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Blue Books for the Green Side: A Reading List on Naval Integration 

By Walker D. Mills and Joseph E. Hanacek

“Naval Integration” has quickly become a focus within the U.S. Marine Corps and Navy. It was a critical section in the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps’ Planning Guidance, where the Commandant elaborated: “I intend to seek greater integration between the Navy and Marine Corps….Navy and Marine Corps officers developed a tendency to view their operational responsibilities as separate and distinct, rather than intertwined…. there is a need to reestablish a more integrated approach to operations in the maritime domain.” Emerging great power competition in the Pacific is again forcing the Marine Corps and the Navy to work more closely and solve complicated new problems. New Marine concepts like Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations are reintroducing naval operations to the center of Marine thinking and warfighting. Despite this recent shift, there is still a glaring lack of naval-oriented education in the Marines.

Over the last few decades, Marines have increasingly left their naval roots behind and conducted campaigns in the rugged mountains of land-locked Afghanistan and the arid deserts of Iraq. The current generation of Marines is less likely to have served on ship than to have served on the ground in the Middle East. Recent commentary has questioned the true significance of their relationship to the Navy, such as by asking “Are we naval in character or purpose?” A flood of responses revealed, if not a clear answer, at least a resounding acknowledgement that the Marine Corps’ relationship with the Navy is a key attribute, if not the defining attribute of the force. Yet naval campaigns, despite being a raison d’etre for the Marine Corps, do not feature in junior officer education and may not be encountered at all by officers until many years later into their careers. Instead, land operations consist of the grand majority of the material taught. Even in classes on amphibious case studies like the Falklands, Marine instructors often largely if not totally ignore the larger maritime campaign and start with the ship-to-shore movement.

The atrophy of combined Navy and Marine Corps thinking is far from being solely a Marine Corps issue. For years the Navy’s approach to maritime warfare has been built around specialization instead of integration. The aforementioned Marines learning about the Falklands campaign didn’t focus on the war at sea because that was the fleet’s specialty, not theirs. The same can be true of the fight on the ground from the perspective of the Navy. While this type of unilateral approach to problem solving has been sufficient in the era of unchallenged U.S. maritime supremacy, it can no longer be accepted given the growing scope and complexity of potential military challenges.

One of the most valuable attributes of a well-integrated team is its resilience. While some efficiency may be lost in cross-training, traits such as adaptability, effectiveness, and survivability can be greatly enhanced. Marines need to understand amphibious and sea control operations in the context of larger naval campaigns, especially because the modern character of those campaigns is evolving into a far more threatening challenge. Marines need to have a basic literacy of naval strategy, operations, and tactics as it pertains to their roles in supporting those campaigns. This effort not only enhances the fleet when campaigns are functioning well, but it provides the fleet with an insurance policy when combat friction begins to manifest.

Naval integration is not a passing fad, nor a flavor of the day. It is supposed to be the core attribute of the Marine Corps. The meat of the Title 10 roles and responsibilities of the Marine Corps are: “The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces… for service with the fleet… as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.” The Marine Corps is a force designed to operate in support of and in conjunction with the U.S. Navy.

In this vein, we have assembled a short reading list focused along the theme of naval integration. These readings can serve as a primer in naval operations for Marines and other landlubbers, or supplement and advance a foundation of naval knowledge for any interested reader. The books generally fall into three categories – fundamentals, history, and current issues. We have also included our favorite periodicals that often run articles and debates oncontemporary tactics and proposals for future concepts.

These readings of interest include:

Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas by Milan Vego

Vego, a professor at the United States Naval War College, may be the world’s leading scholar of littoral warfare. In Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas, Vego melds his own experience serving in the Adriatic with the Yugoslavian Navy, naval history, and more current naval operations. His book is a comprehensive examination of littoral warfare for the student or practitioner and covers everything from the space and geometries of the littoral to sea denial and relevant weapons systems. It is a perfect book to use both as an introduction and a deeper dive into littoral warfare. However, originally published in 1999, Vego’s book has not been updated to reflect geopolitical and technological changes.

Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, Third Ed. by Captain Wayne P. Hughes (ret.) and Rear Admiral Robert P. Girrier (ret.)

Hughes, a recently passed professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and former U.S. Navy officer, was a giant in the study of naval tactics. The third edition of Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat is similar to Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas in that it breaks down and explains warfare in the littoral. The book also explains Hughes’ salvo model for missile combat, which is the standard for modeling missile combat at sea, and provides an excellent starting point from which Marines can begin to factor their shore-and air-based fires into the maritime fight. The book is an A-Z explanation of littoral warfare and also looks forward into continuing trends and the future of littoral warfare. The most recent edition, co-authored by Rear Admiral Robert P. Girrier, and with a forward written by then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson, includes a chapter discussing current revolutions in military affairs and a fictional scenario depicting how a modern war in the littorals could feasibly unfold.

Navy Strategic Culture: Why the Navy Thinks Differently by Roger W. Barnett

Navy Strategic Culture is an important book because it dissects what makes the Navy different from the other services and critically, why that matters. Barnett is another former U.S. naval officer and instructor at the U.S. Naval War College. His book can either be a jumping-off point for a reader who wants to better understand the Navy and does not know where to start, or for a reader who has experienced the Navy firsthand and wants to understand why the Navy is unique. The book will provide the reader with both a better understanding and a better appreciation for the U.S. Navy and its contribution to U.S. strategy writ large.

Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898–1945 by Trent Hone

Whenever young naval officers ask for book recommendations from senior commanders, this book is almost guaranteed to be on the list. Learning War assesses the generations of work and force development that was done in the years leading up to the Second World War that transformed the U.S. Navy into an organization that can adapt to and excel against emerging great power threats. The book, a favorite of CNO Richardson’s, shows how even after several bruising defeats early in the war the U.S. Navy still needed time to adapt and evolve. In future conflicts, critical events could very well be decided on a far shorter timeframe, begging the question as to whether our current learning culture as a military service is going to be up to the challenge in a future war that might only last months as opposed to years. 

The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare by John Keegan

John Keegan is an award-winning British historian and former lecturer at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. The Price of Admiralty is his attempt to write about naval history, as Keegan is, in the words of a critical review by Wayne Hughes, a “landlubber.” He has researched and written extensively on ground combat, however he can still deliver in his explanations and descriptions of naval combat. The Price of Admiralty is as exhaustively researched as his other books and presents an accessible and valuable history of naval warfare from the perspectives of the combatants. Though British-centric, The Price of Admiralty can provide any reader with a better understanding of what naval combat is, how it feels, and how it has evolved over the centuries. 

Small Boats and Daring Men: Maritime Raiding, Irregular Warfare and the Early American Navy by Benjamin Armstrong

The core argument in Armstrong’s new book Small Boats and Daring Men is that irregular warfare at sea was critical to the success of the early American navy, and was quite common. Armstrong, a history professor at the United States Naval Academy, mixes well-known cases of irregular warfare, like those conducted against the Barbary Pirates, with lesser known but equally interesting cases like the U.S. naval expeditions to Sumatra. Small Boats and Daring Men is a fascinating study of 18th and 19th century maritime competition and conflict that may change the reader’s perspective on the age of sail and the history of the U.S. Navy. It also offers a historical basis for irregular littoral operations. 

Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal by James D. Hornfischer

The Marine Corps solemnly remembers the 1,592 Marines killed during the Guadalcanal campaign and the horrific fighting that ensued there. It is also quick to recall that the first month of the campaign was conducted largely without the support of naval forces, which were intended to support the troops on the ground. What is often forgotten is that during the operation U.S. and Japanese naval forces were relatively similar in strength, that the outcome of the battle at sea was far from certain, and a naval defeat would spell certain defeat on land. Hornfischer, with several other award-winning books about the U.S. Navy to his name, is well-versed in applying narrative history to naval storytelling. His work here provides ready and digestible insights into how naval- and land-based objectives became intertwined at the tactical and operational level of war and, in doing so, he gives the reader a critical retelling of this pivotal littoral battle so familiar to Marines, from the naval perspective.

There are several other outstanding histories of the Solomons Campaign and Guadalcanal that are worthy mentions, including Ian W. Toll’s Pacific Crucible, Joseph Wheelan’s Midnight in the Pacific, and Richard B. Frank’s Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account

One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander by Patrick Robinson and Sandy Woodward

The Falklands War is the best case of a “modern” amphibious battle. Fought over islands in the South Atlantic between the United Kingdom and Argentina, the Falklands campaign is frequently referred to as a case study on how modern naval combat works. Much of the weaponry and tactics used in the Falklands are still standard today, and the war saw joint forces on both sides fighting maritime campaigns, including amphibious operations. The reader can learn many lessons from Woodward – the British task force commander. His memoir is frank and he candidly discusses his successes and mistakes. A careful reader would also do well to note the changes in naval warfare and the operating environment over the last four decades so as to not get caught in the trap of fighting the last war.

There are several other worthwhile studies of the Falklands War including The Official History of the Falklands Campaign by Sir Lawrence Freedman, a professor at King’s College in London, and Battle for the Falklands by journalists Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins. 

Red Star Over The Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, Second Ed. by Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes

In Red Star Over The Pacific, Holmes and Yoshihara provide a much-needed update to their original 2013 edition. Yoshihara and Holmes are China and maritime strategy experts – Holmes is currently the J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, and Yoshihara formerly held the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Naval War College and is now a senior fellow at CSBA. Their book outlines the massive growth in capability and size of China’s naval forces in a way that is straightforward to understand, and they also cover the implications of Chinese naval force development and the way it impacts and compares to the U.S. Navy. Fascinating and current, the book is also a warning to the reader to take competition and potential conflict in the Pacific seriously, as the authors make clear just how important naval power has become to Chinese grand strategy.

The War for Muddy Waters: Pirates, Terrorists, Traffickers and Maritime Security by Joshua Tallis

Tallis’s new book is easily among the most current on this list. What Tallis argues in The War for Muddy Waters is that maritime security is as important and will continue to be as important as traditional naval warfare. Tallis dives into security issues in the littoral with pirates, smugglers, and terrorists and presents a view of maritime security challenges that is often overlooked but increasingly important as demographics shift toward ever more littoralization. The War for Muddy Waters will expose the reader to the broader but equally relevant world of maritime security beyond limited naval issues.

Front Burner: Al Qaeda’s Attack on USS Cole by Kirk Lippold is an excellent anti-terrorism and force protection case study that expands on the irregular threat to warships and the Navy in port and in the littoral. Another great and recent book on non-naval maritime issues is journalist Ian Urbina’s The Outlaw Ocean: Journeys Across the Last Untamed Frontier.

Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil by Worrall R. Carter

If General Omar Bradley was correct in his alleged quip that “Amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics,” there is no better place to begin the discussion of naval logistics than with Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil. Carter details the logistics efforts of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific theater during the Second World War. The book covers many facets of modern naval logistics including expeditionary logistics, forward basing and sea basing, maintenance, and supply activities inside in contested areas. Many of the logistics fundamentals the Navy dealt with in the Second World War still apply today. If nothing else, the book is sure to give Marines and sailors alike a far greater appreciation of the immense logistical effort required to sustain maritime campaigns across an area as large as the Pacific. 

Periodicals

We would also like to emphasize the great periodical publishing on naval and maritime security issues. Proceedings is a professional publication of the United States Naval Institute, and it publishes a monthly issue with articles on a range of issues relevant to the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard online and in print. It also features regular essay contests on a variety of topics.

The U.S. Naval War College publishes the Naval War College Review quarterly but also has a variety of longer-form manuscripts and working papers. Because it is a government-funded entity, all War College publications are free to download from their website.

Lastly, the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) publishes a range of content on a near-daily basis related to maritime security, all of it fully available to read for free on their website. CIMSEC is U.S. based, but not U.S. centric – which makes for a more international perspective. They also release regular calls for submissions on specific topics.

Conclusion

We believe that these books and publications are an excellent jumping-off point for any landlubber looking to learn more about naval and maritime perspectives, but especially for Marines who recognize that these perspectives have been missing from their professional military education. This is by no means an exclusive list – there are dozens if not hundreds of more fantastic books out there. These are just our personal recommendations and books that have been important in our own learning. More books on naval integration may be in the making, and certainly many have already been published that cover the Navy-Marine relationship, just waiting to be discovered and shared.

Happy reading. 

Walker D. Mills is a Marine infantry officer currently serving as an exchange officer in Cartagena, Colombia. He has previously authored commentary for CIMSEC, the Marine Corps Gazette, Proceedings, West Point’s Modern War Institute and War on the Rocks. He is an associate editor at CIMSEC. He can be found on twitter @WDMills1992.

Joseph E. Hanacek is a Surface Warfare Officer stationed in San Diego, CA. He has served aboard USS Lake Champlain (CG-57) and USS Jackson (LCS 6), and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He has previously authored commentary for Proceedings and War on the Rocks.

Featured Image: A Marine puts away returned books in the library aboard USS Bataan (LHD 5). (Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Aaron T. Kiser/Navy)

Sea Control 183 – The Bilgepumps

By Alex Clarke

Alert and cover your ears it’s another historically informed maritime current events podcast inbound! Or… Bilgepumps this week is what three naval geeks who have found a particularly tasty cake shop would sound like if recorded.

So what is episode three about? Well the #Bilgepumps team are talking about the matrix, China in the East and South China Seas again as they’re just the front that never stops giving, lasers, dronenoughts, Plan Z and auxiliaries. And that’s just the headlines, the rest is oh so much history, with possibly a lot of cynicism.

#Bilgepumps is a new series and new avenue, although it may no longer have the new car smell. While we’re getting the impression it’s liked, we still very much want to hear any comments, topic suggestions, or ideas for artwork. Please tweet them at the Bilgepump crew (with #Bilgepump) at Alex (@AC_NavalHistory), Drach (@Drachinifel), and Jamie (@Armouredcarrier). Or you can comment on our Youtube channels (listed down below). 

Download Sea Control 183 – The Bilgepumps

Links

Alex Clarke is host of the Bilge Pumps series on the Sea Control podcast.

Contact the Sea Control podcast at seacontrol@cimsec.org

Why Yemen Matters

By Jimmy Drennan

Introduction

On Sunday, Yemeni separatists known as the Southern Transitional Council (STC) seized 64 billion riyals ($260M USD) from a convoy belonging to the Central Bank of Yemen. This follows their withdrawal in April from a fragile treaty and declaration of autonomy in the southern port city of Aden. The STC’s proclamation threatens to throw Yemen into a fresh phase of bloody turmoil, even as the unmitigated spread of COVID-19 could devolve the world’s worst humanitarian crisis into catastrophe. Meanwhile, talks to end the war between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi rebels of northwestern Yemen drag on, with the Houthis indicating they may attempt to take pivotal territory in the oil-rich city of Marib. Why does any of this matter?

The stability of Yemen is not, in and of itself, one of our core national interests. Yet we continue to aid the Saudis in their war against the Houthis. Supported by international navies, we continue to patrol international waters in the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. We are still pursuing Al Qaeda and ISIS throughout poorly governed regions in Yemen. Why? The answer is pragmatism.

While it is not practical, nor advisable, for the United States to commit blood and treasure to unilaterally resolve Yemen’s civil war, the instability that spills over Yemen’s borders threatens American interests. Now, with the STC potentially pitting its Emirati backers against the Saudis, who recognize the Republic of Yemen Government led by exiled President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, the risk of Yemen’s festering instability igniting a larger regional conflict is greater than ever.

A Proxy Conflict Turns Central

Although a proxy war between Arab states, both of whom the United States relies on for critical military and economic access, would implicitly run counter to American interests, a hypothetical regional conflict still doesn’t explain why Yemen matters today. Even now, instability overflows from Yemen in the form of ballistic missiles, suicide drones, unmanned explosive speedboats, anti-ship cruise missiles, and sea mines. These attacks by the Houthis are generally aimed at the Saudi-led coalition (which does not include the United States), but the use of these weapons near international shipping lanes in the southern Red Sea threaten core national interests in maintaining the free flow of global commerce. The Houthis have credibly threatened to contest the Strait of Bab al Mandeb by attacking international shipping in recent years, including American warships in 2016 – which prompted swift retaliatory action against the launch sites. The strait is the sole southern gateway to the Suez Canal and therefore a strategic chokepoint for maritime trade between Europe and Asia, obviating the need to make the costly and time-consuming trip around the Cape of Good Hope.

Houthi ballistic missile and drone attacks in Saudi Arabia and the UAE threaten critical energy infrastructure, not to mention American citizens and military forces throughout the region. When considering the risk of regional Arab-on-Arab conflict, threats to freedom of navigation, and attacks on Arab energy infrastructure, another question harkens back to Ancient Rome with the Latin “cui bono?” Who benefits? In every case, the answer is Iran.

Iran publicly supports the Houthi effort to overthrow Yemen’s Hadi-led government. Having a proxy on Saudi Arabia’s southern border, or at least a like-minded partner with whom it can supply advanced conventional weapons, is of obvious benefit to Tehran. Arming the Houthis with anti-shipping weaponry allows Iran to threaten a second global maritime chokepoint, a crucial economic “ace in the hole” in its existential fight against the administration’s maximum pressure campaign. The United States, its international partners, and the United Nations have repeatedly exposed Iran’s illicit arms shipments to the Houthis; however, international sentiment is so heavily slanted against the Saudis (due largely to the early conduct of their air campaign) that Iran can quietly refute the allegations while the anti-Saudi narrative continues to resonate on Capitol Hill and social media. Meanwhile, the Houthis block humanitarian aid shipments and hold them for ransom as millions of Yemenis starve, and the world barely notices.

Iran has also learned valuable lessons on how to employ its growing arsenal in the event of a direct conflict with Saudi Arabia or the United States. In 2019, the British Government warned that Iran was using Yemen as a missile testing ground. “We’ve seen the UN panel of experts talk about the new Kamikaze drones that are coming out of Iran, we’ve had the Badr-1, which is the missile system that looks like a V2, being launched into Saudi Arabia and we have seen from technical reports that the enhancements that are being applied to that war by Iran are considerable,” Labour MP Graham Jones said.

In Yemen, Iran has deftly exerted influence below the threshold that would trigger direct U.S. retaliation, just as it has done in the Arabian Gulf over the last three decades since the Tanker War. The United States may lack the incentive to retaliate or intervene in Yemen, but ignores the failed state at its own peril. The most pragmatic approach is to help the Saudis focus on the primary source of instability in Yemen. Iran threatens Saudi Arabia from the east, north, and south, and now, with the STC’s declaration of autonomy, Tehran has the opportunity to further spread instability and division throughout the Gulf Cooperation Council states, which will only be exacerbated by global economic strain. Iran employed a similar tactic with Qatar in 2017, and now Turkey (whose relationship with Iran is ambiguous at best) appears to be joining with Qatar to finance the Muslim Brotherhood in southen Yemen.

A strategy explicitly focused on isolating the Houthis from Iranian support – militarily, diplomatically, and economically – would dramatically alter the Houthi and Iranian strategic calculus. The U.S. could organize an international effort to interdict illicit arms shipments through the Gulf of Aden (irrespective of origin). It must continue to expose Iranian malign influence in western Yemen, and work to disrupt and eventually quell Houthi revenue streams coming from Iran. Even with these efforts stability may still not “break out” in Yemen, and the Houthis are not likely to surrender the political and territorial gains they’ve earned over the last five years.  

However, as Saudi efforts shift upstream to stem the flow of Iranian aid at its source, the Houthis’ ability, and intent, to threaten American interests in partner nations and the international commons would significantly diminish. Supporting the Saudis in isolating the Houthis from Iran is pragmatic because it balances necessity with available resources and political will. Political support from Congress will be more forthcoming by shifting the focus away from western Yemen itself toward stabilizing the international commons, and broadening the scope to an international effort to eliminate illicit arms shipments and destabilizing influence.

Conclusion

Yemen and Saudi Arabia may be toxic topics in Washington, but ignoring them could be disastrous. If COVID-19 is the domino that turns a humanitarian crisis into widespread fatalities, the United States may be compelled to intervene at great cost and risk. In the event of armed conflict with Iran, western Yemen would be a second front and a second contested maritime chokepoint. Not only would ignoring Yemen allow threats to American interests to grow, it would jeopardize U.S. influence over a key partner in the global energy market. The Saudis demonstrated their clout in April by flooding the market with oil to punish Russia for refusing earlier cuts, with analysts predicting they will win the price war. On Easter, President Trump negotiated a deal for the Saudis to cut production, and while COVID-19 impacts continue to dominate the market, American influence on Saudi Arabia proved critical in softening the blow. Despite our progress toward energy independence, our relationship with the Saudis is still a major factor in our economic health.

Ultimately, the Holy Grail for securing American interests in the Middle East is for partner nations to provide for their own defense. Saudi Arabia is already a cultural and economic heavyweight, and its Vision 2030 has the potential to gradually bring it more in line with western Democratic ideals, and to improve its security and defense institutions. A functional Arab regional security architecture is among the greatest of Iranian fears. In Yemen, the United States can send a strong message to Iran and invest in Saudi Arabia’s future as a regional security leader and sustainably secure American interests more broadly. By doing more now the U.S. can do less in the Middle East in the future.

Iran certainly sees opportunity to sow further instability in the wake of the STC’s separatist declaration in Aden. Tehran will gauge Washington’s reaction closely, and the penalty for inaction on our part could be severe. It is time to decide whether Yemen matters more to us, or more to Tehran.

Jimmy Drennan is the President of CIMSEC. Contact him at President@cimsec.org. These views are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of any government agency.

Featured Image: South-southwest-looking, high-oblique photograph taken during the Hubble Space telescope’s STS-61 servicing mission shows the southwestern Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea. (NASA photo)

Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and Mine Warfare in Littoral Control

Chokepoints and Littorals Topic Week

By Mark Howard

The USMC was recently directed to change its mission focus from countering extremists to great power competition. To this end, numerous studies and guidance have been released, prompting considerable discussion internally and externally to the USMC. One new idea is the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept, the purpose of which is employ Marines as an “inside,” low signature, joint naval force conducting sea control and denial operations in littoral and chokepoint regions.

In reviewing the proposed EABO operations, many different capabilities are mentioned, but one, naval mines, are given scant attention, and to the point of being almost completely ignored. One of the main prerequisites for success in the littorals will be a diverse weapon suite under decentralized command and control.1 However, the 70-page EABO Handbook only mentions naval mines four times.2 Other guiding documents are similarly unhelpful. Force Design 2030 mentions mines twice,3 while Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) mentions them three times.4 Most of these mentions are defensive in orientation or in reference to developing “battlespace awareness in uncertain environments.”5 Naval mines should instead be seen as an integral offensive tool used by EABO commanders to assist them in securing control of chokepoints and littorals.

Naval mines have the ability to shape the battlespace, manage vertical escalation of hostilities, act as cost-effective force multipliers, and are a proven coercive diplomatic tool that can have deep psychological and strategic impact. With advancements in naval mines and the changing naval threat environment, the USMC should reconsider the role of mine warfare to explore how it may complement nascent force development and warfighting concepts.

Mine Warfare and Naval Operations

Traditionally, naval mines have been thought of as being used in unrestricted warfare as a long-term attrition weapon intended to disrupt sea lines of communication for both warships and freighters. While the objectives of maritime warfare in the littorals remain somewhat similar to warfare in the open ocean, there are key differences that can be exploited for advantage.6 

Mining littorals can be accomplished relatively quickly, such as through aerial employment, as there is no complex deployment cycle required or large support bases that need to be in position. As logistically independent weapons, mines can maintain a persistent presence without requiring sustainment support or additional forces. Minefields are especially resilient in that they can easily be reseeded or reinforced from long-range aerial mining. Mining efforts can also be accomplished by either joint or combined operations. Should U.S. forces not be immediately available, mines can be dropped in conjunction with host nations’ forces in anticipation of the arrival of U.S. forces, leveraging partner nation capabilities in forward areas and in terrain they know best.7

Minefields can be sown with the intent to disrupt enemy operations or fix an enemy’s position long enough to allow other friendly assets to deal with the threat. Mines can also be used to force a hostile force at sea to recalculate its intended transit into a route that offers more opportunity for follow-on engagements from friendly units. Lastly, mines can be used in a more traditional manner to positively block and deter any maritime transit.8

Mines do not promote the vertical escalation of hostilities and are inherently a weapon of deterrence. International treaties require that minefields be noticed to all mariners and demand minefields remain under belligerent control. The exact location of minefields must be recorded so the area can be cleared once hostilities have ended.9 Once in place, mines are passive, low-signature, waiting weapons; the enemy must come to them. It is the enemy who must be the aggressor; the one who deliberately chooses to sail into the mined area and therefore shares responsibility for the outcome. Additionally, advanced mines can be set to respond to specific types of vessels, allowing for more flexible responses and strategies that could discriminate between warships and commercial shipping.

Naval mines are especially cost effective, but this has not always worked to their advantage with respect to the attitude of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Historically, mines have been chosen by weaker nations for this very reason of being cost effective, and the stigma of mines being a weapon of the weak remains today. Setting aside the psychological perception, mines have repeatedly demonstrated disproportionate cost advantages, where these advantages work in two directions. Not only are the costs for procuring and employing mines favorable relative to the targets sunk or damaged, but the expenditures the enemy must make to react to the minefield brings a significant cost of its own in resources and time.10 A mine need not even sink a target to achieve its purpose. Damaging a ship could be a better outcome as a damaged vessel requires that a force spend considerable time and resources withdrawing the stricken vessel safely from the area, something the U.S. Navy has seen in its own experience with mine strikes. Historically, one of the most impressive results of efficient mine warfare occurred in the Dardanelles in 1914, when Turkish forces routed the British Royal Navy with a string of only 20 mines.11 

Mines can take the place of other platforms in maintaining sea denial while extending the reach of friendly platforms. Naval mines serve to enhance and extend naval power as a whole.12 Their value also extends deep into second order effects, going far beyond the individual vessels they cripple or sink and into the adversary’s risk calculations and perceptions of access. Often, the psychological impacts of minefields tend to overshadow the actual military threat. Historians regularly comment on how the mere presence of naval mines in contested waters has “most often resulted in extreme political responses or exaggerated psychological reactions,”13 and how the “…psychological impact of the minefield was clear, even if disproportionate to the actual threat.”14

Naval mining operations have strategic value, and are a proven coercive diplomatic tool with an enviable track record. The best example might be the mining of Haiphong Harbor in 1972. The mining campaign helped force a change in the North Vietnamese diplomatic negotiating position concerning the withdrawal of American forces and the timetable for the release of POWs. With the mining of the harbor, “the face-to-face confrontations and the dangers inherent in it could be avoided.”15 Targets and desired effects need not be exclusively military in nature.

Conclusion

The USMC concept of creating an “inside” force to control chokepoint and littoral regions is a solid concept backed with a considerable amount of thought. However, one of the main prerequisites for success will be a suitable and diverse weapon suite that when used effectively, will be able to overcome state or non-state actors bent on controlling the same areas.

But offensive naval mining has received only trivial attention from USMC concepts. It suggests little to no serious consideration has been given to how a mining campaign can prominently feature in contesting chokepoints and littorals.Despite being in a period where budgets are likely to remain flat, if not decline due to severe budgetary pressures, the prominent use of these especially cost-effective weapons has mostly been ignored. For a weapon that has repeatedly demonstrated significant tactical, operational, and even strategic power, this must change.

Mark Howard retired from the Navy as a Commander after 23 years of service. He served as a flight officer in EA-6B Prowlers and is a graduate of the Naval War College with a master’s degree in National Security and Strategic Studies.

Endnotes

1. Milan Vego, (2015), “On Littoral Warfare” Naval War College Review: Vol. 68 : No. 2 , Article 4, pg 16

2. Department of the Navy, (2018), “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) Handbook”, version 1.1, USMC Warfighting Lab, Concepts & Plans Division A

3. Department of the Navy, (2020), “Force Design 2030”, Washington, DC: Commandant of the Marine Corps.

4. Department of the Navy, (2017), “Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment”, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

5. Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, pg. 16

6. Vego, (2015), “On Littoral Warfare”, pg 1

7. National Research Council (2001), “Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces”, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press

8. Joshua Edwards (2019) “Preparing Today for the Mines of Tomorrow,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 72 : No. 3 , Article 5, pgs 5-6

9. David Lets, (2014) “Beyond Hague VIII: Other Legal Limits on Naval Mine Warfare”, Stockton Center for the Study of International Law: Vol 90, Pg 446

10. Andrew Patterson, Jr. (1971), “Mining: A Naval Strategy”, Naval War College Review: Vol. 24 : No. 5 , Article 6, pg 11

11. Sir Julian S. Corbett, (1921), “History of the Great War based on Official Documents, Naval Operations Vol 2”, Longmans, Green and Co., pg 223

12. “Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces”, pg 63.

13. Patterson, Jr. (1971), “Mining: A Naval Strategy”, pg 63

14. Greer, (1997), “The 1972 Mining of Haiphong Harbor: A Case Study in Naval Mining and Diplomacy”, pg 8

15. Ibid.

Featured Image: NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH, Calif. (Jan 17, 2013) Chief Mineman Michael H. Hoffman and Mineman 2nd Class Daniel P. Cadigan go through final checks after building a practice mine at Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist 1st Class Eli J. Medellin)