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Arctic

The Arctic is a Strategic Distraction

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By T.X. Hammes

Over the past five years, numerous articles have called for increased U.S. defense resources focused on the Arctic. This is a strategic mistake, a distraction.

This article will outline the reasons proponents feel the high north has increased value, examine the actual strategic value of each, and show that none is sufficient to divert scarce resources from higher value theaters. Strategy should serve as an appetite suppressant to keep the nation from committing to peripheral missions at the expense of critical ones.1

The 2024 Department of Defense (DOD) Arctic Strategy was justifiably “prudent and measured,” limiting DOD actions to enhancing domain awareness, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. It planned to work with Allies and partners to uphold deterrence and homeland defense.2 The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy did not mention the Arctic.3 In contrast, proponents agitate for the United States to dedicate increased defense assets to maintain access to its vast natural resources, exploit the increased economic and shipping opportunities, and provide for national defense.

Unfortunately, the Joint Force is already overtasked in trying to meet its global and domestic missions while rebuilding the force. It is therefore prudent to examine the actual value of the far north before committing scarce resources to what is, at best, a strategic distraction.

A potential new trade route

The most exaggerated claim concerns the value of the Arctic as shortened and hence cheaper shipping routes between Asia and Europe. Many stories tout the speed and value of the shorter route for Asia to Europe shipping.4

While factual, these stories exaggerate both the volume and the value of shipping using the northern routes. To evaluate the real value of these routes, it is essential to understand their current usage and the limits that geography and oceanography impose. Figure 1, below, illustrates both routes.

Figure 1: Arctic Sea Routes. (Photo source: Arctic Council Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report.)

The Congressional Research Service notes:

“The Northern Sea Route (NSR, a.k.a. the ‘Northeast Passage’), along Russia’s northern border from Murmansk to Provideniya, is about 2,600 nautical miles in length…Most transits through the NSR are associated with the carriage of LNG from Russia’s Yamal Peninsula…The Northwest Passage (NWP) runs through the Canadian Arctic Islands…potentially applicable for trade between northeast Asia (north of Shanghai) and the northeast of North America, but it is less commercially viable than the NSR.”5

While this description sounds promising, it is important to understand the current and potential flow of shipping, the nature of containerized shipping, and the impact of oceanography on its future growth.

Almost all of the Northwest Passage lies within Russia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Russia also claims that key straits on the route lie within its internal waters.6 See Figure 2, below.

Figure 2: Northern Sea Route in Russian Waters. (Photo source: Andrew Todorov, “New Russian Law on Northern Sea Route Navigation: Gathering Arctic Storm or Tempest in a Teapot?” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, March 9, 2023.

Thus, almost all transits must pass through straits Russia claims as internal waters. Russia has assigned responsibility for managing the NSR to Rosatom, the state-owned nuclear power monopoly, which complicates obtaining the required permission for internal passage. In 2022, Russia also claimed the Lomonosov Ridge, a subsea mountain range, as part of its continental shelf. This pushes its claimed EEZ boundaries to the edge of those areas claimed by Greenland and Canada. See Figure 3, below.

Figure 3: Arctic Nations Territorial Claims. (Photo source: Ian Birdwell, “Rival Claims to a Changing Arctic,” Maritime Executive, August 15, 2016.)

The percentage increase in shipping along these routes may sound very impressive, but only because the baseline was miniscule. Actual shipping remains minimal. The Centre for High North Logistics recorded only 97 voyages on the NSR during 2024.7 See Figure 4, below.

Figure 4: NSR Transits by Type in 2024. (Photo source: “Main Results of NSR Transit Navigation in 2024,” Centre for High North Logistics, NORD University, November 28, 2024)

Despite continued official Chinese and Russian efforts to promote the route, as of August 31, 2025, only 52 vessels had transited the NSR. Container freight represented only 20 percent of the total. See Figure 5, below.

Figure 5: NSR transits by type through August 31, 2025. (Photo source: “Overview of Transit voyages along the Northern Sea Route as of August 31, 2025,” Centre for High North Logistics, NORD University, September 1, 2025.)

Further restricting traffic growth, in October 2025, four of the world’s five biggest container shipping companies — MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company, A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S, CMA CGM SA and Hapag-Lloyd AG — stated they will not use the NSR due to environmental, safe navigation, and transit issues. The fifth company, Cosco Shipping, a Chinese company, has not made a statement.8

The Northwest Passage supports even less shipping than the NSR. As the 2024 shipping season concluded only 18 ships completed the full journey – eight cruise ships, nine cargo ships and one tanker.9

Factors restricting the value of shipping via NSR or NWP

Several major and enduring factors – draft restrictions, unpredictable sea ice, the requirement for ice breakers, and higher cost per container–reduce the economic viability of these routes.

Draft restrictions

Arctic hydrography is particularly restrictive for commercial shipping. The NSR has a controlling draft of 12.5 meters and the NWP is limited to 10 meters. This means the Panamax-class (5,500 TEU maximum) is the largest that can use the NSR but they draw too much water for the NWP. In addition, ships may not have a beam of more than the ice breaker escorting them, or about 30 meters maximum.10

In August 2025, the NEWNEW company proudly announced it had increased its NSR traffic from 7 voyages in 2024 to 13 voyages in 2025. In those 13 trips, it carried a total of around 20,000 TEUs.11 For comparison, the Inira-class carries over 24,000 TEUs on a single voyage. From January 2022 to April 2024, over 800 ships per week transited the Cape of Good Hope and Suez Canal,12 for a yearly total of over 41,000 transits. More ships pass the Cape every 11 hours than use the NSR in a year and many are much larger than the Panamax-class.

Unpredictable Sea Ice

While Arctic Sea ice is steadily receding, this does not mean passages are necessarily or predictably clear. Sea ice moves with prevailing currents with thicker multi-year ice moving into areas where one year ice has melted. As such, moving multi-year ice often stacks up in restricted waters. The NASA image (Figure 6 below) shows how the melting ice on the NWP flows east and closes the route despite major reductions in total ice coverage. It led NASA to conclude:

“Despite overall declines in the thickness and extent of Arctic sea ice, shipping routes along the northern coast of North America have become less navigable in recent years.”13

Figure 6: Sea Ice Chokes the Northwest Passage. (Photo source: “Sea Ice Chokes the Northwest Passage,” NASA Visible Earth, August 8, 2024.

The fact that the sea ice floats means it is very difficult to predict exactly where the passage will be blocked. This problem is not limited to the NWP. As late as September 2025, “a non ice-class Suezmax oil tanker has been forced to wait several days due to ice conditions before proceeding along Russia’s Northern Sea Route…at very slow speeds in close proximity to the shoreline to find a route through the ice.”14 Even ice rated ships are often delayed, the Buran, an Arc4 rated Liquid Natural Gas tanker “reached the Northern Sea Route north of the Bering Strait on October 29 and for the past three days has been struggling to find a path through early winter sea ice.”15

Compounding the problem of drifting ice, the routes have notoriously shallow water. The channels are not well marked and still surprise mariners. On September 7, 2025, the Thamesborg, a Dutch bulk freighter, ran aground in the remote Franklin Strait of the NWP. It required three salvage ships to refloat the Thamesborg.16 The vessel was not unloaded and refloated until October 9 – a delay of 33 days. Canadian Coast Guard inspections also revealed damaged ballast tanks.17

In addition to ice, Arctic weather ranging from storms to heavy fog often slows transiting ships. While delays are not a significant problem for bulk shipping, they have major impacts on the timeliness required for container freight.

Icebreaker requirements

Paradoxically, as the arctic ice cap is melting, the demand for icebreakers is surging. Russia has 47 in service with 15 under construction. Canada is funding two dozen new ones. Both nations require numerous ice breakers to support domestic industries in their EEZs.

In contrast, the United States currently has two icebreakers with one of those used primarily as a research vessel. The U.S. Coast Guard has also purchased a used icebreaker and hopes to have it in operation by 2026.18 Although the Coast Guard analysis indicated it would only need three heavy and three medium icebreakers, on October 10, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security announced the United States and Finland have signed a Memorandum of Understanding for a Finnish company to produce four icebreakers with the next seven being produced in U.S. shipyards.19Given only 18 NWP passages in 2024, it is unclear why the United States needs to increase its icebreaker fleet from two to 11. 

Cost

Proponents of Arctic shipping routes note that shorter northern routes will mean lower costs. Unfortunately, several factors mean the cost of shipping individual containers will often be higher. Draft restrictions, lack of ports enroute, slow emergency response, stricter construction requirements, specialized crew training, ice breaker escorts, and insurance costs all contribute to higher cost per container. While the cost of an individual ship’s voyage may be less on a shorter route, the Thamesborg and Lynx show a shorter route does not necessarily mean it is cheaper or even faster.

Bulk cargo is usually shipped point to point so can benefit from a shorter route. Obviously, it makes sense to ship coal, LNG, and oil that is produced in northern Russia to China or India via the NSR. However, due to economies of scale, bulk cargo originating elsewhere may be cheaper to ship via the much larger ships that can transit southern routes. Not only are Arctic-capable ships much smaller, but they must also meet strict construction, outfitting, and crew training requirements which make them more expensive to purchase and operate. Due to the route hazards, insurance rates are also higher. Further inflating the cost per voyage is the requirement for ice breaker escorts. Both Canada and Russia charge each vessel for icebreaking services.20

For its part, container shipping has different cost factors. The most important metric is the cost per container rather than the cost of the voyage for an individual ship. Thus, scale is an important factor.

A second critical metric for container freight is timeliness. Unlike either northern route, southern routes can be part of a shipping network. This is critical for on-time delivery and economy of scale. The desired standard for on-time delivery for containerized freight is 99%. To achieve this goal, container ships operate in networks with “strings” or routes of many ports serviced by multiple ships on a steady schedule. For example, a US east coast to Southwest Asia route taking 42 days round trip serviced by six ships means regular weekly service out of the ports serviced on that route.21

The network described limits delays to a week. Today, much of the global economy consists of subcomponents built in one country, shipped to a second for final assembly of the subcomponents, and then on to another country for inclusion in the final product. Such supply chains are based on just-in-time delivery. As the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated, failure to deliver on time means production lines must be idled, making reliable delivery time critical. As noted, the unpredictable sea ice, infrequent sailings, and often brutal weather on the northern routes reduce reliability. Given the northern routes cover 2,500 miles with minimal infrastructure or support services, weeks-long delays are not unusual.

Access to natural resources

Minerals, particularly those yielding rare earth metals, are often touted as the primary resources of interest in the north. In fact, the Geological Survey of Norway estimated the value of rare earth minerals in the Arctic alone is $1.5-2 trillion.22 However, most of the minerals lie within the Exclusive Economic Zones of the six nations bordering the Arctic — Russia, Norway, Denmark, Canada, the United States, and Iceland. Any exploitation will be done by those nations, and so there is no special urgency to secure them against competitors. Figure 3 shows how only a small slice of the Arctic Ocean lies outside national EEZs. A paper from the Institute for Security & Development Policy also noted:

“Overall, the High North’s … resources have long attracted global interest, but their exploitation is technologically difficult and capital-intensive, and often faces local resistance due to risks to nature-based livelihoods and cultural heritage. … In short, the Arctic’s mineral wealth is both enormous and yet largely untapped…”23

Just as important, rare earths are not rare. The High North is estimated to hold only 15 percent of the world’s supply.24 In fact, in the last year major deposits have been found in Wyoming and Arkansas; these deposits have the obvious advantage of easier access. The issue is not the ore but the refining process. Currently most rare earth minerals are shipped to China for refinement into rare earth metals. If the United States continues to invest in refining facilities, supplies of rare earths will not be an issue.

Oil is another driver of interest. According to the U. S. Geological Service “roughly 22 percent of the undiscovered, technically recoverable fossil fuel resources in the world” may remain in the Arctic with 84 percent of it outside the Exclusive Economic Zones of Arctic nations.25

However, the high production cost of High North oil meant the United States government received no bids in the January 2025 Alaska Wildlife Refuge lease sale.26 Apparently, oil firms have decided it makes no economic sense to invest in very high-cost production when there is still oil in fields with much lower production costs. Russian firms are the obvious exceptions. As state-controlled firms, they must continue to invest onshore in the north of the country. Oil revenues are essential to the Russian economy and government budget.

National Security

Two threads emerge from the discussion of the need for U.S. defense of the High North. The first is the need for surveillance to detect any Russian attack coming over the pole. The second concern is the security of Greenland, Svalbard, and the protection of shipping routes.

During the Cold War, the United States and Canada operated the Defense Early Warning (DEW) radars from 1957 to 1985 to provide warning of Soviet bomber and missile attacks over the pole. From 1985 to 1988, DEW transitioned to the North Warning System (NWS). The NWS provides surveillance for the atmospheric defense of North America. Today, the United States and Canada are working to improve the surveillance element of missile defense. Re-establishing the radar system in the High North will be an extremely difficult, very expensive, and time-consuming project.27 A potential alternative is space surveillance. The Pentagon is already exploring deploying space-based sensors as part of the Golden Dome. If this very expensive project continues, it will provide the surveillance aspect of the DOD tasks.

The sudden concern that the United States must field and deploy forces to physically defend Greenland, Svalbard, and the new shipping routes is a bit puzzling. By holding the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap, NATO credibly defended the western exit from the High North throughout the Cold War against a highly capable Soviet Navy. Even with global warming, the Gap will remain Russia’s best exit to the west. In the east, the Bering Strait is about 50 miles wide with two islands in the middle.

In fact, the most significant change since the Cold War has been the steady decline of the Russian forces in the region. “Decades of attrition, neglect, and resource depletion have left Russia’s Arctic capabilities outdated and functionally broken.”28 Against the degraded Russian air and sea forces, land-based missiles and drones can provide an affordable option. There is no requirement for U.S. or allied forces to penetrate the NSR. Containerized land-based missiles, drones, radar, command and control systems integrated with space-based surveillance can allow U.S. and allied forces to engage surface ships and aircraft transiting the Arctic. In short, the United States and its allies can control traffic that attempts to leave the Arctic. These systems can also support the most challenging mission – tracking and, if needed, engaging Russian submarines.

Conclusion

Strategy should provide discipline to guide the investment of limited defense resources. Proponents of investing in capabilities focused on the High North point to defending Greenland and Svalbard; balancing the increased Chinese and Russian interests in the region; maintaining access to its vast natural resources; and taking advantage of the shortened shipping via the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. Yet, the vastly increased range of land-based missiles supported by pervasive surveillance means it is easier and cheaper to defend the chokepoints at the exits to the Arctic Ocean than during the Cold War. And they will do so against vastly reduced Russian forces. The vast natural resources lie within the EEZs of the Arctic nations, so access requires diplomacy and businesses willing to make arrangements for western firms to exploit them. Military resources will not improve access. Finally, the shipping routes will, even with massive growth, never amount to more than a minor fraction of global trade. So, while there is some value in investing in High North capabilities, those resources will have to be taken from already under-resourced theaters with much higher strategic value. Strategy requires allotting scarce assets to priority missions – the High North is not one of them.

While there is essentially no need for major military investment in the High North, the United States should continue to engage concerning environmental issues and apply sanctions against violators. It should also reduce its icebreaker contract to the maximum of six suggested by the Coast Guard. While the current two icebreakers may be insufficient, the proposed buy is much too large. It will take shipbuilding resources away from the Navy at a time when the fleet is understrength and has no path to sufficient numbers of ships. The U.S. can continue to maintain a defense of the High North using the same terrain and maritime chokepoints used during the Cold War. The investments in new generations of cruise missiles and long-range drones necessary to support the priority theaters will also provide a flexible force to defend the north if needed. Lastly, it should not allocate limited DOD assets to the region because high-priority theaters like Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East are already under-resourced. These measures can effectively manage Arctic interests within the appropriate context of focused national strategy.

T.X. Hammes is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. He served 30 years in the U.S. Marine Corps.

Endnotes

1. Frank G. Hoffman, “Strategy as an Appetite Suppressant,” War on the Rocks, March 3, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/strategy-as-appetite-suppressant/.

2. U.S. Department of Defense, “2024 Arctic Strategy,” https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF.

3. Donald J. Trump, “United States National Security Strategy, November 2025,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.

4. “Arctic Shipping Update: 37% Increase in Ships in the Arctic Over 10 Years,” Arctic Council, January 31, 2024, https://arctic-council.org/news/increase-in-arctic-shipping/ and Malte Humpbert, “Chinese Containership ‘Istanbul Bridge’ Reaches UK via Arctic Route in Record 20 Days,” gCaptain, October 13, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/chinese-containership-istanbul-bridge-reaches-uk-via-arctic-route-in-record-20-days/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-5ee6139183-381157581&mc_cid=5ee6139183&mc_eid=64e8ec0a99.

5. “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, Updated July 2, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R41153.

6. Cornell Overfield, “Wrangling Warships: Russia’s Proposed Law on Northern Sea Route Navigation,” Lawfare, October 17, 2022, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/wrangling-warships-russias-proposed-law-northern-sea-route-navigation.

7. ”Main Results of NSR Transit Navigation in 2024,” Centre for High North Logistics, NORD University, November 28, 2024, https://chnl.no/news/main-results-of-nsr-transit-navigation-in-2024/.

8. Brendan Murray and Danielle Bochove, “China Turns to Arctic Shortcut While Major Carriers Steer Clear,” gCaptain, October 3, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/china-turns-to-arctic-shortcut-while-major-carriers-steer-clear/. 

9. “International Voyages on the Northwest Passage in 2024,” Aker Arctic, November 13, 2024, https://akerarctic.fi/news/international-voyages-on-the-northwest-passage-in-2024/.

10. Stephen M. Carmel, “Taking a Round-Turn on Reality: Commercial Shipping through the Arctic,” email to author.

11. Malte Humpert, ”Chinese Companies Dispatch Multiple Container Ships Along Arctic Route for Faster European Trade,” High North News, August 4, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/chinese-companies-dispatch-multiple-container-ships-along-arctic-route-for-faster-europe-trade/.

12. ”Ship crossings through global maritime passage: January 2022 to April 2024,” Office of National Statistics, https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/internationaltrade/bulletins/shipcrossingsthroughglobalmaritimepassages/january2022toapril2024.

13. ”Sea Ice Chokes the Northwest Passage,” NASA Visible Earth, August 8, 2024, https://visibleearth.nasa.gov/images/153166/sea-ice-chokes-the-northwest-passage.

14. Malte Humpert, “Sanctioned Suezmax Oil Tanker Without Ice Protection Stuck for Days on Russia’s Arctic Northern Sea Route,” gCaptain, September 15, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/sanctioned-suezmax-oil-tanker-without-ice-protection-stuck-for-days-on-russias-arctic-northern-sea-route/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-245bcea0f7-381157581&mc_cid=245bcea0f7.

15. Malte Humpbert, ” Russia Pushes ‘Shadow Fleet’ to Limit as LNG Carrier Struggles Through Early Arctic Ice on Northern Sea Route,” gCaptain, November 3, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/russia-pushes-shadow-fleet-to-limit-as-lng-carrier-struggles-through-early-arctic-ice-on-northern-sea-route/.

16. Malte Humpbert, ”Two Salvage Vessels Arrive in Canadian Arctic to Begin Refloating of Grounded ‘Thamesborg’,” gCaptain, September 23, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/two-salvage-vessels-arrive-in-canadian-arctic-to-begin-refloating-of-grounded-thamesborg/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-a458a9f7c7-381157581&mc_cid=a458a9f7c7&mc_eid=64e8ec0a99.

17. Malte Humpbert, ” Arctic Cargo Ship ‘Thamesborg’ Refloated AIS Data Show, Awaiting Company Confirmation,” gCaptain, October 9, 2025, https://gcaptain.com/arctic-cargo-ship-thamesborg-refloated-ais-data-show-awaiting-company-confirmation/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-400f2f7a4e-381157581&mc_cid=400f2f7a4e&mc_eid=64e8ec0a99.

18. Stew Magnusen, ” The Icebreaker Numbers Game,” National Defense, January 13, 2025, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/1/13/the-icebreaker-numbers-game.

19. ”DHS Celebrates Purchase of New Coast Guard Icebreakers as President Trump Signs Deal with Finland,” Department of Homeland Security, October 10, 2025, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/10/10/dhs-celebrates-purchase-new-coast-guard-icebreakers-president-trump-signs-deal.

20. Nouman Ali, “The Cost of Icebreaking Services,” SeaRates, Jun 11, 2020, https://www.searates.com/blog/post/the-cost-of-icebreaking-services.

21. Stephen M. Carmel, “Taking a Round-Turn on Reality: Commercial Shipping through the Arctic,” email to author.

22. Mark Rowe, ”Arctic nations are squaring up to exploit the region’s rich natural resources,” Geographical, August 12, 2022, https://geographical.co.uk/geopolitics/the-world-is-gearing-up-to-mine-the-arctic.

23. Mia Landauer, Niklas Swanström, and Michael E. Goodsite, ”Mineral Resources in the Arctic: Sino-Russian Cooperation and the Disruption of Western Supply Chains,” Niklas Swanström & Filip Borges Månsson, editors, The “New” Frontier: Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic and its Geopolitical Implications, September 2025, Institute for Security and Development Policy, https://www.isdp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/SP-Arctic-Sep-2025-final.pdf.

24. Ibid, p.109.

25. Mark Rowe, ”Arctic nations are squaring up to exploit the region’s rich natural resources,” Geographical, August 12, 2022, https://geographical.co.uk/geopolitics/the-world-is-gearing-up-to-mine-the-arctic.

26. ”Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: Status of Oil and Gas Program,” Congressional Research Service, updated July 24, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12006#:~:text=On%20January%208%2C%202025%2C%20DOI,the%20lease%20sale%20discouraged%20participation.

27. Sune Engel Rasmussen, ” Inside the West’s Race to Defend the Arctic,” Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/inside-the-wests-race-to-defend-the-arctic-0f04ca7a?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAi4UrfELbN8TNIpkiANQ9qkJ409UcY7ybn1KHm71Es8FzKPdjCv2Sk3_6eJxEI%3D&gaa_ts=68efa5d0&gaa_sig=X9bLexZswY1r8pD8-BgF7-BUcPWUSkNZB5DFNXcqGswh-PVRHJkHIZ_O-GK6LEEDyK8b2uDpyvgFayIxLxTHnA%3D%3D.

28. Michael S. Brown, ”Rethinking the Arctic Threat Landscape,” Proceedings, November 2025, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/november/rethinking-arctic-threat-landscape?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=PWNov6-25&utm_id=PWNov625&utm_source=U.S.+Naval+Institute&utm_campaign=f01c9a3224-Proceedings_This_Week_2025_6_November&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_adee2c2162-f01c9a3224-223022301&mc_cid=f01c9a3224&mc_eid=e0ac270dd4.

Featured Image: The icebreaker USCGC Healy (WAGB 20) keeps station while conducting crane operations alongside a multi-year ice floe for a science evolution in the Beaufort Sea, Aug. 9, 2023. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Briana Carter)

Asia-Pacific

Charting a Course: Addressing Chinese Maritime Coercion Around Taiwan

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By Anthony Marco and Nils Peterson

On September 13th, 2025, a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessel entered the restricted waters around the Republic of China’s (ROC) Dongsha Atoll, also known as the Pratas Island, located approximately 400 kilometers southwest of the ROC’s main island of Taiwan. The CCG intrusion prompted a swift response from the ROC’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA), which consisted of a CGA vessel chasing the CCG intruder from the area. Over the next four days, the CCG mounted four separate incursions into the restricted waters around Dongsha, a worsening symptom of a wider Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maritime gray zone campaign against the ROC in which the CCG has a prominent tool of coercion.

This article employs the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) definition of gray zone coercion, the “deliberate use of coercive or subversive instruments of power by, or on behalf of, a state to achieve its political or security goals at the expense of others, in ways that exceed or exploit gaps in international norms but are intended to remain below the perceived threshold for direct armed conflict.”

The ongoing coercion by the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) aims to erode the ROC’s sovereignty by sending a message to the international community that the CCP has both the capability and the will to exert control over the waters near Taiwan, but this activity also threatens the United States’ national security interests. It is in America’s interest that the ROC remains a political entity distinct from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for two primary reasons. First, at the operational level, Taiwan is a key maritime terrain in the First Island Chain or FIC, forming the foundation of American strategy in East Asia to counter the CCP’s territorial revisionist ambitions from a geographic standpoint. Second, at the strategic level, a CCP takeover of Taiwan would severely undermine the confidence of key regional and treaty allies, such as Japan and the Philippines, in the United States’ ability to defend them against further CCP aggression.

In the immediate term, CCG gray zone activity also displays the potential to endanger hard US economic interests by threatening major sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that enter the Taiwanese main island’s major ports at Kaohsiung, Keelung, Mailao, Taichung, and Taipei. Taiwan produces over 90% of advanced semiconductor chips and is the seventh-largest merchandise trading partner of the United States, underscoring the importance of SLOCs entering Taiwan for American economic welfare.

If the PRC expands its gray zone maritime activity in a manner that threatens SLOCs, potentially leading to a maritime quarantine of Taiwan, this presents the US and its Pacific partners with the decision of whether to employ a military response. Recognizing, at a minimum, the economic damage and escalatory risks tied to potential CCP attempts at threatening the vitality of SLOCs, it behooves American policymakers to take steps to deter the expansion of this CCG-spearheaded maritime gray zone campaign.

The Nature of the CCG Threat

Over the past two years, the CCP has taken substantial steps to intensify its maritime gray zone campaign in ROC waters. In February 2024, a Chinese motorboat violated Kinmen’s restricted waters, prompting a CGA-mounted chase, which resulted in the deaths of two Chinese nationals when their boat capsized. The PRC has since used the incident to justify mounting a concerted effort to undermine ROC territorial sovereignty over the Kinmen Islands and Matsu Islands–located four miles and six miles off the coast of the People’s Republic of China, respectively–by routinely dispatching CCG vessels that violate the islands’ restricted waters: CCG activity reached a total of 85 violations around Kinmen in September 2025.

While Kinmen and Matsu lie just a short boat ride away from the PRC mainland, the CCP’s effort to undermine ROC territorial sovereignty has more recently extended to Dongsha. According to the CGA, an “unprecedented” flotilla of Chinese fishing vessels, numbering six “mother ships” and 29 “smaller boats,” entered restricted ROC waters around Dongsha on February 15th, 2025, prompting a swift response from local CGA vessels.

During this incident, a CCG vessel violated Dongsha’s restricted waters by attempting to intervene in the CGA’s law enforcement response. Since this incident, the CCG has sought to normalize this activity with consistent intrusions into the waters around Donghsa. Although Dongsha, like Kinmen and Matsu, lies on the ROC periphery, its recent targeting by the CCG is demonstrative of a graduated coercive campaign.

The CCG has also recently demonstrated its capacity to perform in a role that is specifically more dangerous to US interests. In a noticeable departure from past practice, the CCG, in what appears to be a PRC attempt to hybridize a potential blockade, debuted in PLA live-fire exercises around Taiwan during Joint Sword 2024-A in May 2024. This was followed up by Joint Sword 2024-B in October 2024, featuring approximately seventeen CCG vessels circumnavigating the Taiwanese main island as part of coordinated blockading drills with the PLAN.

During Joint Sword 2025-B, this year’s inaugural exercises in February, the CCG played a higher profile role that included carrying out mock vessel boardings and inspections–suggestive of potential actions that would interdict commercial shipping, a cardinal feature during a blockade or gray zone “quarantine”–in addition to violating, for the first time, the Taiwanese main island’s 24 nautical mile contiguous area.

Although the CCP has not yet made a serious effort to dispute SLOCs to Taiwan, its multi-pronged gray zone activities suggest an intensifying trend that makes this a growing concern for the future. One potential route entails mounting infrequent CCG patrols of SLOCs that evolve into routine patrols, activities the CCP has attempted to normalize in other places through consistent effort, justified under the auspices of a contrived or provoked maritime incident. Patrols could evolve into the boarding and inspection of international commercial vessels, setting the conditions for a partial or full and temporary or indefinite maritime quarantine of the main island.

From a US standpoint, whether such gray zone maritime activity forms a deliberate, calibrated irregular warfare strategy to achieve unification non-kinetically or broadly aims to isolate Taiwan economically and politically, wherever and whenever the PRC can, any attempt to threaten SLOCs in this manner jeopardizes hard US and partner-nation interests. Thus, taking preventive measures to preserve SLOCs prior to PRC efforts to sever them is necessary, especially since attempting to roll back the latter’s efforts after the fact is more difficult and could risk a more dangerous escalation.

Policy Recommendations

The US Government (USG) should pursue a nested set of policy goals to address the CCG threat to American interests. At the operational level in the immediate term, the objective should be to deter CCG activity that would threaten American SLOCs. At the political level in the immediate term, the USG should accept the unpleasant reality that the existing CCG activity erodes ROC sovereignty, as it lacks the capacity to substantially roll back CCG presence. At the operational and political levels in the future, the objective should be to have a coalition prepared to deter a PRC maritime quarantine of Taiwan.

These policy goals rest on three key assumptions; if any of these is invalidated, the recommendations would no longer hold. First, the CCP does not deploy CCG assets in such numbers that they overwhelm our capacity to defend key SLOCs. Second, the CCP continues its salami-slicing strategy to degrade the operational environment around Taiwan, which involves minimizing direct confrontation between the PLA and foreign coast guard assets in waters that the party views as its own. Third, the CCP leadership thinks it still has time to achieve its political objective to gain control of Taiwan and therefore decides it does not now need to launch a maritime quarantine, blockade, or invasion.

The ROC, on its own, will likely struggle to preserve SLOCs. During a 2024 House Subcommittee Hearing on Transportation and Maritime Security, Senior Policy Researcher at the RAND Corporation, Captain Eric M. Cooper, USCG (Ret.), estimated that there are a total of 700 CCG vessels operating in the Indo-Pacific. The entirety of the CCG’s complement is not dedicated to gray zone activity against Taiwan, but it has a growing presence deep in the South China and East China Seas. The CGA, on the other hand, maintains a smaller, but not insignificant force of approximately 250 vessels. Since 2018, the CGA has implemented a ten year indigenous shipbuilding program, with a target goal of 141 newly constructed vessels, but it remains and will remain overmatched by the sheer quantitative advantage retained by the CCG. Thus, it is unreasonable to expect the CGA to adequately deter potential CCG activity that jeopardizes SLOCs.

Recognizing the vulnerability of SLOCs, the US Coast Guard (USCG) is uniquely positioned to preserve them. Already, throughout the Indo-Pacific, the USG maintains a series of bilateral Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements (MLEA) that authorize the USCG to carry out activities such as conducting legally protected patrols to help safeguard a partner country’s maritime security.

Traditionally, bilateral MLEAs stipulate that the USCG dispatch personnel and or vessels to assist in maritime law enforcement within a partner country’s territorial waters (12 nautical miles), contiguous zone (24 nautical miles), and EEZs (200 nautical miles). For example, as provisioned under a bilateral MLEA, the USCG boarded six vessels illegally fishing within the Cook Islands’ EEZ this past June. The USCG also conducts maritime law enforcement exercises with regional partner countries.

In June 2024, the USCG trained alongside the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) in the South China Sea to buttress the latter’s law enforcement and search and rescue capabilities. The USCG has also scaled up exercises in the Indo-Pacific region into trilateral events: in June 2025, the USCG, PCG, and Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) participated in drills outside Japan’s territorial waters for the first time. According to the senior participating USCG officer, Captain Brian Krautler, “By operating together, we strengthen our collective forces, ensuring readiness against threats to maritime safety and security.”

With the specific intent of maintaining SLOCs entering Taiwan, the USCG should seek to replicate similar activity with the CGA as would be provisioned in a bilateral MLEA. The USCG already has a pre-existing cooperative relationship with the CGA that is guided by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed between the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in March 2021. Under this MOU, the USCG and CGA formed a Coast Guard Working Group (CGWG) to establish a common understanding of maritime security priorities and advance cooperation between the USCG and CGA. In addition to the dialogues within the CGWG, instances of security cooperation have occurred. For example, in 2024, the USCG dispatched an International Port Security (IPS) Program team to Taiwan to exchange knowledge with CGA officials regarding how to enhance maritime cybersecurity and general port security.

Despite these positive developments, current USCG and CGA cooperation is inadequate, with it being limited to informal bilateral talks, workshops, and occasional practice sharing. Thus, the MOU should be updated to deepen security cooperation or an unofficial agreement, akin to a bilateral MLEA, established that extends USCG authorities in ROC waters, specifically granting the USCG the ability to conduct patrols along SLOCs, sending a clear message to the CCP that the US will protect its interests.

In line with past practice, whenever the US deepens security cooperation with the ROC, the CCP will likely vehemently protest such a move; however, given the recognizable and public economic interests at stake in preserving SLOCs, the USG should frame USCG presence patrols in Taiwanese waters within the context of that specific end rather than communicating an intent to buttress ROC claims to sovereignty, although this would be an undeniably favorable byproduct.

It must be acknowledged that, compared to the CCG, the current and near-term potential force posture of the USCG in the region is problematic. Presently, the USCG has eight vessels forward deployed in the region and possesses another 79 vessels capable of serving in the region, but this would practically amount to the USCG’s entire inventory of high seas vessels. Despite this modest vessel count, the USCG could afford to apportion a couple of cutters and a handful of smaller craft, based on existing deployments in the Indo-Pacific region, communicating the USG’s resolve concerning the preservation of SLOCs.

A comprehensive analysis is warranted to assess the impact this deployment would have on other USCG priorities in the theater. Still, such deployments would communicate the USG’s resolve to preserve SLOCs. This is especially the case due to the escalatory risks the CCP would incur by contemplating a confrontation with a USCG vessel performing its duties. The USG could also establish a shiprider agreement, a type of MLEA, with the CGA, permitting USCG personnel to board CGA vessels: the USG maintains twelve such agreements with regional partners such as Papua New Guinea and the Republic of Vanuatu. Although typically partner force personnel board USCG vessels, USCG personnel have boarded Royal Navy vessels under a shiprider arrangement, which can be replicated with the CGA.

Moreover, the USG should seek ways to internationalize any USCG efforts to preserve SLOCs entering Taiwan. USCG Captain (Ret.) Eric Cooper has made compelling arguments for the establishment of a multilateral maritime law enforcement task force in the form of the US-led Bahrain Combined Maritime Force (CMF). Headquartered in Bahrain and consisting of 46 participating countries, the CMF maintains maritime security in major waterways around the Middle East. Organizing a task force akin to a CMF with the aim of preserving Taiwan’s SLOCs could include countries like Japan and the Philippines, especially when considering these two countries’ significant economic interests linked to these SLOCs and their recent combined participation in USCG-led exercises.

If these recommendations are implemented, the following would be benchmarks to measure success: In the immediate future, the continued absence of CCG vessels in key SLOCs. In the longer term, a stable rotational presence of up to three USCG cutters and between five and ten smaller craft regularly operating in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in areas proximate to Taiwan, in conjunction with a CMF-style task force.

The deteriorating security situation around Taiwan due to the CCP-initiated gray zone coercion shows no signs of improvement in the near future. In addition, the United States no longer enjoys being the unrivalled seafaring power in East Asia. In this security environment, the creative employment of USCG assets and personnel in combination with regional partner countries becomes an important policy pathway toward achieving American national interests.

Anthony Marco is a First Lieutenant in the U.S. Army and holds a BS from the United States Military Academy at West Point and an MA from Reichman University as an Anna Sobol Levy Scholar. He also serves as a special advisor on the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s Proxies and Partners Special Project.

Nils Peterson is a Marshall Scholar studying for an MA in Taiwan Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies and holds a BA in History and Chinese from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He previously led the China Team at the Institute for the Study of War as a War Studies Fellow.

The views and opinions presented herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of DoD or the Army. Appearance of, or reference to, any commercial products or services does not constitute DoD or Army endorsement of those products or services. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute DoD or Army endorsement of the linked websites, or the information, products or services therein.

Featured Image: The Wanshan Vessel formation conduct towing exercises in waters off Huangyan Dao in South China Sea in July, 2024. (China Coast Guard photo)

Warfighting Development

Cosmetics versus Combat: Inspect for Warfighting Over Rust

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By Spike Dearing

From the moment we leave our homeports, the ships of 7th Fleet live under the shadow of Chinese weapons and in the ever-present gaze of their ISR network. We are far from home, and very near to those who may wish us harm. This reality is embodied in the phrase “Tip of the Spear.” We expect to be the first to fight, the first to deliver and sustain damage, and the first to die. As such, the priority of the surface force in 7th Fleet ought to be in line with the Secretary’s hardcore focus on warfighting, of keeping the spear sharp. But it has dulled. Our priorities instead have pivoted to preservation. Rust and paint have taken precedence over combat readiness at exactly the moment when our time could not be more valuable.

Preservation in and of itself is not a bad thing and it certainly has a place in our list of priorities. Those who defend the primacy of preservation rely on two arguments. First, a well-preserved ship is indicative of a well-trained crew. The battle between steel and seawater is eternal, they do not play well together. Running rust can ruin a deck, and beyond the purely cosmetic, it can do damage to the hull and various systems exposed to the outside of the ship. It takes the dedicated efforts of many sailors to effectively keep it at bay. This first argument presupposes that if a ship is well-preserved, it is because the crew is working hard at it. And if they work hard at preservation, then they must be working hard at everything else too. Perhaps.

The second argument is that a well-preserved ship sends a message to friends and foes alike. To our friends it is a message of pride, fortitude, and reliability. For eight decades ships of the United States Navy have been patrolling the waters of the Indo-Pacific, safeguarding the peaceful flow of maritime traffic and commerce. That our ships are well maintained and present demonstrates to our friends that we will be there to carry on this legacy and can be trusted to preserve this system if challenged. To our foes the message is that we are still here, still committed, and still lethal. Our finely manicured exteriors are a sign that rather than a fleet in decline that is wanting for manpower and resources, we are still the preeminent naval force in the world.

I do not dispute the inherit truth in either of these arguments. That being said, should preservation of ships be such a high priority? Should it be more important than combat readiness? Should it consume a lot of a Commanding Officer’s attention and potentially ruin their careers? The press releases and official statements centered on the Navy are geared more towards preparing for war and ensuring the Fleet maintains its lethal advantages over potential adversaries. But when it comes to defining priorities however, words pale in comparison to how time and effort is actually being expended. In the 7th Fleet surface force today, much more time and focus has been allotted towards preservation rather than warfighting readiness. This will have an adverse effect on our wartime performance if not properly realigned.

Since returning to 7th Fleet nearly 14 months ago, I can recall four instances where senior officers (ranking O-6 and above) toured the waterline and inspected ships on “preservation tours.” These high-ranking officers would walk down the piers in Yokosuka or take a small-boat ride out to a ship at anchorage, scope out the warships, determine whether their level of rust was defensible, and then turn around. While such preservation spot-checks have become a common occurrence, these senior officers hardly – if at all – come aboard the “Tip of the Spear” ships and request that the Combat Information Center (CIC) be fully manned up and a combat scenario be run for their observation. I personally have not witnessed this ever taking place, which I find alarming.

What exactly is the current state of paint and rust going to reveal about a ship’s ability to actually fight and win a war at sea? Certainly not more than observing trained watchstanders execute simulated combat operations in a stressful environment and gauging their performance.

This is not a radical idea. After the burning and decommissioning of USS Bonhomme Richard (BHR) the Navy instituted a new process of no-notice fire safety inspections. Assessors would show up to ships, request the entire in-port emergency teams (ship version of firefighters) be mustered for accountability, and conduct safety walkthroughs. Ships responded to this shift by increasing training and vigilance amongst the crew. No captain wanted to get caught slacking by the fire safety inspectors. This action shifted a priority. While fires have still broken out on ships in the time since, none have suffered the same fate as BHR.

Instituting a similar practice for combat scenarios is necessary. Snap combat inspections are a time-honored practice of great power fleets preparing for war. Doing so would provide an honest look into how ships are preparing to execute their primary purpose – to intimidate and destroy the enemy. Commodores and Flag Officers should be interested in stopping by their ships to see how well they actually fight.

This is the ultimate test for ship COs and would absolutely re-focus their priorities if they have been drawn away from their tactical roots. The potential of the Commodore swooping by to spot-check a combat evolution would motivate commands to always have their teams well-trained and prepared for an unannounced visit – which extends to being more ready for an unannounced war. This is even more important for 7th Fleet ships who do not have the luxury of a long transit to a conflict to train themselves up.

The execution of such a program could be made simple. It is a reality that setting up a CIC for a scenario is time-intensive for sailors. A call to a ship’s CO from their immediate superior that a visit will be conducted the next day would provide an opportunity to have the system properly configured while not allowing so much time that the watchstanders could get away with not being adequately knowledgeable or trained. These snap combat inspections should also be genuinely stressing and not easily gamed. The senior officer could have a set of multiple scenarios sent over to the ship in advance and then select a scenario once they arrive to push the watchstanders to adapt and improvise. This would eliminate the possibility that the ship could practice a certain scenario multiple times and perform well due to their familiarity with the sequence of events. Snap combat inspections should guard against assessing heavily scripted drills that sailors can easily prepare for.

Regardless of the details of such an initiative, the central purpose should remain intact. It is not a given that warfighting readiness will get prioritized. It demands active and sustained attention from senior leaders to drive this focus into their commands. Perhaps Commodores and Admirals – by being more deliberate about what they choose to inspect – can bend the surface force towards victory.

LT Spike Dearing is a Surface Warfare Officer and Integrated Air and Missile Defense Warfare Tactics Instructor serving on USS JOHN FINN (DDG 113) as the Damage Control Assistant.

These views are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official views of any U.S. government entity. 

Featured Image: PHILIPPINE SEA (Feb. 1, 2024) Petty Officer 1st Class Nikolai Raab stands watch in the combat information center (CIC) aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Rafael Peralta (DDG 115). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Devin Monroe)

SWO Specialization Week

The Surface Warfare Officer Career Path – An Egalitarian Construct in need of some Improvement

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SWO Specialization Week

By Mike Fierro

As a SWO, my career included serving as the Surface Commander Detailer and CRUDES Placement Officer. My career included four tours in engineering billets afloat (two as the Engineer Officer in steam ships), and two instructor billets, one at what used to be called Surface Warfare Officers School Command (now Surface Warfare Schools Command) as the Steam Engineering Course Director, and at Tactical Training Group, Pacific (TTGP) as the Surface Warfare Syndicate Lead, responsible for training carrier and amphibious strike groups for operational deployments. Additionally, I served in major staff positions in the Pentagon and overseas. My sea duty included three ships homeported in the Western Pacific and two in San Diego. My wife was also a SWO who served two tours as Engineer Officer, one in a steam ship and one in a gas turbine ship. We were both blessed with command at sea (me in a SPRUANCE-class destroyer and she in a DDG-51, Commodore of a Destroyer Squadron and command of an Expeditionary Strike Group as a flag officer).

While teaching at TTGP, a class of Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Principal Warfare Officers attended a special two-week course there. In my post-Navy career, I have had extensive interaction with the RAN and gained an understanding of their career structure and dynamics among their warfare specialties. As the Surface Operations Officer for a Carrier Strike Group during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, I worked closely with liaison officers from the UK, France, Netherlands, and Italy. My tour at Naval Forces Europe/Naval Forces Africa/SIXTHFLEET provided insight into NATO and allied navies. In my Western Pacific tours, I operated with naval forces from Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore. As a civilian contractor, I worked as a Manpower Analyst for the Naval Aviation Resource sponsor (N98) providing insight into the Nuclear Power Manpower structure for carriers and submarines. This experience helps inform my perspective on the issues in the GAO report on SWO specialization.

The GAO report states that the major impetus for conducting it was the tragic collisions that resulted in the deaths of 17 Sailors. It touches on other impacts to surface ship readiness including training, retention, and personal satisfaction and preference. Its purpose is well-established and a necessary step in ensuring corrective measures are taken to avoid recurrence in the future. It covered many issues in good detail. The discourse in Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of the Navy does a good job of addressing dissonance in the report. There are more points, however, that are relevant to the discussion.

Far and away, the most important issue for the surface navy that needs to be addressed here is the strengthening of the training program for officers and enlisted. Changes to surface warfare training 20 years ago weakened the structure of the community, and key among them was the decision to eliminate the division officer course for entry-level officers. Those close to the decision report that this cost-saving measure was justified largely by anecdotal input by junior officers close to decision-makers. The Surface Warfare community has reestablished a robust Division Officer training scheme, which will pay long-term dividends. This deserves to be mentioned because of the amount of attention being placed on the survey of junior officers. Wisdom comes from experience and perspective you only get with the passage of time. Responsible leaders protect subordinates from making decisions based on emotion or incomplete knowledge and lack of experience, often at the risk of being unpopular.

The appeal of specialization to some in the U.S. Navy (USN) is that it would strengthen knowledge, expertise, and self-confidence which often come through experience. The Surface Navy has a robust training program for the employment of combat systems (Aegis and SSDS). The related training in systems and equipment obtained by Combat Systems Officers is likewise robust. The Surface Navy can benefit from a robust training program for Engineer Officers or officers on track to be Engineer Officers with a program similar to the Weapons Tactics Instructor courses that were instituted several years ago. Such a robust training program might provide the technical substance to instill the necessary skill and assuredness to excel as an Engineer Officer, and such a concept appears to be under development.

Will changing the Navy’s current surface warfare construct, one that has been generally successful and is uniquely American in its egalitarian nature, create a better Surface Warfare community and higher warfighting readiness? A common refrain is, “Why can’t the USN be like other navies and specialize; why does it have to be different?” Turning that around, “How can other navies serve as a reasonable model for the U.S. Navy?” Other navies are not organized like the U.S. Navy around warfare communities. Their naval air arms are not like our naval aviation community. They do not have numerous strike groups and operational staffs, much less the major ashore staffs that must be manned with experienced unrestricted line officers.

The size of a navy has major implications for how specialization can affect its manpower management. Beyond not being organized like the USN, they are not of the same scale. For example, the RN and RAN are a fraction of the size of the USN in both ships and manpower. The USN has over 80 CRUDES ships and more than 30 amphibs, and about 350,000 active-duty uniformed personnel, not counting about 100,000 reservists. For major surface combatants, the RN has six DDGs, 12 frigates, five amphibs and eight patrol vessels. It has less than 40,000 uniformed personnel, including reservists. The RAN has three DDGs, eight FFs, three amphibs, and approximately 20,000 uniformed personnel, including reservists. Thankfully despite their small size, these key allies punch above their weight.

Shipboard organization in the RN and RAN is structured around three specialties. Principal Warfare Officers (PWOs) focus on operating the ship and its weapons systems. Weapons Electrical Engineering Officers (WEEOs) maintain and repair topside equipment. Mechanical Engineering Officers (Chief Engineers or “Mechs”) operates and maintains propulsion and platform (hotel) services.

In those navies, the WEEOs and Mechs are professional engineering officers. They are not considered warfare officers in our context. They do not ascend to command of a warship as PWOs do. They are not under what we would consider the SWO community. Instead, they belong to the Head of Navy Engineering. A parallel in the USN would be that half to two-thirds of a ship’s line department heads are Engineering Duty Officers and not in what we consider the SWO community. Under the RN/RAN construct, the detailing, manpower control, and budget authority of those officers would not be in the SWO Community. (As a side note, different than EDOs, Surface LDO and Warrant Officers are detailed and funded from PERS-414, which is nested within the SWO Community.)

In the RN/RAN model, the WEEOs and Chief Engineers are qualified professional engineering officers and do not stand TAO watches. What we consider the TAO watch is stood only by PWOs, and their warships are staffed to have three PWOs to stand this watch. Adopting the RN/RAN model in an Aegis ship would require the USN to convert one of the two Combat Systems Department Heads to a WEEO, and since the WEEO and Chief Engineer do not stand TAO, that means that at least one additional department head-level PWO is needed to staff a three section TAO watchbill. In a non-Aegis ship, with only a Combat Systems Officer, Operations Officer, and Engineer Officer, a fourth department head or other specialist officer would be needed to fill the WEEO responsibilities. In this construct, the SWO Community would not fund or control the Engineer Officer and WEEO.

With this specialty structure, these navies do not share a unified identity as a community. Rather, each identifies with their own specialty and wear different insignia, which can sometimes cause friction.

Since the Commanding Officer is a PWO and the WEEO/Chief Engineer are under a different career authority, there is a different command dynamic onboard RN and RAN ships compared to the USN. In those navies, there is more deference by the CO to the Chief Engineer as the COs are generally unfamiliar with propulsion and engineering. While the WEEOs and Chief Engineers are  knowledgeable and competent, the dynamic is shaped more by personality than in the command environment with which the USN is familiar. Since the CO has little engineering experience to fall back on, the CO is completely reliant on the Chief Engineer.

The USN and the U.S. military are vastly different than other navies and militaries. Beyond the size of the fleet and its tactical and operational staffs, the USN has large headquarters and strategic staffs that must be manned. The SWO community contributes a large share of warfare-qualified officers to fill these positions, including former Engineer Officers. Specializing engineering officers in the RN/RAN models will result in fewer warfare-qualified officers for these positions Navy-wide, not just within the SWO Community. This compounds manning issues that have presented themselves as new communities like Information Warfare, Foreign Affairs Officers, and others pull bodies from an already limited pool of manpower. A new engineering community would almost assuredly further complicate staff manning challenges as there will most likely be complicated schooling and career requirements that will need to be managed with filling seats on staffs.

There are over 100 surface combatants in the USN, most with LT/LCDR-level department heads. In the current billet structure, the SWO community billet inventory does not have enough post-DH engineering related, career progressive billets to occupy that many former Engineer Officers year-on-year. The preponderance of O-4 and above engineering billets are in portfolios that the SWO Community either does not own or cannot fully control (either EDOs or Acquisition Professionals (APs). Specializing this community would mean an ill-advised attempt to wrestle these positions away from these other communities. This would not be impossible, but the political will to do so must be strong and sustained, neither of which can be promised as administrations change or as real-world circumstances dictate.

Strictly applying the RN/RAN models to the USN is unsuitable from several standpoints. The USN is an egalitarian Navy vice an elitist one, which is what develops when only one group can grow to be the CO. Beyond that, the USN has traditionally valued the well-rounded knowledge and experience of its COs. A review of historical data will show that among department heads, former Engineer Officers are chosen for command at an impressive rate. If Engineer Officers are removed from competition for command, will the quality of the remaining department head candidates be sufficient to maintain the standard of USN commanding officers? A review of flag officer biographies will show that former Engineer Officers are chosen for admiral positions at an equally impressive rate, which is made even more impressive when including Nuclear Surface Warfare Officers.

There are Engineer Officers that want to compete for command, and they should be able to do so, particularly since they often prove to be very competent COs. Additionally, there are SWOs that want to be engineering specialists, and they should be able to shift to Engineering Duty Officer (EDO).

As a hedge against potential negative outcomes of a decision to specialize SWO engineering, the Navy can consider moving the EDO community into PERS 41 so it mirrors the aviation community, which keeps control of its engineers. As it currently stands, EDOs are managed separately. However, a wholesale shift of the EDO community to the SWO community will likely be widely unpopular. The best course of action would be to address specific concerns of the parties and allow creative detailing to figure out a solution for the good of the Navy as well as for the good of these individuals. This will be challenging, but if officers present specific leadership and/or engineering talent, this is not impossible. However, it will require thinking outside of the box.

The report discussed officers that would be happy to remain in engineering. What would a specialized career track look like for officers who want to do that? What would tour lengths need to be for it to make sense? At what point do officers specialize? The Division Officer level is too soon to specialize in engineering. If the decision is to go completely over to the RN/RAN model and create a WEEO community, there will likely be officers interested in becoming WEEOs so specialization should draw from post-Division Officers with both engineering and combat systems experience.

For the SWO community to achieve benefits of specializing in engineering, the payoff is likely to be longer or repeated tours in engineering departments at sea. What is sustainable? Three-, four- or five- year Engineer Officer tours at sea? Given the make-up of the surface fleet, it is conceivable that repeated Engineer Officer tours in the same ship class will result. Is that lack of apparent upward mobility something the engineering specialist officers and the SWO community would embrace? This could perhaps result in circumstances where the CO and Engineer are near peers in seniority, which would be a major change for sure.

For engineering specialization to be done right and achieve the optimal benefit for the good of the Navy, it will require additional education and professional qualifications, which keep an officer away from SWO business for lengthy periods of time. Determining the benefits of an investment in time away from SWO business will require analysis of the value of that time away. If the SWO community does not have sufficient demand for those skills, or they are in demand in other communities such as the EDO and AP communities, it probably does not bring direct value back to the SWO community. In that case, the community might consider the ancillary benefit of having experienced SWOs in those positions. It would be similar to the logic applied to justifying over-assessing junior officers who laterally transfer because there is a benefit from their SWO experience.

The GAO report touched on Surface Nuclear Officers. That is an important discussion in its own regard and not one to address here. The Surface community reaps such great benefits from its Surface Nuclear officers that care should be taken not to jeopardize that. USN Engineer Officers and nuke SWOs have proven competent to stand TAO watch and serve as topside Department Heads. These officers often go on to successful command tours and some achieve flag rank.

Making changes should be driven by the problems that must be solved. If the Navy believes the issue is improving surface ship readiness and it feels its ship Engineer Officers are the cause of the poor general state of surface ship readiness, then that is like blaming the problems of the national power grid on electricians. There is a large enterprise that supports the Engineer Officer, from the Port Engineer through Regional Maintenance Centers and NAVSEA Codes. The Navy budget has typically underfunded surface ship readiness, frequently at levels of 65% year-on-year, which builds a large backlog of incomplete maintenance. This leads to higher failure rates between maintenance availabilities and higher costs to repair, compounding the impact of underfunding maintenance. If the funding of the maintenance program is not fixed, even perfect Engineer Officers will not make much difference. The material readiness solution needs to be addressed at a systemic level, such as through improved POM-level funding for surface ship readiness. Blaming Engineer Officers is an easy scapegoat and reductive answer to a much larger, much harder problem.

Conclusion

Is the SWO career path perfect? Nothing is so perfect that it cannot be improved. The career path has had adjustments over the years. For example, the community changed the career path by moving Department Heads between departments from their first Department Head (DH) tour to their second. This was a learning experience for the surface community and resulted in the general policy of officers specializing in their two DH tours. The community learned that long, single department head tours were unpopular and hurt officers in the long run in competition with peers who did split tours. The career path also changed with the split tour division officer program, which was popular with junior officers and widely unpopular with COs. However, this kept more junior officers in the community and yielded officers with broader experience. Additionally, XO/CO fleet-up has proven to be more successful than anticipated. The community is capable of learning and adapting. Whatever changes occur, they should protect the concept that the American military is a meritocracy that rewards superior performance and professional excellence with command opportunities.

Mike Fierro is retired career U.S. Navy Captain who served primarily in CRUDES ships, commanded a Spruance-class destroyer, and served as a Surface Operations Officer on a Carrier Strike Group staff during OEF. His shore assignments include commanding Naval Support Activity Annapolis, serving on the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff, serving as a Placement Officer and Detailer in PERS 41, and serving as the Assistant Director for Policy, Resources and Strategy at U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa/COMSIXTHFLT in Naples, Italy. He has taught at SWOS, TacTraGruPac, and the Naval War College. He was a Steam Examiner on the Propulsion Examining Board. After retiring, he worked as a Manpower Requirements Analyst on the OPNAV Staff. He currently serves as the president of BecTech, a woman-owned small business supporting the U.S. Navy, Missile Defense Agency, and partner navies. He and his wife reside in Scarborough, ME.

Featured Image: SUEZ CANAL (Dec. 15, 2025) The U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS McFaul (DDG 74) passes under the Mubarak Peace Bridge while transiting the Suez Canal. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass communication specialist 2nd Class Gabriel Fields)