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Strategic Outlook

Syria: Lord of the Flies

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“The rules!” shouted Ralph. “You’re breaking the rules!”

   “Who cares?”

   Ralph summoned his wits.

   “Because the rules are the only thing we’ve got!”

   But Jack was shouting against him.

   “Bollocks to the rules! We’re strong-we hunt! If there’s a beast, we’ll hunt it down! Well close in and beat and beat and beat-!”

   He gave a wild whoop and leapt down to the pale sand. At once the platform was full of noise and excitement, scramblings, screams and laughter. The assembly shredded away and became a discursive and random scatter from the palms to the water and away along the beach, beyond night-sight. Ralph found his cheek touching the conch and took it from Piggy.

   “What’s grownups going to say?” cried Piggy again. “Look at ‘em!”

   The sound of mock hunting, hysterical laughter and real terror came from the beach.

   “Blow the conch, Ralph.”

   Piggy was so close that Ralph could see the glint of his one glass.

   “There’s the fire. Can’t they see?”

   “You got to be tough now. Make ‘em do what you want.”

   Ralph answered in the cautious voice of one who rehearses a theorem.

   “If I blow the conch and they don’t come back; then we’ve had it. We shan’t keep the fire going. We’ll be like animals. We’ll never be rescued.”

From the Suez Crisis to Libya, the United States has held the Conch. Whether America has been early or late, right or wrong, both enemy and ally have heeded America’s call to tend to the fires of security, stability, and justice. Syria has indeed broken the rules and run off in a fit of mayhem. However, we should be wary of blowing the Conch in Syria if we are unwilling to exceed half-steps; we risk undermining our own military/political credibility and revealing the thinning nature of our global leadership.

Fire for Effect

lordoftheflies61If the Conch is to have any authority, it must have a very clear effect. In Lord of the Flies, Ralph knows well that if the Conch is blown and no one comes, it loses its authority.

When asked by Senator Robert Corker (R-Tenn) what our military operations were seeking, the answer from General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) was also that of the at-large observers of U.S. policy: “I can’t answer that, what we’re seeking.” To be fair to the CJCS, at multiple points he, DoD Secretary Chuck Hagel, and DoS Secretary John Kerry state that the U.S.’s goal is to degrade and deter the Assad regime’s ability to deploy chemical weapons. That said, there was a continuing disconnect between the stated goal of overall U.S. strategy and the stated goal of the strikes and a disconcerting attempt to disconnect the two. Senator Ron Johnson (R-WI) brought up, and was affirmed by Secretary Kerry, that the administration’s overall goal is aiding the opposition. However, it was clearly noted that the strikes were to be separated from that goal; “The action, if it is authorized… that the consequence of degrading his chemical capacity inevitably will also have downstream impact on his military capacity” (Secretary Kerry) but not in such a way as to significantly shift the balance of the conflict. That conflict being Assad’s main concern, if we don’t mount a larger threat than the opposition, the conch becomes mere background noise.

It is a confusing and round-about series of objectives we are laying out for ourselves, talking about “tailored” strikes in a very un-tailored conflict towards goals disassociated with the main thrust of U.S. policy towards targets not directly associated with the WMD operations we’re concerned about. Overall, the entire enterprise seems to be a muddle. The U.S. will likely avoid striking the actual chemical weapons because of concerns that we’ll inadvertently release those weapons into populated areas where depots are located. The way the plan is beginning to shape up to the public, the best way to describe it is a story about Milton Friedman…

“At one of our dinners, Milton recalled traveling to an Asian country in the 1960s and visiting a worksite where a new canal was being built. He was shocked to see that, instead of modern tractors and earth movers, the workers had shovels. He asked why there were so few machines. The government bureaucrat explained: “You don’t understand. This is a jobs program.” To which Milton replied: “Oh, I thought you were trying to build a canal. If it’s jobs you want, then you should give these workers spoons, not shovels.”

-Stephen Moore’s Missing Milton: Who Will Speak for Free Markets?

A middle policy consisting of operations meant to “shake things up” or in the words of Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), “not win” is a waste. It shows that those who use WMD need only survive a tepid response. We have no room for an action program, only results.The US has two real options:

1. Blow Conch, Beat Jack to a Pulp: Commit to a robust response to severely degrade the Assad’s regime’s ability to conduct the war against the opposition, in such a way that the US’s increased involvement is clearly the result of Assad’s WMD use. This is a clear sign to the regime, and to the world, that use of WMD will have severe consequences with severe impacts. It does embroil us further into the conflict and may aid parties we do not wish, but at the very least it has the stated effect of setting a global precedent that use of WMD will not be accepted and will have consequences of consequence.

2. No Strikes, Just Save the Survivors: It’s guilt-inducing and feels unsatisfactory but the conflict is too big and too messy for half measures that might feel judicious. If Assad walks away from a military strike by the world’s last remaining superpower with the continued ability to survive the onslaught of a legion of rebels, how much weaker does the US appear? The world recognizes that both sides are corrupted in the extreme in Syria, and a failure to act against internal use of chemical weapons in a conflict already defined by endless atrocity and will likely not encourage nations to develop WMD as some administration strategists suggest. The Assad regime already found itself looking down a smoking barrel of sanctions and isolation. With pre-existance serving as the only precedent that saves Assad from a strike for merely having weapons, his battle with the US’s enemies serves as his only defense now. No nation would want to pay that protection fee for chemical weapon employment, namely turning their borders into the walls of a blood-soaked charnal house. In that particular case, there is a sad, but real difference set by the precedent by internal atrocities in a no-good-side civil war and the use of chemical weapons on foreign states. The best help the US can provide is to serve in every way it can to aid who have left Syria and those trying to leave.

Saving Grace?

Lord of the Flies ended in death and disaster, as a conflict spiraled wildly out of control. I’ve before voiced my grave concern at the idea of getting involved in Syria, based on the fact there is virtually nothing left of the original moderate “just looking to go to work without getting shot or sent to a secret prison” crowd of normal righteously angry people. During the hearing, Secretary Kerry said:

The opposition has increasingly become more defined by its moderation, more defined by the breadth of its membership and more defined by its adherence to some, you know, democratic process and to an all-inclusive, minority-protecting constitution, which will be broad-based and secular with respect to the future of Syria.

And General Dempsey followed with:

Syria historically has been secular, and the vast majority of Syrians, I believe, want to remain secular. It’s — it’s our judgment that — and the judgment of our good friends who actually know a lot of this in many ways better than we do because it’s their region, their neighborhood — I’m talking about the Saudis, the Emirates, the Qataris, the Turks, the Jordanians — they all believe that if you could have a fairly rapid transition, the secular component of Syria will re-emerge

It’s doubtful the political landscape has changed significantly since AQ funding and foreign fighters began overwhelming reasonable agendas and arsenals, but what a blessing it would be if it has. In the words of General Patton, “Take calculated risks. That is quite different from being rash.” Syria still feels like the latter.

Matt Hipple is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy.  The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity.  They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.

Beans Boots Bullets

Closing the Loop: Boosting Operational Sustainability and Quality of Life through Wastewater Reclamation

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By Lt. j.g. Todd Coursey, USN

This post was inspired by a question on the application for this year’s U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC): “If you had $1 million and 18 months to change the Navy, what would you do, and how would you accomplish it?” We will be running additional innovative ideas in this series in conjunction with the CRIC’s new discussion forum “The Whiteboard.” 

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Ship_pumping_ballast_waterYou’re on deployment in the U.S. 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility (AOR) off the Arabian Peninsula. You’ve been in 90 degree heat most of the afternoon. You just came off watch and as you head to the shower you hear the ship’s 1MC announce, “Water hours – showers secured.”

As some sailors know all too well, volume demand for shipboard water at times exceeds its capacity. The traditional approach to alleviate this problem is to change demand, constraining shipboard personnel to endure limited water use. But there’s another way. Engineering a closed-loop water system to re-use water supplies, leveraging mature civilian industry technologies and academia knowledge, could provide a respite for shipboard personnel and equipment.

Current shipboard practice is to discharge both black water (sewage) and gray water (non-sewage) overboard while operating beyond 3 miles of land, hold black water within 3 nautical miles while diverting gray water overboard, and while in port collect both black and gray to offload to suitable shore facilities.

Instead of diverting gray water overboard, the Navy should treat gray and black water as the two independent systems they are, and close the loop in the sewage-treatment system for reclamation of gray water. This reclaimed water should be used in non-human consumption applications – the water quality to flush a toilet is less stringent than water quality required for drinking water. Recycled, lower quality water can be used as a supplemental cooling medium for refrigerant plants, for topside freshwater wash-downs, bilge cleaning, freshwater ballast tank flushes, and some fire-fighting applications.

Additionally, treating gray and black water as independent systems increases sewage-holding capacity by reducing the introduction of gray water into black water. It also lessens the demand on saltwater/freshwater conversion and potable water systems by diverting it to reclaimed lower quality water for suitable applications. Operationally, reclamation of gray water therefore provides an advantage as the Navy supports a more littoral fleet. By extending water use in restricted discharge areas, the Navy enhances its ability to undertake sustained littoral operations.

To facilitate the reclamation, the Navy should consider using mature industrial technologies such as biomass reactor vessels and membrane filtration systems on gray water for appropriate applications. Recent national (mostly through the Clean Water Act) and international environmental controls have forced cruise ship and transport industries to improve their sewage discharge, and consequently there has been significant development in both bio and membrane technologies to support reclamation of gray water.

The Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), through its Environmental Protection, Safety and Occupational health Division (N45), has a vision for Environmentally Sound Ships of the 21st Century, whereby new-design ships must be able to operate in U.S, international, and foreign waters in compliance with environmental laws and regulations without degradation of mission or quality-of-life. This means that ships must be designed and operated to minimize waste generation and optimize waste management. With a concentrated focus in re-use of gray water and process improvements in treating the sources of effluent sewage, we can improve the quality of life for sailors, and improve worldwide capability and operability.

Lt. j.g. Todd E. Coursey is an Engineering Duty Officer and the project officer aboard USS Porter (DDG 78). Prior tours include USS Ashland (LSD 48) and enlisted tours aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), and Nuclear Field “A” School in Charleston, SC, where he completed his BS degree and was selected for Officer Candidate School (OCS).

Capability Analysis

Has South Korea Lost the East Asian Stealth Race?

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On August 18th South Korea selected Boeing’s F-15SE Silent Eagle as the sole candidate for Phase III of its Fighter eXperimental Project (F-X) over Lockheed Martin’s F-35A and the Eurofighter Typhoon. The decision has drawn vociferous criticism from defense experts who fear the selection of F-15SE may not provide the South Korean military with the sufficient Required Operational Capabilities (ROCs) to counterbalance Japan and China’s acquisition of 5th generation stealth fighters.

In hindsight, Zachary Keck of The Diplomat believes that Republic of Korea’s (ROK)preference for the F-15SE over two other competitors was “unsurprising.” After all, Boeing won the previous two fighter competitions with its F-15-K jet. In 2002 and 2008, South Korea bought a total of 61 F-15K jets from Boeing. South Korea’s predilection for the F-15SE is understandable given its 85% platform compatibility with the existing F-15Ks.

The ROK Air Force has 60 F-15K Slam Eagles in service with its 11th Fighter Wing based in Taegu.

However, the most convincing explanation seems to be the fear of “structural disarmament” of the ROK Air Force should it choose to buy yet another batch of expensive fighters to replace the aging F-4 Phantom and F-5 Tiger fighters. Simply stated, the more advanced the fighter jet, the more costly it is. The more expensive the jet, the fewer the South Korean military can purchase. The fewer stealth fighters purchased, the smaller the ROK Air Force.

Indeed, the limitations of South Korea’s US$7.43 billion budget for fighter acquisition and procurement (A & P) seems to have been the primary motivating factor in selecting the F-15SE. As Soon-ho Lee warned last month, “if the F-X project is pursued as planned, the ROK Air Force may have to scrap the contentious Korean Fighter eXperimental (KFX) project, which [may leave] the ROK Air Force [with] only around 200 fighters.”

The F-15SE enjoyed an undeniable price advantage in competition with the F-35A. Though the F-15SE does not actually exist yet, the New Pacific Institute estimates by looking at previous F-15 K sticker pricesthat a sixty plane order would cost $6 billion. The latest estimates from the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin put the unit cost of an F-35A at approximately $100 million, plus $16 million for the engine. Under this new price target (which may prove optimistic), 60 F-35As could cost the ROK over $7 billion.

But now that the decision has been made, how will the purchase of the F-15SE affect the ROK military’s operational and strategic capabilities?

The acquisition of the F-15SE would have little to no impact on South Korea’s current air superiority over the North. The gap in air power is simply too wide. As James Hardy of IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly wrote last year, “Estimates by IHS Jane’s reckon that North Koreahas only 35 or so MiG-29 ‘Fulcrum’ air-supremacy fighters in service, alongside about 260 obsolete MiG-21 ‘Fishbeds’ and MiG-19 ‘Farmers.’” This may explain Jae Jung Suh’s of John Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies claim that “quantitative advantage quickly fades when one takes account of the qualitative disadvantages of operating its 1950s-vintage weapons systems.”

That said,  as I noted in my previous article, the factors fueling the arms race among the major East Asian powers are two-fold: the ongoing territorial rows over disputed islands and seas, and the fear of their rival’s future capabilities. These two factors account for the fact that defense budget increases and acquisition of improved capabilities by China, Japan, and South Korea were reactions to perceived threats posed by their rivals’ attempts to rearm themselves.

This helps to explain why many South Korean defense analysts and ROK Air Force officers are outraged by the Park Geun-hye Administration’s decision to stick with plans to purchase the F-15SE. In a recent telephone interview, a friend of mine of who is a retired ROK Air Force major told me that the ROK’s  purchase of F-15SE is akin to  “buying premium DOS Operating System instead of purchasing Windows 8.” In other words, some ROK defense analysts and many of its Air Force officers believe that the F-15 series is obsolescent and does not measure up to Japan’s planned purchase of the F-35 or China’s indigenous production of the J-20.

But in order to achieve regional strategic parity with its powerful neighbors, South Korea must spend at least 90% of what its rivals spend on their national defense. The ROK’s  $31.8 billion defense budget pales in comparison to China’s $166 billion. And it is still substantially smaller than Japan’s $46.4 billion. Exacerbating this problem is the current administration’s reluctance to increase the ROK defense budget in the face of decreasing tax revenues and soaring welfare expenditure.

No matter which stealth fighter the ROK chooses, the ROK’s defense budget is inadequate to achieve strategic and tactical air parity with its rivals or tip the regional balance of power in its favor.

Despite the fiscal constraints imposed by the Park Geun-hye Administration, there are alternative solutions the ROK can consider to meet its strategic needs.

One option would be to delay purchasing a new aircraft. This option would give Lockheed Martin time to enter mass production of the aircraft, at which time it might be able to offer a more affordable price.  Lockheed has pledged to “work with the U.S. government on its offer of the F-35 fighter for [the ROK].” But if that offer does not translate into cheaper unit costs, it is meaningless. Even if Seoul agrees to buy the F-35, the structural disarmament that could result combined with budget shortfalls could cripple the ROK Air Force’s operational readiness.

Another option would be to reduce the size and budget of the ROK Army to accommodate the purchase of either the F-35 or the Eurofighter. But since the ROK Armed Forces remains Army-centric given the military threat from North Korea, this seems unlikely.  As Michael Raska of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies has written, “the composition, force structure and deployment of the ROK military have each remained relatively unchanged” and will remain so in the years to come.

A computer-generated concept of the proposed KFX stealth fighter (ROK Air Force)

A more pragmatic approach would be to cancel the F-X purchase program and focus on enhancing its indigenous Korean Fighter eXperimental (KFX) program first unveiled in 2011. Since both Indonesia and the United States have agreed to work with the ROK in developing the 5th generation fighter program, the proposed KFX could be less challenging and costly to develop. Such a program could mitigate structural disarmament dynamics and enable a smoother transition if the ROK can eventually afford to purchase the F-35 rather than the F-15SE.

Finally, the ROK could consider a commitment to developing Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) to minimize the potential strategic imbalance. In 1999, when UCAVs were still in incipient stages of development, the Executive Editor of the Air Force Magazine John A. Tirpak predicted  that “the UCAV could be smaller and stealthier than a typical fighter…[all at one-third the cost of an] F-35.” Indeed, the ROK plans to revive the “once-aborted program to develop mid-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (MUAV) to bolster its monitoring capabilities of North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs.”

Contrary to the popular belief among many South Korean defense analysts, the ROK cannot come up with the defense budget to match its rivals. So long as that’s true, the type of stealth fighter chosen will have little or no effect on the ROK’s ability to achieve strategic and tactical air parity with its neighbors. The ROK can, however, avoid severe gaps in air power stemming from potential structural disarmament by reexamining the development of indigenous stealth fighters and UCAVs.

This article was originally published on RealClearDefense and is cross-posted by permission.

Jeong Lee is a freelance writer and is also a Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat’s Asia-Pacific Desk. Lee’s writings on US defense and foreign policy issues and inter-Korean affairs have appeared on various online publications including East Asia Forum, the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, the World Outline and CIMSEC’s NextWar blog.

Current Operations

Suez and Syria: Updated 9/5

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A brief update on some of the fast-moving maritime issues:

Suez Canal Attack

Update 9/5: Footage from the attack is reportedly now available here.

Suez TransitOn Saturday, assailants attacked the Panamanian-flagged container ship COSCO Asia with machine gun fire as it transited the Suez Canal near the el-Qantara area. Egypt reportedly arrested 3 involved in the attack.

Fellow CIMSECian James Bridger had an insightful post on the Suez Canal’s security situation earlier last month, warning that a range of actions could be taken with the aim of disrupting traffic through the canal, primarily as a result of islamist retaliation against Egypt’s military coup.

Syrian Storm Clouds

PriazovyeTo the north, Russia sent the surveillance ship Priazoye from Sevastopol on the Black Sea to monitor U.S. naval forces off Syria. The news came while the number of U.S. forces gathering in the region increased as the Nimitz carrier strike group (CSG) moved into the Red Sea to await further orders instead of returning home to Everett, Washington after its deployment. The CSG includes the Ticonderoga-class cruiser USS Princeton and three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: the USS William P. Lawrence, USS Stockdale, and USS Shoup.

The strike aircraft aboard Nimitz and ships’ cruise missiles add to the seapower already assembled in the Mediterranean – the destroyers USS Stout, USS Mahan, USS Ramage, USS Barry, and USS Gravely. An unknown submarines are also in the area along with the amphibious ship USS San Antonio, a dock landing platform that earlier transited to the Eastern Mediterranean.