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Project Trident

Project Trident Call for Articles: Stable Seas Wants Your Writing on Ocean Governance

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By Curtis Bell

Submissions Due: July 13, 2020
Week Dates: July 20-24, 2020
Article Length: 1000-3000 words
Submit to: [email protected]

Stable Seas is partnering with CIMSEC to launch the latest Call for Articles of Project Trident to solicit writing on the impact of ocean governance on future international maritime security. Stable Seas, a program of One Earth Future, engages the international security community with novel research on illicit maritime activities such as piracy and armed robbery, trafficking and smuggling in persons, IUU (illegal/unregulated/unreported) fishing, and illicit trades in weapons, drugs, and other contraband. 

From the Sulu Sea to the Gulf of Aden, to the southern Caribbean and to the Gulf of Guinea, navies and maritime enforcement authorities are increasingly concerned about the threats posed at sea by terrorists, violent non-state actors, and even nation states that exploit similar methods. While counterterrorism strategy typically focuses on stopping activities on land, threatening organizations consistently use the maritime domain to transport weapons, raise funds through illicit activities, conduct piracy and kidnapping, and even launch attacks against soft maritime targets.

Ocean governance encompasses a broad spectrum of efforts aimed at maintaining good order on the seas while also preserving the seas themselves. Many authorities and efforts are concerned with illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing that is depleting natural resources. Ocean conservation aims to protect threatened ecosystems critical to human sustenance, endangered species, and the well-being of the ocean itself. Legal theorists and maritime law enforcement authorities debate interpretations of legal regimes such as UNCLOS as they seek to manage their claims and navigate challenges to their authority. Law enforcement agencies of many stripes are enhancing their understanding of the maritime domain as criminal entities look to the world’s oceans with a sense of opportunity, whether to pursue drug trafficking, human trafficking, or black market arms dealing. 

Given these trends, how can navies and coast guards better coordinate with local governments and international agencies in countering violence at sea? What lessons can be learned from instances of good onshore/offshore collaboration? How are governments working together across jurisdictions and in international waters to counter this threat?  

Authors are invited to write on these topics and more as we look to understand the expansive challenges surrounding ocean governance. Send all submissions to [email protected].

Curtis Bell is the Director of One Earth Future’s Stable Seas program. He created Stable Seas in 2016 and has since led the development of the Maritime Security Index and other Stable Seas research products. Curtis is a political scientist by training and also developed One Earth Future’s quantitative forecasting project. Before joining One Earth Future in 2015, Curtis taught international relations at the University of Colorado and the University of Tennessee. He earned his doctorate in political science at the University of Colorado and has published several academic papers on organized political violence and the politics of fragile states.

Featured Image: Illegal fishing off Gabon in 2011. (NOAA photo)

Arctic

Why NATO Needs a Standing Maritime Group in the Arctic

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By Colin Barnard

Introduction

Since the Cold War, the U.S. has maintained a steady presence in the Arctic—specifically the European Arctic, or High North—primarily through nuclear submarine deployments while relying on NATO allies in the region for logistical support. However, melting ice caps, an increase in commercial maritime activity, and ongoing territorial disputes necessitate stronger NATO cooperation in the region to achieve a deterrence posture against Russia and safeguard maritime security. Deterring Russian aggression is important in all European bodies of water, and the Arctic will increasingly face the same maritime security issues as other parts of the world, including illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing by China and the movement of migrants and refugees by sea.

Checking a Growing Russian Sphere of Influence

The Arctic has reemerged as a front for NATO in recent years, as Russia has ignored European policies not to militarize the region. Since at least 2010, Russia has been reopening and rearming much of the Arctic infrastructure used at the height of the Soviet Union. In 2012, Russia resumed its patrol of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a commercial shipping lane running along Russia’s northern coastline from the Kara Sea to the Bering Strait. In 2014, Russia established a new joint strategic command in Severomorsk to oversee its Northern Fleet with renewed focus on the Arctic. And in 2019, following the first successful navigation of the NSR without icebreakers two years prior, Russia implemented mandatory pilotage for foreign vessels and demonstrated its maritime interdiction capabilities.

Similar to Russia, NATO needs to improve its capability and capacity to operate on the Arctic front. In order to deter the Russian threat and safeguard maritime security, sustained presence in the region is needed. To this end, NATO should create a new standing maritime group dedicated to the Arctic and separate from the maritime groups focused elsewhere. While likely to be hotly debated, a new standing maritime group should gain traction among many of the Arctic states, especially Iceland, Norway, and Denmark, who have long recognized the growing Russian threat in the region. With sustained presence, so too will come sustained situational awareness, which is fundamental for conducting successful operations.

Currently, NATO’s maritime component commander, HQ Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), maintains operational control of NATO’s four standing maritime groups: two destroyer/frigate groups and two mine countermeasures groups. These groups are already overtasked, posturing against a resurgent Russian Navy across the North Atlantic, Baltic, and Black Seas, and lending support to NATO’s maritime security operation in the Mediterranean, Operation Sea Guardian, as well as the EU refugee and migrant crisis. Regardless of these ongoing tasks, these groups are not tailored for Arctic naval operations. For this reason, a new group needs to be formed.

Instead of relying exclusively on frigates and destroyers from NATO navies to form the new group, NATO should look to its coast guards as well, recognizing that many of these forces field ships that are optimized for Arctic operations. The U.S., Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Iceland, and Norway all have Arctic maritime borders, and most have ice-class ships. Denmark has Thetis-class and Knud Rasmussen-class patrol vessels, the latter of which double as icebreakers. Norway has the patrol vessel Svalbard, which also doubles as an icebreaker and recently completed the first Norwegian voyage to the North Pole. Three new patrol vessels will soon join her. Iceland, too, can lend support with their aging but capable Ægir-class or newer Thor-class patrol vessels. Thor is not capable of icebreaking, but it can still operate in the Arctic.

HDMS Knud Rasmussen (P570) shown in the Nares Strait during an exercise with the U.S. Coast Guard, Aug. 23, 2011. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Luke Clayton)

Of course, these examples are just from the smaller NATO navies and coast guards of the Arctic; the U.S. and Canada would have a responsibility to support the group as well. U.S. Arleigh Burke-class destroyers can operate in the Arctic, as recently demonstrated, and where capabilities are lacking, the NATO Defense Planning Process should abide. NATO partners Sweden and Finland have land borders in the Arctic region and would likely contribute to the group, if not with tangible patrol and surveillance assets, then with information exchange. Beyond historical cooperation with NATO states through agreements such as NORDEFCO, Sweden and Finland have increased cooperation with NATO in recent years, joining the UK’s Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), improving on existing agreements with the U.S., and participating in NATO exercises in the Baltic Sea.

One potential, but not required, outcome of establishing a standing maritime group for the Arctic is the feasibility for NATO to conduct freedom of navigation operations, or FONOPS, against Russia’s excessive maritime claims in the region. For years, the world has read stories of FONOPS in the South China Sea to challenge China’s excessive claims. According to the Department of Defense (DoD), FONOPS are conducted to “consistently challenge excessive maritime claims made by a variety of coastal States, including allies, partners, and competitors.” However, despite excessive maritime claims made the world over, high-profile FONOPS are rarely conducted outside of the South China Sea, including against Russia.

Concerns over whether or not FONOPS in the Arctic would do more harm than good are valid, but these concerns are mostly due to the U.S. Navy’s current lack of capability and capacity in the region, which the new standing maritime group would help address. Nevertheless, objections to FONOPS in the Arctic, especially NATO-led, are still likely to be made for fear of escalation with Russia. However, even if Russia were to cite a NATO FONOP, it does not require one to justify its continued aggression, nor did it require one in Georgia in 2009 or in Ukraine in 2014 and 2018. Russia justifies its aggression because of NATO’s continued expansion into once Soviet territory, something which George Kennan, the architect of the Cold War containment strategy, predicted. Russia is going to act regardless of NATO conducting FONOPS.

With this tension between NATO and Russia in mind, some believe a military “code of conduct” is needed for the Arctic. While the recommendation for the deployment of a standing maritime group to the region may appear hardline in contrast, such a group would operate professionally alongside Russian units, as is already done by the other maritime groups. Moreover, such a group would be part of NATO’s increasing role in Arctic maritime security. From assisting with search and rescue operations to helping deter illegal/illicit activity ranging from IUU fishing to trafficking in persons or goods, NATO’s role in the region would be two-fold: deter Russia while safeguarding maritime security. Neither role precludes a code of conduct for the region, and the latter presents an opportunity for de-escalation and possibly even a measure of cooperation with Russia.

The China Angle

Another potential outcome of NATO’s sustained presence and situational awareness in the Arctic is a better deterrence posture against China. China, declaring itself a “near-Arctic” state and achieving observer status on the Arctic Council, is increasingly becoming a player in the region. While for now most of the play has been economic, investing large sums in Arctic states—including NATO allies—and adding the Arctic to its Belt and Road Initiative (Polar Silk Road), it can be assumed that its economic investment in the region will eventually be followed by militarization.

HMS Albion is shown operating near the coast of Norway as part of Exercise Hairspring in 2008. (Royal Navy photo by POA Angie Pearce)

How China might move to militarize the Arctic is anyone’s guess, but its 2018 white paper on the Arctic, as summarized by Lieutenant Commander Rachel Gosnell, USN, clearly states China’s interests in the region, and it has plans to protect them. While much of the paper touts adherence to international law, the world has very little reason to believe China will do so. One example of how China could move to militarize the Arctic is on the back of its seemingly benign fishing fleet. China has stated it has inherent rights to the fish migrating to the Arctic because of its large population. And where China’s fishing fleet goes, militarization will soon follow, as has been demonstrated already by Chinese fishing “militias.”

Conclusion

NATO’s sustained presence and situational awareness are needed to achieve deterrence against both Russia and China while safeguarding maritime security in the Arctic. The first step toward achieving this goal is to increase NATO capability and capacity to operate in the region, centered on a new standing maritime group that is dedicated to the Arctic and separate from NATO’s maritime groups operating elsewhere. This group should be formed by NATO states with Arctic maritime borders and ice-class ships. As NATO becomes the recognized authority for maritime security in the region, de-escalation and even cooperation with Russia could be possible. It is time for NATO to invest in this future, starting with a standing maritime group for the Arctic.

Lieutenant Barnard is serving as a staff operations and plans officer at NATO Maritime Command in Northwood, U.K. He was previously gunnery officer onboard USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) and weapons officer onboard USS Firebolt (PC-10), and was recently selected to be a foreign area officer in Europe. He graduated from the University of St. Andrews in Scotland with a master’s in terrorism studies and holds a bachelor’s in political science from Abilene Christian University in Texas. His views are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Department of Defense, or NATO.

Featured Image: NoCGV Svalbard (W303), an icebreaker and offshore patrol vessel of the Norwegian Coast Guard (Kystvakten).

Operations and Leadership

Put the Commander back in Commander’s Intent

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By Capt. Bill Shafley

Commander’s intent is the cornerstone of mission command.1 Yet, it remains a nebulous form of communication. In naval operations, commander’s intent is infrequently understandable, let alone actionable. It is filled with jargoned terms like purpose, method, key tasks, end state, critical information requirements (CCIRs), and acceptable level of risk (ALR). While these terms of reference create nicely formatted PowerPoint charts, the resultant commander’s intent is an exchange of sterile terms that inhibit rather than enable mission command. The processes that create commander’s intent are staff-centric. The thinking surrounding mission command is commander-centric.2 The resulting mismatch prevents shared awareness, slows disciplined initiative, and challenges a commander’s ability to take prudent risk.3

The Critical Role of Commander’s Intent

Not only can we get better at writing intent, we must do so in a manner that enables our up-echelon commanders to take advantage of the creativity, ingenuity, and style of their subordinate commanders. First, commanders must take back the responsibility for thinking about and crafting their own intent. The Naval Planning Process (NPP) has whittled away the commander’s role in the process of analyzing a mission, developing courses of action, and creating a written order, and the commander’s role must be restored.4 Second, commanders must personalize their intent and ensure it reflects their vision of the unfolding operation, not the staff’s version of same. Successful intent statements are plain language attempts at a commander’s visualization of the battle. It lays the foundation and provides the framework for all that unfolds.5 Finally, commanders need to be developed for effective leadership in an environment where mission command is the norm. In an era where communication is ubiquitous and spans of control are ever-growing, the information demands of higher headquarters grow as well. This is making it more and more challenging to define commander’s business.

Formalized opportunities for this type of development need to be programmed into the career path of senior leaders. Improving self-awareness, deepening critical thinking skills, and providing the opportunity to reflect upon the responsibilities of and best practices for executive decision making are a must. 

Essential Element of Mission Command

In a white paper issued by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, “The commander is the central figure in Mission Command.”6 Staffs have neither the authority nor the accountability to execute operations. From receipt of the mission to orders production, the commander is the pivot point in command and control.7 NPP is all about planning, while commander’s intent is about decision making.8

As Milan Vego stated, “There is possibly no greater responsibility for a commander but to make decisions on the employment of…combat forces.”9 Staffs need to get out of the commander’s intent business. The planning process gives them ample opportunity to inject their expertise into mission analysis and course of action (COA) development. The by-product of a staff generated commander’s intent is that it feeds off the data collected, analyzed, and presented to the commander. It flows from the steps of mission analysis and COA development and thereby gets structured in terms of tasks, end state, and risk. Even the most involved commander will find it challenging to weave intent into this staff process. A personal example brings these observations to the forefront.

During strike group work-ups, the destroyer squadron (DESRON) staff worked diligently in developing its planning bona-fides. We committed to five-paragraph orders that included commander’s intent, CCIRs, and ALR as a format to communicate our mission tasking with assigned units. With the notion that these orders to subordinate units would give them ample understanding of what needed to occur, the staff needed to make follow-on decisions and decide how much risk we as a team were willing to accept to accomplish the assigned mission.

As the commander, I spent time with my planners throughout the planning process in an attempt to ensure the strike group’s mission and how it fed the fleet end state was adequately captured. Our planners developed a Situation, Mission, Enemy Situation, Admin, Command and Signal (SMEAC) five-paragraph order format. Over the course of work-ups, we refined the manner in which we captured the friendly and enemy situations. We labored over purpose and method. We added critical information requirements and discussed risk. Yet, after each order, reflection, and modification of our format, I still found myself summarizing that data in plain language from commander to commander to ensure we could see the forest through the trees.

In hindsight, I have concluded that the order is for watchstanders and subordinate planners, the intent is for commanders. It was clear to me in practice that my planners could only get me so far. I needed to add clarity to their words and do it a manner that made sense to my subordinate commanders. Without that additional clarity, the shared awareness, disciplined initiative, and prudent risk-taking I was trying to achieve would remain opaque.    

Commander’s Personal Viewpoint

As Gen. Dempsey described it, “In mission command, the commander must understand the problem, envision the end state, and visualize the nature and design of the operation.”10 Intent should reflect a commander’s personal and deep understanding of the mission. It should describe how subordinate units and warfighting functions come together to bring about a desired effect against an enemy force. It is, in its purest form, visualization. It communicates in clear terms for subordinate commanders how the boundaries and conditions around which a battle ahead should unfold. Intent communicates roles, success, failure, and pace. It describes to subordinate commanders and their staffs what is required to make decisions and who can make them and even how to act in the absence of further orders. Milan Vego has offered rules of thumb in drafting intent, including writing it in the first person, ensure it reflects the personality of the commander, keep it short and memorable, and write clearly and precisely.11 Intent crafted in this manner is akin to scaffolding around a building. It is simple pieces simply put together.  

Reflecting again on recent personal experience, workups provide numerous opportunities for strike group and warfare commanders to use intent as a reflection of this deeper understanding of the mission. Multi-warfare, multi-phased operations that consume a common set of resources create opportunities for friction, early culmination, and priorities. Commanders know where the breaking point lies and must be able to communicate that eventuality in a manner that is meaningful. We can use these opportunities to apply Vego’s reminders and really dig into what the sequence of tactical operations presented mean to the afloat fighting force and its staying power in the fight. 

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz achieved this in his famous Calculated Risk letter in the days leading up to the Battle of Midway.12 In a mere five sentences, he was able to communicate when it was appropriate for Rear Admirals Frank J. Fletcher and Raymond A. Spruance to commit their forces to action.13 Nimitz artfully told his commanders simply to avoid attack unless you know you can win. With that clear direction in hand, they took off to Midway and made the decisions necessary to turn the tides of the war.

Faced with the same resource challenge associated with the commitment of combat power during our own work-ups, we struggle to make it that clear. Nimitz understood it from the strategic through the tactical level. Fletcher and Spruance were tactically competent, their strike forces ready to take the fight to the enemy. Nimitz was aware of how this engagement was sequenced in time and space throughout his area of operations. He knew what failure meant to the remainder of the campaign in terms of residual combat power. It is a very good example of simple pieces put together simply.

Raising Commander’s Intent Above the Noise

Modern commanders keep a lot of plates spinning. There are horizontal and vertical relationships to foster within and beyond the immediate organization. There are allies and partners that need to be brought into the fold and enabled. As a local commander looks to the fight two echelons up and attempts to tap into the developing situation, even with the best staffs and the most refined process, it gets harder and harder to know what decision lies ahead and how commanders must work together to solve them. The time available to think and reflect is at a premium. A commander’s span of control affects his ability to influence subordinates directly. These challenges impact a commander’s ability to craft clear and meaningful intent. Buying back time through efficient and effective communication and developing our senior leaders for these challenges can mitigate some of this risk.

In the age of digital communication, we are clobbered by the exchange of information. Commanders are robbed of the time to write something thoughtfully, let alone consume it, and provide feedback. This deprives commanders of one of the remaining meaningful tools they may have to communicate complexity in these dispersed environments. Most commanders will argue that time is the biggest challenge to their collective ability to think critically, reflect deeply, and cogently communicate important information.

As a best practice, deliberate use of the battle rhythm and the various voice and video tools available can alleviate some of these pressures. As the battle rhythm drives the commander’s decision cycle, it can be used to home in on and tease out information necessary to assess ongoing operations and guide follow-on ones. A well-crafted and judicious set of critical information requirements are similarly helpful.14 While voice, video, and data tools remain available, interaction between and amongst commanders virtually affords the opportunity to communicate intent broadly. Minutes count in these environments. Time spent preparing for the battle rhythm and time spent consuming the information it presents slices away at the cognitive power of commander and their staffs. It is important to make wise use of it. Strike group workups provide another example.

Time must be guarded, and information exchange streamlined and relevant for commanders to gain the advantage in this environment. Workups deliberately tax afloat staffs to stress test the processes used to generate orders to subordinate units. Time becomes the most precious commodity. As workups evolve, the pace at which the changes occur to the base plan deliberately create trade-offs and resource constraints. As the fluidity of the tactical situation evolves, the challenge becomes to recognize those trade-offs, communicate them to higher headquarters, and capture them in a running change to commander’s intent. This rapidly evolving tactical situation, inside of this complex communications environment quickly exposes the weaknesses of even the best set of staff processes.

I frequently found myself challenged to keep a broader view. My own personal time to think critically about what was occurring around me in time and space was taken away brief after brief. Fatigue was setting in from endless phone calls in the middle of the night about tactical information that I had asked for in pristinely written orders that turned out to be irrelevant. Despite a fantastic staff and what I thought were fairly refined processes, my ability to think critically, write cogently, and re-assess my intent remain challenged.

Learning to Personalize Intent

Leaders are swimming in information, striving to make sense of it, and looking for where best to apply scarce resources to best effect. We can’t just expect a senior leader to learn how to be effective in this environment through broadening headquarters assignments alone. There are few opportunities for group commanders to get the balance of education and training necessary to excel in these new environments.15 Exposure to additional leader development opportunities that stress self-awareness, critical thinking, and executive decision making are necessary investments for commanders. These should include board selected in-residence opportunities at senior service colleges, political-military think tank fellowships, and corporate leadership development courses. Pulling forward courses like CAPSTONE for newly selected flag officer down to the major command level would go a long way in developing our senior commanders. Every year counts in an officer’s career progression. Spending 18-24 months off the flight-line or away from the waterfront is a calculated risk in its own right. In residence education, and more than once perhaps, is a must to provide the time away from the “building” to develop. Opportunities like these would help senior officers with the process of growing into roles where doing at the tactical level is replaced with sensing, shaping, and communicating priorities and expectations synonymous with executive leadership.16

Conclusion

Nimitz, Fletcher, and Spruance are tall figures for senior leaders to emulate. Though the environments they commanded in were markedly different in many ways, they wrestled with many of the same issues we wrestle with today. Their formations were large and diffused over many miles. And while communication methods improved over time, they were still left with fog and friction to overcome.

But none of them sailed with the same retinue of staffs, processes, and methods of communication that we sail with today. Yet they still succeeded with crafting plans that synchronized forces in space and time, and in a manner that created effects that employed resources effectively and efficiently. Simple written notes to each other created a shared understanding of the mission at hand and the roles of the forces assigned.

Commanders today are disadvantaged in many ways. We have large staffs and refined processes. Our communications methods create opportunities for over-communicating and are bereft of the right information at the right time for the right decision. Doubling down on putting the commanders back in intent, providing them with the skills necessary to create time and space for thinking and reflection, and deepening our investment in their development will help lay the foundation for successful mission command.

Captain Bill Shafley is a career Surface Warfare Officer and currently serves as Commodore, Destroyer Squadron 26, and Sea Combat Commander for Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group. He has served on both coasts and overseas in Asia and Europe. He is a graduate of the Naval War College’s Advanced Strategy Program and a designated Naval Strategist. These views are presented in a personal capacity.

References

1. For a good working definition of Mission Command, see ADRP 6-0 (2012).  p. 1-3.  https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/misc/doctrine/CDG/cdg_resources/manuals/adrp/adrp6_0_new.pdf.

2. General Martin Dempsey (2012) “Mission Command White Paper, 03 APR 2012,” p. 4. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/missioncommandwhitepaper2012.pdf.

3. For the tenets of Mission Command, see ADRP 6-0 (2012).  p 2-1. 

4. Milan Vego, “The Bureaucratization of the Military Decision Making Process,” Joint Forces Quarterly: Vol 88, 1st Qtr 2018, p. 39. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Article/1411771/the-bureaucratization-of-the-us-military-decisionmaking-process/  

5. Dempsey, “White Paper,” p. 4.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Vego, “Military Decision Making,” p. 35.

9. Ibid., 36.

10. Dempsey, “White Paper,”  p. 4.

11. Vego, “Military Decision Making,” p. 39.

12. Robert C. Rubel, “Deconstructing Nimitz’s Principle of Calculated Risk,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 68: No. 1, Article 4. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/4.

13. Ibid.

14. See my previous published work in CIMSEC regarding Information exchange and Mission Command. https://cimsec.org/the-currency-of-mission-command/43263.

15. SWOS Major Command and the Major Command Course at NLEC are the two predominant courses for SWO Major Commanders.  Over the course of 4 weeks, both courses do their best to provide these opportunities, but they are not enough.

16. See Heather Venerable’s recent work regarding education and Senior Officers.  https://cimsec.org/playing-to-win-crafting-a-creative-strategic-vision-for-maritime-superiority/.

Featured Image: POLARIS POINT, Guam (Feb. 7, 2020) Capt. Al Alarcon, prospective commanding officer of the submarine tender USS Frank Cable (AS 40), salutes sideboys as he arrives at a change of command ceremony aboard the ship. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Second Class Heather C. Wamsley/Released)

Fiction

“Pixelated Covers in the Sky”: Graduating The Naval Academy Class of 2055

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In 1876, Lieutenant Theodorus Mason, later the first head of the Office of Naval Intelligence, published an article “Two Lessons from the Future.” Using the literary device of letters in the future, he wrote that “they are supposed to be written in the future, and are merely conjectures as to the probable results of possible events.” The letters predicted the impact in 1880 of torpedoes defeating the Navy in a great battle and a later victory due to trends and necessary changes. As he wrote in the latter: “Something had to be done and was done” including throwing the Naval Academy open to all applicants, with “great weight being given to professional aptitude and officerlike qualities.”

It is in the spirit of Theodorus Mason that the following speech is offered.

By Claude Berube

Commissioning Day, 2055

Good morning, Brigade.

It doesn’t seem that long ago that I sat where you are now – sort of. Thirty-five years ago. I was in the Naval Academy Class of 2020, the first class to have a virtual graduation due to the COVID-19 pandemic. I can’t say a few of us weren’t disappointed while we were just weeks away from celebrating four years of hard work, some fun, and the foundation of lifelong friends and shipmates. But we and our families saw the immediate consequences of COVID-19. Some of our parents and siblings lost their jobs as the nation closed most businesses – some of them permanently. Eventually, nearly every one of us lost someone we knew – family, friends, neighbors. We had dreamt of that one day – commissioning – being on the football field under the sunshine and roar of the Blue Angels. Our loved ones were going to be in the stands cheering as we approached leadership and receive our diploma. We were to be sworn in as officers in the Navy and Marine Corps. We were going to toss our covers in the air and leave before children swarmed the field to pick them up.  

That did not happen.

That Superintendent made some of the toughest calls any Superintendent in the history of the Academy had to make, from not reforming the Brigade after Spring Break to cancelling graduation. The history – the data – in the past 35 years has proven what those decisions meant. He protected the health and safety of the midshipmen, the faculty, the staff, and the community. History shows what would have happened if he hadn’t demonstrated that leadership – that ability to make tough calls.

He saved lives. And we welcome and recognize he and his wife who are with us here to share in this day.

[Resounding applause from the midshipmen via the speakers.]

Our class took that leadership by example to heart. It prepared us to make the tough calls in our own careers. We learned to be agile like when the entire faculty and Brigade had to literally shift overnight from teaching in the classroom to teaching online as we were spread across the country on computers – those things you only see in museums today. We learned how to modify our services. We learned the importance of the situational awareness of our people when they’re overseas. And in the aftermath of COVID-19, the nation and the Navy learned to adapt our education and training.           

COVID-19 had many effects but three especially on how we had to change the navy including the Naval Academy. The first was its effect on the economy. The Dow Jones tanked – three times. The debt spiraled out of control. The president and Congress had little choice – they had to shrink the military budget. The navy was the first hit because of the cost of its platforms. In recognition of his prophecies about the “Terrible Twenties,” CDR Salamander was given the rank of brevet Commodore. When we graduated in 2020, some navalists were touting a 355-ship Navy. [Gasps from the midshipmen]. That’s right. Who could have predicted the 155-ship Navy that you will join in a few weeks?

We had to be leaner, so autonomous, unmanned vehicles proliferated. By 2040, we grounded the last of our manned air platforms and that’s why modern graduating classes don’t select naval aviation as a community like their parents and grandparents did, and why Pensacola was BRAC’d shortly after. Only a few officers are needed to command drone squadrons from our aircraft carrier.

The second effect was on jobs. Jobless rates soared in 2020. Some businesses closed until the pandemic abated the following year. Other businesses closed permanently. Those businesses that returned found ways to reduce costs. Fast food was the first to turn to automation. Even restaurants began replacing service staff. Soon there was a permanently high unemployment rate which led to more people competing for enlistments in the military and admission to the Naval Academy. When I was in high school, about 16,000 students competed for 1,100 slots. Nearly 40,000 students across the United States competed for one of the 500 slots in your class. The Navy determined that it should expect more years of service. In addition to the competitive entry to the Academy, constantly high unemployment meant we could no longer lose our educated and trained officers after only five years. Back in 2018, I signed my 2-for-7 [groans from the midshipmen]. Today, you sign your 2-for-17s+5s (active and reserve.) But you all have a guaranteed job defending our country and you’re still young enough to embark on a second career.

The third effect was the options and flexibility presented by online teaching. As the fleet shrank in size, so too did the need for officers. Additional cost savings came from smaller crews from increased automation. The Navy revisited how we commissioned officers.

When I was your age, officers commissioned through the Academy, ROTC, Officer Candidate School, or a few in the Direct Commission Officer program for Reserves. The Naval Officer Commissioning Act of 2037 consolidated the programs for the first time since before the first World War. But we knew we couldn’t return to the past. We had to adapt. And that’s why we changed how the Academy prepared officers. We asked ourselves a fundamental question: how could the navy and the nation retain the best of the Academy, OCS, and ROTC? We couldn’t maintain the four-year program we had become accustomed to. Some alumni argued, “you shouldn’t change tradition.” But what tradition? The Academy wasn’t always a four-year program. And it didn’t always require four years for a class to graduate, as we witnessed in previous wars. Commissioning didn’t always include a hat toss – that started in 1912. The Herndon climb only started in 1940 and they didn’t grease it until 1949.

Tradition is not constant. It has a start. It changes. Tradition rarely retains its original qualities and people rarely remember the historical reasons that began those traditions.

The Navy and Congress found the right formula for our 21st century conditions. Anyone accepted to the Academy could choose whatever accredited domestic or international college to attend that they wanted to for one year. Because of advancements in online teaching, they would have one online course with a Naval Academy professor to start their tie to Annapolis. In their second year, they would serve on a ship as a midshipman. These conditions allowed the students to grow by seeing a bit of the world around them, to experience other schools and cultures, and to see what life in the Navy meant. If they did well in that one-year college program and received a positive recommendation from their ship’s commanding officer, they would come to Annapolis for I-Day. Induction Day. And here you would learn for the next three years.

Class of 2055, we must be aware of the conditions around us. We must adapt to those conditions. We must remain agile. And just as my class faced its challenge and sacrifice, so too does yours. Because of that, you are each ready to join the fleet and the challenges you will face in your careers.

I salute you, good luck, and hold fast.

[The midshipmen stood, cheered, and tossed their covers in the air. As media digitographers captured the moment, the covers and the midshipmen slowly pixilated, disappearing off the field to leave behind neat rows of holograph emitters.]

Commander Claude Berube, USNR, PhD, teaches history at the U.S. Naval Academy, is the Director of the Naval Academy Museum, and is a former Senate staffer and defense contractor. His next two books will be released in the next year. The views above are the author’s alone and not necessarily reflect those of the Navy or Naval Academy.

Featured Image: ANNAPOLIS, Md. (December 19, 2019) U.S. Naval Academy delayed graduation ceremony. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Nathan Burke/Released)