Russia Week Kicks Off on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

This week CIMSEC is publishing articles analyzing Russian policy. The call for articles may be read here. Below is a list of articles featuring during the topic week that will be updated as the topic week rolls out and as prospective authors finalize additional publications.

Russia’s Self-Inflicted Security Dilemma by Corentin Laguerre
The Ambitions and Challenges of Russia’s Naval Modernization Program by Steve Micallef
The Tsarist Presidency by Steven Swingler
The Mediterranean: Driving Russia’s Strategic Decisions Since 1676 by Jason Chuma

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Nextwar@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: A military exercise of the Kantemirovskaya tank division somewhere in Moskovskaya oblast (Chistoprudov Dmitriy)

“The Fleet at Flood Tide” – A Conversation with Author James D. Hornfischer

The Fleet at Flood Tide: America at Total War in the Pacific, 1944-1945 by James Hornfischer
The Fleet at Flood Tide: America at Total War in the Pacific, 1944-1945 by James Hornfischer.

By Christopher Nelson

A passionate naval historian, Jim Hornfischer finds time in the early morning hours and the weekends to write. It was an “elaborate moonlighting gig” he says, that led to his latest book, The Fleet at Flood Tide: America at Total War in the Pacific, 1944-1945

The Fleet at Flood Tide takes us back to World War II in the Pacific. This time Hornfischer focuses on the air, land, and sea battles that were some of the deadliest in the latter part of the war: Saipan, The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot, Tinian, Guam, the strategic bombing campaign, and the eventual use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  

The battles Hornfischer describe share center stage with some of the most impressive leaders the U.S. placed in the Pacific: Admiral Raymond Spruance, Admiral Kelly Turner, Admiral Marc Mitscher, General Holland “Howlin’ Mad” Smith, and Colonel Paul Tibbets. It is quite a cast of characters.

Hornfischer, to his credit, is able to keep this massive mosaic together – the numerous battles and personalities – without getting lost in historical details. His writing style, like other popular historians – David McCullough, Max Hastings, and Ian Toll immediately come to mind – is cinematic, yet not superficial. Or as he told me what he strives for when writing: “I then dive into the fitful process of making this rough assemblage readable and smooth, envisioning multiple readers, from expert navalists to my dear mother, with every sentence I type.”

The Fleet at Flood Tide is his fifth book, following the 2011 release of Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Gudalcanal. Hornfischer — whose day job is president of Hornfischer Literary Management — also found time to write The Ship of Ghosts (2006), The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors (2004; which won the Samuel Eliot Morison Award), and Service: A Navy SEAL at War, with Marcus Luttrell (2012). Of note, Neptune’s Inferno and The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors have been on the Chief of Naval Operation’s reading list for consecutive years.

I recently had the opportunity to correspond with Jim Hornfischer about his new book. This interview has been lightly edited for clarity.

How did the book come about? Was it a logical extension of your previous book, Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal?

All these years on, the challenge in World War II history is to find books that need writing, stories that need telling with fresh levels of detail, or in an entirely new frame. After Neptune’s Inferno, I was looking for a project that offered expansive territory in terms of geography, people and operational terrain, fresh, ambitious themes, and massive amounts of combat action that was hugely consequential. When I realized that no single volume had yet taken on the entirety of the Marianas campaign and followed that coherently to the end and what it led to, I had something. I wrote a proposal for a campaign history of Operation Forager, encompassing all its diverse operations on air, land and sea, as well as the singular, war-ending purpose to which that victory was put. The original title given to my publisher was Crescendo: The Story of the Marianas Campaign, the Great Pacific Air, Land and Sea Victory that Finished Imperial Japan. In the first paragraph of that proposal, I wrote, “No nation had ever attempted a military expedition more ambitious than Operation Forager, and none had greater consequence.” And that conceit held up well through four years of work. Everything I learned about the Marianas as the strategic fulcrum of the theater fleshed out this interpretation in spades.

As you said, in the book you focus on the Marianas Campaign, and there are some key personalities during the 1944-45 campaign. Namely, Raymond Spruance, Kelly Turner, and Paul Tibbets are front and center in your book. When scoping this book out, how did you decide to focus on these men?

As commander of the Fifth Fleet, Raymond Spruance took the Marianas and won the greatest carrier battle in history in their defense along the way. Spruance, to me, stands as the finest operational naval commander this nation ever produced. After all the ink spilled on Halsey and the paucity of literature on Spruance, it was, I thought, time to give him his due. Kelly Turner, Spruance’s amphibious commander, has always fascinated me. After his controversial tour as a war plans and intelligence guy in Washington in the run-up to Pearl Harbor, and then in the early days of Guadalcanal, surviving a dawning disaster (and did I mention he was an alcoholic), it’s incredible that Turner retained Spruance’s confidence. Yet he emerged as the leading practitioner of what CNO Ernest J. King called “the outstanding development of the war”: amphibious warfare. He has been poorly credited in history and deserved a close focus for his innovations, which included among other things an emphasis on “heavy power”—the ability to transport multiple divisions and their fire support and sustenance over thousands of miles of ocean—as well as the first large-scale employment of the unit that gave us the Navy SEALs.

As for Paul Tibbets, he and his top-secret B-29 group were the reason for the season, so to speak, the strategic purpose behind all the trouble that Spruance, Turner, and the rest endured in taking the Central Pacific. Without Army strategic air power, the Navy might never have persuaded the Joint Chiefs to go into the Marianas in 1944. And without Paul Tibbets and his high performance under strenuous time pressure, the war lasts well into 1946. Did you know that it was his near court-martial in North Africa in 1942 that got him sent to the Pacific in the first place?

General Carl Spaatz decorates Tibbets with the Distinguished Service Cross after the Hiroshima mission/USAF Official Photo
General Carl Spaatz (l) decorates Colonel Tibbets (r) with the Distinguished Service Cross after the Hiroshima mission (USAF Official Photo)

Early in the book you say that naval strategy was driven more by how fast the navy was building ships and not by battle experience. How so?

Well, of course the naval strategy that won the Pacific war, War Plan Orange and its successors, was drawn up and wargamed in the 1930s. But at the operational level, nothing prepared the Navy to employ the explosion of naval production that took place in 1943 and 1944. Fifteen fast aircraft carriers were put into commission in 1943. Thus was born the idea of a single carrier task force composed of three- and four-carrier task groups. The ability to concentrate or disperse gave Spruance and his carrier boss, Marc Mitscher, tremendous flexibility.

They realized during the February 1944 strike on Truk Atoll that it was no longer necessary to hit and run. There had been no precedent for this. Instead of hitting and running, relying on mobility and surprise, they could hit and stay, relying on sheer combat power, both offensive and defensive. That changed everything.

By the time the Fifth Fleet wrapped up the conquest of Guam, the carrier fleet was both an irresistible force and an immovable object. That was a function of a sudden surplus of hulls, and the innovations that the air admiralty proved up on the fly in the first half of 1944. Most of these involved making best use of the new Grumman F6F-3 Hellcat, fleet air defense, shipboard fighter direction, division of labor among carriers (for combat air patrol, search, and strike), armed search missions (rocket- and bomb-equipped Hellcats), the concept of the fighter sweep, adjusting the makeup of air groups to be fighter-heavy, night search and night fighting, and so on.

Grumman F6F Hellcats of VF-8 in flight/Wikipedia
Grumman F6F Hellcats of VF-8 in flight (Wikimedia Commons)

Just as important was the surge in amphibious shipping. In 1943, more than 21,000 new ‘phibs were launched of all sizes. The next year, that number surpassed 37,000. That’s the “fleet at flood tide” of my title. As Chester Nimitz himself noted, the final stage of the greatest sea war in history commenced in the Marianas, which became its fulcrum. Neither Iwo Jima nor Okinawa obviated that. And that concept is the conceit of my book and its contribution, I suppose—the centrality of the Marianas campaign, and how it changed warfare and produced America’s position in the world as an atomic superpower.

Spruance, King, Halsey, Tibbets, Turner ––  all of them are giant military historical figures. After diving into the lives of these men, what surprised you? Did you go in with assumptions or prior knowledge about their personalities or behavior that changed over the course of writing this book? 

I had never fully understood the size of Raymond Spruance’s warrior’s heart. I just mentioned the Truk strikes. Did you know that in the midst of it, Spruance detached the USS New Jersey and Iowa, two heavy cruisers, and a quartet of destroyers from Mitscher’s task force, took tactical command, and went hunting cripples? This was an inadvisable and even reckless thing for a fleet commander to do. He and his staff were unprepared to conduct tactical action. But he couldn’t resist the chance to seize a last grasp at history, to lead battleships in combat in neutering Japan’s greatest forward-area naval base.

Japanese Admiral Chuichi Nagumo/Wikipedia
Japanese Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (Wikimedia Commons)

Also, I hadn’t known how much Spruance exulted in the suicide death on Saipan of Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the executioner of the Pearl Harbor strike and Spruance’s opponent at Midway. Finally, I was unaware of the extent of his physical courage. Off Okinawa, in the space of two weeks in May 1945, two of his flagships, the Indianapolis and New Mexico, were hit by kamikazes. In the latter, he disappeared into the burning wreckage of the superstructure, to the horror of his staff, and turned up shortly afterward manning a fire hose. That’s a style of leadership that the “cautious” COMFIFTHFLT is seldom credited for.

Regarding Tibbets, I mentioned his near court-martial in North Africa. Few people know this happened, or even that he served in Europe at all, but he was among the finest B-17 squadron commanders in the ETO in 1942. The lesson of his near downfall is: Never mess with a line officer whos destined to become a four star. This would be Lauris Norstad, Tibbets’s operations officer in North Africa, who went on to become one of the most important USAF generals of the Cold War.

You touch on this in your book, but the war stressed all of these men greatly. And each of them handled it in their own way. Taking just Spruance and Tibbets as examples, how did they handle the loss of men and the toll of war?

Spruance, in his correspondence, often described war as an intellectual puzzle. He could be hard-hearted. Shortly after the flag went up on Mount Suribachi, he wrote his wife, “I understand some of the sob fraternity back home have been raising the devil about our casualties on Iwo. I would have thought that by this time they would have learned that you can’t make war on a tough, fanatical enemy like the Japs without our people getting hurt and killed.” That’s a phrase worthy of Halsey: the sob fraternity. And yet when he toured the base hospitals, he felt deeply for the wounded in war.

It was for this reason that Spruance opposed the idea of landing troops in Japan. He favored the Navy’s preference for blockade. But those were perfectly exhausting operations at sea, week after week of launching strikes against airdromes in Western Pacific island strongholds, and in the home islands themselves. By the time Admiral Halsey relieved Spruance at Okinawa in May 1945, Spruance was exhausted both physically and morally.  

Paul Tibbets suffered losses of his men in Europe, but in the Pacific he was stuck in a training cycle that ended only at Hiroshima on August 6. Later in life, he considered the mass death and destruction he wrought as an irretrievable necessity. Responding to those who considered waging total war against civilian targets an abomination of morals, Tibbets would say, “Those people never had their balls on that cold, hard anvil.” I don’t think the moral objectors have ever fully credited either the tragic necessity or the specific success of the mission of the atomic bomb program: turning Emperor Hirohito’s heart. Tibbets was always unsentimental about it. 

Why is Spruance considered a genius?

Admiral Raymond Spruance, USN/Alfred J. Sedivi, courtesy of the U.S. Naval Institute
Admiral Raymond Spruance, USN (Alfred J. Sedivi, courtesy of the U.S. Naval Institute)

He was the ultimate planner, and through his excellence in planning, naval operations became more than operational or tactical. They became strategic, war-ending. It was no accident that Raymond Spruance planned and carried out every major amphibious operation in the Western Pacific except for the one that invited real disaster, Leyte. He was in style, temperament, and talent a reflection of his mentor, Chester Nimitz. The Japanese gave him the ultimate compliment. Admiral Junichi Ozawa told an interviewer after the war that Spruance was “impossible to trap.”

Switching gears a bit, what is your favorite naval history book?

It’s a long list, probably led by Samuel Eliot Morison’s volume 5, Guadalcanal, but I’m going to put three ahead of him as a personal matter: Tin Cans by Theodore Roscoe, Japanese Destroyer Captain by Tameichi Hara, and Baa Baa Black Sheep by Gregory Boyington. This selection may underwhelm your readers who are big on theory, doctrine, and analytical history, but I list them unapologetically. These were the books that set me on fire with passion for the story of the Pacific War when I was, like, twelve. If I hadn’t read them at that young age, I don’t think I would be writing today. It is only a bonus that all three were published by the company that’s publishing me today, Bantam/Ballantine. We are upholding a tradition!

What is your research and writing process like?

It’s all an elaborate moonlighting gig, conducted in relation to, but apart from, my other work in book publishing. It takes me a while to get these done in my free time, which is stolen mostly from my generous and long-abiding wife, Sharon, and our family. But basically the process looks like this: I turn on my shop-strength vacuum cleaner, snap on the largest, widest attachment, and collect material for 18 to 24 months before I even think about writing. Having collated my notes and organized my data, I then dive into the fitful process of making this rough assemblage readable and smooth, envisioning multiple readers, from expert navalists to my dear mother, with every sentence I type. I stay on that task, early mornings and weekends, for maybe 18 more months. Then, in the case of The Fleet at Flood Tide, my editor and I beat the draft around through two or three revisions before it was finally given to the Random House production editor. Then we sweat over photos and maps. History to me is intensively visual, both in the writing and in the illustrating, so this is a major emphasis for me all along the way. I never offload any of this work to a research staff.

In spite of all of this effort, the result is usually, maddeningly, imperfect in the end. But it is always the best I can do, using this hand-tooled approach under the time pressure that inevitably develops.


What’s next? Are you already thinking about what you want to write about after you finish the book tour and publicity for The Fleet at Flood Tide? Do you have a specific subject in mind?

One word and one numeral: Post-1945.

Last question. A lot of our readers here at the CIMSEC are also writers. What advice would you give to the aspiring naval historian?

Think big. Then think bigger. Then get started. And focus on people and all the interesting problems they’re facing.

James D. Hornfischer is the author of the New York Times bestsellers Neptune’s Inferno, Ship of Ghosts, and The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors, winner of the Samuel Eliot Morison Award. A native of Massachusetts and a graduate of Colgate University and the University of Texas School of Law, he lives in Austin, Texas.

Christopher Nelson is a naval officer stationed at the U.S. Pacific Fleet headquarters. A regular contributor to CIMSEC, he is a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College and the U.S. Navy’s operational planning school, the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School in Newport, Rhode Island. The questions and comments above are his own and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.

Featured Image: Marines on the beach line during the invasion of Saipan in 1944.  (USMC)

China Delivers Submarines to Bangladesh: Imperatives, Intentions, and Implications

The following article was originally featured by the National Maritime Foundation and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here.

By Gurpreet S. Khurana

On 14 November 2016, the Bangladesh Navy (BN) took delivery of two old refurbished Chinese Type 035G Ming-class diesel-electric submarines. As part of the US$ 203 million contract signed in 2013, the submarines were handed over to the BN crew during a ceremony at the Liao Nan Shipyard in China’s Dalian city. The submarines are slated to be commissioned as Bangladesh Naval Ships (BNS) Nabajatra and Joyjatra and are expected to arrive in early 2017 at the new Bangladeshi submarine base being constructed near Kutubdia Island.

This may be a rather seminal development with strong ramifications not only for the littoral countries of the Bay of Bengal, but also for the wider Indo-Pacific region. This essay seeks to undertake an assessment of this development in the context of the likely imperatives of Bangladesh, the intentions of China, and its implications with specific reference to the Indian context.  

Imperatives for Bangladesh

For any navy, the surface warships and their integral aircraft are capable of being used across the entire spectrum of conflict including for ‘constabulary’ and ‘benign’ missions ranging from counter-piracy to maritime search and rescue (M-SAR). In contrast, submarine forces – due to their inherent stealth characteristics – are optimized for sea-denial during war. Even in peacetime, these underwater platforms are used to undertake highly specialized missions against a military adversary like clandestine surveillance, intelligence-gathering, and Special Forces operations. Hence, it is difficult to fathom why Bangladesh – which does not encounter any conventional maritime-military threat – has inducted submarines into its navy. The maritime disputes between Bangladesh and two of its only maritime neighbors – Myanmar and India – were resolved through international arbitration in 2012 and 2014 respectively. Neither Naypyidaw nor New Delhi have indicated any reservations to the verdict of the international tribunals, nor have any other major outstanding contention with Dhaka.

It is nonetheless well known that the BN has since long aspired for a three-dimensional navy through inclusion of underwater warfare platforms. After Dhaka succeeded in settling its maritime boundary through the highly favorable decisions of the international tribunals, the apex political leadership showered much attention upon the BN as the guardian of the country’s newfound maritime interests. Notably, Bangladesh is seeking an increasing dependence upon sea-based resources for economic prosperity of its rather high density of population. The political nod to acquire submarines may therefore be seen as an incentive for the BN. Besides, it is a low-cost deal to reinforce strategic ties with China, including by taking forward Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s support to President Xi Jinping for its ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) initiative. Hence, the development seems to have been driven by symbolism for Bangladesh, rather than being a result of the navy’s appreciation-based force-planning based on an objective assessment of the projected security environment.   

China’s Intentions

As in case of other defense hardware exports, Beijing’s overarching intent behind the sale of submarines would be to go beyond strengthening political ties with Dhaka, to bring about its ‘strategic dependence’ upon China. The long-term submarine training and maintenance needs of the BN would also enable China’s military presence in the Bay of Bengal, and enable it to collate sensitive data for PLA Navy submarine operations in the future. This area is becoming increasingly important as the transit route for China’s strategic crude-oil and gas imports, and bears the origin of China’s oil pipeline across Myanmar. Strategic presence in the area is also critically necessary for Beijing to supplement the strategic and geopolitical dimension of its Maritime Silk Road (MSR) plans.

Further, by selling the two old (though upgraded) Ming-class submarines – which were commissioned in early 1990s and presently at the end of their service life with the PLA Navy – Beijing has assiduously generated useful revenue out of hardware, which would have only ‘scrap value’ in a few years. As per an established practice in China, a significant proportion of the revenue would go to PLA Navy since the submarines were sourced from its inventory.

Implications

The sale of Chinese submarines to Bangladesh bears significant ramifications for the Indo-Pacific region. Lately, apprehensions are being increasingly expressed over the rapidly increasing number of submarines being operated by regional countries. An addition of a submarine-operating country would not only multiply the complexity of water-space management – particularly due to the confidentiality associated with the deployments of such stealth platforms – but could also lead other countries to follow suit. The development also strengthens the imperative for Indian Ocean navies to institute a mechanism for de-conflicting unintended naval encounters at sea through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which ironically, is presently being chaired by Bangladesh.

The submarine sale to Bangladesh has come at a rather inopportune time for the countries of the Bay of Bengal. With the two major maritime disputes having been resolved, the sub-region was looking forward to enhanced maritime cooperation in various sectors like trade connectivity, blue economy, and maritime safety and security, including through the revitalisation of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). The BN’s acquisition of submarines could lead to littoral countries reassessing their maritime security strategies and adopting a cautious approach to maritime cooperation. 

In the Indian context, New Delhi has little reason to be threatened by Dhaka’s newly-acquired sea-denial capability. Nonetheless, Beijing’s likely intent needs to be factored in its national security calculus, particularly considering the imminence of China’s military-strategic presence in close proximity to India’s naval bases, including its nuclear submarine bastion. Evidently, India’s foreign policy vis-á-vis Bangladesh needs to be recalibrated. At the national-strategic level, India possesses insufficient financial and defence-industrial wherewithal to offset China’s overwhelming influence upon Bangladesh, but there is no dearth of other leverages. In such circumstances, New Delhi may need to graduate from its long-standing policy of ‘appeasing’ Dhaka to a ‘carrot and stick’ policy.

Captain   Gurpreet S Khurana, PhD, is Executive   Director at National   Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the NMF, the Indian Navy, or the Government of India. He can be reached at gurpreet.bulbul@gmail.com.

Featured Image: Handover ceremony of two ex-PLA Navy Type 035 submarines to the Bangladesh Navy. (banglanews24.com)

Against the Growing Anti-Ship Missile Threat, Are We Truly Semper Paratus?

By Michael Milburn

This is the first of a three-part series examining the effectiveness of current ship self-defense capabilities on U.S. Coast Guard cutters within the context of expanded roles in the maritime domain. The author proposes solutions to current gaps in capability and presents a high level cost-benefit analysis to the proposal.

Introduction

The problems of the world cannot possibly be solved by skeptics or cynics whose horizons are limited by the obvious realities. We need men who can dream of things that never were.” President John F. Kennedy’s words challenge us to recall the limitations we once accepted and the adversity that forced change. Imagine the various catalysts that preceded major world events, technological milestones, social failures, and successes. Now imagine our nation – its safety, security, and vitality. Imagine those same feelings gutted and burning during the catastrophic impacts to the USS Stark and USS Cole. Because of these events, our Navy was forced out of the “obvious reality” and challenged to improve self-defense.

It is no secret that tensions between the United States, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are becoming progressively more inherently dangerous. Countries remain on high alert with fingers on triggers, awaiting the next move. As the U.S. Coast Guard sails off distant shores – the Arctic, the Middle East, and the South China Sea – it faces these same threats. The U.S. Coast Guard can be perceived as a soft target as it generally operates in a peacetime, non-aggressive, law enforcement capacity, unless transferred to the U.S. Navy by order of the President or act of Congress. But what happens when attacks are directed toward the Coast Guard? Bringing the service into 21st century warfighting has never been clearer than now with the need to examine a different Coast Guard that focuses on our statutory mission of Defense Readiness, in addition to homeland defense. One relatively quick and cost-effective method would be to upgrade USCG ships with modern close-in-weapons-systems (CIWS) to counter the proliferating anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) threat. This would enhance USCG survivability in forward areas while building off of the Navy’s progress in fielding such systems in order to realize savings. 

The Anti-Ship Missile Challenge

A C-802 anti-ship missile travels at Mach 0.9, 1 nautical mile (NM) every 5.9 seconds. Launched from 20NM, a C-802 will take approximately 120 seconds to impact its intended target. This missile was originally created by China and exported to Iran after the 1991 Gulf War. It is operated by numerous coastal batteries within the Strait of Hormuz and other areas. Akin to the AK-47 assault rifle, the C-802 continues to be a common weapon system worldwide. Ten nations field the weapon. Smaller nations such as Iran continue to upgrade its technology, payloads, and increase its range. Strategic placement along highly trafficked waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait continues to concern the U.S Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy, both of whom have military installations throughout the Middle East that are only accessible by way of such straits. 

Taking into account a ship’s reaction time, radar coverage, and the ever-decreasing engagement distance, there may be little to no indication of an inbound missile until it is less than 15NM away. This leaves less than 90 seconds to report, track, react with countermeasures, maneuver the ship, evaluate countermeasure effectiveness, and then re-engage. If it is not effective, CIWS is relied upon to take it out within its respective envelope. However, many modern anti-ship cruise missiles are even faster than the C-802. More and more missiles today fly at supersonic speeds of up to Mach 2-3. A missile traveling Mach 2.0 covers 1NM every 2.7 seconds; Mach 3.0 1NM every 1.8 seconds. That is 58 and 36 seconds of engagement time at a range of 20NM, respectively.

These highly sophisticated weapons are capable of being modified to fire from longer ranges and can also be installed on virtually any platform. They are no longer controlled by single or limited guidance systems. In recent decades, as early as the late 1980s, many countries including the U.S. looked to add multiple guidance systems on missiles to advance accuracy thereby increasing the probability of a hit. This was an adaptation to simplistic yet effective countermeasures of using chaff rounds, turning off a system the missile was looking for, or simply moving the ship out of the line of fire. Such simplistic countermeasures are no match for supersonic cruise missiles fitted with advanced seekers, capable of high-g turns, and that employ unpredictable maneuvers to maximize payload survivability and damage.

The recent and highly publicized events of the UAE Navy ship HSV-2 SWIFT, USS MASON, USS NITZE, AFSB PONCE and USS SAN ANTONIO have proven that post-Cold War missiles are still very much real and deadly. These attacks come as the first missile attacks against a U.S. or Coalition ship in over 25 years since Operation Desert Storm and just proved the necessity of installed self-defense weaponry. According to Vice Adm. Joseph Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources, “in the next few years, everywhere the Navy goes, if you’re not in a submarine, you better watch out because every crappy country will be able to launch high-speed missiles at you and the propagation of that is going to be amazing.” Why is the USCG ignoring the ASCM threat?

Close-In-Weapons-Sytems

Let us examine CIWS. According to NavWeps, a Phalanx “CIWS will prioritize the first six threats it sees at about 5 nautical miles (NM) and engage at 2NM.” That means confirmation of the threat occurs around 30 seconds from impact and the weapons system can effectively engage certain threats just 11.8 seconds before impact. There are 18 seconds of reaction time and 3 NM of dead space where certain counter-ASCM systems cannot engage effectively. CIWS is just that: a close-in weapons system designed as a last resort against the ASCM threat at extremely close range.

image-4
SeaRAM pinpoints its target and fires Rolling Airframe Missiles — lightweight, supersonic, self-guided weapons designed to destroy close-range threats, including helicopters and cruise missiles. [Photo credit: Raytheon]
The SeaRam system using the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) provides the enhanced counter-ASCM capability the USCG needs to guard against modern threats in place of the currently equipped Phalanx system. RAM is a supersonic, lightweight, quick-reaction, fire-and-forget weapon designed to destroy anti-ship missiles. Its autonomous dual-mode passive radio frequency (RF) and infrared guidance provides the capability for engaging multiple threats simultaneously. It can engage threats at over five miles and double the range of the Phalanx system.

RAM is continually improved to stay ahead of the ever-evolving threat of anti-ship missiles, helicopters, aircraft and surface craft. SeaRam is the successful integration of key attributes of the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System and Rolling Airframe Missile, replacing the 20mm Phalanx gun system with an 11-missile launcher assembly. It combines RAM’s superior accuracy, extended range, and high maneuverability with the Phalanx Block 1B’s high-resolution search-and-track sensor systems and quick-response capability against close-in threats. 

Building Off Navy Progress

While the U.S. Navy continues to improve self-defense capabilities against the ASCM threat, the Coast Guard by comparison has yet to consider this a priority. In fact, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that National Security Cutters (NSC) have yet to achieve a hard or soft kill against a subsonic cruise missile as required by Congress. While the Phalanx CIWS onboard NSCs is fairly capable, the U.S. Navy has progressed to fleet-wide implementation of the more advanced RAM and SeaRAM systems – leaving even updated variants of systems from the early-80s for history.

The response came almost immediately amidst increasing threats from Russia and China in strategically key areas like the Eastern Mediterranean and the South China Sea. A handful of Navy destroyers in Spain were equipped to counter a Russian cruise missile threat that quickly emerged and littoral combat ships (LCS) are being tested with SeaRam, but the Navy is looking to expand these numbers to more ships across the fleet.

The Legend-class National Security Cutter USCGC WAESCHE (WMSL-751), Indonesian Navy landing platform dock ship KRI BANDA ACEH (BAC 593) and the amphibious dock landing ship USS GERMANTOWN (LSD 42) steam through the Java Sea in 2012. (U.S. Navy)
The Legend-class National Security Cutter USCGC WAESCHE (WMSL-751), Indonesian Navy landing platform dock ship KRI BANDA ACEH (BAC 593) and the amphibious dock landing ship USS GERMANTOWN (LSD 42) steam through the Java Sea in 2012. (U.S. Navy)

SeaRam and the MK 31 guided missile weapon system are not exactly “cheap” upgrades. On average the SeaRam and RAM systems cost the service around $998,900 per missile with 11 missiles for SeaRam and 21 for the MK31. As with any retrofitting there will be increased prices for outfitting the first few ships and lower production prices for long lead projects such as NSCs 8 through 10, all 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs), and the new icebreakers.

Where the Coast Guard has the upper hand is letting our more experienced, and bigger-budgeted (13 times our operating budget) sister service do the leg work. Once a decision is made on a system, the Coast Guard can simply buy-in at a lower rate, appending their order to the Navy’s purchase of a large-rate multi-year procurement. Subsequently, this agreement can become Navy-Type Navy-Owned equipment (NTNO) and the network for support greatly increases. This was and is the case for SPS-75 and 57mm Borfors (on NSC and LCS classes), and the SLQ-32 systems installed on NSCs, WMECs, and virtually all U.S. Navy surface ships. Congressional regulations require interoperability and cross-service utilization for systems executing DoD operations. The SLQ-32, 57mm Bofors, Data Link 11/16 systems, and other combat systems currently in use by the USCG all meet these requirements

These weapon systems bring the Coast Guard into modern ship self-defense. This would be a smart move for the Coast Guard as these systems are commonly used across not just the U.S. Navy, but eight other navies as well. This brings more experienced technical and mechanical support worldwide along with increased interoperability that the U.S. maritime services have preached and signed agreements on. Outfitting the USCG with this system allows for greater interoperability and provides needed protection during independent operations. This adequately meets Congressional acquisition requirements and reinforces the service as a military entity able to operate forward.

Conclusion

Years ago we ignored the electromagnetic spectrum, swarming boat threats, and quite possibly the ASCM threat as well. Our objectives were not aimed at those areas as they were predominantly Navy missions. Was this naive? The USCG motto, after all, is Semper Paratus, meaning “Always Ready,” but when it comes down to reality, are we really confident enough to place an NSC, or soon the OPC, into a high-threat area where modern missiles lie over the horizon? We cannot overlook that we are targets and we need to survive those unexpected attacks in order to be there when it counts.

In part two, we will examine the use of non-kinetic systems and measures for ship self-defense against anti-ship missiles. We will then discuss the integration of hard-kill and soft-kill tactics under the NSC program. We will cover costs associated, similar programs throughout history, issues with these systems, and the possible barriers the service may face along the way. There will be room to explore the Coast Guard’s continuing and expanded role in the maritime domain along with the associated international relationships and how these measures can enhance the service’s traditional roles.

Petty Officer Michael A. Milburn is a career Cutterman, with over 7 years of  experience aboard four different cutters, including commissioning two National Security Cutters. He is a current member of CIMSEC, USNI, Association of Old Crows, Surface Navy Association, and various other professional organizations. The views in this article are his alone and do not represent the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security or any other government organization.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (June 24, 2016) Legend-class cutter USCGC Stratton (WMSL 752) and littoral combat ship USS Coronado (LCS 4) steam in formation while transiting to Rim of the Pacific 2016. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Ryan Riley/Released)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.