Chokepoints and Littorals Topic Week

By Mark Howard

The USMC was recently directed to change its mission focus from countering extremists to great power competition. To this end, numerous studies and guidance have been released, prompting considerable discussion internally and externally to the USMC. One new idea is the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept, the purpose of which is employ Marines as an “inside,” low signature, joint naval force conducting sea control and denial operations in littoral and chokepoint regions.

In reviewing the proposed EABO operations, many different capabilities are mentioned, but one, naval mines, are given scant attention, and to the point of being almost completely ignored. One of the main prerequisites for success in the littorals will be a diverse weapon suite under decentralized command and control.¹ However, the 70-page EABO Handbook only mentions naval mines four times.² Other guiding documents are similarly unhelpful. Force Design 2030 mentions mines twice,³ while Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) mentions them three times.⁴ Most of these mentions are defensive in orientation or in reference to developing “battlespace awareness in uncertain environments.”⁵ Naval mines should instead be seen as an integral offensive tool used by EABO commanders to assist them in securing control of chokepoints and littorals.

Naval mines have the ability to shape the battlespace, manage vertical escalation of hostilities, act as cost-effective force multipliers, and are a proven coercive diplomatic tool that can have deep psychological and strategic impact. With advancements in naval mines and the changing naval threat environment, the USMC should reconsider the role of mine warfare to explore how it may complement nascent force development and warfighting concepts.

Mine Warfare and Naval Operations

Traditionally, naval mines have been thought of as being used in unrestricted warfare as a long-term attrition weapon intended to disrupt sea lines of communication for both warships and freighters. While the objectives of maritime warfare in the littorals remain somewhat similar to warfare in the open ocean, there are key differences that can be exploited for advantage.⁶ 

Mining littorals can be accomplished relatively quickly, such as through aerial employment, as there is no complex deployment cycle required or large support bases that need to be in position. As logistically independent weapons, mines can maintain a persistent presence without requiring sustainment support or additional forces. Minefields are especially resilient in that they can easily be reseeded or reinforced from long-range aerial mining. Mining efforts can also be accomplished by either joint or combined operations. Should U.S. forces not be immediately available, mines can be dropped in conjunction with host nations’ forces in anticipation of the arrival of U.S. forces, leveraging partner nation capabilities in forward areas and in terrain they know best.⁷

Minefields can be sown with the intent to disrupt enemy operations or fix an enemy’s position long enough to allow other friendly assets to deal with the threat. Mines can also be used to force a hostile force at sea to recalculate its intended transit into a route that offers more opportunity for follow-on engagements from friendly units. Lastly, mines can be used in a more traditional manner to positively block and deter any maritime transit.⁸

Mines do not promote the vertical escalation of hostilities and are inherently a weapon of deterrence. International treaties require that minefields be noticed to all mariners and demand minefields remain under belligerent control. The exact location of minefields must be recorded so the area can be cleared once hostilities have ended.⁹ Once in place, mines are passive, low-signature, waiting weapons; the enemy must come to them. It is the enemy who must be the aggressor; the one who deliberately chooses to sail into the mined area and therefore shares responsibility for the outcome. Additionally, advanced mines can be set to respond to specific types of vessels, allowing for more flexible responses and strategies that could discriminate between warships and commercial shipping.

Naval mines are especially cost effective, but this has not always worked to their advantage with respect to the attitude of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Historically, mines have been chosen by weaker nations for this very reason of being cost effective, and the stigma of mines being a weapon of the weak remains today. Setting aside the psychological perception, mines have repeatedly demonstrated disproportionate cost advantages, where these advantages work in two directions. Not only are the costs for procuring and employing mines favorable relative to the targets sunk or damaged, but the expenditures the enemy must make to react to the minefield brings a significant cost of its own in resources and time.¹⁰ A mine need not even sink a target to achieve its purpose. Damaging a ship could be a better outcome as a damaged vessel requires that a force spend considerable time and resources withdrawing the stricken vessel safely from the area, something the U.S. Navy has seen in its own experience with mine strikes. Historically, one of the most impressive results of efficient mine warfare occurred in the Dardanelles in 1914, when Turkish forces routed the British Royal Navy with a string of only 20 mines.¹¹ 

Mines can take the place of other platforms in maintaining sea denial while extending the reach of friendly platforms. Naval mines serve to enhance and extend naval power as a whole.¹² Their value also extends deep into second order effects, going far beyond the individual vessels they cripple or sink and into the adversary’s risk calculations and perceptions of access. Often, the psychological impacts of minefields tend to overshadow the actual military threat. Historians regularly comment on how the mere presence of naval mines in contested waters has “most often resulted in extreme political responses or exaggerated psychological reactions,”¹³ and how the “…psychological impact of the minefield was clear, even if disproportionate to the actual threat.”¹⁴

Naval mining operations have strategic value, and are a proven coercive diplomatic tool with an enviable track record. The best example might be the mining of Haiphong Harbor in 1972. The mining campaign helped force a change in the North Vietnamese diplomatic negotiating position concerning the withdrawal of American forces and the timetable for the release of POWs. With the mining of the harbor, “the face-to-face confrontations and the dangers inherent in it could be avoided.”¹⁵ Targets and desired effects need not be exclusively military in nature.

Conclusion

The USMC concept of creating an “inside” force to control chokepoint and littoral regions is a solid concept backed with a considerable amount of thought. However, one of the main prerequisites for success will be a suitable and diverse weapon suite that when used effectively, will be able to overcome state or non-state actors bent on controlling the same areas.

But offensive naval mining has received only trivial attention from USMC concepts. It suggests little to no serious consideration has been given to how a mining campaign can prominently feature in contesting chokepoints and littorals.Despite being in a period where budgets are likely to remain flat, if not decline due to severe budgetary pressures, the prominent use of these especially cost-effective weapons has mostly been ignored. For a weapon that has repeatedly demonstrated significant tactical, operational, and even strategic power, this must change.

Endnotes

1. Milan Vego, (2015), “On Littoral Warfare” Naval War College Review: Vol. 68 : No. 2 , Article 4, pg 16

2. Department of the Navy, (2018), “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) Handbook”, version 1.1, USMC Warfighting Lab, Concepts & Plans Division A

3. Department of the Navy, (2020), “Force Design 2030”, Washington, DC: Commandant of the Marine Corps.

4. Department of the Navy, (2017), “Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment”, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

5. Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, pg. 16

6. Vego, (2015), “On Littoral Warfare”, pg 1

7. National Research Council (2001), “Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces”, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press

8. Joshua Edwards (2019) “Preparing Today for the Mines of Tomorrow,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 72 : No. 3 , Article 5, pgs 5-6

9. David Lets, (2014) “Beyond Hague VIII: Other Legal Limits on Naval Mine Warfare”, Stockton Center for the Study of International Law: Vol 90, Pg 446

10. Andrew Patterson, Jr. (1971), “Mining: A Naval Strategy”, Naval War College Review: Vol. 24 : No. 5 , Article 6, pg 11

11. Sir Julian S. Corbett, (1921), “History of the Great War based on Official Documents, Naval Operations Vol 2”, Longmans, Green and Co., pg 223

12. “Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces”, pg 63.

13. Patterson, Jr. (1971), “Mining: A Naval Strategy”, pg 63

14. Greer, (1997), “The 1972 Mining of Haiphong Harbor: A Case Study in Naval Mining and Diplomacy”, pg 8

15. Ibid.

Featured Image: NAVAL WEAPONS STATION SEAL BEACH, Calif. (Jan 17, 2013) Chief Mineman Michael H. Hoffman and Mineman 2nd Class Daniel P. Cadigan go through final checks after building a practice mine at Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist 1st Class Eli J. Medellin)

Chokepoints and Littorals Topic Week

By Capt. John Holmes, USMC

“Words are the new weapons, satellites the new artillery… Caesar had his officers, Napoleon his armies, and I have my divisions: TV, news, magazines” –Elliot Carver to James Bond

It’s a strange time in America, and the world at large. Like many Americans during this odd and stressful time, I’ve turned to popular media to take a break from the unrelenting confusion and fear of daily life. One of my favorite pieces of escapism comes in the form of the celluloid adventures of a certain British secret agent codenamed 007, James Bond. My cinematic reveries were interrupted when it became apparent that 1997’s Tomorrow Never Dies, starring Pierce Brosnan as the titular hero, was a lot closer to our current reality than I had ever expected. Themes of great power competition, technological proliferation, state and non-state conflict, media manipulation, and conflict in the strategic waterways and littorals, which may have seemed somewhat out of place in 1997, feel all too prescient in 2020. If the British forces in the film were instead American, then the film makes for a worrisomely plausible prophecy of disaster.

Over a nearly 75-year long career, James Bond has faced KGB assassins, Voodoo priests, ninjas, space hijackers and everything in between. In Tomorrow Never Dies he faces off against…a newspaper publisher. Bond’s adversary in this film, the vicious media baron Elliot Carver (a somewhat frothing caricature of Rupert Murdoch, Ted Turner, and their peers), was indeed mocked as an unlikely or unimposing adversary when the film first premiered. However, he may actually be the most realistic and dangerous adversary Bond has ever faced. While Carver has the requisite heavily armed thugs, ruthless henchmen, and even a stealth boat, these are all largely theater. Carver’s true weapon is information. Control of information represents control of the single greatest resource available. Unlike other resources, information is both a weapon and the battlefield upon which current and future conflicts will play out.

When Tomorrow Never Dies was released, it was much derided, as it seemed that the end of the Cold War left James Bond and those like him without a clear adversary. This actually mirrors the prevailing sentiment of the time, when political scientists around the world were musing about the “End of History” and the “Clash of Civilizations” as opposed to nation-state rivalry and “Great Power Competition” which had shaped the preceding centuries. Despite those optimistic predictions, we find ourselves in a new phase of competition in which the balance of power is becoming increasingly fragile. Compared to the existential threats of the Cold War, Carver’s plan to provoke a war between England and China in order to secure media rights and access to the Chinese market was lampooned as being an unlikely take on the sort of “Yellow Journalism” pedaled by William Randolph Hearst and others prior to the Spanish-American War. In a rather heavy handed moment, Carver even utters Hearst’s famous line “You give me the pictures, and I’ll give you the war.”

In 1997, reviewers and commentators doubted that anyone would be willing to risk a war merely for the sake of ratings. In 2020, every major event, and even most minor ones, is spun in the hopes of increasing the viewership, reach, or influence of some media outlet or another. What was a novel and somewhat unrealistic prospect 23 years ago is today simply the way of the world. Beyond the quest for viewers, followers, likes and so on, modern-day “Great Powers” seek to avoid actual combat while directly and aggressively competing through all other means. Long before triggers are pulled, and even before troops are deployed, the conflict is being waged through all other instruments of national power: diplomatic, economic, and informational. The information environment is a key battleground in which both nation-states and non-state actors, such as Carver’s media empire or home-grown terror and criminal networks, wield nearly equal powers. In this unique environment, non-state actors may have the greater advantage due to a lack of accountability and face few consequences for their actions. Zero accountability, wielded by a nation-state’s proxies, a non-state actor, or even an individual is a powerful weapon. The information environment is the only place where a small group of actors can have such an outsized influence with relative impunity.

Carver’s media empire, encompassing all forms of media available at the time, is portrayed near the start of the film in a memorable character introduction scene. As the scene unfolds his executives and department heads provide an almost comically villainous commentary outlining the next day’s top stories, which include sensationalist reports of war, natural disaster, and civil unrest. Various members of Carver’s team are directed to blackmail prominent heads of state and to accept payment for spreading rumors about Mad Cow Disease. All of this occurs interspersed with scenes of Carver gleefully creating headlines for events that have not happened yet; events which he himself is secretly orchestrating. Of particular interest to Carver is the inciting incident of the film: the sinking of a British destroyer in the South China Sea, and the downing of a Chinese MiG by Carver’s agents in the hopes of stirring up conflict on the eve of the launch of his new satellite network.

Part of Carver’s animosity toward the Chinese comes from the Chinese government refusing to grant him broadcast rights on the mainland. This reflects the Chinese government’s continued real world quest to control all media, within their own borders, and throughout the world at large as well. Due to the Chinese government’s aggressive censorship of the truth, it has become a running joke on the internet that “nothing happened” at Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. In 1997, China was powerful enough to deny broadcast rights to a media conglomerate like the Carver Media Group or its real-life counterparts, but not quite powerful enough to ensure that the offending organization would bend to its will. As the last decade or so of Hollywood kowtowing to China has demonstrated, that era has ended.

Control of information and control of the physical realm go hand in hand. Without information access, there can be no physical access. In previous centuries, this took the form of flattering and paying tribute to local rulers or even the outright theft or seizure of maps and navigational charts. In 2020, the information environment is much more complicated. The interplay of traditional media, social media, internet proliferation, and public diplomacy represent the tenuous balance of power and access in which both nation-states and non-state actors have to navigate through. By comparison, physical navigation through strategic chokepoints seems easy! Carver was ahead of the curve in his realization and understanding of the power of information.

A specific criticism of Carver’s plan in Tomorrow Never Dies is his reliance on traditional media, and later reviewers have argued that in the days of the internet, Carver’s plans would have fallen apart. Of course, these reviews either pre-date or are willfully ignorant of the era of “fake news,” in which incorrect, inaccurate, and/or manipulated information can assume a life of its own. Today it is more than believable that certain media outlets would only require slight nudging for an individual like Carver to achieve his goals. Even if Carver and his plans were fully and directly exposed to the general public (spoilers: they are not), a dedicated cadre of internet dwellers would likely absolve him of any responsibility. Remember that, today 500 years after Ferdinand Magellan circumnavigated the globe, there is a persistent, vocal minority which maintains that we have all been lied to and the earth is flat. If anything, the internet and social media would only make Carver more powerful.

Another relic of the period in the background of Tomorrow is concern over U.S.-Vietnam relations. When, for example, the CIA assists Bond and his Chinese counterpart Wai Lin (played by the incomparable Michelle Yeoh) parachute into the area where the British destroyer sunk, the Americans are greatly concerned about the risk of any equipment with U.S. markings washing ashore in Vietnam. In their defense, the filmmakers could never have guessed that the U.S. and Vietnam would achieve a rapprochement due to their mutual distrust of and competition with China. Infamously, China’s claims in the South China Sea, in which they claim exclusive shipping, fishing, and mineral rights, extend to just outside of Vietnam’s territorial waters. Chinese manmade islands, complete with garrisons, continue to crop up in order to further cement these claims. A theme of the film, which is and will continue to be a critical facet of competition and influence in the littorals and strategic waterways, is the idea of strange bedfellows. A British agent working hand-in-hand with a Chinese one was unusual in 1997, and borderline unheard of in 2020. Instead, the ongoing great power competition will, and must, take on an almost 19th century-esque balance of temporary, regional, and unexpected alliances.

Somewhat amusingly, the aforementioned parachute entry is launched from a “U.S. airbase in the South China Sea,” which an onscreen map reveals to be Okinawa. It wasn’t too long ago that Okinawa was a considered a strategic backwater by both the U.S. and Japan. Now, it has become critical to both U.S. policy and international strategy in the Western Pacific. What’s old is new again, in ways that the originators could hardly imagine. Just recently the U.S. started promulgating the doctrine of expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) and littoral operations in a contested environment (LOCE), last made famous as key components of the Pacific Campaign during the Second World War. Similarly, the concept of control of strategic chokepoints and influence in the littorals is not new either. It was a major feature of both wars and peace in the 18th and 19th centuries and only really fell out of focus at the end of the Cold War.

Some things do, however, change. Tomorrow Never Dies is often cited as one of the more technology heavy James Bond films, and with good reason. Technological advancement and proliferation is such a major feature of our daily life that it can be exhausting trying to keep up with the latest and greatest devices. A passion for the newest and most high-tech gadgets was a big part of the 1990s and Tomorrow Never Dies is definitely representative of this trend. MI6’s long suffering gadget master Q presents 007 with a 90s-era Nokia cellphone which could, among other things, copy fingerprints, pick locks, stun adversaries, and remotely drive his car. Other than fully displaying Hollywood’s fascination in the 90s with gadgets and technologies, this served as a metaphor for the oncoming prevalence and dominance of technology. In 1997, cell phones were still fairly new to the general public. Perhaps the filmmakers got the application wrong, but they were definitely on to something with the power of a cell phone in one’s pocket.

In the opening sequence of the film, Bond surveils a weapons bazaar on the Russian border. Eventually, Bond must intervene to ensure that an airstrike does not accidently trigger a pair of nuclear torpedoes. In the ensuing chaos, one of Carver’s more unassuming henchmen, Henry Gupta, escapes. Touted as one of the world’s top “techno-terrorists,” Gupta makes off with a GPS encoder which, when compared to the recovery of the nuclear weapons, is considered a minor loss. The folly of this is assumption is soon made apparent. Carver uses his satellite network to spoof Royal Navy GPS signals causing a British destroyer to wander into Chinese territorial waters. The destroyer is then buzzed by Chinese MiGs which order the ship to turn back. The British sailors check the GPS signal, which displays a false position, and assume that the Chinese are posturing. It was probably unnecessary for Carver’s henchmen to then manufacture a crisis by sinking the destroyer and shooting down one of the MiGs, as tensions were already high.

GPS spoofing or jamming was a novel concept in the late 1990s. Most considered the risk to consist of nothing more than getting units lost or mass formations being unable to coordinate. In the last few years, however, it has become a significant concern in areas of competition such as the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, and of course the South China Sea. In 2020 this type of interference is performed by nation-states or third parties acting on behalf of nation-states. Consider, however, the Chinese territorial claims mentioned above, and the tendency of both Russian and Chinese aircraft to buzz U.S. and partner nation ships and aircraft. Such situations could easily and quickly escalate. It would likely not take the presence of a hostile stealth boat to tip ongoing tensions into open conflict; just a nudge in the right direction. With appropriate spoofing, both sides could have justifiable grievances; one arguing that their territorial sovereignty was violated and the other using position reports to contest that fact.

Carver’s ultimate weapon is information, not his stealth ship, or later, his stolen missiles. As quoted above, he views satellites as “…the new artillery.” It is the launch of his worldwide satellite network which serves as the background against which he instigates a conflict between China and Britain. Carver’s private satellite network, and its ability to communicate with the entire world, is portrayed as somewhat momentous and vaguely sinister while simultaneously being entirely plausible and slightly banal. This is far cry from the previous film in the series, in which a satellite weapon designed by the Soviet Union functions as a doomsday device. It was not long ago that satellite launches were exclusively the provenance of nation-states. Today, any company, group, or individual with the appropriate means can contribute to the increasingly crowded skies. With no real way to monitor what is in orbit or what capabilities these satellites have, the potential for control, communications, surveillance, interference, and any number of benevolent or nefarious actions is nearly unlimited. Bond probably didn’t realize how correct he was when he flippantly identified satellite networks as an incredible tool for disinformation.

One of the more unbelievable aspects of Tomorrow Never Dies is that Carver elects to conduct his final operations aboard his stealth ship, in hope of witnessing the start of a war between China and England. While this fits with his megalomaniacal personality, it’s very unlikely that he would be willing to risk even minor discomfort, let alone his potential death at the hands of a British secret agent. He easily could have (and as it turns out should have) observed the operation from his headquarters in Germany or his local affiliate in Ho Chi Minh City (referred to as Saigon in the film). As a media mogul and technologically savvy individual, Carver should have known that control and influence no longer require a physical presence. While a physical presence is an excellent way to monitor a nation-state’s interests, it is hardly cost effective in all cases and represents only part of the battle. If access is the goal, then the majority of the action must happen miles away, in the information environment.

Hopefully, the age of mercantilist skirmishes on the high seas to control access and resources are over. At the current moment, China’s only aircraft carrier routinely conducts patrols in the South Pacific to great fanfare every time it leaves port, never mind the fact that U.S. aircraft carriers and other warships are almost constantly stationed in this area. The purpose of having carriers and other ships in that region, and most other regions of the world, is not to directly contest with the ships of other navies, but rather to project a presence. No nation has the ability to station troops and assets around the world at all times in sufficient force to directly control its interests. By contrast, competition and influence through information and technology is bargain-priced. For far less than the cost of a carrier strike group, a nation or individual can exert an extremely outsized influence without ever having to set foot in the contested region. When Carver smugly declares that he desires “worldwide domination,” this is what he means. While 30 years ago that might have meant shattering armies and planting flags in opposing capitals, in 2020 he who controls the information controls the world.

By the time competition in the littorals and strategic waterways devolves into active combat, the majority of the fighting has already occurred outside of the physical realm. Tomorrow Never Dies demonstrates just how little it may take to push us in that direction. A slightly amoral media outlet looking to make a point may have a significant impact on the world even if they aren’t as openly villainous as Carver. In the end, Carver’s most imposing henchmen are not the gun-toting goons, but rather the media department heads who appear only briefly at the beginning of the film. They represent an interplay of information, media, and technology which not only shapes public opinion but also creates it.

In a time when people are more interconnected than ever, the power of information is paramount. Information is both the current battlefield and the most precious global commodity. There can be no freedom of physical navigation without freedom of operation in the information environment. By the end of Tomorrow Never Dies, even the good guys seem to have learned this lesson, as Bond’s boss dictates a press release announcing Carver’s death in a “boating accident.” We must understand that the confluence of competition in the littorals and strategic waterways along with the competition in the information environment run together to create an increasingly tenuous balance of power between the great powers. And while we may not always have a gentleman-spy to help us navigate away from a potential disaster, there are more than a few media outlets and information brokers, both state and non-state, who seek to profit by steering us in the opposite direction.

Captain Holmes is an Assault Amphibian Vehicle Officer and Psychological Operations Officer assigned to II MEF Information Group and currently attached to the 22d MEU/SPMAGTF CR-AF. Previous assignments have included both the First and Third Marine Divisions. The views expressed here are his own and do not represent those of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Featured Image: Elliot Carver’s stealth ship from “Tomorrow Never Dies” (via jamesbond.fandom.com)

Chokepoints and Littorals Topic Week

By Ian Birdwell

In a speech to the Arctic Council during the 11^th Ministerial Meeting in Rovaniemi, Finland, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo railed against a critical security problem for the United States in the Arctic region: Russian Militarization.¹ Pompeo argued “No one denies Russia has significant Arctic interests…But Russia is unique. Its actions deserve special attention, special attention of this Council, in part because of their sheer scale. But also because we know Russian territorial ambitions can turn violent.”

As the Arctic has warmed, the once ice-locked Russian northern coast has become an emerging strategic zone of littorals and chokepoints for global trade, with the potential to shorten the transit time from Rotterdam to Shanghai by thousands of nautical miles. It is already in use.² As the ice has warmed and regional interest has grown from powerful states like China, Russian forces have expanded their regional presence to reinforce territorial claims and assist vessels transiting the emerging Northeast Passage as part of the general modernization of Russian military forces.³ Despite these objectives, Russian Arctic militarization holds the potential to kick off a regional arms race. The reopening of Soviet-era Arctic installations and the construction of Arctic patrol vessels does correspond to the overall reinvigoration of the Russian Military; however, a comparison to equivalent American arctic capabilities evokes the kind of fears highlighted by Pompeo in his address. The most severe technological indication of American military under-preparedness remains the “icebreaker gap” of ice-capable and icebreaker vessels, with two American ice-capable vessels arrayed against Russia’s expanding fleet of more than 40 ships. For comparison China maintains two such vessels.⁴

The situation is not wholly grim when considering the growing interest of the American military toward the emerging Arctic security environment, with the U.S. Marine Corps having participated in a joint-training operation with Norway and the U.S. Navy sending a patrol into the Barents Sea after years of absence.⁵ However there are varied challenges for the United States’ ability to effectively address the region, including domestic financial concerns which killed the last push for a new icebreaker, balancing the internal politics of NATO regarding the Arctic, and policy stagnation at the highest levels of government with respect to the Arctic.⁶ Each of these factors leaves American policymakers in a lurch regarding the region which makes funding new Arctic capabilities problematic.⁷ With increasing Russian capabilities, growing global interest from states like China, and American security risks all increasing as the sea ice of the region melts away, the question remains of how the United States could best address the rising militarization of the Arctic.

The most effective direction for American policy in the region should be the signaling of a strong commitment by emphasizing the preparedness of existing U.S. expeditionary forces for Arctic operations, rather than the development of uniquely Arctic security capabilities. The focus on increasing the preparedness of existing forces rather than developing Arctic-specific forces or structures enables a more ready tackling of existing inhibitors to American Arctic security policy development, and it does so in three critical ways. First, it prevents the abandonment of cooperative regional pursuits. Next, it enables an adaptive response to shifting regional dynamics. Third, it prioritizes existing security arrangements without straining alliances.

The Arctic represents one of the few regions of the world where strategic adversaries will routinely cooperate and support the exact same scientific projects. This cooperative arrangement has been beneficial for all parties within the Arctic Council, the principle institutional mechanism for research cooperation on Arctic issues.⁸ Though the number of American allies and friends outweighs adversaries on the Council, the three legally binding agreements for the region have come from joint negotiations between the United States and Russia.⁹ American policy on the Council has been that of a patron alongside Russia in order to formulate policy and support research endeavors, with the critical aspect of the Council being that of the exclusion of security and territorial discussions.¹⁰ If the United States makes overtures to increase Arctic-specific military preparedness to balance against Russian capabilities, such as new ice-capable patrol vessels or icebreakers, the successes of the Arctic Council could be put into jeopardy as the Council has expressly avoided discussions of territorial disputes and security.¹¹

Instead of developing Arctic-specific capabilities the U.S. military should instead pursue the readying of existing military forces for Arctic operations through training missions and the development of doctrine for Arctic operations, as these shifts will have the benefit of being able to tamp down considerations of a full-on Arctic arms race. Developing military capability solely for Arctic use could upset one of the few areas of positive interaction left for the U.S. relationship with Russia given the continual tension in other regions like Eastern Europe and the abandonment of other cooperative frameworks such as nuclear arms control.¹² Moreover, given the American reliance on the Arctic Council to develop new policies for myriad agencies other than the American military, the preservation of funding for Arctic research and access to data from the Russian Arctic is critical to maintain American Arctic policy trajectories given the stagnation in Arctic policy since 2013.¹³ It becomes critical for the future of American policy development in the region as a whole to preserve the balance within the Arctic Council and not exacerbate the rising security challenges stemming from Russian militarization.

The Arctic’s marine environment is one defined by sea ice, and this highlights the second reason why the United States should be signaling regional commitment through an emphasis on regional preparedness and training rather than the more hardline approach of developing unique equipment for regional operations. Russian preparedness for Arctic operations is by far the most developed of all Arctic littoral states for white-water surface naval operations, despite the aged nature of the fleet and the superiority of American forces in traditional blue-water environments.¹⁴ The American focus on surface vessels for the Arctic region have largely downplayed or ignored the enormity of the financial burden to construct, crew, and berth an American white-water fleet. The cost of operations within the region for surface vessels is simply too much to bear for the U.S. government as other regions continually take greater priority.¹⁵ Instead, the U.S. Navy should rely on existing vessels with more extensive Arctic operations experience to project American security and signaling to the region: the submarine fleet. Extensive institutional experience from ballistic missile submarines and scientific research expeditions enables the American submarine fleet to be the primary agent for American Arctic security signaling.¹⁶

The Barents Sea represents the area most likely to become a flashpoint between the United States and Russia due to the presence of significant fisheries, oil resources, and the uneasy security situation between Norway and Russia.¹⁷ The Barents Sea is warming especially quickly and its proximity to the primary berths of the Russian Northern Fleet makes it a prominent area of potential conflict, significantly reducing the need for the pursuit of ice-capable vessels for the U.S. Navy.¹⁸ Posturing in northern Scandinavia with a defensive orientation utilizing traditional land, air, and sea forces will help contest the entrance of the Barents into the Norwegian Sea.¹⁹

These chokepoints are critical beyond military action as well, especially for maintaining mariner safety within them as the Arctic warms.²⁰ Some of the most critical negotiations involving military activities regarding the Arctic have been related to coordination for search and rescue operations critical for expanded fishing and commercial routes. Given the chokepoints of the region are contested on either end of the Northern Sea route, the development of a white water navy would inhibit communal policy goals of regional economic development through arms racing rather than protect them. For instance, with half of the Bering Strait American and half Russian, a healthy relationship between the two coast guards is critical for the security of all mariners transiting the strait in order to have it become economically viable as safety considerations dominate the minds of merchant vessels entering this hazardous region.²¹

NATO has and will continue to be one of the most important partners for the United States, and though the organization appears monolithic it is not without challenges. The internal politics of NATO states informs their decision-making in critical respects regarding the Arctic, and especially regarding Russia in the Arctic. The most visible of such considerations involves Canada, which due to a confluence of issues related to Russian and American relations has been less than thrilled of the prospects of the United States spearheading NATO presence in the Arctic because of the possibility of eroding Canadian sovereignty regarding the Northwest Passage by the U.S. and other states.²² The status of the passage has been a contentious domestic political issue for every Canadian administration since the late 1990s. If the United States begins developing new ice-capable military patrol vessels or insists on forming a NATO maritime group, it could be seen as eroding Canadian regional sovereignty and cause a disagreement to flair between Ottawa and Washington.²³ Given the Russian method of attempting to play Western allies off one another, such a disagreement would add fuel to Moscow’s efforts and further endanger coordination.²⁴

A more moderate approach of pursuing national security objectives would be through bilateral and multilateral training and coordination with Arctic partner states like Canada and Norway.²⁵ Emphasizing regional partnerships by increasing visible proposals of joint training operations and American force readiness for potential deployment would be useful in signaling commitment to defending American interests in the emerging strategic chokepoint without stepping on the toes of strategic partners. The aforementioned speech by Secretary of State Pompeo came just months after such training operations occurred bilaterally with the U.S. Marine Corps and Norwegian military in February 2019, and a year before scheduled regional NATO exercises proposed by Norway.²⁶ Leaning on the proposals of NATO members like Norway on critical issues like Arctic preparedness removes the risk of the United States irritating critical regional actors while removing a degree of culpability for escalating the militarization of the region. Instead, visibly preparing for Arctic operations through training initiatives pursued bilaterally with Arctic states and multilaterally through NATO emphasizes a whole-of-region response to regional security issues while sharing associated costs.

Conclusion

The Arctic is changing physically and the security dimensions of the region are changing along with it. The region will not be ice-free overnight, and the United States is not without partners in addressing those changing strategic considerations. It behooves the United States to not pursue a hardline balancing arrangement against Russian militarization and instead pursue what it has been doing for some time, preparing for the potential of Arctic operations across all service branches. The pursuit of this policy perspective will signal American commitments to regional security without exacerbating the militarization of the Arctic into a full blown arms race, enabling an emerging littoral to be sufficiently addressed without intensifying competition within one of the most peaceful and cooperative regions of the world. 

Ian Birdwell is a Ph.D. Student at Old Dominion University’s Graduate Program in International Studies. His research focuses on the exploration of the motivations behind the pursuit of Arctic security, how identity factors into the cultivation of regional habits, and the impacts of emerging trade routes on global power dynamics.

Links

1. https://www.state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-focus/

2. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/02/ice-melting-arctic-transport-route-industry/

3. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-arctic-insight/putins-russia-in-biggest-arctic-military-push-since-soviet-fall-idUSKBN15E0W0; https://www.csis.org/events/russian-defense-expenditure-and-military-modernization

4. https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/the-icebreaker-gap-doesnt-mean-america-is-losing-in-the-arctic/

5. https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-military/2019/03/29/new-marine-rotation-arrives-in-norway-as-corps-preps-for-a-cold-weather-fight/; https://www.navytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/05/04/us-navy-surface-ships-enter-the-barents-sea-for-the-first-time-since-mid-1980s/

6. https://www.csis.org/analysis/implications-us-policy-stagnation-toward-arctic-region; https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/1793/attachments/original/1505784594/NATO_Canada_and_the_Arctic.pdf?1505784594

7. https://www.csis.org/analysis/implications-us-policy-stagnation-toward-arctic-region

8. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/brief-history-arctic-council-infographic/

9. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/form-function-future-arctic-council/; Wilson Rowe, Elana, and Helge Blakkisrud. The Arctic Council and US domestic policymaking. Policy Brief, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2019.

10. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y

11. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/form-function-future-arctic-council/

12. https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/why-are-us-russia-relations-so-challenging/

13.  https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/0143A277BC17E5E53F9A5B8A38C55302/S0032247418000219a.pdf/united_states_and_the_making_of_an_arctic_nation.pdf

14. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-most-prepared-nation-fight-and-win-arctic-war-150596

15. https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Tab_A_Arctic_Report_Public.pdf

16. https://www.navy.mil/docs/USN_arctic_roadmap.pdf

17. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/05/04/russia-trails-first-us-warships-in-barents-sea-since-1980s-a70181

18. https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-how-atlantification-is-making-the-arctic-ocean-saltier-and-warmer

19. https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/the-icebreaker-gap-doesnt-mean-america-is-losing-in-the-arctic/

20. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45527531; https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/complexities-arctic-maritime-traffic/

21. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-arctic-strategy-maritime-shipping-part-iv/; https://www.newsweek.com/us-russia-train-together-arctic-1443438

22. https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/1793/attachments/original/1505784594/NATO_Canada_and_the_Arctic.pdf?1505784594

23. https://nationalpost.com/opinion/matt-gurney-canadas-defence-free-ride-is-ending-and-our-sovereignty-could-be-at-stake;

24. https://jamestown.org/program/russias-arctic-agenda-and-the-role-of-canada/

25. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/world/europe/global-warming-russia-arctic-usa.html

26.  https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2100494/us-forces-to-hone-arctic-warfare-skills-in-norways-high-north-in-exercise-cold/; https://forsvaret.no/en/coldresponse

Featured Image: Russian Arctic Brigade troops (Photo: mil.ru)