LCDR Nathan Sawyer joins the podcast to discuss his article in USNI Proceedings, “Beyond Tactics: How the Hawkeye Proved the Power of Adaptability in the Red Sea.” They discuss the role of the E-2 Hawkeye, and the importance of adaptability and leadership afloat.
The United States Marine Corps has an outsized effect on Navy force planning. While the Navy and the Marines exhibit a sincere and genuine single team spirit conducting global naval operations, they are a fierce team of rivals when determining the requirements for amphibious ships (also known as “amphibs”), which the Navy funds for their construction and operation.
Soon after becoming Marine Corps Commandant, General David H. Berger announced a headline-grabbing transformation of the Corps in his July 2019 Commandant’s Planning Guidance. In its new role, the Marines would operate inside actively contested maritime spaces to conduct sea denial and assured access missions with a particular focus on the Indo-Pacific theater. In March 2020 Berger further explained his concept in Force Design 2030. Berger’s guidance declared that the Navy’s large amphibs were too vulnerable and too expensive to risk in combat, the Marines’ requirement for 38 or 34 large amphibs was no longer valid, and the Marines had a new requirement for small, agile amphibs.
His unprecedented, if not historic, transformational initiative sparked a yearslong controversy over two inter-related issues. First, Force Design 2030 punctured the Corps’ rationale for Navy’s large amphibs, which the two sea services refer to as either “big deck” or “small deck” ships. Second, the initiative handed the Navy a multi-billion dollar bill to construct and operate a new class of amphibs designated eventually as the Medium Landing Ship.
Issue#1: Number of Large Amphibious Ships
Shifting Requirements
From Berger’s determination that large amphibs were too vulnerable and too expensive, it logically followed what Mark Cancian, an analyst at the Center for Security and International Studies and a retired colonel of Marines, concluded. If the Marines believed their “future lay in small amphibious ships, then the Pentagon should limit the building of large amphibious ships.” The Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office—a powerful analytical office reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense—took notice of this contradiction in the Marines’ transformation planning.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Marines’ requirement for large amphibs has been an issue for the Navy. Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates (2006-2011) in May 2010 explained why: “We have to take a hard look at where it would be necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious landing again – especially as advances in anti-ship systems keep pushing the potential launch point further from shore.… what kind of amphibious capability do we really need to deal with the most likely scenarios, and then how much?”
Echoing Gates’ arguments, Jerry Hendrix, a senior fellow at the Sagamore Institute and a retired Navy captain, stated that the Marine Corps has “been less than convincing on the role of amphibs in the future fight” and the need for joint forcible entry and amphibious assault. He observed, ” … outside of beaches on the Korean Peninsula … where [are they] going to be doing amphibious assault … what [is] the argument” for this capability? According to Cancian, the Marines have not “offered a strong wartime rationale for 31 large amphibious ships.”
Trump’s Defense Secretary Wants Fewer Large Amphibious Ships
By early 2020, it appeared Secretary of Defense Mark Esper had determined that the requirement for opposed amphibious landings was diminishing. He wanted a warfighting strategy to drive amphibious force planning, not a peacetime forward presence strategy. So, Esper directed his staff to conduct a new amphib study as a component of a larger study on the Navy’s total ship requirements. Completed in October 2020, the Future Navy Force Study served as the basis for the first Trump administration’s last Navy shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress in December 2020. Esper’s unprecedented tasking of his staff to conduct this study resulted in the Navy losing control over its force planning efforts for about eight months.
This plan had dire consequences for the Marines. It reduced the number of large amphibs by calling for a range of 9 to 10 “big deck” ships and a range of 52 to 57 for all other amphibs. Ronald O’Rourke, the respected Congressional Research Service analyst, suggested that this range could be divided into 19 or fewer “small deck” ships and 28 to 30 of the new Light Amphibious Warship. The combined total of “big deck” and “small deck” ships would be well under 30, which was unacceptable to the Marines.
Biden’s Navy Secretary Also Wanted Fewer Large Amphibious Ships and Another Study
On June 17, 2021, new Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro released the fiscal year 2022 shipbuilding plan. It called for 8 to 9 “big deck” amphibs, 16 to 19 “small deck” amphibs, and 24 to 35 new Light Amphibious Warships, which in 2024 the Navy redesignated the Medium Landing Ship. Also in June, the Navy and the Marines completed another amphib study which determined a requirement for 28 to 31 large amphibs. For the Marines, “31-amphibs” became their red-line for large amphibs, contradicting the Secretary’s range of 24 to 29 in the fiscal year 2022 shipbuilding plan.
In September 2021 Del Toro directed another evaluation of amphibious ship requirements called the Amphibious Force Requirement Study for delivery by March 2022. (Del Toro delayed submitting this study to Congress until December 2022.) By February 2022, Admiral Michael Gilday, the Chief of Naval Operations, publicly stated that the fiscal year 2023 shipbuilding plan would include, “probably nine big deck amphibs and another 19 or 20 [“small deck” ships] to support them.” Gilday’s numbers indicated a range of 28 to 29 for the large amphibs. A few months later, Del Toro released the fiscal year 2023 shipbuilding plan in April, presenting an unhelpful package of three alternative plans for a range of 7 to 9 “big deck” ships and 15 to 26 “small deck” ships for a total between 22 to 26 by fiscal year 2045. The reduction in large amphibs would prevent the Marines from simultaneously deploying three Marine Expeditionary Units.
While the Biden administration signaled it did not fully support the Marines’ requirements, some in Congress did. Representative Joe Courtney (D-Conn.) and Representative Rob Wittman (R-Va.) introduced a bill to maintain 31 large ships. In late July 2022, Gilday released his Navigation Plan2022 which called for 31 large amphibious ships and 18 Light Amphibious Warships.
Congress Is Incensed and Supports the Marines
By April 2022, Congress still had not received Del Toro’s Amphibious Force Requirements Study. A dispute, which became a stand-off between the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office and the Navy, caused the delay. This office wanted the Navy to reconsider portions of the report, but the Navy declined, and so the study languished. By December, Congress had had enough and passed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 with a statutory requirement for not less than 31 large amphibs, including 10 “big deck” and 21 “small deck” ships. This Act also required the Navy Secretary to ensure that the Commandant’s views are given appropriate consideration before a major decision is made by an element of the Navy Department outside the Marine Corps on a matter that directly concerns amphibious force structure and capability. In addition, the Act assigned directed responsibility to the Commandant for developing the requirements relating to amphibs. Del Toro finally sent the classified Amphibious Force Requirements Study to Congress in late December 2022. No sooner than Congress received this study, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin directed a “redo” with little Navy objection, which according to Politico, increased the Marines’ frustration.
Navy Secretary Announces an Amphibious Strategic Pause
Del Toro publicly stated in February 2023 that the Navy was taking a “strategic pause” from buying the “small deck” ships. He explained that the Navy needed additional time to determine the mix and number of amphibs before resuming procurement. The Secretary’s announcement was somewhat disingenuous as the Secretary had already initiated a de facto strategic pause in his April 2022 submission of the fiscal year 2023 shipbuilding plan and the fiscal year 2030 budget. According to Politico, the Marines were furious over this outcome. Gilday explained that lack of funding was the “driving issue” for the decision not to fund any more of these $1.8 billion “small deck” ships.
Congress Intervenes Again for the Marines
By April 2023, Del Toro’s strategic pause not to buy “small deck” amphibs had greatly annoyed the Senate Armed Services Committee. A month later the Committee reproached Del Toro in a June 13th letter for not responding to its questions regarding the Navy’s non-compliance with the statutory requirement to maintain 31 large amphibious ships. The senators saw no planning in the Navy’s fiscal year 2024 shipbuilding plan to achieve this force-level goal. Co-signed by 14 Democratic and Republican senators, the letter stated, “The Navy’s current plan not only violates the statutory requirement, but also jeopardizes the future effectiveness of the joint force, especially as we consider national security threats in the Indo-Pacific.” The letter continued that the Del Toro had until June 19th to respond with an updated shipbuilding plan for fiscal year 2024, and a pointed reminder that the 31-ship requirement “is not a suggestion but a requirement based on the assessed needs of the Navy and the Marine Corps.” In early August USNI News reported that the strategic pause was still in effect. At her September 2023 confirmation hearings to become the 33rd Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti endorsed the Marines’ requirement for 31 large amphibious ships.
Congress Helps Thwart an “Existential Threat” from the Navy Secretary
As the Marines entered 2024, the debate over the number of large amphibious ships remained unresolved. Lieutenant General Karsten Heckl, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, called the amphib shortage the Marines’ “single biggest existential threat.” In March, the Defense and Navy Departments eliminated this threat by ending the two-year “strategic pause” for procuring “small deck” amphibs. The Navy’s budget submission for fiscal year 2025 and itsfiscal year 2025 shipbuilding plan, both approved by the Defense and Navy Departments, included the procurement of “small deck” ships. In addition, these documents commenced the procurement of a new class of Medium Landing Ships. The Biden Administration had caved to Congress and ended the almost two-year strategic pause.
Issue #2: The Unaffordable and Unsurvivable Ship
Marines Give The Navy A Shipbuilding Bill
Berger’s guidance called for a new class of Navy amphibious ships that were “smaller, more lethal, and more risk-worthy platforms” to shuttle Marines around archipelagic islands. The Marines would “shoot” anti-ship cruise missiles from one island and then “scoot” to another island using the new amphibs as “water taxis” to “shoot” once more. In 2020 the Navy designated this new amphib as the Light Amphibious Warship. The Navy anticipated procuring a class of 28 to 30 ships with a crew of “no more than 40 Navy Sailors” at a “unit procurement cost of less than $100 million.”
Almost immediately the Navy and the Marine Corps clashed over the ship’s capabilities and costs. The Navy wanted a “survivable ship,” while the Marines wanted an operational ship as fast as possible, as well as one built to civilian standards and not military standards to reduce construction costs. Their disagreement delayed the delivery of first ship to “fiscal year 2023 and then to fiscal year 2025.” By January 2024, the Navy released its request for proposals for the first six of these new class of ships for delivery in 2029. The Navy asked for a ship that could lift 75 Marines and 600 tons of equipment with a “cargo area of about 8,000 square feet, a helicopter pad, a 70-person crew, spots for six .50-caliber guns and two 30mm guns.” The Navy also wanted the ship to be under 400 feet long, a draft of no more than 12 feet, a 14-knot endurance speed, and roll on/roll off beaching capability.
By April 2024, the Navy had re-designated the ship as a Medium Landing Ship with an increased estimated unit procurement cost of roughly $150 million in constant fiscal year 2024 dollars for the first 8 ships and a class size of 35 ships by 2043. The Navy estimated that 55 of these ships would “cost less than $200 million per ship, on average.” The Congressional Budget Office, however, projected the average cost at $350 million per ship.
In December 2024, the Navy received industries’ responses to its January 2024 request for proposals. After seeing the costs, the Navy immediately canceled its request. Gobsmacked, Nickolas Guertin, the assistant secretary of the navy for research, development and acquisition, stated the request for bids, “came back with a much higher price tag. … we had to pull that solicitation back and drop back and punt.” In January 2025, the Navy punted and began looking for “existing, private-sector designs” requiring minor modifications for conversion at a small cost.
In 2025, Unanswered Questions Remain About the New Amphibious Ship
The central issue about the procurement of the Medium Landing Ship remains its construction cost, which is dependent on whether the Navy builds the ship to commercial or naval warfare standards, which is, in turn, dependent on the ship’s final operational concept. Building to commercial standards lowers construction costs. The operational concept remains unclear whether these ships will operate in a benign environment. Will they only operate in the pre-crisis phase or after hostilities have commenced and these ships find themselves in contested waters? Moreover, if the Marines intend to resupply its forces as well to relocate them during the conflict, it is highly likely that these ships would be vulnerable to detection and attack.
Consequently, the Navy will have a mission requirement to protect and sustain the Marines operating as stand-in forces, placing another demand on the Navy to provide forces while also conducting other high priority missions (see Table 1). In April 2024 the Congressional Budget Office reported that “A ship that is not expected to face enemy fire in a conflict could be built to a lesser survivability standard, with fewer defensive systems than a ship that would sail in contested waters during a conflict.”
Table 1: A comparison of potential missions for the Department of the Navy during a conflict over Taiwan, divided into missions shared by the Navy and Marine Corps and missions that would be assigned to predominantly Navy forces. (Author graphic)
Perhaps in an attempt to strengthen the argument that the Navy should construct these ships to commercial standards, thefiscal year 2025 shipbuilding plan did not classify the Medium Landing Ship as an “amphibious warfare ship.” Instead, in a puzzling decision it was categorized as a “command and support” vessel, despite its requirement to land Marines on beaches to conduct kinetic operations.
Wrap-Up
The Navy and Marine Corps Have Different Priorities and Agendas
The Navy and the Marine Corps co-exist on some important core common tasks and viewpoints, reinforced by established historical, political, legal, and bureaucratic frameworks. The Marine focus on forward presence, forcible entry, and expeditionary warfare employing the Navy’s amphibs. Whereas for the Navy, expeditionary warfare is merely one among many Navy warfare functions to include anti-air warfare, anti-surface ship warfare, anti-submarine warfare, strike warfare, special operations warfare, mine and countermine warfare, electronic and information warfare, strategic deterrence, combat logistics, and sealift for Joint Force logistic sustainment. For the Marines, amphibs are a priority. For the Navy, however, ballistic missile submarines, attack submarines, aircraft carriers, large surface combatants, small surface combatants, auxiliary ships, logistics ships, oilers, and minesweepers are all priorities as well as amphibs (see Table 2).
Table 2: A comparison of ship acquisition priorities between the Navy and Marine Corps. (Author graphic)
The Navy does not get to focus on just one type of ship and it is responsible for a wide range of warfighting functions. In contrast, the Marine Corps has a much narrower set of responsibilities. When force structure priorities differ between the Navy and Marines, the Navy finds itself in an awkward position between one side—composed of the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Defense, and the Department of the Navy—and the other side comprised of the Marines and Congress. Such triangulation can lead to an almost unmanageable situation whereby the Navy loses control of the planning for its future, which actually occurred in 2019.
Gilday noted that the Navy “must prioritize programs most relevant” to a conflict with China. What can be more relevant to a conflict with China than logistics, especially with a U.S. Navy conducting distributed operations, likely without the availability of Guam. Lines of communication will stretch for thousands of miles from the U.S. homeland to the operating areas. These sea lines of communication, as well as U.S. ports, will require protection because China has the means and the will to interdict and sever these lines to isolate U.S. fighting forces and prevent their sustainment. Logistics ships to sustain combat operations, submarine tenders to rearm submarines, and oilers to refuel the Navy’s distributed forces across the vast Pacific distances may be more needed by the Navy than a new class of 35 amphibs. In February 2024 Admiral Samuel J. Paparo, Jr., then the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, stated that the Navy’s Combat Logistics Force, which supports and sustains the Navy’s distributed maritime operations with “beans, bullets, and black oil” is operating on “narrow margins” with insufficient ships for a war with China. He specifically cited inadequate numbers of oilers. Admiral Paparo also noted that the Chinese consider the U.S. Navy’s logistics capabilities a critical vulnerability with his statement that “When we run [war]games, the red team goes for the Combat Logistics Force every single time.” The Navy’s lack of strategic guidance hindered a comprehensive understanding of this and other thorny force planning issues, consequently strategic force priorities were often set on the fly.
The differences between the two sea services are real, and relations about Department of the Navy funding priorities have often been fractious and kept in-house. A major exception underscoring this sometime discordant relationship occurred in December 1995. General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps (retired), who served as Commandant, fired a salvo at the Navy for allegedly short-changing the Marine Corps for its fair share of the Navy Department’s budget. Admiral Frank B. Kelso, II, U.S. Navy (retired), Chief of Naval Operations (1990-1994), reminded Mundy that the Marines cannot ignore the “total requirements of the Navy” beside supporting the Marines in the “littorals.”
Conclusion
When the Marines believe their future is in jeopardy, which certainly was the case with this confrontation over 31-large amphibs and the fight for 35 new smaller amphibs, the Marines do not hesitate to seek Congress’ intervention on their behalf. Besides calling the reduction in large amphibs an existential threat to the Marines’ existence, General Heckl thundered, “Our identity is elemental to who we are as Marines. We are soldiers of the sea. We are the nation’s naval expeditionary force. And we just can’t lose that.” His statements reflected the Marine Corps’ laser focus on its own force structure, rather an appreciation of the bigger picture.
Advocates for any of the services can sometimes believe so passionately in the potential effectiveness of their particular service with its “unique” weapon systems, ships, or aircraft that “they find it difficult to appreciate the fuller pattern of a future war and the unforgiving priorities dictating resource allocation.” Their degree of identification with their service may “discourage viewpoints and thinking oriented toward the best interests” of theJoint Force as a whole.” The Marines’ success in setting the goal of 31 large amphibs and a new class of amphibs illustrates the powerful influence the Marines can and will exert over the Navy’s force planning process to achieve their objectives. The nation can only hope that the recent outcomes in amphib numbers that the Marines have achieved in coordination and cooperation with congressional and industrial influence will produce the desired benefit to America’s national defense, and not shortchange other high-priority requirements.
The Marine Corps has a well-deserved special place in the hearts of Congress and the American people—a sentiment that can defy the logic of Navy force planning, and the intentions of any administration to prioritize the nation’s defense requirements. The Marines—thanks to Congress—have a big vote in Navy force planning. Short of the Marine Corps becoming an independent armed service outside the Department of the Navy, the Navy, as best as it can, just has to live with a pertinacious Marine Corps — or it can borrow a page from the Marine Corps’ playbook.
Prior to his full retirement as a member of the U.S. senior executive service, Bruce Stubbs had assignments on the staffs of the secretary of the Navy and the chief of naval operations from 2009 to 2022. He was a former director of Strategy and Strategic Concepts in the OPNAV N3N5 and N7 directorates. As a career U.S. Coast Guard officer, he had a posting as the Assistant Commandant for Capability (current title) in Headquarters, served on the staff of the National Security Council, taught at the Naval War College, commanded a major cutter, and served a combat tour with the U.S. Navy in Vietnam during the 1972 Easter Offensive. The author drew upon his forthcoming publication, Cold Iron: The Demise of Navy Strategy Development and Force Planning, to compose portions of this commentary.
Featured Image: Ships of the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group sail in formation. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Corbin J. Shea/Released)
In 2027, Task Force Blade, a U.S. Naval (USN) task force in the Western Pacific, attempts to neutralize a People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN) force through Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO). By dispersing its Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, Littoral Combat Ships, and Virginia-class submarines across the Philippine Sea and strategic chokepoints, the task force aims to enhance its elusiveness, resilience, and lethality. However, the limitations of this approach become apparent when confronted with the unique challenges posed by the vast Western Pacific theater and PLAN forces.
The operation begins with intelligence gathering using RQ-4 Global Hawk drones, P-8A Poseidon aircraft, and NRO satellites. Despite the advanced sensors, the PLAN’s use of electromagnetic spectrum management and deception techniques hinders the effectiveness of this intelligence gathering. These remote sensors struggle to gather and communicate targeting information to shooting platforms, and their lack of riskworthiness prevents them from gathering better information by gaining closer proximity to targets. Attack platforms, such as the U.S. destroyers, are subsequently compelled to break from their distributed operating posture to gain closer proximity to targets in order to gather targeting information with their organic sensors. These warships then attempt to coordinate a long-range missile attack using a combination of weapons such as Tomahawks and Standard Missile-6s (SM-6s).1 The SAG also coordinates with aircraft to launch Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASMs) against the PLAN forces.
But the process of compromising the distributed operating posture gave the PLA enough notice to put its platforms into a higher state of readiness, optimize its disposition against the probable threat axis, and surge several squadrons worth of aircraft to cover the warships. This forewarned and reinforced air defense network posed by the PLAN’s advanced warships and aircraft counters the comprehensive missile attack launched by U.S. forces. The need to break the distributed force posture to gain proximity to PLA forces drew U.S. forces deeper into the PLA weapons engagement zone, setting the stage for multiple rounds of counterattacks by PLA forces. The U.S. missile attack created signatures that clarified the sensing challenge for PLA forces, creating pressure for the now-targetable U.S. forces to concentrate into conventional formations to improve survivability. The limited magazine capacity of U.S. ships and logistical challenges limit the task force’s ability to sustain combat operations as it considers whether it can persist inside the WEZ.
Though this is only a vignette, it exposes significant limitations in the USN’s current approach to DMO when applied to the Western Pacific. Current distributed operating concepts must address these vast distances, complex environment, and the PLA’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. The U.S. Navy can address some key challenges inherent in executing DMO against the PLA in the Western Pacific by incorporating lessons from Ukraine’s advanced scouting and targeting, asymmetric tactics, and establishment of sea denial zones in the Black Sea. Ukrainian actions can inform a novel framework for how a distributed U.S. maritime force can overcome the operational challenges and asymmetric disadvantages it will face against the PLA in the Western Pacific.
DMO – Defining the Concept
The most current and official definition of DMO is in the 2020 Tri-Service Maritime document “Advantage at Sea.” Accordingly, “Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) is an operating concept that focuses on the distribution, integration, and maneuvering of naval forces to mass overwhelming combat power and effects at chosen times and locations.”2 Furthermore, the “Fighting DMO” series on CIMSE notes several common themes in public definitions of DMO, including “the massing and convergence of fires from distributed forces, complicating adversary targeting and decision-making, and networking effects across platforms and domains.”3 Others have noted that the “denial of enemy intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities is essential to DMO,” and that the force must be “hard to find, hard to kill, and lethal.”4,5 These definitions can be synthesized to define DMO as the following:
The distribution and maneuver of naval forces across various domains, blending sea-based and land-based capabilities to effectively concentrate combat power and hinder adversary targeting while emphasizing the dispersion of units, diversified use of sensors and weapons, and incorporation of long-range and autonomous systems.
DMO signifies a strategic evolution from traditional platform-centric warfare to a network-centric paradigm.6 This approach enables massing firepower without co-locating launch platforms, facilitated by increased weapons range and networks for long-range coordination. It seeks to garner the advantages of concentration – a massive, unified strike force – without the associated risks of grouping assets too closely. DMO emphasizes a dispersed yet cohesive operational pattern, aiming to create a formidable force without centralizing targets for the adversary.
DMO synthesizes the principles of distribution, integration, and maneuver to mass combat power effectively and is a response to specific challenges posed by the PLA’s sophisticated naval capabilities.7 The PLA maintains a highly capable anti-ship missile arsenal, including advanced weapons like the DF-21D and DF-26 missiles, which can target U.S. carriers and major surface combatants over long distances.8 The concept seeks to mitigate these threats by dispersing naval forces across a broader area. By employing DMO, the U.S. Navy aims to enhance its survivability in environments dominated by long-range missile threats and maintain its ability to project power despite an increasingly contested maritime domain.
Critical PLA challenges to DMO
The PLA’s sophisticated detection abilities, advanced missile ranges, and mass firepower strategies will challenge a distributed maritime force’s attempts at being elusive, resilient, and lethal. The PLA’s advanced ISR and detection capabilities include a vast network of land-based radars, over-the-horizon (OTH) radars, and a constellation of reconnaissance satellites. Maintaining resilience will prove challenging as the PLA’s long-range precision strike missiles, such as the DF-21D and DF-26 “carrier killer” missiles, target U.S. naval assets from long ranges. The PLA’s massed firepower strategies, particularly their saturation missile attacks, can overwhelm a distributed force’s defenses and deplete its magazine depth, effectively neutralizing its offensive capacity and ability to strike effectively first.
The PLA can nearly relentlessly detect and track naval assets across enormous distances. Their land-based radar systems, such as the JY-27A and YLC-8B, provide long-range surveillance coverage extending hundreds of kilometers from the Chinese mainland.9 Additionally, the PLA’s OTH radars, like the SLC-7 and SLC-18, exploit ionospheric reflection to detect surface targets up to 3,000 km away.10 Furthermore, China’s growing fleet of Yaogan and Gaofen series satellites equipped with synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors enable all-weather, day-and-night monitoring of maritime activities.11 These advanced ISR assets, working in concert, severely undermine a distributed force’s fundamental intent to remain elusive. Maintaining operational effectiveness under DMO will require an increased focus on advanced stealth technologies, improved evasion tactics, and robust counter-surveillance measures.12 Adapting to this threat environment is critical for the U.S. Navy to counteract the sophisticated surveillance methods of the PLA effectively.
An SLC-18 surveillance radar on display at Airshow China 2022 in Zhuhai. (Xinhua photo)
The PLA’s advanced missile capabilities, including weapons like the DF-21D and DF-26 “carrier killer” missiles, present significant challenges to distributed operations. These missiles can target U.S. naval assets from 1,500 miles and pose a severe threat to carriers and other large vessels.13 The DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle, with a range of up to 1,500 miles, further complicates this, as its maneuverability and speed present additional tracking and interception challenges.14 Moreover, the PLA’s continued development of the YJ-18 and YJ-21 anti-ship cruise missiles, with ranges exceeding 330 miles and 900 miles, respectively, adds another layer of complexity to the threat environment. These missiles, capable of being launched from various platforms such as submarines, ships, and aircraft, can saturate and overwhelm a distributed force’s defenses.15 The PLA’s investment in the H-6K bomber, which can carry up to six YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship missiles, further extends the reach and flexibility of their strike capabilities.16
Using massed, multi-axis missile attacks can achieve rapid dominance in a conflict. This approach exploits the finite nature of U.S. naval missile defense systems, such as the Aegis Combat System and Standard Missile interceptors. By launching a mass quantity of missiles from various platforms, including land-based launchers, ships, submarines, and aircraft, the PLA can saturate and exhaust these defensive capabilities.17 Such a depletion would effectively neutralize a distributed force’s (or platform’s) capacity before it can launch its own attacks.18 The affected force will have lost its ability to strike effectively first.19
The actions conducted by Ukraine against the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) illuminate a way to resolve these challenges. The success of Ukraine in countering Russian aggression offers valuable lessons to address the PLA challenges of sophisticated ISR networks, long-range precision strike missiles, and massed firepower strategies. By incorporating key components of Ukraine’s approach, such as the use of mobile and shore-based anti-ship missiles, the employment of unmanned systems for ISR and strike missions, and the adoption of unconventional tactics like the “mosquito fleet” concept, the USN can develop a more resilient and effective distributed force posture. An evolved DMO framework, which emphasizes increased mobility, flexibility, and the integration of novel technologies and tactics, can help mitigate the risks posed by the PLA’s advanced capabilities and provide a more robust deterrent in the region. Nonetheless, adapting to this evolving threat landscape will require continuous innovation, experimentation, and a willingness to challenge traditional paradigms of naval warfare.
Ukraine in the Black Sea
Ukraine’s Black Sea operations demonstrate a potent combination of advanced scouting and targeting, unconventional tactics, and the establishment of sea denial zones. Through enhanced surveillance using drones like the Bayraktar TB2, Ukraine executed precision strikes on key targets, such as the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva.20 Ukraine complements this advanced scouting with asymmetric tactics, including employing mines, UUVs, shore-based anti-ship missiles, and small, fast-attack craft known as the “mosquito fleet.”21 By integrating these elements with innovative surface maneuvers, Ukraine disrupts traditional approaches to naval engagements, achieving stealth and effectiveness in striking first.
A Russian warship shortly before it was hit from a Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2 drone. (Photo by Ukraine Ministry of Defense)
The culmination of these approaches is the establishment of sea denial zones, where Ukraine effectively restricts adversary access and transforms maritime spaces into formidable defensive lines.22 These measures limit enemy movement and provide a powerful deterrent against aggressive naval actions. Adapting and applying these lessons to the DMO concept can help mitigate the risks posed by the PLA’s advanced capabilities and enhance the resilience and effectiveness of U.S. naval forces in the Western Pacific.
Ukraine has effectively employed advanced scouting techniques in the Black Sea to enhance its ability to strike Russian naval assets first. The use of aerial surveillance drones, such as the Bayraktar TB2, has provided remote situational awareness deep inside the adversary weapons engagement zone and targeted precision engagements, as demonstrated by the tracking and targeting of Raptor-class patrol boats.23 The sinking of the Moskva cruiser was achieved through precise intelligence that cued Neptune missile launches, highlighting Ukraine’s capacity to execute high-impact strikes by leveraging a rapid intelligence-gathering and targeting cycle. Ukraine’s comprehensive scouting methodology also incorporates penetrating UAVs and UUVs for intelligence-gathering missions against various targets, including the minesweeper Ivan Golubets and the cruiser Admiral Makarov.24 These successes showcase Ukraine’s effective integration of reconnaissance, scouting, and ISR capabilities to target Russian BSF operations. By combining advanced technologies, riskworthy scouts, and streamlined intelligence analysis and decision-making processes, Ukraine has established an effective model for conducting maritime surveillance and targeting in a contested environment. The USN can use similar scouting concepts to gain an advantage in the Western Pacific.
Ukraine’s Black Sea naval operations have uniquely applied unconventional tactics, leveraging advanced technologies and innovation to counter Russian aggression. The employment of Bayraktar TB2 drones for precision strikes against Russian Raptor-class patrol boats and a BK-16 high-speed assault boat near Snake Island represents an unconventional use of aerial drones in a maritime context, allowing Ukraine to challenge Russia’s naval superiority while minimizing risk to Ukrainian forces.25
Similarly, the deployment of MAGURA V5 USVs to successfully attack larger Russian vessels, such as the Project 22160 patrol ship Sergey Kotov and the Tarantul-class corvette R-334 Ivanovets, represents a departure from traditional naval conflict, as these small, agile, and expendable platforms can swarm and overwhelm enemy defenses.26 These unconventional approaches, further enhanced by the integration of cyber warfare capabilities and special forces operations, as exemplified by the joint Ukrainian SBU and Navy effort that seriously damaged the Ropucha-class landing ship Olenegorsky Gornyak near the Port of Novorossiysk, have allowed a smaller, less powerful naval force to effectively challenge a larger adversary.27
2027 Revisited: TF Blade in the South China Sea
TF Blade, operating in the South China Sea, adopts a form of Ukraine’s advanced scouting and targeting tactics to counter a PLA naval threat. The task force, composed of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, Littoral Combat Ships, and USVs, detects a PLAN SAG near the Spratly Islands using a network of MQ-9B SeaGuardian UAVs and Orca UUVs.28 The SeaGuardians provide persistent, high-resolution imagery of the PLA SAG, which includes a Type 055 Renhai-class cruiser and several Type 052D Luyang III-class destroyers. At the same time, the Orca UUVs gather acoustic intelligence on the PLA ships, identifying their unique sound signatures and tracking their movements. Fusing the data from these penetrating scouting platforms, the task force’s AI-enabled battle management system generates a comprehensive, real-time picture of the PLA SAG’s disposition and vulnerabilities, revealing that the Type 055 cruiser, a critical command and control node, is operating with degraded air defense capabilities.
In 2027, TF Blade seizes the opportunity, launching a coordinated, multi-domain strike against the PLA SAG. A swarm of USVs deploy electronic warfare payloads to jam the PLA ships’ sensors and communications while emitting deceptive signatures. At the same time, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are able to launch a salvo of SM-6 missiles from widely distributed firing positions. These missiles, guided by the targeting data from the SeaGuardians and Orcas, converge on the Type 055 cruiser, overwhelming its weakened defenses and neutralizing the ship with multiple hits. This strike’s precision and coordination considerably weakens the PLA SAG, forcing it to withdraw from the area and reassess its strategy.
Following the successful strike against the PLA Surface Action Group (SAG) near the Spratly Islands, TF Blade continues to monitor the situation using its advanced scouting and targeting capabilities. The task force launches a series of asymmetric attacks to further disrupt PLA operations and degrade their combat capabilities. A Zumwalt-class destroyer employs its stealth to gain proximity to a PLA amphibious group and deploys a swarm of small, expendable USVs to conduct a coordinated attack on a PLA Type 071 transport dock. These USVs, armed with miniaturized torpedoes and guided missiles, evade PLA defenses and deliver a compromising strike on the vessel by significantly damaging its well deck.
TF Blade’s CSG and its associated Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) establish a sea denial zone against the PLA Navy in the Western Pacific. By deploying a network of MQ-4C Triton drones for high-altitude surveillance, supplemented by satellite reconnaissance, the CSG and DESRON effectively track critical PLA assets, including Type 055 destroyers operating near the Paracel Islands, and monitor their movements toward the first island chain. Another layer of close-in penetrating scouts and drones is situated in higher-risk areas to gain high quality targeting information that can be relayed back through the Tritons to cue standoff engagements from distributed forces.
TF Blade positions its penetrating UUVs near the Spratly Islands to further restrict PLA naval operations while laying sensor-laden smart mines to control crucial sea lanes and chokepoints. These UUVs discreetly monitor PLA submarine activity, particularly the movements of their Type 093 and Type 039 classes, providing real-time intelligence on their positions and patrol patterns. Leveraging this intelligence, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers distribute themselves into firing positions outside PLA submarine patrol boxes, launching Tomahawk strikes against PLA command and control centers on Mischief Reef and Subi Reef, damaging their A2/AD network.
These actions challenge and reshape PLA’s traditional maritime strategies, imposing significant operational constraints on their naval forces and pushing their effective range further back from critical areas like the Taiwan Strait. Through this multi-domain approach, the CSG and DESRON establish a robust sea denial zone in the Western Pacific.
Logistical and Sustainment Challenges in Extended Maritime Operations
Applying Ukrainian Black Sea tactics against the PLA in the Western Pacific presents significant logistical challenges due to the region’s vast distances and the USN’s need to maintain long supply lines. Unlike Ukraine’s operations in the Black Sea, which benefit from close proximity to land-based support, the U.S. Navy would need to sustain operations up to 6,000 nautical miles from its main bases in the continental United States. The PLAN, in contrast, enjoys a logistical advantage with its interior lines of communication and access to numerous bases along the Chinese coast, the furthest being only 1,500 nautical miles from the potential areas of operation in the South China Sea.
The USN must establish a robust network of forward operating bases, pre-positioned supplies, and mobile logistics platforms to overcome these challenges and effectively implement DMO tactics informed by the Ukrainian experience. This would require significant investment in logistics infrastructure, such as increasing the number of support ships from the current 29 to an estimated 60-70, as the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recommended.29 Additionally, the USN would need to expand its access to facilities in allied countries, such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, and develop new technologies to extend the range and endurance of its platforms, particularly unmanned vehicles. For instance, the U.S. Navy’s current MQ-4C Triton drone has a range of 8,200 nautical miles, but operating in the Western Pacific may require even more extended endurance capabilities.30
Conducting DMO using Ukrainian concepts will require making logistics more distributed, with smaller depots that are less targetable. This will increase the redundancy of the logistics network where no logistics node is so critical that its loss severely impacts the broader force. Techniques employed by Ukraine, such as the use of diversified, smaller platforms, can be scaled up and supported by the USN’s advanced logistical capabilities, enabling sustained operations even in the extended operational areas of the Western Pacific. Smaller, higher quantities of capabilities would require fewer exquisite capabilities, allowing for the use of numerous smaller ports and airfields that may not be accessible to the USN’s large ships. Utilizing more yet smaller logistics nodes throughout the theater would improve logistics resiliency and flexibility.
Differences in Maritime Theater Characteristics
The operational environments of the Black Sea and the Western Pacific differ significantly, presenting unique challenges in applying Ukrainian naval tactics against the PLA Navy. The Black Sea is a relatively confined body of water with a maximum width of 600 nautical miles. In contrast, the Western Pacific is a vast expanse of ocean, with the potential area of operations spanning thousands of nautical miles from the South China Sea to the Philippine Sea. These differences in scale and geography substantially impact the effectiveness of various naval tactics and technologies, and the viability of applying Ukrainian lessons to the Pacific theater.
The Black Sea’s confined nature allows for the effective use of smaller, more agile craft and the deployment of dense networks of sensors and mines to control key chokepoints. These tactics may be less effective in the vastness of the Western Pacific, as the PLAN has greater room for maneuver and can leverage its larger, more capable ships to project power over greater distances. Ukraine’s successful use of shore-based anti-ship missiles, such as the Neptune, and drones, like the Bayraktar TB2, similarly rely heavily on the Black Sea’s limited distances and the ability to integrate land-based support. However, more extended detection and engagement ranges, as well as the limited availability of land-based support infrastructure, may reduce the effectiveness of these systems in the open ocean environment of the Western Pacific. Adapting Ukrainian tactics to this theater would require significant investment in developing long-range platforms, such as larger USVs and UUVs, as well as enhancing existing systems to extend their reach and endurance.
While the Black Sea’s confined nature allows for the use of dense networks of sensors and mines to control key chokepoints, the USN can still adopt this approach in critical areas of the Western Pacific. These include critical maritime chokepoints like the Taiwan Strait, Philippine Strait, the Ryukus Island chain, and the littorals in the South China Sea. In these areas, the USN could create localized sea denial zones informed by the Ukrainian experience. By adapting these tactics and technologies to the unique geography of the Western Pacific, such as focusing on strategic chokepoints and key archipelagic terrain, the USN can effectively apply the lessons learned from Ukraine’s Black Sea operations to counter the PLAN, despite the differences in the scale and characteristics of the operational environments.
Satellite photo of the Ryukyu islands. (NASA photo)
Recommendations
For the USN to better implement these tactics, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) should sponsor studies to explore the optimal integration of penetrating and riskworthy USVs and UUVs into the DMO concept, focusing on their roles in ISR, EW, and offensive operations. These studies should specifically investigate the most effective USV/UUV platforms and payloads for specific missions, command and control architectures for coordinating drone swarms, USV/UUV facilitation of distributed killchains, tactics for employing drone swarms in littoral environments, and countermeasures against adversary drone threats.
The USN should develop and test asymmetric warfare tactics inspired by Ukrainian operations. These should focus on the coordination of USV/UUV swarm attacks on enemy surface combatants, the integration of cyber and EW capabilities to degrade enemy C4ISR networks, the employment of mines and coastal defense systems to establish localized sea denial zones, and the use of small, agile units for amphibious raids and seizure of key maritime terrain. The integration of these tactics should be refined through wargaming, simulations, and live exercises, such as the Navy’s Large Scale Exercise (LSE), to validate their effectiveness and identify areas for improvement.
The USN should prioritize developing and integrating a system similar to Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) with USVs and UUVs to enhance the situational awareness and distributed lethality of conventional naval forces.31 Key focus areas should include the AI-driven autonomous coordination systems for human-machine teams, advanced communication and data-sharing technologies for secure and reliable connectivity, and the integration of collaborative combat systems with other maritime assets operating in a distributed manner. These systems should undergo rigorous testing in realistic A2/AD environments to ensure reliability in a contested electromagnetic spectrum.
The USN should also explore ways to integrate DMO with Marine Stand-In Forces (SIF) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO).32 These efforts should focus on developing rapidly deployable, self-sustaining EABO units that can provide ISR and targeting support to distributed naval forces. Additionally, the Navy should explore the employment of SIF using USVs, UUVs, and coastal defense systems to create localized sea denial zones.33 To seize and defend critical maritime terrain in contested environments, coordination between DMO and SIF/EABO assets should be a key priority. Finally, these experiments and exercises should refine tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for integrated DMO-SIF/EABO operations, ensuring a cohesive and practical approach to distributed maritime warfare.
Finally, the USN should establish and codify clear DMO doctrine, and it should evaluate the proficiency of naval formations at executing this doctrine during their certification cycles. Simultaneously, the Navy should create a dedicated warfighting development organization to lead, coordinate, and prioritize DMO-related efforts across the Navy and Marine Corps. It should develop and maintain a repository of lessons learned and best practices from DMO exercises and operations, provide training and education to Navy and Marine Corps personnel on DMO concepts and tactics, and foster collaboration with allies, partners, and industry to advance DMO capabilities and interoperability. By taking these steps, the U.S. Navy can create a comprehensive framework for the successful implementation and continuous improvement of DMO, ensuring its forces are well-prepared to operate effectively in contested environments and counter the evolving threats posed by near-peer adversaries.
Conclusion
Ukraine has demonstrated the value of exploiting vulnerabilities in Russian naval operations with asymmetric capabilities. These methods have effectively pushed Russian naval forces away from the western Black Sea and forced them to operate primarily near their bases in Crimea and Novorossiysk. This forfeiture of sea control has found Russia largely confining its naval forces to defensive positions with limited ability to project power or support land-based operations in southern Ukraine. Despite the significant disparity in maritime strength and the loss of a substantial portion of its fleet early in the conflict, Ukraine’s innovative approach to sea denial, centered on penetrative scouting, precision targeting, and asymmetric capabilities, has allowed it to effectively dispute Russia’s sea control in the Black Sea coastal waters, significantly undermining its strategic position in the region.34 While the lessons learned from Ukraine’s Black Sea operations provide valuable insights, their direct application to the Western Pacific requires careful consideration of this vast and complex theater’s unique geographical and operational challenges.
By analyzing the theoretical underpinnings of DMO, the practical challenges in the Western Pacific, and Ukrainian actions against the Russian Black Sea Fleet, a framework can be developed that directly addresses the challenges of a distributed force facing the PLA. Despite the difference in operational environments, the fundamental principles and tactics employed by Ukraine in the Black Sea can be adapted and applied to counter the PLAN in the Western Pacific. The USN can enhance the effectiveness of DMO by focusing on advanced scouting, asymmetric tactics, and the establishment of sea denial zones along key maritime terrain, as demonstrated by Ukraine’s success. This will not only broaden the applicability of DMO as an operational concept, but can also provide a tangible framework for addressing asymmetry in naval warfare.
LtCol James Jackson is a career logistician in the U.S. Marines. He is a graduate of the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School and is currently an Operational Planner at Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command.
References
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[2] Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, U.S. Department of Defense, pg. 25, December 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Dec/16/2002553074/-1/-1/0/TRISERVICESTRATEGY.PDF.
[3] Dmitry Filipoff. “Fighting DMO, PT. 1: Defining Distributed Maritime Operations and The Future of Naval Warfare”. Center for International Maritime Security. Accessed March 8, 2024. https://cimsec.org/fighting-dmo-pt-1-defining-distributed-maritime-operations-and-the-future-of-naval-warfare/.
[4]Harlan Ullman. “Are There Flaws in the U.S. Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations?,” Defense News, January 23, 2023. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2023/01/23/are-there-flaws-in-the-us-navys-distributed-maritime-operations/.
[5] Richard Mosier. “Distributed Maritime Operations: Hard to Find,” Center for International Maritime Security. Accessed March 8, 2024. https://cimsec.org/distributed-maritime-operations-hard-to-find/.
[6] Dmitry Filipoff. “Fighting DMO, PT. 1: Defining Distributed Maritime Operations and The Future of Naval Warfare”. Center for International Maritime Security. Accessed March 8, 2024. https://cimsec.org/fighting-dmo-pt-1-defining-distributed-maritime-operations-and-the-future-of-naval-warfare
[7] Ibid.
[8] Dr. Sam Goldsmith, “VAMPIRE VAMPIRE VAMPIRE The PLA’s anti-ship cruise missile threat to Australian and allied naval operations,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 2022, 10.
[9] “Introduction to Chinese Military Radar,” GlobalSecurity.org, accessed March 12, 2024, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/radar-intro.htm.
[10] Ibid.
[11]James Andrew Lewis, ‘No Place to Hide: A Look at China’s Geosynchronous Surveillance Capabilities,’ Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), accessed March 20, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/no-place-hide-look-chinas-geosynchronous-surveillance-capabilities.
[12] Richard Mosier. “Distributed Maritime Operations: Hard to Find,” Center for International Maritime Security. Accessed March 8, 2024. https://cimsec.org/distributed-maritime-operations-hard-to-find/.
[13] “Missiles of China.” Missile Threat. Accessed March 12, 2024. https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/.
[14] “Missiles of China.” Missile Threat. Accessed March 12, 2024. https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/.
[15] “YJ-18,” Missile Threat, accessed March 24, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/yj-18/.
[16] Military Today, ‘H-6K Strategic Bomber,’ accessed March 20, 2024, https://www.militarytoday.com/aircraft/h6k.htm.
[17] “The Chinese Navy: Preparing for ‘Informatized’ War at Sea,” Office of Naval Intelligence, Suitland, MD, 2021, https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/China_Media/2021_China_Informatized_War_at_Sea.pdf
[18] Dmitry Filipoff.”Fighting DMO Pt 4: Weapons Depletion and the Last Ditch Salvo Dynamic.” CIMSEC. Accessed March 12, 2024. https://cimsec.org/fighting-dmo-pt-4-weapons-depletion-and-the-last-ditch-salvo-dynamic/.
[19] Wayne P. Hughes Jr. and Robert P. Girrier, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, Third Edition (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2018), 269. See Hughes’ concept of “striking effectively first”.
[20] H.I. Sutton, “Timeline-2022 Ukraine Invasion At Sea,” Accessed March 22, 2024, http://www.hisutton.com/Timeline-2022-Ukraine-Invasion-At-Sea.html.
[21] Ibid.
[22] USNI News. “Western Navies See Strategic, Tactical Lessons from Ukraine Invasion.” Accessed March 20, 2024. https://news.usni.org/2023/01/31/western-navies-see-strategic-tactical-lessons-from-ukraine-invasion.
[23] H.I. Sutton, “Timeline-2022 Ukraine Invasion At Sea,” Accessed March 22, 2024, http://www.hisutton.com/Timeline-2022-Ukraine-Invasion-At-Sea.html.
[24] Sutton, “Timeline-2022 Ukraine Invasion At Sea”.
[25] H.I. Sutton, “Timeline-2022 Ukraine Invasion At Sea,” Accessed March 22, 2024, http://www.hisutton.com/Timeline-2022-Ukraine-Invasion-At-Sea.html.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Naval News, “Boeing Delivers First Orca XLUUV to U.S. Navy,” Naval News, April 28, 2022, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/04/boeing-delivers-first-orca-xluuv-to-u-s-navy/
[29]Timothy A. Walton and Ryan Boone, “Sustaining the Fight: Resilient Maritime Logistics for a New Era,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Resilient_Maritime_Logistics.pdf. Viii.
[30] “MQ-4C Triton Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS),” Naval Technology, accessed March 24, 2024, https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/mq-4c-triton-bams-uas-us/.
[31] “Air Force, Navy collaborating on 4 ‘fundamentals’ of CCA drones,” DefenseScoop, accessed 1 April 2024, https://www.defensescoop.com/air-force-navy-collaborating-on-4-fundamentals-of-cca-drones/
[32] United States Marine Corps, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2023), 1-2.
[33] U.S. Marine Corps, A Concept for Stand-in Forces (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2021), 4.
[34] Vego, Milan (2015) “On Littoral Warfare,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 68: No. 2, Article 4. This paper utilizes Dr. Vego’s definition of sea control: “the ability to use a given part of the sea or ocean and associated airspace for military and nonmilitary purposes and deny the same to the enemy during open hostilities.”
Featured Image: A satellite photo appearing to show the damaged Russian landing vessel Olenegorsky Gornyak leaking oil while docked in Novorossiysk, Russia. Ukraine said its sea drones damaged the warship. (Photo by Planet Labs PBC via AP)
Commander Justin Cobb, a Maritime Fires Officer with Carrier Strike Group 11, joins the program to his recent article, “No One Should Think the War Will be Short.” Justin’s article was recently published in USNI Proceedings and won their Future of Naval Warfare Essay Contest. It discussed why a conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic of China is more likely to be protracted than short and what the United States should do about it.
Commander Justin Cobb is the maritime fires officer with Carrier Strike Group 11. A rotary-wing aviator, he previously served as the commanding officer of the Helicopter Training Squadron 18 Vigilant Eagles at Naval Air Station Whiting Field, Florida. A graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College, he conducted his joint tour at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium, where he was the lead action officer on the NATO joint command-and-control concept.
