military operations. Russian logistical incompetence during the initial stage of their invasion of Ukraine make clear how relevant Oil & War remains, and a reprint from Marine Corps University means you can download it for free.
After spending the last three years living and working in Colombia, this is one of the best books about the country that I have read. It comes from an unusual source, Wade Davis is a Canadian who fell in love with the country as a student, but sometimes it takes an outside to truly understand and convey the essence of a place. The book is really an explanation of modern Colombia with the narrative following the Magdalena River from its source in Central Colombia to the Caribbean – passing not only through the stunning landscape of Colombia and it’s rich history, but also all of the strife, conflict, and tragedy that have shaped the country over the last 500 years.
Adriatic is Kaplan’s most recent book (2022) and it is part travelogue and part memoir, with a healthy dose of Kaplan’s reminisces about the region. After enjoying several of his other books like Balkan Ghosts, Asia’s Cauldron, and Monsoon, I can’t wait to tear into his newest work and I’m stoked that it’s centered around a body of water.
Victory at Sea is one of those books that I’ve heard so much about but have not been able to read yet. I just picked up a copy and I’ve already take some time to look at the beautiful illustrations by Ian Marshall. If you want a teaser or a recap, we did a great episode with Dr. Kennedy about his book for Sea Control 378.
My wife started laughing the instant I took this book out of its packaging: “This is literally all of your interests in a single book.” She was correct and you can listen to the podcast we did with Tracey, Sea Control 340, is great. It’s as much a scrapbook as it is a book, including beautiful maritime art, pictures of Tracey’s own finds, and poetry. There are also informative sections on the long-term impact of plastic on our oceans.
Dr. Berube is one of the most vocal CIMSEC supporters and a phenomenal Sea Control guest, but that’s not why his book is here. He’s used the book to produce a study of the U.S. Navy in the 1830s, a period overshadowed by the War of 1812 and American Civil War. There’s a particular focus on Andrew Jackson’s relationship with the Navy, technical developments and the intellectual growth of the Navy’s officer corps.
“I went looking for adventure, and instead I found insurance,” was how Dr. Hannah Farber explained her research for this book when she joined us on Sea Control 380. The extent to which marine insurance impacts international trade and economic relationships has become more obvious as a result of the invasion of Ukraine and subsequent negotiations over Black Sea grain, but before that it played a critical role in the birth of the United States.
You’re going to approach this book expecting a lot of pictures of cats on ships, and you won’t be disappointed. But amongst all the stills of cats lounging in adorable hammocks, there’s a lot of information packed in: the reason cats started going to sea, cats as a recruiting tool, superstitions, and more. Coming to a Sea Control episode near you!
A spectacular addition to any children’s book collection. Incredible detailed artwork by the author and great explanations for all sorts of shipboard gear. If you’ve ever struggled to explain to a younger relative what it’s like to go to sea, this book will help start a conversation with some immersive visual aids.
Sebastian is going to read this and shoot me a note written with the tone a disappointed grandfather would use when addressing his grandson who broke a garage window. I will get to it and it looks excellent! One other great benefit to this book: because it’s published by Marine Corps University Press, it’s free! Click that hyperlink. The whole thing is there! Sebastian has beena repeat guest on the Sea Control podcast.
This book is about the epistemic crisis in our public life. “How we know what we know.” How our shared social knowledge matters. And how our institutions matter. Writing in clear, easy prose, Rauch makes a strong case for both defending democracy and not losing touch with reality (it never works out well, he writes). I came away feeling armed, at least in my mind, for modern information warfare.
Wartime learning and adaptation is a convoluted but necessary business. Militaries need to do their absolute best to properly understand and adapt to future war in peacetime, but many concepts and capabilities will break in the naturally unforeseen chaos of conflict. Institutions must be well-designed to translate combat lessons into rapid military reform in the midst of pressing combat operations. Michael Hunzeker’s Dying to Learn is a gripping analysis of wartime learning in WWI and lays out how the various powers on the Western Front adapted their doctrine and their institutions during the course of great power war. Hunzeker assesses the fundamental building blocks of effective force development, including centralized training, decentralized experimentation, and how leaders properly manage these functions. All modern militaries can benefit greatly from these insights and mitigate the extent to which their warfighting methods will collapse in future combat crucibles. Read CIMSEC’s interview with Hunzeker on Dying to Learn here.
There are plenty of books on the Global War on Terror, yet few if any have systematically attempted to capture the comprehensive impact these conflicts have had on the U.S. military. After having served in civilian national security roles for five different Secretaries of Defense, Mara Karlin is well-positioned to understand how the military has been deeply affected by the Global War on Terror. Karlin interviewed more than 100 individuals for this book, most of whom served as senior general and flag officers during the Global War on Terror. They offered their candid and deeply personal perspectives on the legacies of this conflict. But The Inheritance reveals much more than the personal psychological scars of these wars, which have considerable policy implications. It highlights the fault lines that have emerged between American society and its military, and the military and its civilian masters, which may pose significant consequences for how America will go to war in the future.
Victory at Sea is a brilliant and beautifully illustrated capstone on Kennedy’s classic, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. It traces the rise of the U.S. Navy through the Second World War to unrivaled dominance in the post-war era. The Allure of Battle is a millennium-spanning survey of mostly land wars. Despite their differing scope and focus, both books converge toward a similar compelling thesis: The outcome of war is usually decided by the latent strength and endurance of the belligerents. Novel technologies, innovative tactics, brilliant commanders, and pitched battles are interesting and often exciting, but both books argue persuasively that these factors rarely decide the final outcome of a war. Factors of national power and geography are presented as far more predictive of victory and defeat. Also be sure to check out Sea Control 378 with Dr. Kennedy.
