Unmanned Underwater Vehicles: A Conversation with Chris Rawley

To start our UUV Week, we’re talking with Chris Rawley, owner of the website Naval Drones: Unmanned Naval Systems and author of Unconventional Warfare 2.0. Chris is a surface warfare officer in the US Navy Reserve.

Penguins: They Love UUVs. NSF-funded SeaBED shown.
Penguins: they love UUVs. NSF-funded SeaBED shown.

SD: Thanks for talking with us today, Chris. Let’s get right to it with some initial broad strokes. There’s clearly a great deal of potential out there for UUV platforms, but in a very general sense, what mission areas of those set out by the US Navy’s UUV Master Plan show the most promise in terms of cost effectiveness and practicality?

CR: Thanks Sally. Before I start, I have to provide the disclaimer that I am speaking here in my personal capacity and my comments and opinions do not reflect U.S. Navy or DoD policy. Also, I am by no means an expert in this field, though I have picked up some knowledge the past few of years writing for “Naval Drones,” which was initially established as a marketing tool for a UUV concept I developed. After some fits and starts, my company is currently working on this UUV design with a prototyping firm.

From my perspective, mine countermeasures is the mission area ripest for disruption by unmanned undersea vehicles. As CIMSEC’s readers know, mine clearance involves a painstaking, methodical process of hunting to rule out false positives detected by various sensors or using sweeping gear to activate the mines. Dedicated mine countermeasures ships, though still in service, will eventually be replaced multi-mission platforms embarking UUVs. Most readers know about the Littoral Combat Ship’s dedicated mine countermeasures payload, but pretty much any naval combatant or auxiliary with a margin of payload capacity such as the JHSV can launch UUVs or carry boats or unmanned surface vessels (USVs) that can launch UUVs directly into a mine field at a safe stand-off distance from the mother ship . Multiple UUVs operating together will eventually become faster at mine hunting than dedicated surface ships with sweeping gear or mine-detection sonars. ROVs and UUVs such as the SeaFox can also localize, identify, and neutralize the mines. Though I think the UUV Master plan specifically mentions nine mission areas, besides MCM, at some point UUVs will play a part in pretty much any kind of naval operation one could imagine.

While we continue to wait for the silver bullet of long-endurance propulsion systems, the three areas of UUV development with the most potential I see are payload miniaturization, payload modularity, and swarming algorithms.

USN sailors load a SeaFox MCM UUV (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Colby Drake/Released)
USN sailors load a SeaFox MCM UUV (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Colby Drake/Released)

SD: Let’s talk specifically about UUVs in an ASW capacity. A lot of readers (okay, especially me) are interested in what UUVs can bring to anti-submarine warfare (ASW). In all likelihood, such a platform would need to detect low-frequency signals, demanding a large array and a vehicle to support it. Will there have to be a trade off between the reasonable size of a notional platform (to support such an array) and such a platform’s detection capabilities? Are leave-behind arrays delivered as part of a UUV payload a more desirable option?

CR: Autonomous underwater vehicles such as gliders are already helping to characterize the water column, which as you know is one of the most important foundations of ASW. As far as sub-hunting goes, a large UUV towing a passive array might be one way to do it, though I’m not sure that is feasible for a variety of reasons. Or as you’ve alluded to, a larger UUV could basically become a means to more precisely deploy sonobuoys or emplace arrays on the bottom. What about smaller, more numerous UUVs each carrying a single hydrophone and operating at different depths? Or UUVs able to surface and act as non-acoustic data relays between bottom arrays and ASW aircraft? I think there is certainly room for some R&D and experimentation in this area.

SD: The idea of an UUV with the capacity to surface and communicate as a non-acoustic data relay with an MPRA asset is particularly promising and offers a solution to some of the major complexities of airborne prosecutions. Further, the idea of employing UUVs to deploy hydrophones or arrays at specific depths is a novel turn on a well-established technique. But perhaps getting those assets on-station at the appropriate times would present a difficulty; after all, one of MPRA/airborne ASW’s major advantages is speed and flexibility relative to the target. On to another ASW question: in an increasingly crowded underwater environment, do you think that submarine-launched UUVs will offer more or less stealth to launching platforms? Do you see any applicability for UUVs as a decoy, or would maintaining acoustic superiority for existing and future subs prove a more worthwhile, cost-effective pursuit?

CR: Unlike a sub-fired missile, I’m not sure a UUV will make a launching submarine any less stealthy. To my knowledge, most of the UUVs that have been tested have been “swim out,” so they wouldn’t add much extra acoustic signature to the launch platform. Some sort of acoustic or magnetic decoy UUV does seem like a viable and useful payload for a submarine.

SD: U.S. Submarine-launched UUVs may have somewhat of a compatibility crisis in the coming decades. SSGNs are uniquely suited for UUV operations, but as modified-Ohio class platforms reach the end of their service life in the coming decades, how do you think UUV platforms will fit into the Virginia Payload Module program?

A Naval Sea Systems Command illustration depicting the VPM concept.
A Naval Sea Systems Command illustration depicting the VPM concept.

CR: Though launching and recovering a UUV from a submarine certainly adds an element of “stealthiness” for the UUVs themselves, it also comes with several complications. There are trade-offs in a submarine’s limited tube space – be it torpedo tubes or the VPM – between UUVs and other payloads such as torpedoes and missiles. Moreover, as you note, more submersible vehicles will result in an increasingly crowded operating environment. A manned submarine operating in conjunction with a large number of friendly (and potentially, enemy) UUVs makes waterspace deconfliction challenging and puts a capital ship at risk for a collision, especially as the size and speed of UUVs grows.

But here’s the thing: a UUV is inherently stealthy. Why do we need to launch it from another low signature platform (a submarine) when it can be launched more cheaply and across wider areas (such as shallow water littorals) by more numerous surface vessels or even air platforms?   Where there is no other way to get a shorter ranged UUV into the water column, a submarine may be the answer. To answer your question, we should save limited submarine payload capacity for offensive weapons and insert the majority of UUVs into the battlespace using more affordable means.

SD: Interesting points. I hadn’t considered the idea of mutual interference, and it certainly makes sense to deploy UUV assets from surface or air assets, where space would not be as much of a premium. This is another broad question, but what role do you see for UUVs in developing a cogent strategy to counter A2AD?

CR: UUVs could potentially serve as fire control sensors, decoys, and deception tools during a counter-A2AD campaign. I’ll leave it at that.

SD: Fair enough. One of the most frequently cited criticisms of developing UUV platforms is the inherent difficulty of communication and navigation in an underwater environment, as well as limitations on data links and processing. What is your answer to these criticisms?

CR: The easiest solution is the surface the UUV every now and then to transmit its data and get its bearings. But advances in underwater data modems (both acoustic and non-acoustic), along with autonomy will mitigate some of these challenges

SD: If operating covertly in a denied area, surfacing might be detrimental to the UUVs mission, but no more so than other subsurface assets that might be required to surface to receive or transmit data. But, admittedly, this is a pretty narrow scope to view a very broad potential mission set, and such a concern would not apply to all those potential applications. Let’s talk autonomous vehicles. AUVs operating at a distance will undoubtedly carry the potential for loss or interception. Is there an acceptable level of platform loss or risk operators of UUVs will have to accept?

CR: Sure. I think we will need a variety of UUV types. Some, like Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (LDUUV), will be large, expensive, and multipurpose. Others will be designed to be single-purpose, affordable, and expendable, while some others will be somewhere in the middle.

SD: Specifically though, do you think that there might be inherent risks to doing business via UUVs that do not exist for manned counterparts? Not necessarily that these risks outweigh the benefits, but, if there are any, they’re worth discussing.

CR: Signal interception is a problem faced with pretty much any platform these days. Even manned aircraft are going to be hard pressed to operate without emissions given how networked everything is.  Many UUV atmospheric signals will be on commercial channels, so hard to differentiate from civilian traffic. As to the technology being recovered by an enemy, that is certainly possible too, and a much higher risk for unmanned vehicles. We’ve learned lessons from UAVs that are applicable in this area.

SD: Great point; the risk for signal interception would likely not be any greater for unmanned platforms, and could be mitigated in similar ways. Let’s scale down a bit. On your blog, you recently discussed possible applications of small-scale UUVs, such as those fielded by the University of Graz’s Collective Cognitive Robots project. What applications do you envision for small-scale UUVs like these operationally?

CR: Search and recovery, especially in inshore waters or the littorals, comes to mind. But also acoustic decoys, and maybe even small, mobile sonobuoys for ASW. I’d love to get some reader feedback on this one actually.

SD: I really look forward to reading what others have to say on this issue as well. I think the MPRA ASW applications are especially promising. Last but certainly not least, let’s discuss the LDUUV program. What is your take on pier-launched or even surface-ship based systems with longer endurance and on-station capabilities?

The U.S. Navy's LDUUV
The U.S. Navy’s LDUUV

CR: For some applications, a pier-launched UUV might be viable. But a Navy’s strength is based on its mobility. So yes, as we seem to agree, surface ships are a pretty viable launch platform for large UUVs. The Naval Special Warfare Command’s Swimmer Delivery Vehicle is an analogy. Of course, they are most stealthy when operated from a submarine, but can also be launched from ships and smaller combatant craft. And depending on the operational range of the LDUUV, surface ships would be fine for many mission profiles. And if you are looking for stealth, the stealthiest platform is the one that hides in plain sight, so not every launch platform has to be a naval vessel.

SD: This has been tremendously interesting discussion! Thank you, Chris, for your time; congratulations on your progress with your own UUV design. We look forward to following its development! Thanks as well to the CIMSEC readers who have followed along. Let’s continue this discussion in the comments section.

Sally DeBoer is an Associate Editor for CIMSEC.

Visit Chris Rawley’s blog at: blog.navaldrones.com

 

 

 

Sea Control 79 – Post-Election UK Defence & Foreign Policy

seacontrol2Hallo, and welcome to the East Atlantic Sea Control post General Election 2015 discussion, please join the host Alex Clarke, and panellists Paul Fisher and Chris Parry as they delve into the murky world of divining what the world of Conservative (Slim) Majority government will mean for defence.
For those wishing to read more on this topic, we highly recommend Alan Hensher’s PTT paper, Defence of the Realm  Alex Clarke’s papers Protecting Exclusive Ecconomic Zones (Part 1 & Part 2) & The Defence Debate – why the UK needs to change the subject  and perhaps go back to listen to a previous podcast in this series…
For those wishing for more information on blue hair day, go to: http://harrisonsfund.com/blue-hair-day.php

 

 

Death From Above

Kill Chain

Andrew Cockburn. Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins. Henry Holt Publishers. 307pp. $28.00.

It’s not often that a book review coincides with current events. Books, particularly nonfiction, are usually written and published months, if not years after an event has occurred. That’s because good nonfiction is written in retrospect: writers have spent some time absorbing their subject, researching and analyzing the facts; authors are hesitant to be rash in judgment or thought.

However, there are exceptions. Some pieces of nonfiction, particularly journalists’ works, are appropriate now — not later. Andrew Cockburn’s new book, Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins, is one of them.  Cockburn’s book is timely.  In just the past few weeks there has been a flood of reporting from media outlets stating that a drone strike killed an American and an Italian hostage when targeting a group of Al-Qaeda members operating near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Suddenly, questions about drone strikes, the debate about targeted killing, and the transparency of the drone program are on the front page of print and online news media worldwide.

Yes, timely indeed.

Although Cockburn’s book cover is plastered with silhouettes of unmanned aerial vehicles — with what appears to be the X-47B, Predator, Global Hawk, and Fire Scout, among others — he is making a larger argument.  Cockburn it seems, is arguing that all technology is suspect.  It’s not simply unmanned aerial vehicles, but it’s the idea that human beings are continuously so bold as to come up with technological solutions that will win our wars.   History, however, tells us a much different story.

Cockburn, then, starts his book with an interesting tale.

In 1966 the Vietnam War was not going well.  Secretary McNamara, a man who was fond of scientific solutions to difficult problems, turned his attention to “The Jasons.”  The Jasons, Cockburn says, were a small group of scientists and scholars, many of whom would go on to become Nobel Prize winners. These were also some of the same men — Carl Kaysen, Richard Garwin, George Kistiakowski — that were part of the Manhattan Project some twenty years earlier.

The Jasons tried to do what Rolling Thunder could not — they tried to figure out a way to defeat North Vietnam’s ability to use the Ho Chi Minh trail — to cut off their supply routes.  They ended up deploying small sensors along the trail that could, presumably, pick up the noise, vibration, and in some cases, the ammonia of someone urinating, all in an attempt to locate men and machines moving goods to the South.  Then, if they could hear them and find them, U.S. commanders could task air strikes against the communists on the trail.  It didn’t take long, Cockburn says, for the North Vietnamese to find a work-around.  How long?  It took one week.  Cockburn notes that all the North Vietnamese had to do was to use cows and trucks, often running over an area of the trail multiple times to create a diversion while the real logistical effort was moved elsewhere.  So simple and so effective — and relatively inexpensive.  However, Cockburn says the cost of the electronic barrier for the U.S. was around six billion dollars.

This formula is repeated throughout the rest of the book.  That is 1) There is a military problem 2) Someone always tries to find a technological solution, and then 3) Spends a lot of money only to find out the U.S. has made the problem worse.

Now fast forward almost sixty-years to the age of drones, and Cockburn introduces us to Rex Rivolo, an analyst at the Institute of Defense Analysis.  It’s 2007 and improvised explosive devices are a major problem; they are killing and maiming hundreds of U.S. troops in Iraq.  Asked to analyze the networks behind the IEDs, Rivolo, Cockburn says, discovers that targeted killings of these networks  lead to more attacks, not fewer.  This is because someone more aggressive fills the place of the leader who was recently killed.  Rivolo would return to D.C., even getting the ear of the Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, telling him that attacking high- value targets was not the right strategy — the IED networks and individuals setting them off were more autonomous then was initially thought.  Going after the senior guy, Rivolo noted, was not the answer.  But, as Cockburn says, nothing changed. Now people simply refer to the continous cycle of targeting and killing  high-value targets as “mowing the grass.”

The idea of killing  senior leaders or HVTs is not new, it’s been around for a long time (think Caesar).  Cockburn, then, brings up one of the more interesting “what if’s” that military officers — or any student of military history — likes to debate.  That is, what if someone had killed Hitler before the end of the war?  Would the war have ended?  Or would he have become a martyr and someone worse or someone better have taken his place?  Cockburn tells us about British Lieutenant Colonel Robert Thornley, who argued during WWII that, no, the Fuhrer should not be killed.  Thornley noted, that if Hitler was killed, his death would likely make him a martyr for national socialism.  And that Hitler was often a man that “override completely the soundest military appreciation and thereby helped the Allied cause tremendously.”  Therefore, the thinking went, we should let Hitler live and dig his own grave.

However, the problem with this debate is that context matters.  Was it Germany in 1933? 1938? Or 1944? It matters because while Cockburn does not differentiate between the killing of a leader of a state and the leader of a terrorist network, they are indeed different systems that have different levers of power and legitimacy.

He is on firmer ground when he rightly notes how difficult it is for anyone to predict systemic effects when targeting a network.  He reiterates these difficulties throughout the book.  The most historical compelling case is WWII and the strategic bombing campaign.  All one has to do is pick up the WWII U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey and read the fine work done by John K. Galbraith, Paul Nitze, and others.  Disrupting or destroying networks from the air — in this case, Germany’s economy — was incredibly difficult.  In many cases, assumptions of German capabilities or weaknesses were far from correct.  And as Cockburn notes, the term “effects based operations,” namely, operations that are military and nonmilitary that can disrupt complex systems while minimizing risk, was a term that was outlawed in 2008 by General Mattis while the head of Joint Forces Command.

Ultimately, the debate over drones — who should control them, what should they be used for, should the U.S. target particular individuals — will continue.  It’s an important topic.  There are, however, a few shortcomings in this book.  One of the biggest questions that goes unanswered is this: If the U.S. should not strike identified enemies or high-value targets…then what?  Do nothing? Allow a Hitler to simply remain in power?  Is this not a form of moral ignorance?

The questions military planners and policy makers should ask is this:  Do we understand the character of this war?  And are these the right tools we should use to win this war?  We should not blame a drone — or any other type of tech for that matter — for bad strategies, poor operational planning, and gooned up tactics.

Drones are the future.  But we should read Cockburn’s book as a cautionary tale.  We should disabuse ourselves of the illusion that future technologies will be our savior.  And finally, we should not let those illusions crowd out the very difficult task  of understanding our adversaries and the enduring nature of war.

Andrew Cockburn’s book is worth reading.  But have your pencil ready — you’ll want to  argue with him in the margins.

Lieutenant Commander Christopher Nelson, USN, is a naval intelligence officer and recent graduate of the U.S. Naval War College and the Navy’s operational planning school, the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School in Newport, RI.  LCDR Nelson is also CIMSEC’s book review editor and is looking for readers interested in reviewing books for CIMSEC.  You can contact him at books@cimsec.org.  The views above are the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the US Navy or the US Department of Defense.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.