Chokepoints and Littorals Topic Week

By Captain H. Clifton Hamilton, USMC

Introduction

Strategic chokepoints and littorals are the arena of current and future power struggles. Great power competition is layered within these maritime and littoral domains. To a lesser extent, but still consequential, are the potential actions of regional and non-state actors capable of causing disruption along maritime chokepoints and littoral zones. The United States will be required to address multi-layered challenges to its maritime dominance in these areas while also fulfilling the role of humanitarian and the facilitator of free and open commerce. With technological proliferation and the impact of the speed of information, the United States has its work cut out across several chokepoints of interest.

The Strait of Hormuz

Discussions of chokepoints can begin with the most prominent in the popular consciousness. A narrow shipping route located in the Middle East, 96 miles long and 21 miles wide at its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is one such chokepoint. What also comes to mind are Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait. These countries are all affected by occurrences in the strait, but so is the world more broadly. One-fifth of the world’s oil supply passed through the strait in the 2010s and the strait accounts for one-third of all seaborne trade. The Strait of Hormuz is also a gateway from the Persian Gulf, into the Gulf of Oman and Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and ultimately into the Indian Ocean.

The Strait of Hormuz lacks large population centers in its immediate vicinity, but many of its challenges come from the complex military environment that includes the irregular nature of Iranian forces and tactics. The Iranian lack of conventional parity has encouraged the use of asymmetric tactics to achieve some influence over maritime behavior in the Strait of Hormuz. Examples of their asymmetric tactics include the dubious detention of western naval crew members, harassment of non-allied commercial vessels, and weaponizing small islands. Over the course of the past two decades Iran has seized several western vessels and routinely harasses the maritime interests of perceived anti-Iranian nations. Militarily, Iran has at its disposal small boats swarms, naval mines, anti-ship missiles, and large rockets. Iran has demonstrated the ability to undermine western technological superiority by capturing drones or flying devices below the threshold of detection by western systems. Taken together these threats allow for Iran to credibly harass and inhibit freedom of action by U.S. forces and others.

Through these capabilities Iran has the ability to cause significant disruptions to commercial and energy interests. The United States must maintain a credible deterrent force in the region to assure Iran of American resolve and demonstrate the capability to existentially wreck the Iranian regime. In so doing, a delicate diplomatic dance must also be achieved with regional powers that allows for basing an appropriate collaboration within the broader interests of maritime and energy security. Iranian probes must be met with continued tactical, technological, and strategic innovation. U.S. elements of power must continue to be leveraged holistically in the region to prevent Iranian capability and intent from reaching a critical threshold of disruption.

The Strait of Hormuz presents a vexing problem set, but approximately 1,500 nautical miles away lies another complex chokepoint.

The Bab-El-Mandeb

Departing the Strait of Hormuz and traveling westward one arrives at the Gulf of Aden and an important chokepoint, the Bab-El-Mandeb (BAM). The BAM is the southern gateway into the Red Sea, Gulf of Suez, and the Suez Canal which allows for maritime shipping into the Mediterranean and easy access to European economies. Billions of dollars in maritime trade passes through the BAM yearly. It is also an important trading corridor by being a two-way route for goods ultimately bound for Europe and, as well, from Europe to the East and locations in between. These features present different challenges and threat environments.

While the Strait of Hormuz offers an asymmetric military challenge in a largely isolated arena, the Gulf of Aden and BAM provide security challenges in an environment beset with tottering states and bulging populations. Promoting stability and security near the Horn of Africa requires addressing security needs with economic imperatives to assist countries with internal pressures acting against their stability. Yemen, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia are in the immediate vicinity of this strategic chokepoint. These are all countries in various states of disruption and each represents different peoples, cultures, and particular deficiencies. This area requires strong, extra-regional governments to protect the nearby maritime commons, and their absence necessitates U.S. presence. However, the presence of great power competitors in the region complicates efforts.

China has begun to extend beyond the central Asian states of the old Soviet Union and into the Middle East and Africa. This foray is largely in search of energy and markets to satisfy increasing Chinese domestic demand and industrial capacity. However, the Chinese use diplomacy backed by exploitative economic policies. Exploitation often takes the form of secretive, leveraged commercial agreements between the Chinese government and those of the prospective nations. An example from this region includes the Djibouti port, airport, railway, and water pipeline loans, which were revealed to contain highly dubious terms. The Chinese “policy” of non-interference is rhetorically deployed to cover for mismanagement, corruption, and Chinese-facilitated malfeasance.

The most intransigent issue in the region is piracy and the role of non-state actors. Lawlessness and terrorism combine to form a potent combination in a region ill-suited to weather the disruptions terrorism is designed to manifest. Terrorism and piracy are significant issues to contend with in Somalia and Yemen especially, and they are both producers and exporters of the most virulent disruptions.

The USS Cole attack and several high-profile incidents such as the Red Sea attacks in 2016 highlight the volatility of this area. Planners using a whole-of-government approach must seek solutions to the underlying drivers to the continued unrest in the region and not just military solutions of a more reactive nature. Relationships based on mutual respect and staying power are a strong step in the right direction. Strengthening ties, countering nefarious influences, and combatting nihilistic ideologies will begin to turn the tide. Continued investment in and coordination with legitimate powers focused on improving governance is a key attribute to any approach. Diplomacy, information, and economics backed by strong military action against detrimental forces will create local prosperity that benefits the security of global maritime commons.

Southeast Asia

Some littorals feature breakneck developments in grand strategy and what can appear to be routine technological breakthroughs in capability. The South China Sea (SCS) is one such area. Taking the view of its northern resident, the SCS critically links China to Southeast Asia’s littorals and chokepoints. At either end of the SCS are strategic gateways critical to global commerce. The value of trade passing through the SCS complex is estimated to be over three trillion dollars per year, and the volume of traffic represents approximately one-quarter of global shipping.

Technological, economic, military, and geopolitical strategy are colliding in the SCS. The potential consequences harken to the days of the Cold War, where major military miscalculation could result in a form of mutually assured economic destruction. In this case, great power conflict could drive global chaos by disrupting the flow of shipping through Southeast Asia’s critical chokepoints. Any attempt to overtly exert hegemonic influence would also run against the fiercely independent nature of the countries in this region.

Inflaming these factors are the economic and technological advances in the region. China has taken an outsized lead and is exploiting this advantage to unilaterally impose itself as a de facto governor of the region and exercise veto power over decisions that are well within the sovereignty of other states. These other powers however lack the size, technological sophistication, and economic leverage necessary to counter Chinese influence with impunity.

Besides controlling a key gateway between East and West, establishing a sphere of influence would involve focusing on the possible presence of significant reserves of offshore oil. These resources would be a boon to the country capable of securely staking their share, but China has turned local resource exploitation into an arena for regional competition. It is in China’s interest to weaken both its neighbors’ access to these sources of possible energy independence and strengthen its own control of the maritime gateways to and from Asia.

U.S. national power is fully integrated in the region and must be applied assiduously to an existential threat to the established rules-based order. Security cooperation exercises, economic alliances, increased diplomatic outreach, and leveraging Western strengths can bolster the order against Chinese encroachment.

The Arctic

This next area of the globe is one of the locations of Earth’s harshest environments, largely devoid of life and requiring great efforts for man to survive. Natural planetary evolution and man-made activity are fomenting significant change here. Large energy deposits, emerging swaths of arable land, and newly emerging sea lanes are combining to make the Arctic littorals the location of future great power competition.

The Arctic region is vastly affecting the borders of several countries, some of which have come together in the Arctic Council to discuss activities in this region. Consisting of eight nations, the Arctic council includes the representation of indigenous persons, observer states, and other relevant organizations. However, the reality of its impact is much less sanguine. The council is inspiring, but the Arctic still requires the force of law or a threat of consequence weightier than moral opprobrium to develop peacefully with free and open maritime avenues. Nations and corporations are beginning to stake claims to portions of the Arctic as it becomes accessible to development. Claims to rights and privileges must be legitimately arbitrated and means for commercial security must exist.

Currently U.S. assets and attention lags far behind the greatest competitor in this region, Russia. The U.S. is now re-posturing in the Arctic in response to Russia’s superior icebreaker fleet, its constellation of bases and weapons in the Artic, and a demonstrated willingness to act unilaterally when unchallenged. United States Northern Command, (NORTHCOM), rightly declared the Arctic the first line of defense for the U.S., but much more is required to pose a serious challenge to Russian resurgence in the region.

Conclusion

Promoting maritime security in chokepoints and littorals will require aggressive and novel applications of every element of national power. The increasing importance of alliances and institutions cannot be overstated in this age of increasing technological parity and proliferation. The United Sates has the constellation of allies, domestic strengths, and tools to effectively manage these issues in the strategic chokepoints and littorals of the world.

Captain H. Clifton Hamilton has served in the Marines since 2005. Previous assignments include Information Operations, Recruiting, and various Intelligence billets. He currently serves in III MEF. He is a New Orleans native.

Featured Image: NASA astronaut Scott Kelly, recently past the halfway mark of his one-year mission to the International Space Station, photographed the Nile River during a nighttime flyover on Sept. 22, 2015. (NASA photo)

Chokepoints and Littorals Topic Week

By Drake Long

 In one part of the Southeast Asian epic Sejarah Melayu, the 15^th century Malacca Sultanate receives a lavish gift from the distant emperor of China, then ruled by the Ming Dynasty. The Ming Emperor sent to Malacca a ship filled with precious golden needles, one from each of his subjects, that represented not only China’s vast wealth but also the immense manpower the Emperor held at his disposal. The note accompanying the needles made it clear China had heard about the upstart Malacca Sultanate and wanted to see whether it was a potential rival by requesting tribute in kind for the Ming court that could display Malacca’s power. Much to the Ming Emperor’s surprise, Malacca sent back a ship overflowing with grains from the sago tree, with its emissary declaring that one grain represented one subject. The Ming Emperor concluded that the Sultan of Malacca clearly presided over a populous and powerful country, equal to his own. The addendum to all this is that one sago tree actually produces over a thousand grains at once. These grains, unlike golden needles, are therefore worthless.

This story, while almost certainly fictionalized, illustrates an important lesson for observers watching how certain Southeast Asian states interact with China – flattery is not the same as acquiescence. But it could just as well symbolize the confidence a middling power can have when dealing with a maritime power like the Ming Dynasty, so long as it controls vital, geostrategic waterways – like the Malacca Strait. No one knew this better than the Ming, who gave defense guarantees to Malacca when the Sultanate was threatened by Siam, and whose famed admiral Zheng He frequently stopped in Malacca on his way west.

The might of a treasure fleet, or any fleet for that matter, is mitigated tremendously when the primary route for trade and transportation could be easily shut down. Stability and a cordial relationship with the controller of that chokepoint is paramount. This has not changed in the modern day. The Malacca Strait is absolutely vital to global trade – roughly 25 percent of all goods pass through it – and most any country, including China and the United States, have a vested interest in its security and openness.

The current fear of China is a U.S.-instigated blockade of the Malacca Strait that would starve China of resources and trade – described by Hu Jintao in 2003 as the “Malacca Dilemma.” China has revised its maritime strategy to reflect this. Yet an effective blockade of the Malacca Straits seems unlikely. For one, any blockade would not just affect China, but every country that trades through Southeast Asia. Those neighboring the strait would especially not want to see trade rerouted through the south of Indonesia.

Furthermore, China is hardening itself in the event of a blockade, by seeking out other passages and methods to receive resources. The current pipeline project in Myanmar is one such way China will mitigate its dependence on the Malacca Strait. Overland routes running through Central Asian and Russian parts of the Belt and Road Initiative represent another method.

The Malacca Strait may not actually be the most likely flashpoint in a regional wartime scenario. It is increasingly likely that far from being the target of a blockade, China will be able to impose a blockade instead to isolate an American ally or the U.S. itself and weather the consequences.

However, the unique situation of Southeast Asia is that it holds numerous chokepoints, with Malacca merely being the most expedient of those connecting Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean. What are these other chokepoints, and what value do they hold for the Chinese and U.S. Navies?

Consideration should be paid to the tail-end of the Malacca Sultanate’s reign. There was one naval power the Malacca Sultanate couldn’t stave off, even with its advantageous position. Malacca was ultimately toppled by the Portuguese Empire in the early 16^th century. However, while Malacca was a prime trading post for the Portuguese, they learned the hard way about the consequences of disturbing the peace of this strategic chokepoint. Malacca’s resistance against the Portuguese continued on – but in the form of piracy, denying Portugal the ability to fully benefit from its new conquest.

Going to the present, if a modern wartime scenario pushes the U.S. Navy outside the First (and maybe Second) Island Chain, knowledge and an approach to the straits and chokepoints of Southeast Asia will be vital. No navy in Southeast Asia can operate comfortably without access to these littorals, and no presence guarding them is safe if there is anarchy or hostile actors on the coastlines. These are the areas where land-based, mobile forces can hurt enemy navies in disproportionate ways.

The Marine Corps’ Commandant’s Planning Guidance calls for the creation of “tactical dilemmas” for any enemy navy, and envisions a highly mobile, amphibious force that does not rely on safe escort into a contested area. In practice, that has meant the Marine Corps adopting long-range missile systems that can be moved quickly from shore to shore after firing. In the future, the Marine Corps will likely adapt to a wide-range of vessels, hopping from whatever is available in contested areas to become the “Stand-In Force” envisioned by the Commandant’s Planning Guidance. The chokepoints and littorals surrounding Indonesian and Philippine waters would make for excellent forward positioning for a Marine Corps stand-in force. It would provide a critical bulwark for U.S. force posture in the Pacific by facilitating access for follow-on forces from allied Australia, and access into the South China and Philippine Seas.

Thinking Like a Pirate

In the modern day, pirates exist in the strategic chokepoints of Southeast Asia. A cursory look at where piracy is most active shows how the Malacca Straits and the Sulu Sea stand out as centers for an unusual (but manageable) uptick in maritime crime over the past year. But to be clear, very few incidents meet the legal definition of piracy. Most are more accurately called armed robberies at sea, where they involve coastal attacks or petty burglary of ships in port.

The motivation for these crimes is the same no matter the definition. These chokepoints have heavy traffic in goods and oil, and economic opportunities for coastal communities are relatively scarce. The pattern of piracy throughout the region provides a blueprint for which parts of Southeast Asia are the most strategically vital and provide the best cover for groups on land to attack targets out at sea without repercussion. In the case of the Sulu Sea, the southern Philippines that adjoins it has presented major challenges for law enforcement’s surveillance and human intelligence abilities, not least because of its long-running insurgency. These characteristics kept insurgent groups such as Abu Sayyaf alive and operating transnationally up to the modern day.

In short, the nature of these chokepoints allow non-state actors like pirates to pose a plausible threat to more capable forces, and this provides a blueprint for how the U.S. Marine Corps in particular could approach the PLAN and contested areas. Consider the example of the Sulu Sea.

Around $40 billion worth of trade passes through the Sulu Sea annually, predominantly from Indonesia and Australia. There are few good alternatives to this sea when delivering goods or supplies out of certain centers of commerce and ports, which is why trade continues even when a spate of kidnappings and robberies breaks out in its waters. For Australia, the Sulu Sea is a thread connecting it to Southeast Asia, and as such it has participated in numerous joint patrols and regional anti-piracy efforts.

More pressingly, in the event of the U.S. being pushed out of the First Island Chain by force, the U.S. alliance and facilities on the territory of Australia make that country a likely staging ground for a push back into Southeast Asia’s maritime commons, or wherever the fighting may be. The route for that thrust would likely go through the Celebes and Sulu Seas in the northwest. The U.S. Marines at Darwin will find themselves at the vanguard of this push. This was previously seen during the U.S. offensive on Imperial Japan’s territories during the Second World War, preluded by the Solomon Islands campaign and the Battle of the Coral Sea.

The particular issue is China knows this as well. It is extremely likely that isolating Australia would be a paramount objective for the PLAN in any major wartime scenario, if only to coerce Australia into not hosting additional U.S. forces. This is, among other reasons, why China is pursuing the low-risk high-reward strategy of getting a base or some kind of facility to operate out of in the South Pacific. Threatening Australia’s sea lines of communication going toward Northeast Asia would be a deathblow to Australia’s economy, and narrowing its access to a regional conflict would put pressure on any U.S. and allied forces staged there.

A PLAN blockade or presence near the Sulu Sea is thus likely, as it gives China the ability to economically coerce a trade-dependent and allied maritime state like Australia. It would also keep the pressure on another U.S. treaty ally, the Philippines, whose facilities the U.S. may not even be able to use during wartime or in the beginning stages of a conflict.

However, the areas most trafficked by pirates generally have the safest littoral bases for them to operate out of, and while relevant countries have greatly stepped up their maritime domain awareness in recent years, the PLA may suffer a deficit in intelligence of what is happening beyond the coastline and within densely forested islands. “Hit-and-run” attacks would be difficult to retaliate against effectively, especially if Marine Corps vessels and vertical lift are sufficiently quick enough to lift units and their long-range precision fires out of harm’s way. In addition, borders are infamously porous in these areas where pirates operate, complicating efforts to neatly find their bases, catch them in the act, and apply pressure to their hosts.

Navy ships cannot enter the waters of these chokepoints easily – the Sibutu Passage at the southern end of the Sulu Sea is only about 18 miles wide. If the Navy keeps its distance, merchant marine and smaller vessels are easily threatened without consequence, creating something of a dilemma on when and where to intervene. Terrain knowledge of coastal areas requires knowledge of their communities, which a hostile or occupying force will not get easily or quickly, and the areas around these specific chokepoints like the Sulu Sea are veritable vacuums of information even for law enforcement agencies.

Even in a less ideal scenario, an enemy navy would need to go ashore or be bogged down in the dilemma of dealing with land-based threats to those assets necessary for surveilling the area or an effective blockade. That detracts from other objectives, and would involve a disproportionate amount of resources. Arriving to one end of the Basilan Strait, only to discover the Marines have hopped to the other end, would be immensely frustrating.

One assumption being made is that the future Marine Corps will have some unmanned surface vessels or unmanned underwater vessels as part of its toolkit for operating in a contested domain. The core capabilities of those USVs and UUVs should be ISR and communications. The disadvantage of areas like the Sulu and Celebes Seas is that Marines will face information problems as well. A superior land-based, low-risk ISR capability would lend Marines the ability to target ships at sea, but a strong HUMINT relationship with coastal communities would similarly go a long way toward eluding the enemy and operating effectively in a contested area where the U.S. Navy may be nowhere nearby. It is worth noting these same coastal communities were key to Allied ISR efforts in the Second World War.

Conclusion

The Marine Corps’ future method toward strategic chokepoints and littorals could be taking the pirate’s approach and ramping it up with new weaponry, ships, superior ISR, and tactical creativity. This is not anything regional navies are suited to deal with, and definitely not something an organization like the PLAN would be comfortable responding to given it would require flexibility and initiative at the tactical level that the command-and-control obsessed PLA does not actively nurture.

Taking piracy a bit more literally, Marines could board enemy merchant marine ships operating in the area and inflict material damage to the enemy. However, the ultimate goal for the Marines in a regional conflict where the U.S. lacks sea control will be to use land-based assets to punch a hole through an enemy navy’s sea control, and then facilitate access for a friendly navy to move onto the battlefield. In this vein, the Marine Corps will find a viable operating ground in Southeast Asia’s littorals and chokepoints.

Drake Long (@DRM_Long) is an analyst and reporter covering the South China Sea and Southeast Asian maritime issues for RadioFreeAsia. He is also a 2020 Asia Pacific Fellow for Young Professionals in Foreign Policy.

Featured Image: HAT YAO BEACH, Thailand (Feb. 28, 2020) – A U.S. Marine with Alpha Company, Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, sets security alongside Royal Thai Marines during an amphibious landing for exercise Cobra Gold 2020 at Hat Yao Beach, Kingdom of Thailand, Feb. 28, 2020. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Audrey M. C. Rampton) 200228-M-IP473-1063