2027 War Readiness Week

By Clay Robinson

U.S. Central Command poses an opportunity for the Marine Corps. During his March 2023 testimony to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), CENTCOM commander General Erik Kurilla stated, “God forbid there’s ever a conflict with China, but we could end up holding a lot of their economy at risk in the CENTCOM region.”¹ In the same testimony he pointed to how “72 percent of all Chinese oil is imported. That can make them vulnerable.”² Then General Kurilla zeroed in on the sea lanes within the Middle East adding, “98 percent-plus goes through by ship. That makes them vulnerable.”³

The Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) could be the contact and blunt force that is tasked with the mission of holding key Chinese imports at risk in the Middle East. Force Design should be modified to embrace this mission by adding Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) to the core mission sets of MLRs. The MIO mission is currently assigned only to Marine Expeditionary Units, but the MLR’s low signature, platoon-sized maneuver elements with organic operational mobility, combined with a “mothership” such as an Expeditionary Mobile Base (ESB) and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), could make the MLR ideally suited for large-scale MIO.⁴

Force Design has received varying levels of critique, such as that from former Senator and Secretary of the Navy Jim Webb for charting a course that could “eliminate many of the Marine Corps’ key capabilities and permanently reduce the long-standing mission of global readiness.”⁵ Another criticism levied the concern that “A force tailored to fight in a specific region of the world may find itself unable to operate effectively in a markedly different climate. The Marine Corps cannot afford to have a significant portion of its fighting units dedicated to only operating in a specific area of the world — in this case, the Indo-Pacific region.”⁶ Adding the MIO mission to MLRs could represent common ground. By expanding the mission of the MLRs to provide greater utility outside the Indo-Pacific region, the Marine Corps can still address great power threats while enhancing global readiness.

During a PRC invasion of Taiwan, U.S. INDOPACOM could unleash a “Hellscape” of thousands of unmanned platforms to swarm the Taiwan Strait and keep China’s military off balance until more assets arrive.⁷ Meanwhile in the Middle East, a more nuanced mission of MIO requiring skills akin to those proposed by Major General Dale Alford, USMC, (ret.) in his 2021 article titled, “The Four-Block Littoral Force,” could fall to the Marine Corps. Marines could be called upon to rapidly help CENTCOM impose economic costs on China by boarding high-value ships, plucking them from nearby maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea approaches to the Suez Canal, and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.

This force would form the nucleus of the prize crews that will keep the ships from reaching Chinese ports. MLR Marines would maintain control and security of the prize vessel and could be augmented by seasoned mariners with expertise in seamanship, navigation, and engineering. This additional seafaring expertise might come from members of the U.S. Coast Guard or a modern version of the U.S. Maritime Service (USMS) such as that proposed by Wade Heath who recently suggested that the USMS be codified as a full-fledged uniformed service, on par with the U.S. Public Health Service or National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.⁸

In his reimagination of General Charles Krulak’s Three Block War, General Alford describes the “Four-Block Littoral Force” as emphasizing “operations in the littorals, especially maritime chokepoints.”⁹ General Alford’s Block 1 requires a littoral-focused gray-zone contact force with Marines operating persistently in maritime chokepoints, prepared to support the fleet.¹⁰ After Block 2 (the crisis response force), his Block 3 requires a blunting force of platoon, company, and battalion-level units that “could come from one, two, or perhaps even all of the following: a permanent base, an expeditionary advanced base, an amphibious ship, or perhaps even from non-standard, improvised commercial vessels.”¹¹ General Alford concludes with a Block 4 (destroying force).

The contact (1) and blunting (3) blocks align well with the use of MLR Marines as a cadre of highly-trained boarding parties that feature an appropriate balance of quality and quantity for the mission. The combination of both quality and quantity is where the Marine Corps excels, making Marines better suited for a large-scale MIO mission over boarding parties formed by surface fleet sailors or special operators. The former lack both proficiency in seizing territory and the ability to use a variety of boarding team delivery platforms, to include helicopter insertion. The latter lacks the numbers that would be required to strangle an impactful portion of the Chinese maritime economy. There have simply never been enough resources to sufficiently train shipboard VBSS teams to excel using a variety of insertion techniques for what has almost always been a collateral duty mission for surface sailors. Meanwhile, SEAL Teams can truly excel at small numbers of these boardings, but there are just not enough of them to address the numbers of vessels required of this campaign. MLRs are also better suited for folding seized vessels into the broader littoral terrain and operations that MLRs focus on.

A MLR operating from an amphibious warfare ship or expeditionary mobile base (ESB) and conducting distributed operations across several LCSs might be capable of fielding upwards of 20 Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) teams. CENTCOM already operates the forward-deployed ESB, USS Lewis B. Puller, and plans are well underway to forward deploy four Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) to Bahrain beginning in 2025.¹² Although ostensibly planned to replace mine warfare vessels, these LCSs can be expected to ply the same constrained, littoral waters the MLRs could use and perhaps some efficiencies could result. The MLR could also benefit from aspects of Expeditionary Advance Base Operations and naval integration such as operating from foreign vessels, non-standard vessels, and vessels of opportunity that are routinely being tested and experimented upon, like the embarkation of Marines on LCS-class ships.^13,14 Beyond the boarding mission, MLR Marines would be useful for the close-contact, gray zone encounters that frequently occur in steady state operations across theaters.  

Conclusion

In his June 2023 update on Force Design, General Berger reported that “The Navy and Marine Corps will continue to prioritize our sea-based expeditionary forces to maximize their forward presence as a keystone of our contribution to integrated deterrence. To deter or respond, we must be postured forward, operating from the sea.”¹⁵ Employing MLRs in maritime interception operations that can rapidly seize merchant vessels, form the nucleus of subsequent prize crews, and inflict pressure on great power rivals across multiple theaters can contribute significantly to deterrence. MLR Marines could be the professional teeth that hold Chinese maritime commerce at risk in the Middle East and elsewhere. As defense leaders look for creative yet feasible options to deter China from a 2027 invasion of Taiwan, the vulnerability of critical Chinese energy imports to maritime interdiction by agile MLR Marines could be part of the solution. It is time for Force Design to make the MIO mission a core contribution of the Marine Littoral Regiment.

Commander Clay Robinson is a retired U.S. Navy surface warfare officer with over twenty-
five years of experience in naval operations and strategic planning. He is currently an
adjunct instructor with the U.S. Naval Community College.

References

[1] Hunt, Edward. “In the Middle East, the U.S. Holds China at Risk,” Foreign Policy in Focus, May 16, 2023, https://fpif.org/in-the-middle-east-u-s-holds-china-at-risk/

[2] Hunt, Edward. 2023.

[3] Hunt, Edward. 2023.

[4] Headquarters Marine Corps. “Marine Littoral Regiment,” The Official U.S. Marine Corps Public Website, January 11, 2023, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2708146/marine-littoral-regiment-mlr/

[5] Webb, James. “The Future of the U.S. Marine Corps,” The National Interest, May 8, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/future-us-marine-corps-152606?page=0%2C2

[6] Wilson, Gary, Woods, William, and Wyly, Michael. “Send in the Marines? Reconsider Force 2030 beforehand,” Defense News, August 4, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/08/04/send-in-the-marines-reconsider-force-design-2030-beforehand/

[7] Rogin, Josh. “The U.S. military plans a ‘Hellscape’ to deter China from attacking Taiwan,” The Washington Post, June 10, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/06/10/taiwan-china-hellscape-military-plan/

[8] Heath, Wade, “Reestablish the U.S. Maritime Service,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2024, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/october/reestablish-us-maritime-service

[9] Alford, Dale, “The Four-Block Littoral Force: The Infantry’s attack toward Force Design 2030,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 2021, https://buff.ly/3jjNZpD

[10] Alford, Dale. 2021.

[11] Alford, Dale. 2021.

[12] Renfroe, Shannon. “LCS Quartet being lined up by Navy for Middle East Mine Operations,” Stars and Stripes, May 17, 2024, https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2024-05-17/lcs-mine-countermeasure-ops-13875628.html

[13] Shelbourne, Mallory. “Moving Marines Across the Pacific Could Be Littoral Combat Ship’s Next Mission,” U.S. Naval Institute News, September 28, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/09/28/moving-marines-across-the-pacific-could-be-littoral-combat-ships-next-mission

[14] Reiher, Dan and Cuomo, Scott. “The LCS Advantage for the Navy-Marine Corps Team,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/lcs-advantage-navy-marine-corps-team

[15] Headquarters Marine Corps. “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf

Featured Image: Arabian Gulf (July 26, 2019) Marines with the Maritime Raid Force, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) climb a tactical assault ladder to board the amphibious transport dock ship USS John P. Murtha (LPD 26) during a visit, board, search and seizure training exercise. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Matthew Teutsch/Released)

2027 War Readiness Week

By Nathan Sicheri

Introduction

The 2027 scenario rests on the notion that President Xi Jinping has directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to conquer Taiwan by force no later than 2027. Defeating an invading force will require more than establishing sea control, it will require sustained material support to Taiwan to resupply its armed forces and citizens while fending off a great power invasion. American delays in ship deliveries and the time of technology acquisition within the Department of Defense make it increasingly likely that the force the Navy sails in 2024 will be largely the same in 2027. The next three years of intensive exercises and warfighting development will do more to shape readiness for the conflict than any single capability. These efforts must focus on the key missions and skills that will have outsized impact on wartime success.

Convoy operations for sustaining Taiwan will offer a key method for strategic success. But if the PLA successfully isolates and invades Taiwan, U.S. and allied forces will have only several months at most to effectively resupply Taiwanese defenders. Unknown factors of American public support, Taiwanese political will, and Taiwan’s ability to sustain resistance may mean that decisive sea control may come too late to supply and support Taiwan within the shrinking window of opportunity. The U.S. must carefully consider how to provide logistical support to a besieged island deep within an adversary’s weapon engagement zone and with little enabling sea control.

Blockade Considerations

The debate on how Taiwan should prepare to deter or defeat the PLA includes asymmetric concepts using numerous affordable capabilities, or employing larger conventional assets.¹ Regardless of the approach, a central operational problem will be how to sustain Taiwanese defenses and society if the PLA were to blockade the island. Taiwan may not be able to survive a PLA blockade or invasion for more than a few months, whether due to a material, political, or military collapse. Taiwan will require substantial American support to survive.²

Some officials recognize that a Taiwan contingency will likely begin with a PLA-imposed blockade, and how America responds to the blockade will determine whether Taiwan can survive Chinese aggression.³ In a blockade the PLA will likely refrain from firing the first shot to claim some sort of diplomatic high ground, daring America or its allies to shoot first and overtly break the peace. Breaking a blockade can mean different things, including running the blockade, forced entry, or a show of force. But all risk escalation unless the blockading force backs down. Breaking the blockade by force risks outright conflict, potentially leading to a PLA invasion of Taiwan and strikes against American and allied forces in the region. But not breaking the blockade will eventually lead to Taiwanese capitulation. Political calculations amplify the problem, as there is a lack of unanimity amongst the American people for their support of Taiwan against aggression. A 2023 poll showed Americans split on using the Navy to “break a Chinese blockade,” with a majority of Americans opposing putting U.S. troops in Taiwan to fend off an invasion.⁴

Supporting Taiwan in Contested Seas

Currently the U.S. Navy and allied forces are escorting vessels during strait transits in contested seas, as recently highlighted by Operation Prosperity Guardian, the ongoing defense of vessels in the Red Sea from Houthi attack. While providing critical experience for the sailors under fire, it is crucial that the lessons learned reach the fleet and are adapted to the more complex scenarios that could apply to escort missions in the Western Pacific. As of September 2024, the Houthis have used short-range ballistic missiles, unmanned explosive aerial and surface vehicles, and cruise missiles to attack warships and neutral shipping from the eastern shores of the Red Sea.⁵ The PLA inventory is far more complex and lethal.⁶ Most of the weapons employed by the Houthis have been subsonic threats within an enclosed sea, which is much different than the open Philippine Sea where vessels will be susceptible to multi-axis attacks from a wide variety of modern forces.

How modern convoy escort missions work in practice will require considerable time to sort out, hence its importance to begin training for an escort contingency prior to the outbreak of conflict. The Battle of the Atlantic was a continuous work in progress to figure out the multinational coordination required to effectively move men and material across the ocean, initially using lessons learned in the First World War but eventually integrating air power and intelligence to counter 1940s wolfpack tactics. In the modern era, the U.S. Navy went almost 35 years without conducting an exercise specifically focused on screening a cross-Atlantic convoy operation.⁷

Resupplying Taiwan will be far more complex and demanding due to the PLA’s extensive capability. Integrating numerous resupply ships into a CSG affords them a measure of protection but also creates a distinctly concentrated target that is more inviting of air and missile attack. Distributed operations may disperse the convoys but forces them to rely on the organic missile inventories of their limited numbers of escorts to fend off aircraft and missile raids. Distributed operations, especially for lightly armed supply ships, will shift the key source of survivability to counter-targeting rather than kinetic defense. How may convoys integrate into the counterintelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and counter-targeting concepts of an information warfare commander?⁸ The tactical problems of survivability and counter-targeting are essential to getting resupply ships into the WEZ and hopefully penetrating deeply enough to resupply a Taiwan under invasion.

America’s most significant advantage is its international partnerships and its ability to generate coalitions. America has four key treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific theater – Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines. Japan is the best geographically positioned and maintains modern military capabilities. The Philippines is another likely partner but lacks naval power to contribute to convoy operations and sea control, principally providing staging and basing access for American forces. Australia provides basing farthest from the direct conflict area and a capable naval arsenal. Lastly, South Korea is positioned similarly to Japan to provide support for American operations. Allied bases and territories provide potential staging grounds and multiple axes to facilitate resupply, complicating the situation for the PLA. International exercises should integrate Indo-Pacific allies for contested convoy operations from their territories and between key points of resupply.

If convoys approach Taiwan unescorted, the PLA Navy, the Chinese Coast Guard, and possibly the Chinese Maritime Militia would redirect them, board, or attack them. The 2024 Philippine-Chinese dispute over the Second Thomas Shoal forewarns possible tactics for contesting resupply: violent boardings and shoulderings.¹² The Second Thomas Shoal and nearby reefs do not hold nearly the same level of political importance as Taiwan, so one can assume vessels inbound towards Taiwan during a blockade or conflict will face more robust threats.

Conclusion

Maritime escort has taken a backseat in recent conflicts due to land route access and uncontested seas, but Taiwan will differ significantly from previous and ongoing 21st-century conflicts. Unlike Taiwan, Ukraine maintains a land border with friendly nations while Israel maintains sea control via allies and access to major sea ports for importing critical equipment. The success of Ukraine fending off Russian aggression without direct American military support, and Israel defending against Iran and its proxies, albeit with direct support, highlights the importance of military resupply. Taiwan suffers from being an island nation dependent upon imports in peacetime, let alone during a conflict. Sealift will be the only way to deliver necessary supplies at scale over a sustained period of time. Airlift and undersea forces can deliver some lightweight resources, but they cannot deliver nearly the same mass as sealift.

The United States must overcome the tyranny of time and distance to preserve Taiwan’s sovereignty. The U.S. Navy will not have the time nor capacity to establish sea control. It must train for contested maritime convoy operations unseen since World War II and develop innovative operational approaches that enable maritime resupply through heavily contested seas. Operation Prosperity Guardian has highlighted the importance of this problem set in the missile age, but the challenge America will face in a confrontation with China will involve far more lethal threats.

Protecting shipping will become a major operational requirement during a 2027 conflict, yet modern U.S. naval doctrine and training places little emphasis on this critical mission. This will prove shortsighted for sustaining Taiwan given how the nation’s survival will be on a short timer for resupply once a major invasion or blockade begins. If America waits for a Mahanian victory to enable unfettered resupply then it may risk strategic defeat, potentially ceding Taiwan to the PRC and having to plan for an even more costly amphibious counter-invasion to liberate the island.

Maritime convoy protection is not simply a byproduct of sea control, but rather a necessary and prominent mission for keeping allies in the fight. It is a fundamental expression of how U.S. naval power underwrites American alliances, yet it is a neglected operation America’s Navy must quickly relearn.

LT Nathan Sicheri commissioned from Virginia Tech NRTOC as a surface warfare officer in 2019. He served as the gunnery officer and repair officer on board USS PORT ROYAL (CG 73) during a Middle East deployment. His second assignment was as the Training Officer onboard PCU JOHN BASILONE (DDG 122) in Bath, Maine. He is currently assigned to Cryptologic Warfare Activity 66 at Fort Meade, MD as a Cryptologic Warfare Officer. He has written previously for USNI.

References 

1. Campbell, C. (2024, August 15). Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved September 15, 2024, from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12481

2. Heath, T. R., Lilly, S., & Han, E. (2023, June 27). Can Taiwan Resist a Large-Scale Military Attack by China? Assessing Strengths and Vulnerabilities in a Potential Conflict. RAND. Retrieved September 15, 2024, from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1658-1.html

3. Alperovitch, D. (2024, June 5). A Chinese Economic Blockade of Taiwan Would Fail or Launch a War. War on the Rocks. Retrieved September 15, 2024, from https://warontherocks.com/2024/06/a-chinese-economic-blockade-of-taiwan-would-fail-or-launch-a-war/

4. Kafura, C. (2023, November 15). Two-Thirds of Americans Think US-Taiwan Relations Bolster US Security. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Retrieved September 15, 2024, from https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/two-thirds-americans-think-us-taiwan-relations-bolster-us-security

5. Blanchard, C. M. (2024, September 6). Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea: Issues for Congress (10). Congressional Research Service. Retrieved September 22, 2024, from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12301#:~:text=Since%20October%202023%2C%20the%20Houthis,port%20of%20Al%20Hudaydah%2C%20Yemen.

6. Gormley, D. M., Erickson, A. S., & Yuan, J. (2019). A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions. National Defense University Press.

7. Eckstein, M. (2020, February 28). Navy Drills Atlantic Convoy Ops for First Time Since Cold War in Defender-Europe 20 – USNI News. USNI News. https://news.usni.org/2020/02/28/navy-drills-atlantic-convoy-ops-for-first-time-since-cold-war-in-defender-europe-20

8. Barrett, K. R. (2023, September). Make Information Warfare the Supported Warfare Commander | Proceedings – September 2023 Vol. 149/9/1,447. U.S. Naval Institute. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/september/make-information-warfare-supported-warfare-commander

9. Dwyer, M., Tidwell, B., & Blivas, A. (2020, August). Cycle Times and Cycles of Acquisition Reform. CSIS. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200804_Dwyer_CycleTimes_V6.pdf

10. O’Rourke, R. (2024, September 24). Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/25174318/navy-force-structure-and-shipbuilding-plans-background-and-issues-for-congress-sept-24-2024.pdf

11. Sacks, D. M. (2024, January). Mapping the Unknown and Thinking the Unthinkable: How US Allies Might Respond to a Crisis over Taiwan. East-West Center. https://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/2024-01/OP%203_Sacks_01092023.pdf

12. Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2024, August 22). Shifting Tactics at Second Thomas Shoal | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Retrieved September 22, 2024, from https://amti.csis.org/shifting-tactics-at-second-thomas-shoal/

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (February 10, 2024) — The Zumwalt Class Guided Missile Destroyer USS Michael Monsoor (DDG 1001) approaches the Henry J. Kaiser-class fleet replenishment oiler USNS Pecos (T-AO 197) to take on fuel. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Mark D. Faram)

2027 War Readiness Week

By Justin Cobb

Zoom out and look beyond the operational outlooks to consider strategy. Any future conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) begun over an invasion of Taiwan is destined to end up being about more than just the fate of Taiwan. The stakes are much higher than the fate of Taiwan alone. A number of articles and studies have concluded that the best, and perhaps only way to prevail against an invasion of Taiwan is to rapidly defeat and destroy the invasion force itself through a denial strategy.¹ These arguments have reviewed the possibilities and implications of horizontal escalation, broadening the war to regions outside of Taiwan, and carefully studied slower more gradual responses such as blockades and sanctions. All have concluded that neither horizontal escalation nor gradual or distant approaches are likely to prevent a successful lodgment of PRC forces on Taiwan, making a PRC victory probable. As accurate as these studies and proposed strategies may be, they have erred from the very start by beginning with the premise that the defense of Taiwan itself is the highest strategic goal should war with the PRC break out.

The denial strategy advocates internalize that a high-intensity limited war fought between the US and PRC is possible, with options for off-ramps from conflict easily defined by either a quick US victory by preventing the initial invasion, or a quick PRC victory by achieving a first successful lodgment and occupation. A more likely scenario, however, is that if large-scale open conflict between the US and the PRC has been initiated, the struggle to defend Taiwan would be better understood as a single named operation in a series of ensuing battles that will almost surely rage through protraction and across theaters regardless of the outcome on the beaches in Taiwan. Neither PRC occupation nor US victory in preventing a successful amphibious landing would present any realistic offramp for cessation of hostilities. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has repeatedly staked its legitimacy on bringing Taiwan to heel.² Once forces and the reputation of the PRC were committed to combat, CCP leadership would be bound to continue hostilities for many of the same reasons that Russia’s future and fate are tied to Ukraine, except with much higher political and military stakes and much greater depth of resources and social will to continue.³ Even without the strong political, social, and psychological requirements to sustain and prevail, given the PRC’s massive industrial advantage, it would have many rational military incentives to pursue protraction against the United States and hunker down to achieve its objective. Conversely, if Taiwan were lost, the United States would also have little incentive to accept the outcome and work towards some new normalized world order. Even less so if it had lost considerable numbers of servicemembers and forces in the process. Certainly, at some level of loss, it could become politically impossible for either side to disengage, and that level may be a single aircraft carrier, or even a single destroyer.⁴ 

It is challenging to reach the conclusion that after a violent clash and initial outcome on Taiwan that broader war could be quickly terminated. War between the PRC and US could be as catastrophic as that between great powers during the world wars and would carry the nuclear dangers of the Cold War. The stakes of such a conflict would also be broadly similar to both of these historical analogies, the legitimacy of the global order and the future direction of the world.

If a future war over an invasion of Taiwan only signals the opening salvos of a broader conflict for global leadership and order, responses to such an invasion must be understood in that context. How might such a global conflict unfold? How should the US respond to a prolonged struggle in defense of the current rules-based order, and what roles do US allies and partners play in such a conflict? And, if such a future is on the horizon, what should the US and its coalition of like-minded partners and allies be doing now to prevent or prepare for it?

Who is likely to be involved and how might such a conflict play out?

A theory of the conflict should be developed before proposing the way ahead. If the US is prepared to commit huge numbers of forces and resources to defend Taiwan in a high-stakes decisive battle, it must also be cognitively prepared for the possibility of escalation up to and including total war and widespread mobilization of populations and industrial capacity. Committing entire fleets to operations that risk the loss of tens of thousands of servicemembers and perhaps dozens of warships and hundreds of aircraft over a short period by either the US or PRC (or, more likely, both) risks enormous potential to fast-track uncontrolled escalation.

As unlikely as a controlled decisive battle scenario is, a war geographically focused exclusively on Taiwan itself also seems less likely. The current size and capability of both the PRC and US military eliminates the possibility of a single knock-out strike by either side. Whether the PRC strikes US forces first in a Pearl-Harbor redux, or endures the first phase of a US-led denial strategy before openly targeting US forces and allies, both sides would still maintain a massive conventional capability for military response. There is little compelling reason to assume that even after an initial defeat in the Taiwan Strait that the PRC would not open large-scale counteroffensive campaigns that could include land assaults against places that enabled a US response, including parts of the Philippines and Ryukyu Islands of Japan and certainly involve subsequent attempts on Taiwan.⁵ Such actions would have immediate implications for a rapid denial strategy and likely cause shifts in political and military priorities from the very beginning. The potential scale of the conflict would likely continue to grow.

Outside of the immediate region, increasing cooperation and broadly aligning geopolitical objectives between the PRC, Russia, North Korea, and Iran point to the potential for a conflict that becomes more coordinated than opportunistic and rapidly expands to threaten US interests globally.⁶ In what has been called the “axis of ill will,” despite their differences in priorities and desired endstates, many signs point to increased cooperation and belligerence from these revisionist actors, not less.⁷ In Ukraine, the Red Sea, and the Levant, the world is getting a sense of what this cooperation might look like, albeit at a lower intensity than is likely if open conflict breaks out between the PRC and US.⁸

Planners and strategists should fully expect support and varying levels of involvement from each of these belligerents should conflict initiate over Taiwan. Across the globe, direct, indirect, and opportunistic support will confront the US and its allies in every theater. Large-scale conflict between the US and PRC would provide the pretext and opportunity for Russia to expand its belligerence to smaller or more vulnerable nations, and for Iran to attempt to further regional dominance. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) may be sufficiently deterred by a mutually assured devastation from an outright invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK). But they should be expected to increase their militancy to tie down ROK support to the US and provide their military support and resources to the PRC, Russia, and Iran at a much larger scale than they have already begun.⁹ The axis of ill-will would be incentivized to take advantage of the opportunity to harm the US in any way that presents itself. Russian submarines could be hunting US and allied ships in the Atlantic and Pacific while maintaining they were PRC submarines, or Iranian forces dramatically increasing missile and drone attacks against US and allied forces and interests throughout the Middle East.

With increasing rapidity and intensity, military actions and maligned activity would threaten nations across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Simultaneously, irregular and cyber warfare from each revisionist belligerent nation might target western financial, utility, and communications networks. Large swaths of the global commons would be at risk for declared no-fly and maritime exclusion zones – all under constant threat. Maritime shipping and global air travel would be severely impacted and, in some cases, paralyzed. Economies and populations would be held at risk, and irreversibly impacted.

Even at the lowest levels of cooperation and intensity, the US and US-led coalition would be forced to respond to these actions simultaneously. Defending shipping, trade, travel, networks, utility grids, and borders simultaneously, those defending the rules-based order would be hard pressed to also mount sustained large-scale counter assaults focused exclusively on Taiwan. US military support and resources would be in even greater demand to defend the homeland and territories as well as that of allies across the globe, even as they are most urgently needed in mass in the Pacific.

Away from the front lines and missile strikes, a rapid partial decoupling of western economies from China would likely follow any large-scale military conflict and be damaging for both sides. In the economic warfare domain of the conflict, western nations might fare worse in the short run as the PRC has been diligently working to insulate itself from current levers of power, while western nations have done relatively little to de-risk their own economies from reliance on the PRC.¹⁰ The economic fallout that is likely to result following a massive military campaign itself could be devastating if full decoupling were to occur.¹¹

In most likely scenarios involving open hostilities between the US and PRC, one thing is almost certain, the status quo ante bellum will not return. While regime change or total victory are far outside the scope of any war involving major nuclear powers, cessation of conflict by either grinding protraction or reasoned detente will still leave a world forever changed. Even in the best-case scenarios that do not involve total war or nuclear exchanges, once large-scale open conflict has commenced the most likely conclusion will be a perpetual state of lower end conflict with occasional high-intensity flare-ups until significant leadership or political changes occurred in either the PRC or the west. If the US was substantially damaged through such a conflict, a new era of global instability, violence, and balkanization would likely take hold, as those no longer restrained by American security guarantees take advantage of a more permissive global environment.

How can the US respond and what roles will allies and partners play?

A strategy that emphasizes speed and large-scale force-on-force actions should be considered the least preferable. Such a strategy risks more unpredictable outcomes, considerably less opportunities to politically message and manage escalation, and is simultaneously far less likely to receive in-kind support from most US allies. Additionally, if the US were to lose or even draw such a large-scale high-stakes engagement, it would have the deleterious effect of leaving allies and partners more vulnerable to follow-on aggression globally.

Assuming deterrence has failed, the US-led coalition should instead focus on building responses designed to degrade and deny the long-term strategic objectives of the revisionist coalition. The range of response options should allow the US to buy time and pursue alternate outcomes while broadly shoring up and defending the global order – directly countering the ultimate strategic objectives of the revisionist block. Relying on proxies (namely the Taiwanese military or remnants of that military should the main force be defeated), non-attributional and irregular responses across all domains, and political and economic pressure at the outset of conflict would allow the US to also posture and provide military resources globally. Escort duties, air defense, forward presence, and some limited conventional responses will be required across strategically significant regions and in support of allies.

While countering and blocking aggression globally, US aims should be focused on draining revisionist powers of resources, will, legitimacy, and support. The US will need to assume the leading role of a global counter-revisionist response that stitches together allies and partners, protects and reinforces the global economy, and reduces the military and economic capabilities of adversaries in ways that do not threaten existential escalation. This US-led effort must out-compete the PRC for any future global leadership role and win the narrative that will define the global order.

When required, counter-strikes and coordinated offensive action across all domains (including cyber) should be layered with special operations actions, arming and funding proxies and resistance groups, intense lawfare, economic warfare, and the building and strengthening of broadened NATO-like alliances with committed global partners. With few notable exceptions, most US allies are in a better position to contribute to this style and intensity of conflict than large-scale conventional modern warfare. An attempted invasion or strangulation of Taiwan could either serve as the rallying point to dramatically strengthen the resolve of a new coalition of allies and partners steeled to resist the PRC and autocratic and totalitarian regimes, or as the opening stages of an even darker chapter of global disorder and destruction.

What should the US be doing now?

The most urgent effort the US should be undertaking is revitalizing its leadership role and strengthening alliances and relationships globally. At home and abroad, the US should be more clearly articulating the stakes and making the case for why the current rules-based order is worth defending. The most pressing question that should be asked is how to better compete and win without widescale conflict, and how to design and inspire a deterrence strategy that is truly whole-of-government and coordinated with allies and partners to resist the revisionist order envisioned by rivals.¹² The defense of Taiwan is only one component of an effort that requires Cold War-like mobilization of governments, economies, and militaries with shared values and a vision of the future that is not dominated by oppressive authoritarian regimes.

While it is true the US and the west more broadly are increasingly engaging and challenging the PRC across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic spectrum, it does not appear well-coordinated and does not seem to have clear leadership. This is visible even within the Department of Defense where the services can be readily seen pursuing different priorities, objectives, and theories of competition and victory, even while congressional reports implore a comprehensive strategic posture.¹³ The confused response levied against the PRC for activities in the South China Sea targeting the Philippines and the Second Thomas Shoal provide a pointed example of how far the US still has to go to mount a unified counter-response to the revisionist deconstruction of the global order.¹⁴

The US can and should lead a strengthened diplomatic, economic, and legal effort, bolstered by meaningful multi-lateral non-military response options, to rally the rest of the world against PRC actions and behaviors. There is a lot of distance between holding the line or pushing back against PRC malign and illegal activity in the global commons on one hand and preparing the US military for massive kinetic response options on the other. If the US is unable or unwilling to do the former, the latter should not be seriously considered. Furthermore, the overarching strategic objective cannot be simply to deny offensive action across the Taiwan Strait. Developing a force focused on a specific operational outcome may be as likely to achieve that objective as it is to become the Maginot Line of the modern era. Making matters worse, such a narrowly-focused strategy could also heighten the prospect of broader deterrence failure in the first place.¹⁵

The U.S. has already moved into an era beyond straightforward competition for global order. The revisionist challengers have signaled they intend to use violence and military strength rather than economics, influence, and soft power to usher this change.¹⁶ Recognizing this fact, those committed to the defense of the current global order must prepare. A denial strategy focused exclusively on Taiwan is not a true strategy but rather a subsidiary campaign objective. Zoom out and assess the broader implications of countering destructive revisionist powers. Western aligned nations must begin expanding military power and cooperation immediately and address the dilemmas that define effective force design and deterrence posturing globally.¹⁷ NATO and new NATO-like alliances of like-minded nations must be developed, strengthened and postured everywhere to defend the global commons, protect our way of life, and defend our shared values. The US certainly needs more ships, aircraft, and missiles, but it also needs to articulate the stakes, prepare economies and people, and engage across every domain to counter and out-compete revisionist nations.

Commander Cobb is an operations staff officer with Carrier Strike Group 11. A rotary-wing aviator, he previously served as the training officer for the SEAWOLF Rotary Wing Weapons School at NAWDC in Fallon, NV, and as the commanding officer of Helicopter Training Squadron 18 at Naval Air Station Whiting Field in Milton, Florida. A graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College, he conducted his joint tour at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium, where he was the lead action officer for several strategic projects including the NATO joint command-and-control concept.

References

¹ Heim, Jacob L., Zachary Burdette, and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga. “US Military Theories of Victory for a War with the People’s Republic of China.” RAND Corporation, February 21, 2024. https://doi.org/10.7249/PEA1743-1.

² Roy, Denny. “China Struggles to Repurpose the Lessons of the Pearl Harbor Attack.” Asia Times, December 28, 2023. https://asiatimes.com/2023/12/china-struggles-to-repurpose-the-lessons-of-the-pearl-harbor-attack/.

³ Schroeder, Peter. “Putin Will Never Give Up in Ukraine—The West Can’t Change His Calculus—It Can Only Wait Him Out.” Foreign Affairs, September 3, 2024. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/putin-will-never-give-ukraine.

⁴ Krepinevich Jr., Andrew F. “Protracted Great-Power War: A Preliminary Assessment.” Center for New American Security, February 2020. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/protracted-great-power-war.

⁵ Geist, Edward. “Defeat Is Possible.” War on the Rocks, June 17, 2021. https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/defeat-is-possible/.

⁶ Chivvis, Christopher S., and Jack Keating. “Cooperation Between China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia: Current and Potential Future Threats to America.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 8, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/cooperation-between-china-iran-north-korea-and-russia-current-and-potential-future-threats-to-america?lang=en.

⁷ Brands, Hal. “China, Russia, and Iran Are Reviving the Age of Empires.” Bloomberg, April 13, 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/features/2024-04-14/china-russia-and-iran-are-rebuilding-empires-to-defeat-us-europe.

⁸ Fong, Clara, and Lindsay Maizland. “China and Russia: Exploring Ties Between Two Authoritarian Powers.” Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-russia-relationship-xi-putin-taiwan-ukraine.

⁹ Park, Ju-min, and Jack Kim. “North Korean Troops in Russia Readying for Combat in Ukraine War, South Korea Says.” Reuters, October 18, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/south-korea-says-north-korea-troop-dispatch-russia-is-grave-security-threat-2024-10-18/.

¹⁰ Collins, Gabriel. “The US-China Economic Relationship Needs ‘Robust De-Risking,’ and a Little Strategic ‘Decoupling.’” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, November 13, 2023. https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/us-china-economic-relationship-needs-robust-de-risking-and-little-strategic-decoupling.

¹¹ Wright, Logan, Agatha Kratz, Charlie Vest, and Matt Mingey. “Retaliation and Resilience: China’s Economic Statecraft in a Taiwan Crisis.” The Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center, April 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/retaliation-and-resilience-chinas-economic-statecraft-in-a-taiwan-crisis/

¹² David, Arnel P., Sean A. Acosta, and Nicholas Krohley. “Getting Competition Wrong: The US Military’s Looming Failure.” Modern War Institute at West Point, December 3, 2021. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/getting-competition-wrong-the-us-militarys-looming-failure/.

¹³ The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. October 2023. https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/A/Am/Americas%20Strategic%20Posture/Strategic-Posture-Commission-Report.pdf.

¹⁴ Danby, Nick. “By, With, and Through at the Second Thomas Shoal.” War on the Rocks, May 20, 2024. https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/by-with-and-through-at-the-second-thomas-shoal/.

¹⁵ Montgomery, Evan. “Kill ’Em All? Denial Strategies, Defense Planning, and Deterrence Failure.” War on the Rocks, September 24, 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/kill-em-all-denial-strategies-defense-planning-and-deterrence-failure/.

¹⁶ Van de Velde, James. “What Is ‘Strategic Competition’ and Are We Still in It?” The SAIS Review of International Affairs, February 2, 2024. https://saisreview.sais.jhu.edu/what-is-strategic-competition-and-are-we-still-in-it/.

¹⁷ Brands, Hal, and Zack Cooper. “The Marshall Papers—Dilemmas of Deterrence: The United States’ Smart New Strategy Has Six Daunting Trade-offs.” Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), March 12, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/dilemmas-deterrence-united-states-smart-new-strategy-has-six-daunting-trade-offs.

Featured Image: MANILA, Philippines (April 28, 2023) – Amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD 8) arrives in the Philippines for a regular scheduled port visit. (US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Dominic Delahunt)

2027 War Readiness Week

By Steve Wills

Introduction

Naval vessels of all types have grown over the past 50 years. Even relatively low-end warship classes, such as the littoral combat ship, possessed significant system complexity. The tilt towards increasing warship complexity occurred before the mid-20^th century. Arguably, the warship significantly diverged from its civilian, merchant counterparts around the time of the American Civil War (1861-1865), the last major conflict the U.S. converted large numbers of commercial vessels into front-line warships. At the time, one could merely provide a naval crew and mount a few guns onto a merchant ship to create a relevant warship. While that level of simplicity has long passed, technology has again made it possible to use elements of the commercial maritime system to quickly create functional warships. The ubiquitous shipping container, equipped with everything from cruise missiles to towed array sonars, generators, berthing, and command spaces, allows for the conversion of any container-capable commercial ship into a combatant.

These conversions do come with limitations in speed and especially the ability to sustain and recover from damage. That said, the “warship in a box” concept offers navies the ability to create combatants of different sizes and capabilities rapidly, from smaller offshore resupply ships with only a couple of containers to large “missile merchant” vessels depending on the number and types of container-based systems fitted.

Making Warships from 1775 to 1865

The United States Navy began in October 1775 with the basis of its fleet consisting of converted merchant ships. A squadron of ships composed of the vessel Alfred, with 24 guns, and the eight gun schooners Wasp and Fly, formed the first combatant formation. The squadron was responsible for capturing British military supplies in Nassau. Most of the Continental Navy was merchant-based until Congress authorized the first thirteen purpose-built frigates in December 1775. John Paul Jones’ famous vessel, Bonhomme Richard, was a heavier type of cargo vessel class, an East Indiamen that featured strengthened decks to carry a gun armament for self-protection on the trade routes.

By the 1790s and early 1800s, the U.S. Navy was known for its powerful frigate warships, yet it still retained the option to expand its fleet in war through the commissioning of armed merchant vessels as combatants. This practice continued up to and expanded during the Civil War, with the Union Navy expanding 15-fold in numbers, primarily through converted merchant ships. The Brooklyn Navy Yard alone refitted 190 merchant ships as warships and completed one such refit (USS Monticello) in just 24 hours.

While converted merchant ships arguably helped win the Civil War through their use as blockade ships, a combination of technological changes during the Civil War made converted merchant warships far less useful. Heavy rifled guns, armored steel plates, and steam-powered machinery created a new kind of warship that civilian conversions could not easily match or contest. Warships had to be designed to support armor and heavy guns, now mounted in heavy armored turrets. Modern armaments and protective armor could not be easily added to an existing commercial ship.

Gradually, the merchant warship disappeared, although some high-speed ocean liners went to sea with the provision to mount medium-caliber guns to serve as “merchant cruisers” for sea lane patrol and raiding. However, these vessels were no match for purpose-built warships, and the submarine largely assumed the role of raiding naval platforms. The end of the merchant cruiser is perhaps symbolized by the sinking of the British-armed merchant cruiser, HMS Jervis Bay, by the German “pocket battleship,” Admiral Scheer, on November 5^th, 1940, in less than 30 minutes of combat.

Return of the Merchant Warship

Unlike the 1940s, today’s merchant ships are often much larger than their warship counterparts. The sheer size of merchant vessels offers some degree of protection through plenty of reserve buoyancy and is resource-friendly by requiring just a handful of sailors to crew them. The introduction of the shipping container in 1956 by American businessman Malcolm McClean effectively invented container intermodalism in the commercial maritime world. Most commercial goods are moved by shipping container, whether by sea, truck, or rail transportation. Russia has already weaponized the shipping container, and perhaps the Chinese as well with containerized cruise missile launchers.

The concept is that an armed merchant ship might serve as a hidden raider or provide defense against seizure by an adversary. For the United States, the growing number of containerized systems, including cruise missiles, suggests a return to a pre-1865 period when commercial ships could be rapidly converted into effective warships. The shipping container’s many forms become the basis for returning to a merchant warship armed with modern weapons capable of fighting and sinking purpose-built combatants.

What types of systems can be containerized for combat?

While shipping containers fitted with missiles have captured most of the attention, many other variants exist that could serve to create a containerized warship. Finnish defense contractor Patria created a 120mm gun system that fits within a shipping container. The weapon box contains 100 rounds of ammunition, requires a crew of three to operate, is self-contained with air conditioning, and resists chemical/biological/radioactive (CBR) agent penetration.

Anti-submarine warfare systems can also come as containerized packages. Atlas-Electronik makes a two-container, plug-and-play, towed array sonar system complete with operator consoles in one of the containers. Loitering drone munitions are another option. German defense contractor Rhinemettal makes a modified shipping container with 126 launch cells for the Hero loitering munition (suicide) drone. Other containerized applications include secondary weapon systems, additional sensors, data storage, medical facilities, and control spaces. Containerized generators offer energy solutions for powering these systems. Containers can also house combat information centers and additional crew berthing.

Pulling Containerized Systems into a Warship in a Box

Containers are the basis of goods movement globally, available in numbers and able to fit on a wide range of vessel types and sizes. Containers with military capabilities can be hardwired together to form a complete system or connected with Wi-Fi in some applications to reduce vulnerability to connection loss due to battle damage.

The modular nature of containerized warships means that training can occur on or off the ship platform. The warship-in-a-box system can be exercised ashore on a pier just as easily as at sea. Given this feature, it might be a good concept for the Naval Reserve to embrace for rapid integration into the fleet. Naval Reserve units located at inland sites could still train with their containers and have regular transportation to port facilities for embarkation on suitable ships for at-sea exercises.

The containers that comprise “Warship-in-a-Box” would be loaded onto an appropriate-sized civilian-built ship, from an offshore resupply vessel to a Panamax container ship in size, and crewed with a Navy complement of sailors approximating the crew of comparable civilian vessels. The idea is to keep the crew size to a minimum to save costs and maximize the number of container warships that can be created. The ship can be painted a haze grey or leave it in merchant livery as a “Q-ship” if desired. Finally, commission it with the appropriate USS Ship Name.

Unlike traditional warships requiring individual weapon system reloads, the warship in a box is defined by its self-contained, containerized capabilities. Warships require specialized equipment and facilities for replenishment of weapons in port. The potential underway reloading of missiles is several years away and still being tested. The warship-in-a-box concept simplifies reloading with containerized systems that can be installed on ships with existing equipment in container ports around the United States. Safety precautions, especially for weapons susceptible to electromagnetic energy, remain a concern. Still, ports worldwide can handle containerized systems with relative ease, unlike purely naval ports, where conventional warships are replenished. This greatly expands the scope of available infrastructure and equipment that can contribute to containerized capabilities.

Like current uncrewed navy ships that are starting to exploit containerized weapons, the warship-in-a-box concept would be deployed for exercises and some contingencies, but would essentially be a “break glass in the event of war” capability to rapidly augment the fleet with additional vessels for warfighting missions depending on numbers and types of containers embarked. They could range in size from large container missile arsenal ships with dozens or hundreds of weapons to offshore resupply ships with only four to six containers supporting one or two basic missions. The Navy has already experimented with shipping container weapons on conventional warships, so moving to a vessel with all capabilities housed in containers is a logical next step.

Drawbacks to the Warship-in-a-Box

While the concept can rapidly bring together the capabilities of a frigate-sized ship, both the host platforms and containerized systems have numerous weaknesses that conventional warships do not possess. Most commercial ship platforms that could host a container-based system are slow, with speeds of only 13 to 16 knots, and are often unsuitable for fleet operations. There would be little to no redundancy in systems or people, features that characterize conventional warships. They are effectively auxiliary warships like the many converted commercial craft seen in world navies into the mid-19^th century, but armed with lethal fires and capable of inflicting significant damage on an opponent at relatively low cost and personnel.

Conclusion

The warship-in-a-box program is not a substitute for purpose-built warships that are globally deployable and commanded by national leadership. However, a force of these units in the hands of the naval reserve could be a quickly deployable and operational group of second-tier units for patrol, escort, and even strike operations given the potential size of their missile magazine. Any conflict with a peer opponent would be global, and historically navies find that they never have enough ships to cover all tasks that surface in the course of a major conflict. Using the shipping container, the building block of the maritime world, represents a relatively quick and easy method of creating additional naval capacity to improve warfighting advantage.

Dr. Steven Wills is a navalist for the Center for Maritime Strategy at the Navy League of the United States. He is an expert in U.S. Navy strategy and policy and U.S. Navy surface warfare programs and platforms. His research interests include the history of U.S. Navy strategy development over the Cold War and immediate, post-Cold War era, and the history of the post-World War II U.S. Navy surface fleet.

Featured Image: A containership at port. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)