By Bruce Stubbs

I. Introduction

The United States should designate the U.S. Coast Guard as its lead agency for maritime security in the Western Hemisphere. In military command and control terminology, this would make the Coast Guard the “supported” service with all other armed services and federal agencies as “supporting” services. Such a designation would reverse the customary approach for the Navy to lead at sea, but this reversal is long overdue.

Restoring America’s maritime dominance in the Western Hemisphere aligns with the 2025 National Security Strategy and the 2026 National Defense Strategy.¹ The former directs a reconsideration of the U.S. military presence in the Western Hemisphere. It specifically calls for “a more suitable Coast Guard and Navy presence to control sea lanes, to thwart illegal and other unwanted migration, to reduce human and drug trafficking, and to control key transit routes in a crisis.”² The latter declares that “the U.S. military’s foremost priority is to defend the U.S. Homeland” through securing the U.S. border, countering narco-terrorists, and securing key terrain.³

These two strategic documents frame their guidance for the entire Western Hemisphere to reflect what the strategies describe as a renewed emphasis on limiting external influence in regional affairs. Their specific objectives and tasks, however, are primarily oriented toward operations in U.S. Homeland Seas. This term is used here to refer to the four maritime approaches to the United States, the Arctic, Caribbean, Eastern Pacific, and Western Atlantic. This commentary examines the structural and operational impediments that impair fully achieving these national policies. It also explains why a more suitable maritime presence in the U.S. Homeland Seas must begin with the U.S. Coast Guard.

Of note, presence itself is not a mission. Presence is no more than the geographic location on the globe where the Navy conducts its five core functions. The term, “maritime dominance,” is used to refer to the sustained ability to monitor, control, and enforce law and sovereignty across the U.S. Homeland Seas, vice naval superiority over a peer competitor. The article advances two arguments. First, maritime security in the Western Hemisphere is fundamentally a persistence problem, not a warfighting problem. Second, and more consequentially, the Coast Guard should be the supported service for the mission and lead its command architecture.

II. The Security Challenges of the Western Hemisphere and the U.S. Homeland Seas

Although the two national strategies employ different terminology, both state similar objectives: secure the U.S. maritime approaches, suppress illicit activity, protect U.S. borders, and ensure control of critical sea lanes during a crisis. Notably, these objectives predominantly emphasize maritime security vice military force, except for the control of key transit routes. Threats to these strategies’ objectives fall into two distinct categories that require different operational responses.

The first category consists of external military threats principally posed by China, Russia, and their state-linked actors. In practice, however, these threats manifest only intermittently in the Western Hemisphere. Consider the June 2024 deployment of the Russian Yasen-M-class nuclear-powered attack submarine Kazan (K-561) to the Caribbean. Armed with Zircon hypersonic and Kalibr cruise missiles, it illustrates the operational character of this threat category.⁴ To address this category of threats, the Navy’s principal mission in the Hemisphere is Homeland Defense including deterrence against external military aggression and strategic coercion.⁵ Because such adversary activities are episodic rather than persistent, the Navy does not maintain a continuous at-sea operational presence across the U.S. Homeland Seas. Indeed, U.S. Fourth Fleet has no permanently assigned forces and primarily functions as a coordinating headquarters. Its area of responsibility encompasses the Caribbean Sea and the waters surrounding South America.

The second category consists of persistent maritime security threats within the Homeland Seas themselves. These include illegal migration, narcotics trafficking, illegal fishing, transnational criminal activity, and other illicit uses of the maritime domain. These activities undermine U.S. sovereignty, border security, and regional stability. To address this category of threats, the Coast Guard conducts continuous homeland security centered on maritime security activities to deter and defeat non-military threats.⁶ The Coast Guard is a unique service, both an armed force and a federal law enforcement agency. As the Acting Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao stated before the House Armed Services Committee in May 2026, “Border security is national security.”⁷ This formulation explicitly links maritime security operations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific to the defense of the U.S. border and the protection of the American homeland.

Broadly speaking, the Navy employs high-end warfighting assets to deter infrequent military threats, whereas the Coast Guard employs maritime security-oriented forces and legal authorities to counter persistent maritime security threats. This distinction does not mean the Navy never conducts maritime security operations or that the Coast Guard does not contribute to military missions. Rather, it reflects the focus and operational specialization of each service. The Coast Guard’s comparatively affordable platforms, law enforcement authorities, and persistent presence make it the most operationally suitable maritime force for day-to-day security operations throughout the Hemisphere. Consistent with these differing missions, the Navy and Coast Guard maintain separate command-and-control structures for operations at sea.

III. Background: Operation Southern Spear

In August 2025, the Joint Force began Operation Southern Spear to detect, disrupt, and degrade transnational criminal and illicit maritime networks in the Western Hemisphere.⁸ The operation served purposes beyond counter-narcotics. It provided the coercive maritime presence that shaped conditions for the subsequent capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in January 2026. Southern Spear was complemented by Operation Absolute Resolve, which extended homeland defense and maritime interdiction operations across the Western Hemisphere. That effort reflected the broader operationalization of the Navy’s homeland defense, counter-narcotics, and regional maritime security missions in the approaches to the United States.⁹ 

The administration designated major Latin American drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, declared a Non-International Armed Conflict, and authorized military force, including kinetic strikes against narco-terrorist vessels at sea.¹⁰ In their September 2025 report, “Going to War with the Cartels: The Military Implications,” Mark Cancian and Chris Park, analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, assessed Southern Spear. They noted that at its peak, the operation concentrated 38 percent of all Navy ships underway in the Caribbean. That force included the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group, the USS Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group, multiple guided-missile destroyers and cruisers, and a Littoral Combat Ship.¹¹ MQ-9 Reapers operating from Puerto Rico and AC-130J gunships operating from El Salvador conducted lethal strikes against cartel maritime targets.¹² By March 2026, the Defense Department reported a 30 percent reduction in drug vessel movements in the Caribbean and 25 percent reduction in the Eastern Pacific.¹³

Southern Spear demonstrated both the effectiveness and the limits of the existing architecture. It produced measurable results against cartel maritime networks. It also exposed the strategic costs of relying upon high-end naval combatants and improvised command structures for a mission that never ends.

IV. The Structural and Operational Impediments

Several significant structural and operational impediments exist that inhibit a more suitable U.S. maritime presence in the Western Hemisphere and U.S. Homeland Seas.

Impediment 1: Force Structure, A Navy Mismatch and a Coast Guard Insufficiency

The Navy’s existing force structure is optimized primarily for high-end deterrence and warfighting missions against peer and near-peer adversaries rather than for sustained maritime security operations in the Western Hemisphere. Carrier strike groups, amphibious ready groups, and guided missile destroyers can perform maritime security missions, but they were designed principally for power projection, sea control, and expeditionary warfare. In December 2025, defense analyst Peter Singer estimated that the U.S. forces committed to Southern Spear cost at least seven times the annual revenue of the cartels they were targeting. They cost thousands of times more than the value of the individual speedboats being destroyed.¹⁴ Cancian and Park reached a similar conclusion, describing the operation as “swatting flies with golden hammers” but the “long-term military solution is to beef up the Coast Guard” rather than relying upon scarce fleet combatants.¹⁵ The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Daryl Caudle, agreed and stated in March 2026, “I don’t need the carrier to do maritime interdiction. I want to reserve the carrier for power projection and deterrence in the theaters that really need that capability.”¹⁶

The Coast Guard’s insufficiency crisis is not a separate problem from the persistence argument. It is what a persistent requirement looks like when it is chronically underfunded. Persistence cannot be surged. It must be built, crewed, and sustained years ahead of need, which is precisely what decades of episodic funding failed to do. The Coast Guard has a force structure optimized for maritime security operations. But it has historically lacked sufficient capacity to achieve a decisive operational tipping point against non-military threats. The Coast Guard’s own fleet mix analysis concluded that its planned fleet would provide only 61 percent of the cutters required to fully execute statutory missions.¹⁷ Acting Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard Kevin Lunday stated in April 2025, “When a National Security Cutter pulls into port, we do a controlled parts exchange, which is a fancy term for cannibalizing our readiness. No ship gets underway without stripping another for parts. You can only cannibalize your readiness for so long in that downward death spiral and that’s where we’re at.”¹⁸ Three major cutters had been laid up because the service lacked sufficient enlisted personnel to crew them. In the following month, Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem bluntly stated in Force Design 2028 that the service, “can no longer reliably protect the American people and our Homeland,” is “less ready than at any time since the end of World War II,” and is “fragile, in crisis, and on a path to failure without sustained investment.”¹⁹

Congress and the President heard the Coast Guard’s distress call. In July 2025 the reconciliation act provided the Coast Guard a one-time appropriation of $24.6 billion.²⁰ This was its largest single investment in the service’s history. This act funded 17 new icebreakers, 21 new cutters, over 40 helicopters, and six C-130J aircraft through fiscal year 2029. Next came the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025 which authorized end strength growth to 60,000 personnel by fiscal year 2028.²¹ These investments were precedent-setting and halted the Coast Guard’s immediate decline. But ships take years to build, and trained, experienced personnel cannot be generated overnight. The Offshore Patrol Cutter program remains years late and billions over budget.²² The capability gap documented in 2025 will not close before the end of this decade, and the command architecture deficiencies that money alone cannot fix will remain unresolved.²³

The Coast Guard’s major cutter recapitalization programs illustrate the scale of the problem. The Offshore Patrol Cutter program, the service’s highest acquisition priority, replaces aging 210-foot and 270-foot medium-endurance cutters. It remains years behind schedule and billions over budget following shipyard failures, production delays, and contract restructuring. The Polar Security Cutter program has experienced similar delays. Those delays are slowing the recapitalization of the nation’s aging icebreaker fleet at the very moment Arctic competition within the Homeland Seas is intensifying.²⁴ These acquisition difficulties are not merely procurement problems. They directly constrain the Coast Guard’s ability to generate the persistent maritime presence the National Security Strategy now demands across the U.S. Homeland Seas.

Impediment 2: Command and Control Gap

No single commander owns the Western Hemisphere maritime security mission continuously across the spectrum spanning routine operations, crisis response, deterrence operations, and kinetic escalation. The United States does not possess a unified operational maritime security command architecture for the Western Hemisphere. Instead, maritime security, deterrence, interdiction, homeland defense, detection and monitoring, and kinetic strike operations are divided among multiple commands. Authorities overlap, geographic boundaries are inconsistent, and operational relationships shift as missions escalate. Coast Guard Atlantic Area, Pacific Area, and subordinate regional commands, formerly the district commands, maintain the only continuous maritime security operational presence across the U.S. Homeland Seas. But they are not joint maritime commanders, and their operational boundaries do not align with Navy fleet geography. Navy Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Fleet Forces Command, and Naval Forces Northern Command have homeland defense and deterrence responsibilities, but none maintains continuous responsibility for the full maritime security mission.

As operations escalate, command relationships shift again. Southern Spear exposed the consequences of that fragmentation. The Department of Defense established Joint Task Force Southern Spear as a parallel headquarters to direct kinetic strike operations against cartel maritime targets rather than assigning the mission to an existing command. That decision was an implicit admission. No existing organization possessed the authority, operational scope, or unity of command required to execute the full Western Hemisphere maritime security mission from routine maritime security operations through theater-level deterrence and kinetic action.

Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) illustrates both the effectiveness and limits of the current architecture.²⁵ Built principally for detection and monitoring under 10 U.S.C. §124, it integrates intelligence, coordinates surveillance, tracks targets, and cues interdiction opportunities across multiple agencies and partner nations. What it was never designed to do is command permanently assigned maritime forces, conduct sustained maritime operations, or maintain continuous operational responsibility for the broader maritime security mission. Coast Guard cutters conducting counter-drug patrols generally remain under Atlantic Area, Pacific Area, and subordinate district command relationships rather than being assigned under JIATF-S operational control. The problem, therefore, is not JIATF-S itself. The problem is a larger maritime security architecture that relies upon coordination among multiple headquarters rather than continuous operational command accountability.

The Navy’s increasing emphasis on “coordinated deterrence” within the Homeland Seas reflects the operational reality. Maritime security, deterrence, intelligence integration, and interdiction activities are now deeply interconnected across multiple commands and agencies.²⁶ That framing, however, implicitly acknowledges the fragmentation the current architecture produces. Southern Spear demonstrated that coordination mechanisms, however well-intentioned, remain insufficient substitutes for continuous operational command accountability when missions escalate from routine interdiction into theater-level deterrence and kinetic action.

Impediment 3: Coast Guard Kinetic Limitations

The Coast Guard remains highly effective in interdiction, boarding, and law-enforcement operations at sea and the use of disabling fires. But it does not possess the organic capability to conduct independent lethal kinetic strikes against maritime surface targets.²⁷ Its aviation assets are designed for surveillance, pursuit, and disabling fire, not deliberate target destruction. Likewise, major cutters are not configured to integrate within joint kill chains involving MQ-9 Reapers, AC-130J gunships, or other theater strike assets employed for destructive kinetic effects. Southern Spear demonstrated that once operations escalated from maritime interdiction into deliberate lethal strikes against narco-terrorist vessels, the Coast Guard could not independently execute lethal strike operations.

More fundamentally, Coast Guard force structure, training pipelines, legal authorities, and operational culture are oriented toward maritime security, law enforcement, and maritime governance rather than sustained offensive strike operations. This approach allows the Coast Guard to “capture and interrogate cartel members, collect evidence, and prepare case packages for criminal prosecution.”²⁸ When operations require destructive kinetic effects, escalation dominance, or politically sensitive lethal force employment, those capabilities reside within the Department of Defense. The establishment of Joint Task Force Southern Spear under a three-star joint commander to oversee kinetic strike operations against cartel maritime targets reflected the operational and institutional sensitivity surrounding those missions. This is a limitation of the Coast Guard’s design, not a shortfall to be corrected. It is the reason the command architecture must be able to draw Navy strike authority on demand, the requirement taken up in Recommendation 3.

V. Implications

Implication 1: Why a More Suitable Maritime Presence in the Western Hemisphere Starts with the U.S. Coast Guard

Since the end of the Cold War, Russian nuclear-powered submarines have deployed into the Caribbean and off the U.S. East Coast. Combined Chinese-Russian surface action groups have operated near Alaska and within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone.²⁹ Chinese naval vessels have repeatedly transited near the Aleutian Islands, while Russian intelligence collection ships have operated near Hawaii and critical U.S. undersea infrastructure.³⁰ These operations are strategically significant and require credible Navy deterrence and response capability. Yet they remain episodic rather than continuous. They appear periodically as demonstrations of military power, strategic signaling, intelligence collection, or geopolitical coercion rather than as a permanent daily maritime presence challenge.

The operational response to many of these incidents also revealed a broader institutional reality. In numerous cases, the first American surface asset to detect, monitor, shadow, or respond to Russian and Chinese naval activity near U.S. waters was not a Navy ship but a Coast Guard cutter. Coast Guard cutters such as Kimball (WMSL-756), Stratton (WMSL-752), and Healy (WAGB-20) routinely encountered and monitored foreign naval vessels. They did so because the Coast Guard already maintains the persistent day-to-day maritime presence across the U.S. Homeland Seas.³¹ The Navy retains the indispensable role for deterrence, escalation dominance, and high-end warfighting against military threats. But the persistence requirement in the Western Hemisphere is fundamentally different. Beyond episodic Russian and Chinese naval deployments, the United States still confronts constant maritime security threats on a daily basis. These threats involve narcotics trafficking, illegal migration, sanctions evasion, illegal fishing, criminal organizations, and sovereignty enforcement. The Navy responds episodically to military threats. The Coast Guard operates continuously against persistent maritime security threats. That enduring operational reality is why the National Security Strategy’s call for a more suitable maritime presence in the Western Hemisphere must start with the U.S. Coast Guard.

Implication 2: Persistent Maritime Security Is the Wrong Mission for High-End Naval Combatants

As discussed above, the Navy portion for a more suitable presence is episodic rather than persistent. It does not generate a continuous daily warfighting presence requirement across the Homeland Seas. The persistent operational requirement in the Western Hemisphere is maritime security against narcotics trafficking, illegal migration, sanctions evasion, illegal fishing, criminal organizations, and sovereignty violations. That requirement exists every day regardless of whether Russian or Chinese naval forces are operating nearby.

Caudle’s May 2026 posture testimony before the House Armed Services Committee reinforced this distinction. He emphasized the Navy’s contribution through domain awareness, coordinated deterrence, advanced surveillance, and maritime interdiction support.³² The operational activities he described — detection, monitoring, and interdiction augmentation — are enabling and supporting functions appropriate to the Navy’s episodic role. They are not an argument for continuous fleet-centric naval presence across the Homeland Seas. Caudle’s own framing of Homeland Defense operations implicitly recognizes that the Western Hemisphere mission is fundamentally a persistent maritime security campaign requiring selective naval augmentation rather than permanent high-end naval concentration.

The Navy’s force structure is not the economical or sustainable instrument for that persistent maritime security mission. Carrier strike groups, amphibious ready groups, cruisers, and destroyers can conduct maritime security operations effectively, but they were designed principally for deterrence and high-end warfighting against state adversaries. Using them for routine maritime security patrols imposes substantial operational and opportunity cost while degrading readiness for the high-end missions only the Navy can perform. The Ford Carrier Strike Group departed for operations against Iran before the counter-narcotics mission was complete. The maritime security requirement outlasted the availability of the Navy forces assigned to execute it.³³ Persistent maritime security is not a surge requirement. It is a standing operational requirement, one that high-end naval combatants are too scarce and too expensive to sustain indefinitely.

The Navy also lacks the legal authorities the mission requires. In a recent year 59 percent of Coast Guard drug interdictions relied on bilateral agreements that Navy crews cannot invoke and Navy ships cannot execute.³⁴ That limitation is one of legal authority, not capability. The power to board, search, seize, and arrest on the high seas belongs to the Coast Guard by statute (14 U.S.C. § 89). The Posse Comitatus Act bars Department of Defense personnel from exercising it. When a Navy warship conducts a counter-narcotics boarding, it does so only because a Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment is embarked for that purpose (10 U.S.C. § 279). The boarding proceeds under Coast Guard authority and command. Navy personnel may take part only in support, and only under that command. The arrangement proves rather than refutes the point. The Navy can surveil, track, intercept, and escort, but it cannot independently execute the law-enforcement core of the maritime security mission. To board, search, seize, and arrest, it must embark Coast Guard personnel and operate under Coast Guard authority.

The Navy’s institutional culture and force-structure history reinforce the same conclusion. As Admiral Michael Mullen, the CNO, stated in 2006, “Your Navy remains first and foremost a warfighting, seagoing service.”³⁵ That orientation is correct and necessary, but it is precisely why the persistent maritime security mission should not compete for the Navy’s scarce high-end capacity. Furthermore, that institutional orientation has repeatedly transformed lower-end maritime security platforms into increasingly expensive fleet combatants optimized for warfighting missions. The Littoral Combat Ship proved operationally constrained and insufficiently survivable. The Constellation-class frigate evolved toward a smaller version of a Burke-class destroyer. It steadily lost the affordability and operational simplicity that originally justified the program. Secretary of the Navy John Phelan canceled the Constellation-class frigate and decided to base the Navy’s replacement frigate on the Coast Guard’s Legend-class hull. That choice reflected a broader institutional reality. The Navy will prioritize warfighting capability over persistent maritime security optimization, because warfighting is its core institutional purpose.³⁶ The Western Hemisphere’s enduring maritime security requirement therefore starts with the Coast Guard, while the Navy remains the indispensable but episodic instrument for deterrence and combat operations against military threats.

Cancian and Park in their report concluded that Coast Guard cutters are better suited, much cheaper while “Navy destroyers have systems and capabilities for a great power conflict … are useless for counter-drug operations.”³⁷ They produced Table 1 to compare the Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyer with the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter and proposed Offshore Patrol Cutter. The table graphically shows this mismatch.

Table 1: Comparison of a Destroyer and Coast Guard Cutters

Used with permission: Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park, “Going to War with the Cartels: The Military Implications,” 8 September 2025, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The comparison shows that the Coast Guard’s cutters deliver greater persistence and lower operating cost while giving up only capabilities unnecessary for most maritime security missions.

Implication 3: Coordination Is Not Command

The Western Hemisphere maritime security mission distributes responsibility across multiple commands, but accountability is not centralized anywhere. No single commander owns the mission continuously across routine maritime security operations, crisis response, deterrence operations, and kinetic escalation. Instead, the United States relies upon a system of overlapping service authorities, interagency coordination mechanisms, shifting operational relationships, and temporary task forces that function adequately during routine interdiction operations but become increasingly fragmented as missions expand in scale, complexity, or violence.

Southern Spear exposed the operational consequences of that architecture. Once operations expanded beyond detection, monitoring, and law enforcement interdiction into theater-level deterrence and kinetic strike operations, existing command relationships proved insufficient. The Department of Defense established Joint Task Force Southern Spear as a parallel headquarters rather than assigning the mission to an existing standing command. That decision revealed three related deficiencies in the current architecture.

The first is assignment. Western Hemisphere maritime security is a continuous responsibility, but no document assigns it continuously to any commander. The Unified Command Plan distributes elements of the mission across geographic and functional commands without making any one commander accountable for the whole. A mission treated as a finite operation will require a new headquarters each time it escalates, and that headquarters will begin its work without the relationships, the authorities, and the practiced habits of a command that has owned the mission all along.

The second is authority. A task force established for a defined operation receives the authorities required for, but limited to, the operation, based on the way the mission is stated. Western Hemisphere maritime security requires statutory law enforcement authority on any given day, and that authority resides in the Coast Guard rather than in a joint task force assembled for a campaign of finite duration.

The third is command relationships. The task organization relied on support relationships among headquarters that retained their own priorities and their own chains of command, an arrangement adequate for coordinating routine interdiction but insufficient for operations that combine law enforcement, deterrence, and kinetic strike. Those operations require tactical control or operational control over assigned forces, exercised by a commander accountable for the outcome.

Together these three deficiencies reveal the requirement for a continuously accountable operational maritime command structure capable of integrating maritime security, deterrence, and kinetic operations across the full spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict.

Maritime security in the Western Hemisphere is not an episodic contingency mission but a continuous operational requirement spanning all four U.S. Homeland Seas. Those threats evolve from routine law enforcement problems into strategic security challenges with little warning. A command architecture built primarily around coordination rather than continuous operational accountability risks fragmentation precisely when unity of command becomes most important.

VI. Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Sustain the Investment in Coast Guard Maritime Security Capacity

This first recommendation is not a call to spend more. It is a call to fund persistence the way persistence must be funded, as a permanent and predictable commitment rather than a one-time rescue. A persistent mission financed by episodic appropriations will always decay between crises. The $24.6 billion reconciliation appropriation signed in July 2025 and the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025 represent the most significant investment in the service’s history. They are a long overdue recognition that decades of chronic underfunding had driven the Coast Guard to the lowest point of readiness since World War II. The investment is substantial and has altered the Coast Guard’s trajectory. But one-time mandatory spending is not a sustained shipbuilding program. Shipyards cannot expand production capacity, train skilled workforces, or invest in facilities on the basis of a single appropriation. The Coast Guard’s Offshore Patrol Cutter program is already years late and billions over budget. That delay reflects the stop-and-start funding history that reconciliation money alone does not correct.

In 2026 the Coast Guard (and the Navy) need a modern version of the famous Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934. That act built the Navy that won the Second World War and accomplished a lot more. The Act was built on three profound shipbuilding policies that would prevent today’s Coast Guard and Navy from lurching from one shipbuilding crisis to another.³⁸ First, the United States must build and maintain a fleet of modern cutters and combatants sustained through a continuous replacement schedule that prevents block obsolescence. Second, sufficient replacement programs must be financed from year to year to maintain continuous force generation and lower costs through repetitive construction. Third, the sequencing establishes maritime security and warfighting requirements first, and affordability is considered only afterward. If the budget does not support the requirements, then the selected means for the mission must change. This does not mean these three policies alone define the Coast Guard and Navy’s force structures. Naval War College professor Anand Toprani has noted that “political and budgetary realities played an equal role as strategic imperatives in shaping the size of the U.S. Navy.”³⁹ In his research, Toprani concluded that “resource constraints are never absent from decisions about the size and composition of the military even in wartime.”⁴⁰ The intent of these three policies is to ensure in the final analysis that if the budget does not support the strategy, then either the means or the ends must change. The abandonment of these three shipbuilding policies after the Cold War produced the slow-motion crisis whose full consequences Southern Spear made visible. Restoring them requires Congress to treat the Coast Guard and the Navy recapitalization not as a supplemental emergency measure but as a permanent annual commitment embedded in their base budget.

Congress should therefore sustain and expand the Fiscal Year 2027 budget request’s $2.1 billion increase for the Coast Guard as a floor, not a ceiling.⁴¹ The Offshore Patrol Cutter program, Polar Security Cutter program, and Arctic Security Cutter program, along with the cutter workforce and aviation fleet, should be funded at levels sufficient to sustain persistent maritime security operations across the U.S. Homeland Seas on a continuous basis. The objective is not merely to address the current crisis through a single appropriation, but to prevent the recurrence of similar readiness and recapitalization failures in the future.

Recommendation 2: Reserve High-End Naval Combatants for Warfighting and Deterrence

Persistent maritime security in the Western Hemisphere should not be sustained primarily with high-end naval combatants optimized for major warfighting against state adversaries. Carrier strike groups, amphibious ready groups, cruisers, and destroyers can execute maritime security missions. But Southern Spear demonstrated the substantial strategic and operational costs of using scarce fleet combatants for a mission that is continuous rather than episodic. Every high-end naval combatant assigned to routine maritime security patrols in the Caribbean or Eastern Pacific is one less asset available for deterrence and warfighting missions elsewhere.

The Navy should therefore remain the force employed episodically for deterrence and combat operations against military threats in the Western Hemisphere, while the Coast Guard provides the persistent maritime security presence against non-military threats. Navy forces should support Coast Guard-led maritime security operations when military capability, escalation management, or destructive kinetic force is required, not substitute routinely for the continuous maritime presence mission itself.

The Navy’s force structure experience over the past two decades reinforces the same lesson. As Implication 2 described, the Navy’s own force-structure history with the Littoral Combat Ship, the Constellation-class frigate, and ultimately a future frigate based on the Coast Guard’s Legend-class hull shows how persistently the service converts affordable presence platforms into expensive combatants.

But Southern Spear demonstrated that no Navy force structure solution should be expected to absorb a mission better matched to the Coast Guard. None of this diminishes the Navy’s role in the Western Hemisphere, but, instead clarifies it. The Navy remains the indispensable instrument for deterrence, escalation dominance, and combat against military threats that no other service can perform. This is an argument about the mission assigned to each service, and the persistent mission is not the Navy’s.

Recommendation 3: Establish Continuous Maritime Command Accountability

The United States requires a standing maritime security command structure with continuous accountability across the U.S. Homeland Seas rather than fragmented coordination among multiple headquarters. The current architecture distributes maritime security, deterrence, interdiction, homeland defense, detection and monitoring, and kinetic strike operations across overlapping commands with shifting authorities and inconsistent geographic boundaries. That structure can coordinate routine operations adequately, but Southern Spear demonstrated that it becomes increasingly fragmented as missions escalate from law enforcement interdiction into theater-level deterrence and kinetic operations.

The future maritime security command and control architecture for the Western Hemisphere should draw upon the relevant lessons demonstrated by the Cold War Maritime Defense Zones and Joint Interagency Task Force South.⁴² Those lessons show that continuous maritime security operations require enduring joint command relationships operating under unified operational accountability. Joint Interagency Task Force South already integrates intelligence, surveillance, detection and monitoring, interdiction coordination, interagency participation, and multinational cooperation under Coast Guard leadership. Southern Spear demonstrated that the next requirement is to extend those principles beyond detection and monitoring into a standing maritime security command structure. That structure would integrate maritime security operations, deterrence support, and escalation management across the Homeland Seas. The objective is not to create another temporary task force or additional coordinating headquarters. It is to establish continuous operational accountability for a mission that now spans a spectrum of routine maritime security operations, crisis response, deterrence activities, and kinetic escalation.

Several designs could deliver that accountability: a strengthened JIATF-S elevated to a standing operational command; a Western Hemisphere maritime component commander; reestablished Maritime Defense Zones adapted to current geography; or a dual-hatted Navy–Coast Guard commander. This commentary does not prescribe a final structure, but the controlling principle should narrow the field. Because the mission is persistent and law-enforcement-centric for all but episodic intervals, the standing command should be Coast Guard-led, with Navy forces placed under its tactical control or operational control when military capability or escalation management is required. How that command aligns with existing combatant commands, numbered fleets, and Coast Guard Areas is a joint force-management question. But the alignment should follow the persistence of the mission rather than the convenience of existing fleet geography.

This recommendation deliberately reverses a long-standing assumption that U.S. maritime commands in the Western Hemisphere should be Navy-led.  The Coast Guard must lead this command for reasons that already exist in fact rather than aspiration. It alone holds the statutory law enforcement authority that the Western Hemisphere mission requires every day. It already maintains the only continuous operational presence across the Homeland Seas through its Atlantic Area, Pacific Area, and regional commands. It operates the nation’s only icebreakers, which means polar maritime dominance runs through the Coast Guard and no other service. And through the National Fleet Policy, signed in 1998, the Coast Guard and Navy have spent decades deliberately building common command, control, and communications systems. They built those systems precisely so that their forces can integrate when the mission demands it. The supported-supporting relationship recommended here does not invent a new partnership. It merely proposes to formalize one the Coast Guard and Navy have practiced for a generation, and it assigns the lead to the service that already owns the persistent mission, the authorities, and the continuous presence the mission requires.

VII. Conclusion

The 2025 National Security Strategy calls for a more suitable Coast Guard and Navy presence in the Western Hemisphere. The 2026 National Defense Strategy states plainly that the U.S. military’s foremost priority is to defend the homeland. That priority includes defending America’s interests throughout the Western Hemisphere. Together they establish a clear strategic direction to build the maritime forces and command structure capable of executing this mission permanently rather than improvising it episodically.

The Southern Spear campaign tested the existing architecture and found it wanting. The operation disrupted cartel maritime networks and demonstrated the value of integrated maritime, intelligence, and kinetic operations. It also exposed the costs of relying upon high-end naval combatants for missions requiring persistent maritime security presence, law enforcement authorities, regional partnerships, and long-duration operational endurance.

The campaign reinforced a broader institutional reality visible throughout American maritime history. The Navy is optimized for deterrence, warfighting, and preparation for major conflict against state adversaries. The Coast Guard is optimized for persistent maritime presence across the U.S. Homeland Seas. It achieves that presence through a combination of military authority, law enforcement authority, partner engagement, and sustained offshore operations. Southern Spear demonstrated that the mission requires each service to perform the role it was institutionally designed to execute.

When Coast Guard boarding teams enforce sanctions against Russian and Venezuelan oil tankers in the Eastern Atlantic, they are not merely conducting inspections but executing American strategic policy. When Coast Guard icebreakers operate in the Arctic, they are not merely breaking ice but asserting U.S. sovereignty against Russian and Chinese expansion. When Coast Guard cutters enforce fishing laws across the 4.38 million square miles of the U.S. exclusive economic zone, they are not merely protecting fish stocks but defending sovereign American resources against foreign poaching fleets operating inside the Homeland Seas. When Coast Guard cutters conduct naval diplomacy throughout the Caribbean, they are not merely training counterparts but strengthening U.S. influence and regional partnerships in ways no high-end Navy destroyer can replicate. This is what a more suitable maritime presence looks like. This is why it starts with the Coast Guard.

Restoring America’s maritime dominance requires resourcing the Coast Guard as America’s persistent maritime security instrument, preserving the Navy’s high-end warfighting capacity for global deterrence, and organizing both services within a permanent maritime security architecture suited to the operational realities of the Western Hemisphere. Achieving that objective requires removing the structural and operational impediments Southern Spear exposed.

Bruce Stubbs had assignments on the staffs of the secretary of the Navy and the chief of naval operations from 2009 to 2022 as a member of the U.S. Senior Executive Service. He was a former director of Strategy and Strategic Concepts in the N3N5 and N7 directorates. As a career U.S. Coast Guard officer, he had a posting as the assistant commandant for capability in Headquarters, served on the staff of the National Security Council, taught at the Naval War College, commanded a major cutter, and served a combat tour with the U.S. Navy in Vietnam during the 1972 Easter Offensive.

Notes

1. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 14269, “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance,” 9 April 2025.

2. U.S. Department of State, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, White House, 4 December 2025.

3. U.S. Department of Defense, 2026 National Defense Strategy, Washington, D.C., 23 January 2026.

4. Sam LaGrone, “Russian Nuclear Sub, Frigate with Long Range Land Attack Missiles Operating Off East Coast,” USNI News, 11 June 2024.  

5. The definition of homeland defense is: “The military protection of United States sovereignty and territory against external threats and aggression or, as directed by the President, other threats.” Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, The Joint Staff, June 2025, page 78. The definition of deterrence provided by: GEN David H. Berger, USMC; ADM Michael M. Gilday, USN; and ADM Karl L. Schultz, USCG, Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare (NDP-1), April 2020.

6. The definition of homeland security is: “A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States and to reduce our vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies.” Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, The Joint Staff, June 2025, page 78. The definition of maritime security provided by: GEN David H. Berger, USMC; ADM Michael M. Gilday, USN; and ADM Karl L. Schultz, USCG, Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare (NDP-1), April 2020.

7. Hung Cao, Acting Secretary of the Navy, Statement on the Department of the Navy Posture Before the House Armed Services Committee, 14 May 2026.

8. Diana Roy, “The U.S. Military Campaign Targeting Venezuela and Nicolás Maduro: What to Know,” Council on Foreign Relations, 3 January 2026.

9. Admiral Daryl L. Caudle, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Statement on the Posture of the United States Navy Before the House Armed Services Committee, 14 May 2026.

10. Diana Roy, “The U.S. Military Campaign Targeting Venezuela and Nicolás Maduro: What to Know,” Council on Foreign Relations, 3 January 2026.

11. Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park, “Going to War with the Cartels: The Military Implications,” Critical Questions, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 September 2025.

12. Howard Altman, “CV-22B Osprey, MC-130J Commando II Special Ops Aircraft Deploy To Puerto Rico,” The War Zone, 23 December 2025.

13. Heather Mongilio, “U.S. Forces Strike Suspected Narco Boat in the Eastern Pacific,” USNI News, 20 March 2026.

14. Peter W. Singer, “Sinking Speedboats With a Supercarrier: The Lopsided Cost of Operation Southern Spear,” Defense One, 7 December  2025.

15. Cancian and Park, “Going to War with the Cartels: The Military Implications,”8 September 2025.

16. Lee Willett, “CNO: New Surface Ship Classes Reflect US Navy’s New Force Structure and Global Output Needs,” Naval News, 12 March 2026.

17. Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Government Accountability Office, Statement on the Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Challenges that Hinder Maritime Security Operations Before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, GAO-26-108901, 3 February 2026.

18. Sam LaGrone, “Reconciliation Bill Calls for $14.6B in Coast Guard Cutters, New Arctic Icebreakers,” USNI News, 29 April 2025. “The supplemental is more than the Fiscal Year 2025 Coast Guard budget request of $13.8 billion and more than 10 times the cutter budget of $1 billion in current budget proposal. The new cutters are part of an overall $22.5 billion supplemental to the Coast Guard’s bottom line that also includes $3 billon for new aircraft and billions more for shoreside infrastructure, according to the bill. If ratified, the Coast Guard has 90 days to submit a proposal with timelines for deliveries.”

19. Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security, Force Design 2028, Introduction, Executive Report, Department of Homeland Security, Released 28 May 2025.  

20. U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Press Release, “U.S. Coast Guard Receives Historic Investment to Rebuild Under President Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill,” 4 July 2025. [Budget Reconciliation Act of 2025 (H.R. 1)].

21. H.R. 4275: 119th Congress: Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025.

22. Caitlyn Burchett, “Eastern Shipbuilding Halts Work on Coast Guard Cutter Program, Cites Financial Strain and Program Conditions,” USNI News, 18 November 2025. United States Government Accountability Office Report to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives November 2025 Offshore Patrol Cutter Coast Guard Should Gain Key Knowledge Before Buying More Ships GAO-26-107583.

23. United States Government Accountability Office, Report to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, June 2023, “Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to Mature Technology and Design,” Revised on August 1, 2023 to reflect shipbuilder’s correct percentage construction completion as of October 2022. Correction is on report page 37. GAO-23-105805

24. Nick Blenkey, “GAO Looks at What’s Gone Wrong With the Coast Guard’s OPC and PSC Programs, MarineLog, 31 July 2023.

25. Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) was started on February 22, 1989, under President Ronald Reagan’s administration as part of its anti-drug enforcement policy. Specifically, the U.S. Department of Defense was tasked to establish a joint task force (JTF) to conduct detection and monitoring operations to support law enforcement disruptions of cocaine and marijuana trafficking in the Caribbean, thereby preventing these drugs from reaching the United States. The joint interagency task force model was established in 1994 to strengthen collaborations among federal and international partners. As a result, the task force in Key West – then known as JTF-4 – was renamed JIATF East. JIATF South, which was originally located in Panamá, was merged into JIATF East in Key West in 1999. The name was changed to Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South) in 2003. Its mission, in conjunction with Partner Nations, leverages all-domain capabilities to target, detect and monitor illicit drug trafficking in the air and maritime domains, within the Joint Operating Area, facilitating interdiction and apprehension to reduce the flow of drugs and degrade & dismantle Transnational Criminal Organizations.

26. Caudle, Statement on the Posture of the United States Navy Before the House Armed Services Committee, 14 May 2026.

27. Stephen Smith, “U.S. Coast Guard Offloads $63 Million of Cocaine After Shootout at Sea Sinks Suspected Drug Smuggling Boat and Crew,” CBS News, 7 June 2024.

28. Cancian and Park, “Going to War with the Cartels: The Military Implications,”8 September 2025.

29. Dzirhan Mahadzir, “Russian, Chinese Warships Operated Near Alaska, Say Senators,” USNI News, 6 August 2023.

30. Nathaniel Herz, “Inside the U.S. Coast Guard’s Aleutian Encounter With China’s military — and What It Means,” Northern Journal, 12 July 2024, and Barbara Starr and Oren Liebermann, “US Coast Guard Monitoring Russian Military Vessel Near Hawaii, CNN, 15 January 2022.

31. “Chinese Warships Spotted off Alaska Coast, US Coast Guard Says,” The Guardian, 11 July 2024. “U.S. Coast Guard Watching Uptick in Russian, Chinese Navy Activity Near Alaska, Reuters, 27 September 2024. Rana Foroohar, “10 Days with the US Coast Guard on the New Arctic Front Lines,” Financial Times Magazine, 8 February 2025.    

32. Caudle, Statement on the Posture of the United States Navy Before the House Armed Services Committee, 14 May 2026.

33. Sam LaGrone, “Carrier Ford’s Extension to the Middle East Could Break Recent Deployment Records, USNI News, 13 February 2026.  

34. United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, “Coast Guard Actions Needed to Improve Maritime Interdictions,” GAO-26-107440, January 2026.

35. Michael G. Mullen, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Opening Statement, Before Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2007, 15 March 2006.

36. Sam LaGrone, “Navy Cancels Constellation-class Frigate Program, Considering New Small Surface Combatants, USNI News, 25 November 2025.

37. Cancian and Park, “Going to War with the Cartels: The Military Implications,”8 September 2025.

38. Charles F. Elliott, “The Genesis of the Modern Navy,” USNI Proceedings, Vol. 92/3/757, March 1966.

39. Anand Toprani, “Was the 600-Ship Navy a Chimera? Budgets, Force Structure, and the Political Realities Behind Reagan-Era Naval Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies, June 24, 2024, p. 3.

40. Anand Toprani, “Was the 600-Ship Navy a Chimera? Budgets, Force Structure, and the Political Realities Behind Reagan-Era Naval Strategy,” p. 8.

41. Stew Magnuson, “SEA-AIR-SPACE NEWS: Best of Times, Worst of Times for Coast Guard Budget,” National Defense, 22 April 2026.

42. James R. Boma, “Troubled Waters Off the Land of the Morning Calm: A Job for the Fleet,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 42 No. 2, 1989.

Featured image: Crew members aboard the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Munro, a 418-foot national security cutter, and its small boat transit the Gulf of Mexico, Feb. 12, 2017. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Seaman Courtney Fussell)

By Julian Pawlak and Deniz Kocak

Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping continue to pose significant threats to global shipping and maritime security.¹ While the terms are frequently used synonymously, differentiation is crucial. According to the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), piracy is defined as “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends […] (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft [or] (ii) in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state.” Armed robbery against ships encompasses “any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a state’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea”.²

In recent decades, piracy incidents, especially off the Horn of Africa, reached high levels, impairing regional shipping and trade from the early 2000s onward. Despite initial containment by joint international efforts, maritime security issues have increasingly drawn attention to the Gulf of Guinea. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre noted an increase from 162 incidents in 2019 to 195 in 2020, with the majority occurring in the Gulf of Guinea. In 2020 alone, 135 crew members were kidnapped in 22 separate incidents, with 95% of these kidnappings happening in the Gulf. Notably, reported incidents have declined within the following years, only to increase again in 2023 in the Gulf of Guinea. As overall numbers are constant (115 incidents in 2022, 120 incidents in 2023, 116 incidents in 2024), piracy and armed robbery remain relevant maritime security issues on a global scale. The numbers for the Gulf of Guinea developed from the high of 81 in 2020 towards 35 in 2021, 19 in 2022, 22 in 2023 and 18 incidents reported in 2024, marking a stark decrease within five years. In the past, however, international shipping companies and security analysts have raised alarms over the increasing number of incidents. These concerns led to significant actions, such as the deployment of a Royal Danish Navy frigate to the region in November 2021. However, relying solely on “piracy counting” and the “politics of numbers” to assess maritime security remain misleading. Given its multifaceted nature, addressing maritime security requires more comprehensive measures, including capacity building, training, and advising local security forces.³ These efforts involve both local and external stakeholders and are complemented by a coordinated, though voluntary, EU-Gulf of Guinea strategy and action plan. With a growing emphasis on local ownership in security policies, it raises the question of whether actors such as the European Union can or should play a long-term, sustainable role in the region.

IMB Director Michael Howlett recently highlighted concerns about the Gulf of Guinea, noting an uptick in maritime security incidents. Howlett emphasized the importance of regional ownership in safeguarding shipping and trade to counter criminal activities. Rather than simply combating piracy to stabilize Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) without a comprehensive plan, European nations and the European Union could assist littoral states in developing sustainable strategies to curb piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea. The maritime sector, inherently suited for international cooperation, could benefit significantly from a broad Maritime Security Sector Reform that leverages local ownership and the existing Yaoundé architecture.

Maritime Security and Maritime Security Sector Reform

Security Sector Reform (SSR) has become increasingly important in international development assistance, policy-making, and academic circles since the late 1990s. SSR involves creating a security governance framework that adheres to democratic norms, legitimate civilian oversight, and transparent, accountable practices. A critical element of SSR is establishing a civilian oversight function over key national security institutions. Because SSR extends beyond mere technical assistance to encompass control over the use of force, a core aspect of national sovereignty, it is fundamentally political.⁴

Maritime Security Sector Reform (MSSR) aims to enhance the governance capabilities of coastal states. This initiative requires a whole-of-government approach, especially focusing on ministries handling security, economic, financial, and judicial matters due to their interrelated duties.⁵ Key actions include developing or updating codes and protocols related to maritime security and law to equip enforcement agencies effectively. Additionally, creating knowledge resources for bureaucratic staff, establishing legitimate civilian oversight, and ensuring accountability and transparency are essential to achieving effective governance and institutional performance.

In addition to strengthening institutions, traditional capacity-building measures such as providing equipment and professional training are crucial to enable security forces to respond effectively and protect maritime interests.⁶ However, focusing solely on enhancing security capabilities does not constitute a comprehensive MSSR or SSR, as it does not fully strengthen governmental capacities across all governance areas, but rather falls under traditional security assistance. This holistic model necessitates including a broad range of state and non-state actors to foster ongoing interdisciplinary and cross-departmental dialogue. Successful cooperation relies on consensus and ensures that agreed-upon rules are consistently enforced.⁷

Reforms in a country’s maritime security sector can be initiated by external organizations like the United Nations or ECOWAS, but the actual implementation and sustainability of these reforms depend on local actors. Consequently, Security Sector Reform should primarily be a local endeavor. Therefore, MSSR is not a checklist exercise but must be precisely tailored to fit the specific local and regional conditions, accurately reflecting realities on the ground.⁸ This principle of local ownership finds successful application in the Western Indian Ocean, where Alexandre demonstrates how the region evolved from externally-driven responses to African-led frameworks through the Regional Maritime Security Architecture (RMSA), illustrating how regional actors can reclaim agency in maritime governance.

MSSR as a Comprehensive Approach

Initially, piracy incidents off the Horn of Africa were mitigated through significant naval interventions, including active anti-piracy operations and the deployment of armed private security contractors aboard civilian ships. Key operations such as NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield (2009-2016), the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia (since 2008), and the multinational Combined Task Force 151 (since 2009) played crucial roles. According to Dirk Siebels, these efforts were largely successful due to “unprecedented cooperation between naval forces and the shipping industry, as well as self-protection measures of merchant vessels, including the use of privately contracted armed security personnel.” This collaboration effectively reduced piracy and kept major shipping lanes open. However, these successes were mainly addressing the symptoms of deeper issues in Somalia, then considered a failed state. The ongoing issue of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing by trawlers off the Somali coast has exacerbated unemployment and corruption, complicating efforts to end piracy, according to Percy and Shortland.⁹

Overall, fragile states and poor governance typically encourage piracy, smuggling, and IUU fishing. Areas with weak or no governmental control often become safe havens and operational bases for organized crime and piracy. Thus, addressing blue crime, piracy, and maritime insecurity effectively requires tackling the underlying problems of weak statehood in coastal states.

The conditions in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea also differ significantly. The SLOCs crossing the Gulf of Guinea, while considered less critical on a global scale than those off the Horn of Africa, still play a vital role in local and African-European trade and should not be overlooked. Furthermore, while Somalia has transitioned from a failing to a failed state, and now to a fragile state, the Gulf of Guinea features several stable countries, though some face domestic security and stability issues. Comprehensive Maritime Security Sector Reform (MSSR) is a beneficial approach to address not just piracy but also further maritime insecurities like smuggling, marine pollution, and primarily IUU- fishing. This approach involves incorporating the needs and issues of littoral countries to address the broader spectrum of security challenges.¹⁰

In African waters, as Bueger accurately advises, “many nations need support in providing maritime security, while not undermining their sovereignty and regional integration processes.” Initiatives within the MSSR framework in the Gulf of Guinea must hence be seamlessly integrated with existing local efforts, such as the Nigerian Deep Blue project and Ghana’s National Integrated Maritime Strategy. These initiatives should extend beyond basic security assistance to include cooperation with regional economic communities, avoiding duplication of efforts or the creation of isolated structures. They should also promote international collaboration in the region and with external partners, leveraging frameworks like the African Union Security Sector Policy Framework, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, and the Gulf of Guinea Declaration on Suppression of Piracy. In the words of Vice Admiral Ignacio Villanueva Serrano, Operation Commander, EU NAVFOR Atalanta, on the role of non-African states in regional maritime security: “Effective maritime security hinges on collaboration between non-African and African stakeholders, harmonizing external expertise with regional ownership.” These measures aim to minimize complications and disputes from cooperation efforts. The European Union’s Coordinated Maritime Presence in the Gulf of Guinea serves as a foundation for enhancing maritime security cooperation under the Yaoundé architecture.

What future course to follow?

Maritime security threats extend beyond territorial waters and national borders. Thus, intensified regional cooperation is essential for addressing insecurities in the Gulf of Guinea and surrounding areas. External actors like the European Union and its national naval units could lend their expertise in coordinating efforts, and offer training and capacity-building in maritime security and anti-piracy measures. However, such measures alone are insufficient to address the range of maritime insecurities, including piracy, armed robbery, IUU fishing, smuggling, and marine pollution. A comprehensive approach is necessary for sustained success. MSSR can significantly contribute to the gradual and enduring establishment of good governance in maritime affairs, ideally fostering the development of a robust security framework tailored to ocean governance.

A major challenge in securing the Gulf of Guinea lies not just in suppressing piracy and armed robbery but also in facilitating political negotiations and establishing firm cooperation among key African stakeholders. These include the littoral states, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the European Union, which plays a supportive role in implementing sustained political reforms. The EU should seek close collaboration with local actors, stakeholders, and experts to effectively address these issues. As the region often adopts “emergency measures or policies […] to respond to the threat to the interests of external actors,” such as piracy,¹¹ external interventions should instead bolster regional leadership and local ownership. Such support could be organized through coordinated MSSR efforts and continued naval initiatives like the EU’s Coordinated Maritime Presence, aiming to foster a more stable maritime environment. The importance of this shift toward regional ownership is underscored by successful examples elsewhere in African maritime spaces. Alexandre highlights how the Western Indian Ocean transformed from fragmented responses to comprehensive African-led frameworks, demonstrating how coastal states can move from “passive observers” to active stakeholders who shape maritime governance through “soft power” approaches.

Yet, it remains to be seen whether European naval capabilities can sustain another continuous deployment in non-European waters. Maritime Security Sector Reform might thus serve as a practical solution for enhancing maritime safety, implemented in collaboration with local actors and supported by experienced external stakeholders. Furthermore, considering the “collapse of Western influence in West Africa,” the approach should balance local “African ownership” with ongoing concerns for maritime security and maintaining long-term partnerships in the region. Since “maritime security remains a global responsibility,” the EU regards maintaining stability in the Gulf of Guinea as essential for its security interests.

Julian Pawlak and Deniz Kocak are researchers at the University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg and its adjunct interdisciplinary Research Network for Maritime Security (iFMS). This article is part of a collaborative initiative on rethinking maritime security in the face of global strategic change.

References

1. Jacobsen, Katja Lindskov (2022): The Politics of Piracy Numbers: The Gulf of Guinea Case, in: Ruxandra-Laura, Bosilca/ Ferreira, Susana/Ryan, Barry J. (eds.): Routledge Handbook of Maritime Security, Routledge: London, 127-138.

2. IMO Resolution A.1025 (26) “Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships”.

3. Christian Bueger and colleagues define maritime security as an “umbrella term” covering four main areas: national security, the marine environment, economic development, and human security. These areas are closely interconnected and impact one another significantly. This broad and holistic perspective on security emphasizes “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want,” paving the way for a comprehensive approach to security that leads to Security Sector Reform (SSR). See Bueger, Christian/Edmunds, Timothy/Ryan, Barry J. (2019): Maritime security: The uncharted politics of the global sea, in: International Affairs 95, no. 5, pp. 971-978; Bueger, Christian/Edmunds, Timothy (2017): Beyond Seablindness: A new Agenda for Maritime Security Studies, in International Affairs 93, no. 6, pp. 1293-1311; Hough, Peter (2013): Understanding Global Security, Routledge: London. pp. 9f.

4. Schroeder, Ursula C./Chappuis, Fairlie/Kocak, Deniz (2014): Security Sector Reform and the Emergence of Hybrid Security Governance, in International Peacekeeping 21, no.2, pp. 214-230.

5. Sandoz, John F. (2012): Maritime Security Sector Reform, USIP Special Report 306. Washington, D.C.

6. ibid.

7. Schroeder, Ursula C./Chappuis, Fairlie/Kocak, Deniz (2014): Security Sector Reform and the Emergence of Hybrid Security Governance, in International Peacekeeping 21, no.2, pp. 214-230; Albrecht, Peter/Stepputat, Finn/Andersen, Louise (2010): Security sector reform, the European way, in: Sedra, Mark (ed.), The future of security sector reform, Centre for International Governance (CIGI): Waterloo, pp. 74-87.

8. Donais, Timothy (2008): Understanding Local Ownership in Security Sector Reform, in: Donais, Timothy (ed.), Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, Lit: Münster, pp. 3-17; Nathan, Laurie (2008): The challenge of local ownership of SSR: From donor rhetoric to practice, in: Donais, Timothy (ed.), Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, Lit: Münster, pp. 19-36.

9. Percy, Sarah/Shortland, Anja (2013): Contemporary Maritime Piracy: Five Obstacles to Ending Somali Piracy, Global Policy, 4: 65-72.

10. Siebels, Dirk (2018): Ships, guns, and laws. Threats to shipping in the Gulf of Guinea and potential countermeasures, Risk Intelligence Presentation, May 2018.

11. Iheduru, Okechukwu (2023): Hybrid Maritime Security Governance and Limited Statehood in the Gulf of Guinea: A Nigerian Case Study, in: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol 22, 3, p. 148.

Featured Image: Members of the Coast Guard Maritime Security Response Team‚ Direct Action Section secure a simulated terrorist aboard the Mississippi Canyon Block 582, Medusa Platform during a joint exercise May 21, 2014. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Chief Petty Officer Robert Nash.)

By Jessie Caldwell

The proliferation of spoofing techniques has diminished the value of Automatic Identification System (AIS) in the context of maritime law enforcement. The open nature of the system prevents higher levels of data security and verification, meaning spoofed and falsified information will remain difficult to prevent without changing the very foundation of AIS. Given the need for accurate data when dealing with problems like sanctions violations or illegal fishing, using AIS data only muddies the waters and makes successful enforcement more difficult. 

AIS uses very high frequency (VHF) transmissions to automatically transmit and receive vessel information.^1,2 It was designed as a safety tool to complement radio, visual, and radar navigation for collision avoidance, and the UN Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention mandates all ships over 300 tons on international voyages and all passenger ships to maintain a functional AIS, broadcasting at all times. 

As AIS usage has increased, so have its applications. Sites like MarineTraffic and AISHub receive data from privately or publicly owned receivers and display it in real time, creating a public resource for maritime domain awareness. This data is used for cargo tracking, environmental research, search and rescue operations, sanctions enforcement, and illegal fishing investigations.^3,4 AIS has additionally become an integral element of electronic chart and display information systems (ECDIS).⁵

What is Spoofing? 

The primary threat to AIS data is spoofing. Spoofing is a cybersecurity term, describing efforts by an actor to falsely represent themselves through illegitimate data. All types of data sent by the AIS, identified by C4ADS as dynamic, identifying, and voyage information, can be spoofed.⁶ 

These threats are caused by weaknesses in the way the system generates, verifies, and transmits data. Both radio and software-based transmissions are vulnerable, but the distinction is rapidly becoming irrelevant due to software-defined radio. Traditional radio spoofing involves actors manipulating their systems to hide their identity or location while onboard. Trend Micro reported that after “purchasing a 700-euro piece of AIS equipment and connecting it to a computer in the vicinity of a port, the researchers could intercept signals from nearby craft and send out modified versions to make it appear to other AIS users that a vessel was somewhere it was not.”⁷ The cost of generating these signals is constantly decreasing. With the advent of software-defined radio, or radio that uses software instead of hardware, personal computers can be modified with a thirty-dollar piece of equipment and begin broadcasting.⁸

Software based spoofing is more versatile than radio-based. Global Fishing Watch describes the difference between software and radio frequency spoofing, “in past (radio frequency) cases, we observed vessels on the water that were broadcasting positions that corresponded to an area other than the true location of the vessel. In these new (software) examples, however, AIS tracks were present where vessels appear not to have been actually broadcasting AIS at all.”⁹ Many of the software-based spoofing exploits are caught because spoofers make identifiable mistakes. A telltale sign of software created ships are those detected outside the range of any terrestrial data receivers that could reasonably pick up their transmissions.

Bjorn Bergman, a data analyst with Global Fishing Watch, has another way of identifying digital intrusions. WIRED reported “the fake tracks were all shown as coming from shore-based AIS receivers, with none collected by satellites. Given that real AIS signals from civilian ships near the supposed warship tracks were received by satellites overhead, Bergman believes this shows the fake AIS messages were not generated by actual malicious transmissions.”⁴ The pattern in fake transmissions Bergman has identified is not public and has not been tested by outside sources, but he argues the problem is widespread:

“we don’t know how the false positions get combined with real data from terrestrial AIS antennas, though we can hypothesize that they could be produced by an AIS simulator program…While we initially thought the false data might be entering the data feed from a single terrestrial AIS station, it appears that false AIS positions were reported at a number of different terrestrial stations.”

Because of the lack of verification, it is not immediately clear where or which data is poisoning AIS feeds. This problem will only continue to develop as spoofers become more skilled in masking their activities and creating more realistic falsified data.

Illegal Fishing 

The back-and-forth between law enforcement and malicious actors is best demonstrated in illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing. Continuous enforcement at-sea presence is impractical given the sheer size of EEZ’s or restricted fishing zones, so AIS at first appears as an easy solution to tag broadcasting vessels that stray into unauthorized areas and appear to engage in fishing. However, as AIS monitoring became widespread, criminal behavior changed. To stay under the radar, vessels began to “go dark” by turning off their AIS before engaging in illegal activity. Numerous studies show fishing vessels allegedly engaging in this trick in the waters around the Galapagos.¹¹ Therefore, a vessel with a nonfunctional or intermittently broadcasting AIS transmitter, potentially indicates that it is engaging in illegal fishing, warranting further investigation. To obfuscate this, spoofing is the logical alternative. Instead of “going dark”, vessels change their digital identity.

A vessel’s AIS signature has become a increasingly relevant to law enforcement case package development, helping to identify vessels engaged in illicit activities, and tracking them through time and space. A vessel’s digital identity is primarily made up of the information transmitted by AIS. Some elements are self-reported and can be purposefully entered incorrectly to disguise illicit activity. The most important piece of identifying information is the Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) number, a unique nine-digit number assigned to a vessel. It is supposed to remain unchanged save for during reflagging.⁶ There are security measures built into the hardware to prevent tampering and digital identity fraud. In some cases, the MMSI can only be changed after entering a passcode. These passcodes, while ostensibly only known by manufacturers and authorized technicians, can be found online, allowing sailors to reprogram and change their MMSI independently.

Vessel owners can also purchase multiple AIS transponders and use them to generate new ship identities with a “clean” MMSI number to confuse authorities. C4ADS refers to these two processes as MMSI tampering, occurring “when a vessel transmits the MMSI number of another vessel or an entirely fraudulent one in order to obfuscate its identity and activities. In effect, MMSI tampering creates new digital identities that severely impair the ability of maritime authorities and other vessels to identify a vessel and monitor its movements.”⁶ As such, spoofers can now generate an entirely false vessel history or steal a clean vessel’s data. 

Sanctions Enforcement 

North Korea is well known for spoofing the identities of their vessels to make it more difficult to timely identify which ships are violating sanctions.¹⁰ The 2019 case of the Tae Yang, a North Korean-flagged vessel, demonstrates this. The ship began broadcasting its location with the MMSI number of another vessel, the Mongolian-flagged Krysper Singa, while visiting North Korea. The real Krysper Singa was around Singapore. By stealing the Krysper Singa’s digital identity the Tae Yang made it appear that the other vessel was violating sanctions and kept its own MMSI number clean. This appeared on commercial databases as a “teleporting” ship since both vessels were broadcasting the same number the ship would appear first around Singapore, then suddenly seem to teleport to North Korean waters, then back. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) as part of its Project Sandstone series discovered that commercial AIS tracking systems automatically clean and correct data, instead of highlighting anomalies. In this case they “inadvertently and incorrectly (linked) the real Krysper Singa to sanctions violations committed by the Tae Yang.”⁹ A careful review of satellite imagery was required to correctly identify the Tae Yang as the ship engaging in ship-to-ship transfers (STS) to violate sanctions. Another North Korean vessel, the KUM RUNG 5, cycled “through around 30 different identifiers, including names, Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) numbers, callsigns, and even IMO numbers, which are meant to be unique to just one vessel throughout its lifetime. This includes the use of at least four names in 2020 alone. Because the identifiers are programmed onboard the vessel, confirming the authenticity of the broadcast is not possible without other means of verification.”¹² The Tae Yang didn’t hide the presence of a vessel at their location, but by switching their identification, made it more difficult to determine the real culprit. 

This problem extends beyond the vessel actively engaging in identity theft . Innocent third parties like the Krysper Singa are affected. Even if mariners correctly program their MMSI and other information, malicious actors can intercept and change the data from a terrestrial receiver as it is transmitted to online maritime tracking sites. 

Many tracking providers use the same data sources so a faked ship will appear on multiple maritime traffic sites.⁴ The malicious actor can therefore be on the other side of the globe from the targeted vessel, widening their reach, and achieve results similar to VHF spoofing. Hackers can intercept data packets and change a ship’s identity by changing their MMSI number, name, IMO number, and altering coordinates or headings. They can even “move” a vessel to an entirely new location. 

For example, at a 2013 hacking conference, two researchers moved a real vessel, the Eleanor Gordon, that was at the time located in the Mississippi River, to appear on a lake in Dallas.¹³ The false positions or identities generated by this type of threat are less likely to threaten vessels directly, as they rely on their onboard AIS and other methods of navigation, but they directly impact the other uses of AIS. Maritime law enforcement cannot rely on the publicly available aggregate data where these fake digital signals appear. Sanctions monitoring, fisheries enforcement, marine traffic analysis, and environmental research all rely on this data and spoofing leaves is meaningfully compromised.

Conclusion 

Under the present framework and technologies, it is extremely challenging to eliminate AIS spoofing. The system itself was not designed to pass along verified data – it was meant to be open and easy to transmit employ as a safety tool. It lacks inherent virus or malware protection, encryption, or data verification tools.¹⁴ Encryption is a potential method,¹⁵ however, as Ken Munro writes on Pen Test Partners blog,

“if nearby vessels don’t have the ability to decrypt the data, the safety benefit of AIS is lost…Finally, even if all transceivers featured and used encryption, a rogue user could simply purchase a legitimate transceiver from which to transmit tampered data.”³

Part of AIS as currently designed is that all ships can access it for safety. Attempts to limit bad actors from transmitting run the risk of preventing legitimate vessels from using AIS.

If spoofing is impossible to stop, the best option in the short term is to continue to improve detection capabilities. Machine learning and other big data tools have begun automating detecting certain patterns in AIS data that suggest activities like fishing or STS transfers and identifying vessels from vessel registry databases.⁷ Global Fishing Watch has developed an algorithm for identifying ghost ships and other researchers are developing similar programs to catch “teleporting” or identity switching vessels.¹¹ This would limit the benefits to spoofing for illicit actors, as they would no longer be able to conceal and confuse their identity as successfully.

In the long term another system could be developed to directly address the deficiencies of AIS. Navigators can use other methods to augment AIS and prevent collisions while at sea. On shore, AIS was not designed for law enforcement. There is no way of verifying data to a high enough standard while keeping the system true to its roots as a safety tool. In the balancing act of openness and security, AIS was designed to be as open and easy to access as possible. Trying to force it to be more secure lessens its applicability as a universal safety tool. 

Jessie Caldwell is a recent graduate of the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. She holds a Masters in International Affairs, focusing on transnational security issues.

These views are expressed in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official view of any government agency.

References

1. NAVCEN. “AIS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS.” AIS Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Coast Guard, 17 Feb. 2022, https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=AISFAQ. 2

2. NAVCEN. “HOW AIS WORKS.” How Ais Works, U.S. Coast Guard, 8 Sept. 2016, https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=AISworks.

3. Munro, Ken. “Hacking AIS.” Pen Test Partners RSS, 18 Sept. 2018, https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/hacking-ais/.

4. Harris, Mark. “Phantom Warships Are Courting Chaos in Conflict Zones.” Wired, Conde Nast, 29 July 2021, https://www.wired.com/story/fake-warships-ais-signals-russia-crimea/. 

5. Fisk, Samantha. “Gloves off as Criminals Move from AIS Spoofing to AIS Hacking -.” Fathom World – Shipping and Maritime Industry News, 16 Sept. 2019, https://fathom.world/gloves-off-as-criminals-move-from-ais-spoofing-to-ais-hacking/.

6. Boling, Andrew, et al. “Unmasked: Vessel Identity Laundering and North Korea’s Maritime Sanctions Evasion.” C4ADS, 2021, https://c4ads.org/unmasked. 

7. Simonite, Tom. “Ship Tracking Hack Makes Tankers Vanish from View.” MIT Technology Review, 18 October 2013, https://www.technologyreview.com/2013/10/18/82918/ship-tracking-hack-makes-tankers-vanish-from-view/. 

8. Balduzzi, Marco. “AIS Exposed Understanding Vulnerabilities & Attacks 2.0.” Blackhat.com, Black Hat Asia, 2014, https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Balduzzi/Asia-14-Balduzzi-AIS-Exposed-Understanding-Vulnerabilities-And-Attacks.pdf. 

9. “Guidance to Address Illicit Shipping and Sanctions Evasion Practices.” U.S. Department of the Treasury, 14 May 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/north-korea-sanctions. 

10. Trainer, Cameron, and Izewicz, Paulina. “Unauthorized Flags: A Threat to the Global Maritime Regime.” Center for International Maritime Security, 20 July, 2020, https://cimsec.org/unauthorized-flags-a-threat-to-the-global-maritime-regime/. 

11. “Fisheries intelligence report reveals vessel behaviors associated with spoofing activity.” Global Fishing Watch, Global Fishing Watch, 17 October 2023, https://globalfishingwatch.org/press-release/fisheries-intelligence-report-reveals-vessel-behaviors-associated-with-spoofing-activity/ 

12. Storm, Darlene. “Hack in the Box: Researchers Attack Ship Tracking Systems for Fun and Profit.” Computerworld, Computerworld, 21 Oct. 2013, https://www.computerworld.com/article/2475227/hack-in-the-box–researchers-attack-ship-tracking-systems-for-fun-and-profit.html. 

13. Bergman, Bjorn. “Systematic Data Analysis Reveals False Vessel Tracks.” Global Fishing Watch, Global Fishing Watch, 29 July 2021, https://globalfishingwatch.org/data/analysis-reveals-false-vessel-tracks/. 

14. Bateman, Tom. “Fake Ships, Real Conflict: How Misinformation Came to the High Seas.” Euronews, 28 June 2021, https://www.euronews.com/next/2021/06/28/hms-defender-ais-spoofing-is-opening-up-a-new-front-in-the-war-on-reality. 

15. Katsilieris, Fotios, et al. “Detection of Malicious AIS Position Spoofing by Exploiting Radar Information.” IEEE Xplore, 12 July 2013, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6641132.

Featured Image: A containership steaming during sunset. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)