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Red Sea Topic Week

Naval Interoperability and NATO’s Naval Presence: Lessons from the Red Sea

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Red Sea Topic Week

By CDR Augusto Conte, Spanish Navy, and Gonzalo Vázquez

In the latest Notes to the CNO series run by CIMSEC back in September 2023, we argued that in an increasingly contested and complex maritime environment, “the next Chief of Naval Operations must strive to find new ways to capitalize on allied capabilities to succeed at sea.” A few weeks later, Hamas’ attack on Israel set the scenario for what has now become one of the most serious maritime crises in decades, further highlighting the need to capitalize on allied naval capabilities to build a more credible deterrent posture and protect our collective interests at sea.

Over the last six months, the spillover of the conflict’s consequences into the Red Sea region has seen the Yemen-based Ansar Allah (the Houthis) launch an unprecedented campaign of attacks against maritime commercial shipping. The notorious impact of their actions has once again underscored the need to strengthen naval interoperability among allied navies, including the development of high-intensity naval capabilities, as well as the need to deepen naval coordination between the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at a higher level – in a way that the efforts and resources of both can be maximized.

Red Sea Crisis Overview

Since October 2023, Houthi attacks against commercial shipping have greatly deteriorated the security environment in the Red Sea, prompting leading shipping companies like Maersk or CMA CGM to redirect their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope – a decision translating into an increase in costs and transit times. Between October 31st and November 15th, Ansar Allah claimed six missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks on Israel’s Eilat, though their weapons lacked the range to strike deep into Israel. They have also sought to disrupt Israeli shipping with UAVs and cruise missiles, and on November 19th, several militants used a helicopter to board and seize an Israeli-owned cargo ship transiting the Red Sea.

With the launch of Operation Prosperity Guardian in December 2023, the collective effort of several nations to deter aggressions has not managed to suppress completely Houthi efforts. The combined naval assets from the US, UK, France, Italy, and Germany have successfully neutralized several threats, managing to shoot down UAVs, intercept missiles, disable small hostile speedboats, and destroy unmanned surface vehicles (USVs). Additionally, at least one unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) has been eliminated by these multinational forces.

In spite of these efforts, attacks have not been entirely stopped. Weeks after the launch of Prosperity Guardian, the European Union initiated Operation Aspides in mid-February, its own naval deployment focused on safeguarding maritime traffic in the region. Aspides, however, discarded the option of carrying out attacks against land targets from its inception, limiting it to escorting vessels across the region and providing missile defense when necessary.

The enhanced maritime security presence seeks to deter further attacks by the Houthi rebels in Yemen against commercial vessels transiting vital shipping lanes. It demonstrates a coordinated international commitment to maintaining freedom of navigation and protecting crucial maritime trade routes in the strategic Red Sea area. Altogether, these efforts by allied navies to mitigate the negative consequences of Houthi attacks with their deployments to the Red Sea offer valuable strategic and operational lessons to NATO. From among them, this article aims to focus on the crucial importance of allied maritime interoperability and the need for it to be constantly exercised and properly maintained.

The evident proliferation of enemy firepower over the last years has directly resulted in the growth of hostile sea denial capabilities, including in the increasingly-contested littorals. The Red Sea crisis provides further evidence to the argument that in spite of current revitalization efforts and the desire to strengthen their high-intensity naval capabilities, NATO navies remain under-resourced and under-prepared to meet the existing challenges to their individual and collective interests at sea. Furthering this point are the words of Jérome Henry, commander of the French FREMM Aquitaine, following their forced abandonment of the Red Sea region in April:

“We didn’t necessarily expect this level of threat. There was an uninhibited violence that was quite surprising and very significant. [The Yemenis] do not hesitate to use drones that fly at water level, to explode them on commercial ships, and to fire ballistic missiles.”

Allied Interoperability in an Increasingly Contested Maritime Environment

NATO defines interoperability as “the ability for Allies to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.” In the naval realm, one of the main obstacles often underscored in this regard are the different types of warships, command and control (C2) systems, weapons systems, etc., which complicate the integration efforts. Yet, as the Alliance itself suggests, “interoperability does not necessarily require common military equipment. What is important is that equipment can share common facilities and is able to interact, connect and communicate, exchange data and services with other equipment.”

The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) introduces a prominent concept in terms of interoperability: “Integrated Deterrence.” This approach involves combining various capabilities (economic, diplomatic, military, among others) to persuade adversaries of the high costs that any aggression against the United States or its allies would entail. It reflects a national security perspective that increasingly considers factors beyond the purely defensive realm. It encompasses several aspects: multi-domain integration, multi-regional integration, full-spectrum integration, inter-agency integration, and most importantly, allied integration. But more importantly, it also promotes collaboration and coordination with allies in areas such as investments, capability development, and technological and economic strategies, among others, to strengthen deterrence and collective defense capabilities.

Houthi attacks have proven to be manageable by allied navies, with the U.S., France, Italy, and the UK successfully intercepting a high number of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) – a first in naval history – and kamikaze UAVs. The performance of these ships’ crews, some of which have had to endure extended deployments away from home in their commitment to protecting freedom of navigation, has been commendable. Nevertheless, such performances have also shown that many of the current and near-future challenges to NATO’s maritime posture demand a collective response in order to be properly addressed; and they cannot be managed only by a small number of members.

Crisis management operations have been one of the central commitments of allied navies for almost two decades, and one of the pillars of the Allied Maritime Strategy. On certain occasions, these operations have revealed shortfalls in participating navies’ capabilities and preparedness. For example, NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011 “quickly revealed mismatches and critical capability shortfalls in the alliance.” Throughout the duration of Operation Unified Protector, “it became clear that only the US possessed the capability to execute a fully-fledged SEAD/DEAD (suppression/destruction of enemy air defenses) campaign,” underlines Sebastian Bruns.

Unlike 2011, though, NATO has not formally launched an operation in the Red Sea, with the U.S. deciding to launch Operation Prosperity Guardian under the auspices of the Bahrain-based Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) Task Force 153 instead. Still, the failure to deter the Yemen-based terrorists from attacking merchant vessels in the vicinity of Bab El-Mandeb and the southern Red Sea has shown the U.S. cannot (and it should not) do it alone.

The nature of modern threats, including the use of ASBMs for the first time in history, the resurgence of Somali piracy in the Horn of Africa, and the significant proliferation of enemy firepower have reminded NATO navies that the existing challenges in and around the Alliance’s maritime neighborhood will demand closer cooperation among its naval services to properly manage the mix of high-intensity and low-intensity naval tasks to be carried out. To succeed in doing so, the Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs) stand out as a valuable tool with the potential to allow for important developments.

Strengthening Allied Interoperability at Sea

Current NATO naval exercises, including the ongoing Steadfast Defender 24, offer additional opportunities to strengthen ties in naval warfare-related tasks, but interoperability needs to be trained and developed on a more regular basis and at a deeper level. Aside from the current deployments to the Red Sea, where several NATO navies are operating simultaneously, other potential avenues for doing so include the deployment of NATO warships in U.S. deployments –especially with its CSGs– and the SNMGs.

To maintain credible deterrence, allied navies must modernize their naval capabilities, especially in areas such as air and missile defense, electronic and cyber combat systems, and sea-based force projection capabilities. Such modernization must be done in close coordination among allies to maximize interoperability, addressing common shortfalls such as the inability to reload at sea (a problem which, as previously mentioned, recently forced French FREMM Aquitaine to abandon the region after running out of munitions). It is crucial that NATO and its allies work to develop updated joint naval doctrine and tactics to meet emerging threats in the littoral environment. This includes the integration of swarm capabilities, missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, and information operations, among others. A robust joint doctrine would lay the foundation for true naval interoperability. Something resemblant to the Cold War days’ Striking Fleet Atlantic (STRKFLTLANT) to develop it and provide a forum where allied navies can regularly exercise their high-end naval warfare should also be considered.

In a 2019 Proceedings article titled “Rebuild Allied Maritime Interoperability”, its authors provided a number of reasons for which NATO must focus its efforts in strengthening naval interoperability, focusing on the role that the U.S. Navy can play in leading such efforts. In their view, “for the U.S. Navy, including allied ships enables it to close gaps between U.S. and NATO tactics, techniques, and procedures and to adapt a firmly U.S.-oriented battle rhythm to NATO standards and platforms.” The deployment of both the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier groups to the Gulf of Aden and the eastern Mediterranean, would have been a great opportunity for doing so.

The Standing NATO Maritime Groups are another important instrument with which to develop and exercise naval interoperability. Yet, much of their potential remains untapped, pending an update that moves them from their post-Cold War structure and missions towards a stronger emphasis on high-intensity naval warfare. SNMGs’ deployments over the past decades have been a good instrument to maintain a certain level of interoperability, but the scope of their missions has been limited to activities in the lower-end of the intensity spectrum. Moreover, their size shrank notably during the two decades following the end of the Cold War, leaving them with “sluggish participation rates” that are insufficient for the current strategic challenges that NATO is now facing at sea. As  CNA analyst Joshua Tallis has argued on more than one occasion:

“In this time of high tension, very few combatants are attached to the alliance’s two major standing naval groups. As of mid-December, three combatants formed Group One […] Only two combatants comprised the Group Two. This is not an overwhelming force presence […] Rather, it is a shadow of the alliance’s historic approach to maritime security.” 

Operation Prosperity Guardian has effectively demonstrated that NATO navies are no longer able to deter their adversaries as they did back in the 1990s and early 2000s. Nor would an operation as Desert Storm be feasible today given the current state of NATO air and naval assets. Therefore, lessons from the Red Sea provide a helpful lens to re-examine the current missions and structure of the SNMGs, suggesting a much-needed structural shift to reduce their focus on low-intensity and constabulary missions and enhance the development of high-intensity naval capabilities while seeking a higher number of ships available to be deployed.

As part of that shift, the challenges associated with operating in a contested littoral environment, as is the Red Sea at this moment, have also brought back timely lessons on littoral warfare. According to US Naval War College professor Milan Vego, “a blue-water navy now faces much greater and more-diverse threats in the littorals than in the past. This is especially the case in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, such as the Persian (Arabian) Gulf.” Even in the absence of a submarine threat that requires ship crews to devote part of their efforts and assets towards anti-submarine warfare (ASW), allowing them to focus almost exclusively on anti-air warfare, Red Sea operations indicate future littoral warfare campaigns will become increasingly demanding.

As ascertained by Jennifer Parker and Royal Australian Navy’s Vice Admiral Peter Jones, “littoral operations not only demand a prominent level of Combined and Joint interoperability, but also stress the need for an integrated approach to operations.” The likely potential for swarm attacks with both UAVs and USVs (the latter featuring in the Black Sea) has made the littoral an even more contested space, and demands stronger efforts to adapt the SNMGs so that NATO navies can be able to manage such kinds of threats in the near future. Although in the case of the Red Sea they have mostly come as UAV attacks that allow for their effective destruction, there have been several instances in which warships have had to rely on their Close-In Weapons Systems (CIWS) to down the drones. It is worth asking, then, what would happen should these mishaps take place when facing a combined swarm attack of UAVs and USVs that overwhelms the ship’s defenses. It is also worth asking whether the SNMGs would be in a position to fight off an attack of such characteristics.

Moving Forward

In short, the Red Sea crisis has reminded the world once again about the importance of maritime commercial connectivity for the global economy. It has, together with the ongoing naval war in the Black Sea, reminded NATO navies that the challenges of this “maritime century” will require bigger and stronger navies, capable of deploying together and addressing threats against them in a joint fashion, including in the highly contested littorals.

Moving forward, Houthi rebel attacks on commercial shipping traffic in the Red Sea are bound to intensify as part of the Iranian response to the Israeli attack on Damascus. The crisis in the Red Sea could escalate, further affecting crucial maritime trade routes and jeopardizing freedom of navigation in the region. In this regard, the relationship between the EU and NATO has been the subject of debate in Europe, especially with regard to the development of the European Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and its cooperation with NATO.

Integration with allies and partners through investments in interoperability and joint capability development, cooperative posture planning, and coordinated diplomatic and economic approaches should be a common goal for NATO allies. We must work together in the Red Sea, with both operations from the EU and NATO, to increase our interoperability and build a truly integrated deterrent. This will require the EU’s soft power influence, but above all, it will require NATO to develop more robust high-intensity naval warfare capabilities, working closely together with the SNMGs (although something resemblant to STRKFLTLANT should also be seriously considered).

At a time when multiple sources of instability with the potential to escalate combine with other low-intensity but still demanding challenges, NATO must strive to build up its deterrent posture and leverage the naval capabilities currently available under a collective effort. For such purposes, allied naval interoperability must be thoroughly exercised and evaluated. If properly assessed and examined, all lessons drawn from naval actions in the Red Sea will provide valuable input on how to readapt NATO’s naval forces for a renewed era of great power competition and to better cope with the threats present in the Alliance’s maritime backyard.

CDR Augusto Conte is a submarine and electronic warfare officer serving as a senior analyst with the Spanish Naval War College’s Center for Naval Thought. He has served as Commanding Officer of the Patrol Vessel Formentor, Executive Officer of the Galerna-class submarine S-72 Siroco, and as Deputy Director of the Navy Submarine School.

Gonzalo Vázquez is a junior analyst with the Spanish Naval War College’s Center for Naval Thought.

Featured image: The guided-missile destroyer USS Mason sails alongside the Japanese destroyer Akebono in the Gulf of Aden, Nov. 25, 2023. The USS Mason is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations to support maritime security and stability in the Middle East. (Image credit: Petty Officer 3rd Class Samantha Alaman.)

Red Sea Topic Week

Panda Express: A Proposed Convoy Operation in the Red Sea

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Red Sea Topic Week

By Clay Robinson

It was a sunny morning with calm seas on March 6, 2024, a fine day for sailing the tranquil waters of the Gulf of Aden. The crew of M/V True Confidence, however, were on edge: less than 10 hours before, their ship had come under attack from a Houthi-launched Iranian missile. Through sheer luck, the missile missed its intended target, and the ship continued its westerly journey bound for Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. At 11:34 AM, the crew’s luck ran out: another Houthi missile ripped through the deck house, exploding in a massive fire ball that set the bridge ablaze.1 Two innocent civilian mariners were killed and four more critically injured. The captain ordered the fifteen surviving crew to abandon ship, leaving it adrift and in flames, yet another victim of the Houthis’ senseless and indiscriminate violence. 

Red Sea Fast Pass: Chinese Opportunism

Even as the tumultuous situation in the Red Sea takes ever more deadly and dangerous turns, China continues to sit idly by and reap the economic and diplomatic benefits thanks to the Houthis’ Iranian patronage and their own calculated self-interest. While much of the world’s shipping has been forced to take longer and more expensive routes to avoid Houthi missiles in the Red Sea, Chinese shipping continued virtually undisturbed, protected as it were under a modern day “non-aggression pact” between China and Houthi forces.2 However, just a few days after the Houthis granted this assurance to China that their ships would not be targeted in exchange for political support, on March 23, 2024, a Houthi missile struck the Chinese-owned M/V Huang Pu.3 Houthi spokesmen were unusually tight-lipped4 after this attack, likely the result of severe chastisement behind the scenes by both China and Iran, and will take extra efforts to avoid targeting Chinese shipping in the future.

It is not clear yet whether this Houthi attack should be attributed to an administrative oversight, missing that M/V Huang Pu’s ownership had recently transferred to China. Or perhaps the Houthis were targeting another vessel nearby. Either way, the safest place to transit the Red Sea is now onboard Chinese-owned ships.

The combination of the Houthi’s public agreement with China to not target their shipping and the likely private reprimand after striking the M/V Huang Pu sets up a scenario whereby Chinese shipping will be getting a free pass through the Red Sea. That provides China a significant competitive advantage at the precise moment its economy is starting to falter. There is a way, however, to both remove that advantage and force China to abide by its international obligations.

The time has come to exact a cost on this unbridled Chinese opportunism.

Panda Express: A Proposed Convoy Operation

The idea is simple: vulnerable multinational commercial vessels would closely shadow Chinese ships as they transit safely past Houthi missile launchers in a convoy-type operation. The Houthis, knowing their targeting is lacking, would refrain from shooting lest they accidentally hit a Chinese ship and anger both Beijing and Tehran. The U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces or the European Union Naval Forces’ Operation Aspides are the most obvious candidates to organize such a convoy – nicknamed Panda Express – but arguably it could be self-organizing or organized under an alternative multinational coalition. The shipping industry could institute a loosely organized program to surreptitiously appropriate passive escort of commercial vessels by Chinese vessels sharing the same shipping lanes. In short, these vessels will shadow Chinese vessels at a safe but proximate distance such as to keep the Chinese vessel between them and the direction of the Houthi missile threat. A limited handful of multinational commercial vessels will transit under the shield of the security that each of the Chinese vessels enjoy, taking advantage of a reliable and predictable, yet passive escort courtesy of China.

The current situation (Figure 1) consists of multinational commercial vessels transiting independently under the impressive but less-than-omnipresent protection of the multinational warships participating in Operation Prosperity Guardian and Operation Aspides. These warships endeavor to intercept Houthi missiles and attack drones targeting commercial shipping.

Figure 1: Status quo of Operation Prosperity Guardian. (Author graphic)

A brief vignette will serve as an example of what Panda Express might accomplish. Prior to a southbound transit of the Red Sea, a multinational commercial vessel will loiter temporarily at the southern end of the Suez Canal, awaiting the passage of another southbound Chinese vessel. This will occur ostensibly every few hours as an average of over five Chinese vessels transit the Suez Canal per day.5 The multinational vessel will then take station on the starboard quarter of the Chinese vessel at a safe distance, but in close proximity such that a sort of passive, perhaps even unwitting, screen of the vessel by the Chinese vessel will occur (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Panda Express concept. (Author graphic)

Some might argue that Panda Express would put innocent civilian mariners at risk by shadowing Chinese merchant vessels, and from a practical standpoint, that threat would exist. But therein lies its value as a deterrent because the Houthis have already stated that they will not attack Chinese shipping. As the two vessels reach the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, air defense vessels of Operation Prosperity Guardian and Operation Aspides can provide a more robust ability to detect and engage any Houthi missile that might be close enough to discern the multinational vessels from the Chinese one. Once through the western reaches of the Gulf of Aden and outside the threat area, the vessel can once again resume navigating independently.

Panda Express leverages opportunities fomented by China for both a protective and influence advantage. This concept is not an evaluation of the technical aspects of a possible tactical advantage on a notional battlefield. Assessments would need to be made about just how close these vessels would have to transit near their Chinese escorts to achieve sufficiently low levels of probability hit (PH) or probability of kill (PK) for inbound Houthi missiles. Similarly, there would be limits to how many vessels could safely transit in company with each Chinese vessel. This concept is rather about taking advantage of the deterrent value of the present situation and using it as a way to exact diplomatic costs on China for sticking to its opportunistic agenda in the Middle East. This is a way to erode China’s economic and diplomatic advantages by highlighting China’s malign opportunism and providing safe passage through the Red Sea. Panda Express is a low cost, legal, and pragmatic way to compete with China.

What will Panda Express accomplish? This escort tactic would begin to serve as a strategic deterrent against Houthi attacks in three ways. First and foremost, the risk of the Houthis accidentally hitting a Chinese vessel while targeting other vessels one would be too great, and it would deter attacks on any ships traveling in close company with Chinese ships. Additionally, Panda Express could reduce the strain on the contingent of warships supporting Operation Prosperity Guardian and Operation Aspides that are spread very thin by helping to better position these assets in order to more efficiently focus their layered defense on the places where they can be most effective. Lastly, diplomatically, China could be held accountable for malign hedging behavior and an opportunistic silent partnership with Iran. Panda Express could drive China to increase pressure on Iran to rein in all Houthi attacks, not just prevent attacks on Chinese vessels.

How long could Panda Express be sustained? There are risks to be sure, but most are worth accepting. China might stop sending its ships through the Red Sea, but this is extremely unlikely. The Suez Canal and Red Sea serve as the primary route for China’s westward shipments of goods, including around 60% of its exports to Europe, representing one-tenth of the Suez Canal’s annual traffic.6 China cannot afford to avoid the Red Sea route altogether.

The maritime shipping industry can determine that the cost of loitering at the entrances to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to wait for Chinese escort are too high. Yes, loitering temporarily for a few hours costs some money, but it is also likely to be far less than transiting around the Capes of Africa.

All this cat and mouse activity on the high seas might lead to collisions between vessels, but these are professional mariners with years of experience plying these waters. They can handle it. And, if Chinese ships were to be instructed to somehow attempt to disrupt this passive escort program, it will only cost them more in time and money.

China: A Silent Partner in the Axis of Insecurity

Is Panda Express worth it? Some points to consider: Chinese leaders have repeatedly claimed they hold very little sway over Iran, and by extension the Houthis; however, several key factors seem to indicate otherwise, and China’s opportunistic fingerprints are all over the Red Sea crisis. China asked Iran to rein in the Houthis.7 China is not alone in asking Houthis to cease the attacks.8 Yet, the Houthis publicly stated only Chinese and Russian ships have a free pass.9

China knows its ships are safe, too. Despite having a significant naval presence in the region, China has kept its Naval Escort Task Force (NETF) out of the Red Sea, choosing instead to loiter in the safer waters of the eastern Gulf of Aden. In late February, the Chinese Defense Ministry denied the 46th NETF deployment is related to the Red Sea crisis and reiterated that it is a “regular escort operation.”10 That none of these NETF vessels are needed in the Red Sea to ensure the safe passage of Chinese shipping is proof China knows its vessels are exempt from Houthi attack.

China does indeed have influence over Iran and, by extension, the Houthis in what has now become an “Axis of Insecurity.” Panda Express would reduce the likelihood of new attacks like that on M/V True Confidence and M/V Huang Pu and put direct pressure on China to either explain to the court of international opinion why shadowing Chinese vessels is a safe tactic, or influence Iran and the Houthis to end their aggression in the Red Sea altogether. Either way, China loses, and the rest of the world wins. It’s time to order Panda Express.

Commander Clay Robinson is a retired surface warfare officer and antiterrorism/force protection specialist. He has worked for the U.S. Department of Defense since 2017 as a strategic planning specialist and is currently an Adjunct History Instructor with the U.S. Naval Community College. He served on board the USS Russell (DDG-59), USS Laboon (DDG-58), and USS Nitze (DDG-94), and commanded Maritime Civil Affairs Squadron One (MCAS-1).

Endnotes

1. Jonathan Saul, “Ship evacuated after first civilian fatalities in Houthis’ Red Sea attacks,” Reuters, March 7, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ship-evacuated-after-first-civilian-fatalities-houthis-red-sea-attacks-2024-03-07/.

2. Sam Dagher and Mohammed Hatem, “Yemen’s Houthis Tell China, Russia Their Ships Won’t Be Targeted,” Bloomberg, March 21, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-21/china-russia-reach-agreement-with-yemen-s-houthis-on-red-sea-ships

3. Luther Ray Abel, “Chinese Tanker Struck by Houthi Missile,” National Review, March 24, 2024, https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/chinese-tanker-struck-by-houthi-missile/

4. Heather Mongilio, “Chinese Tanker Hit with Houthi Missile in the Red Sea,” USNI New, March 24, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/03/24/chinese-tanker-hit-with-houthi-missile-in-the-red-sea

5. “Suez Canal Blocking Could Hike Freight Fees between China and Europe If Not Cleared Soon: Analyst,” Global Times, March 24, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1219372.shtml.

6. Amr Salah Mohamed, “China’s growing maritime presence in Egypt’s ports and the Suez Canal,” Middle East Institute, November 3, 2023, https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-growing-maritime-presence-egypts-ports-and-suez-canal.

7. Parisa Hafezi and Andrew Hayley, “Exclusive: China presses Iran to rein in Houthi attacks in Red Sea, sources say,” Reuters, January 25, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/china-presses-iran-rein-houthi-attacks-red-sea-sources-say-2024-01-26/.

8. Burak Bir, “24 countries condemn Houthi attacks in Red Sea,” Anadolu Agency (AA), January 24, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/24-countries-condemn-houthi-attacks-in-red-sea/3117236.

9. “China and Russia Get a Free Pass Through Houthis’ Red Sea Blockade,” The Maritime Executive, January 23, 2024,

https://maritime-executive.com/article/china-and-russia-get-a-free-pass-through-houthis-red-sea-blockade.

10. Zhao Ziwen, “Why China’s Red Sea diplomatic mission is unlikely to stop Houthi shipping attacks,” South China Morning Post, March 4, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3253641/why-chinas-red-sea-diplomatic-mission-unlikely-stop-houthi-shipping-attacks.

Featured Image: Photo of the MV True Confidence after it was struck by a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile in the western Gulf of Aden, March 6, 2024. (Photo courtesy U.S. Central Command)

Red Sea Topic Week

Evaluating the Naval Response to the Red Sea Crisis

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Red Sea Topic Week

By Colin Barnard

Though Alfred Thayer Mahan is famous for his advocacy of strong naval fleets to win decisive battles at sea, he saw the enduring purpose of navies as something much broader and not constrained to war: enabling and, if necessary, disrupting maritime trade. Even though Mahan could not have imagined autonomous weapons, the Houthis’ campaign against merchant shipping in the Red Sea would have been familiar to him. Whatever technology is used, however, maritime trade has been disrupted before; and, as before, the U.S. Navy and several of its allies are fighting to enable it, demonstrating the Navy’s enduring purpose for all to see. This analysis evaluates the naval response so far, from cooperating with merchant shipping, the cost effectiveness and vulnerabilities of using warships and missiles to counter drones, and the role of allies, to the potential implications for a future conflict with China and current efforts in defense innovation to prepare for it.

Cooperating with Merchant Shipping

Threats against merchant shipping are not new: pirates, German U-boats, and even other merchant ships have disrupted merchant shipping in the past. Navies, coast guards, and the international shipping community have long feared the potential for terrorists to exploit the vulnerability of merchant ships in one of the world’s many maritime chokepoints, of which the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea is one of the most critical. A terrorist group backed by Iran, the Houthis have exploited the geography of the Red Sea to their advantage, targeting shipping to disrupt trade with disproportionate impact in order to effect political change–i.e., hindering Israel’s campaign against Hamas in Gaza. Protecting shipping from such terrorism is a job for naval forces, but they must cooperate with merchant shipping in doing so, as they have in the past.

Enter Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS). An important NATO doctrine, NCAGS provides NATO navies with the tools to cooperate and guide merchant shipping during crisis and conflict. Its shortfalls arise because of the voluntary nature of this relationship. Though shipping can never be guaranteed full protection–especially without troops on the ground to mitigate land-based threats–navies must provide value to the shipping industry if it is to trust and rely on them for what protection they can provide. While the NCAGS doctrine has been practiced by NATO navies for decades, it does not seem to have worked as designed in the Red Sea. Early in the crisis, Reuters reported that shipping was “in the dark” on U.S. and allied naval efforts to counter Houthi attacks. The always candid John Konrad, founder and CEO of gCaptain, took to Twitter to highlight the perils of this apparent disconnect.

While communication between the NCAGS enterprise and shipping was likely better than publicly available information suggests, as Nathan Strang claimed, it would not be unreasonable to suggest the need for a closer relationship between the two. If they are not already, industry liaison officers could be used to better link the U.S. Navy and shipping, and foreign area officers could help allies get on the same page. Public affairs officers also have a role to play. If the NCAGS enterprise was doing its job per Strang, but efforts were difficult to surmise because of classification, carefully crafted news releases about these efforts could have helped put shipping at ease. Depending on NATO’s role in such a crisis, the NATO Shipping Center, NATO’s single point of contact for the international shipping community, would be the best link between the two. NATO has come to aid of merchant shipping before, even when the threat was outside its area of responsibility; and crises like this would help shore up its relationship with shipping in the event of crises or conflict closer to home.

Cost Effectiveness and Vulnerabilities: Destroyer vs. Drones

At the same time naval forces are demonstrating their enduring purpose in the Red Sea, outsiders are questioning the sustainability of manned, multi-billion warships facing off against much cheaper, unmanned drones. The missiles used to shoot down these drones cost upwards of $4 million, while the drones themselves cost only hundreds of thousands. But the issue of cost effectiveness in asymmetric warfare is not new. In the land campaigns of the Global War on Terror, for example, costly munitions were expended in the targeting of much less costly targets. That cost effectiveness is suddenly an issue for public discussion during a maritime campaign is yet another example of seablindness, but the concern is reasonable. Unmanned and easy to replicate, drones can be used to exhaust more expensive naval munitions before attacking warships directly without putting the drone operator at risk. The discussion of cost effectiveness has, therefore, extended to the vulnerability of warships.

This vulnerability was the subject of a recent article by Brandon Weichert, who bemoaned the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer as “a great navy warship past its prime.” Current and former naval officers were quick to criticize the article, which uses the 2000 attack on USS Cole as its prime example of such vulnerability but says nothing about weapon posture or layered defense (the Cole was moored in Yemen for refueling and unready when the attack occurred). While warship vulnerability against drones is concerning, all of history’s advances in weapon technology elicited similar concern. From the longbow and machine gun to the submarine and nuclear bomb, these advances created asymmetry even among peers, and only democratization of these technologies restored the balance. In the meantime, it should be obvious that the best course of action, as the United States (and now UK, too) is following, is to target bases and operators before drones become a threat–though it is doubtful that such strikes alone will be enough to make a difference.

While the Houthi’s use of autonomous systems is the latest example of their democratization, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War was the first indication of such democratization on a mass scale, as well as the first instance of these systems being a decisive factor in war. Prior to the 2020 conflict, autonomous systems—drones—were the purview of major powers with the money to procure and employ them. In Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan employed them as a force of their own, devastating Armenian air defenses, tanks, artillery, and supply lines without putting traditional aircraft or their pilots in harm’s way. Similarly, in the Russo-Ukrainian war, Ukrainian forces have all but stopped the Russian Navy in the Black Sea, using drones to disrupt and in some cases destroy Russian warships. As John Antal warned in his detailed analysis of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, autonomous systems, now employed by state and non-state actors alike, are here to stay. 

Absent Allies and Coalitions of the Willing

Due to the impact of Houthi attacks on world trade, the U.S. and several of its allies formed a coalition of the willing to respond to the crisis. Like the international response to piracy in the Horn of Africa, international naval cooperation has become a rule rather than an exception in the post-Cold War era. Globalization has necessitated this cooperation, increasing the impact of the threats to, and mitigations of maritime security relative to more traditional threats. But unlike the response to piracy, which saw NATO, the EU, and even China, India, and Russia deploy forces to protect maritime trade, NATO is notably absent from this crisis. The Israel-Hamas conflict has divided many allies on their response to the Houthi threat, even if all are affected by the disruption of merchant shipping in the Red Sea. NATO has the means to make a difference in this crisis, but politics as usual are in the way.

As of this writing, 14 states are supporting the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian. Of these 14, only eight are NATO members–the United States included. The EU’s Operation Aspides has even fewer supporters, though they include some of the NATO members absent from Prosperity Guardian. Of course, not all states supporting Prosperity Guardian are contributing warships; but the presence of staff officers, as Norway is contributing, will enhance cooperation. One of the merchant ships attacked early on in this crisis was Norwegian-flagged, incentivizing this contribution, but the general threat posed to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea should be incentive enough for all capable states to contribute. As should be obvious even to the seablind, the impact of supply chain disruption as seen during COVID, the grounding of the Ever Given, and, more recently, the destruction of the Francis Scott Key bridge, necessitates their contribution.

Whether or not it ultimately contributes to the crisis response, NATO must once again confront the challenge of deterring and defending against its perennial foe, Russia, while also contributing to maritime security. Worrisomely, NATO’s Allied Maritime Strategy is out-of-date. Its latest Strategic Concept, released in 2022, refocuses on Russia while maintaining NATO’s role as a maritime security actor; but it poorly articulates the maritime dimensions of NATO’s security environment. NATO is, first and foremost, a maritime alliance, and it needs a maritime strategy to guide its force structure and operational concepts. Such a strategy is more important considering the potential for a future conflict with China. If the U.S. Navy and potentially other NATO navies must surge to the Pacific, alliance buy-in will be needed to manage the varying threats to maritime security in and near NATO’s area of responsibility.

Implications for a Future Conflict with China 

As the U.S. Navy and coalition members stand off against Houthi drones (and missiles) in the Red Sea, the implications for future conflict are worth examining. As in the Russo-Ukrainian War, drones have reduced asymmetry in this crisis; and they were decisive in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Clearly, such technology must be at the forefront of the U.S. Navy’s planning for a future conflict with China, which has the industrial capacity to produce drones in far greater quantities than so far exhibited. Updates to strategy and the fleet design it informs need to be quick, as warships, submarines, aircraft, and their integration with this technology cannot happen overnight. The new U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations, Lisa Franchetti, called this state of affairs a “1930s moment.” In the 30s, the U.S. Navy was too small and insufficiently resourced for the coming Second World War, and the U.S. Navy is not much different today (shipbuilding delays being one of the most troubling examples).

While the U.S. Navy’s strategy prior to the Second World War was centered on battleships, as Franchetti explained, it shifted from this platform-centric strategy to one integrating naval forces above and below the sea to defeat the Nazis and Imperial Japan. The next shift in strategy is clearly toward autonomy. The Navy is already making significant efforts to this end. The Replicator Initiative, focused on commercially sourcing and mass producing drones to take on China, is the overarching example of these efforts. The Navy’s unmanned  Task Force 59 in the Middle East is the prime example of the Navy’s role at the pointy end of this strategy, developing and implementing its tactics. Likewise, other branches, especially the U.S. Marine Corps, are making efforts to better design themselves for next generation warfare. How exactly this next generation warfare will look is still unclear, but drones are likely to be used to counter drones. The era of drone-on-drone warfare is near.

One of the biggest lessons to be learned from the drone warfare experienced so far is offense-defense balance. Drones add to an already saturated battle space, increasing the burden on layered defenses. Leveraging emerging technology to improve offensive capabilities is critical, but defensive capabilities must be given corresponding weight. Importantly, however, neither offensive nor defensive capabilities need to be wholly reliant on emerging technology; “old ways” may prove to be more effective than imagined, as they were for Lieutenant General Van Riper in the infamous Millennium Challenge. The novel 2034, co-authored by retired Admiral James Stavridis and Elliot Ackerman, imagines how these old ways might make the difference in a conflict with China, should new technology be defeated. New technology might win some wars and mitigate certain crises; where it is not the deciding factor, however, old ways—or some combination of the old and new, as is currently on display in Ukraine—may be.

Conclusion

Navies are demonstrating their enduring purpose in the Red Sea Crisis, but their response has been far from perfect. The seemingly strained relationship between navies and merchant shipping evident early in the crisis is concerning, but establishing better relationships between the two using liaison officers and the NATO Shipping Center–if NATO involves itself—could help in the future. The cost-effectiveness and vulnerabilities of the naval response are also concerning, as is the absence of certain allies. Regardless, the drone technology at the center of this crisis is here to stay, and the implications for a future conflict are the most concerning of all. Defense innovation efforts are already underway to prepare for such a conflict, but over reliance on emerging technology to go on offense, without simultaneously preparing for defense, could be fatal. Going forward, navies are at the center of these challenges, especially war with China. Thankfully, the Red Sea Crisis could prove their perfect test.

Colin Barnard is a PhD candidate at King’s College London and foreign area officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve, currently assigned to a unit supporting U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet in Naples, Italy. He was formerly on active duty for ten years, during which he supported U.S. and NATO operations across Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. He has previously written for CIMSEC and the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings. The views expressed in this publication are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the U.S. Department of Defense or U.S. Navy.

Featured Image: The British-registered cargo ship Rubymar sinking, after it was targeted by Yemen’s Houthi forces in international waters in the Red Sea, on March 3, 2024, in the Red Sea. (Photo by Yemeni Al-Joumhouriah TV)

Strategy

Asymmetric Naval Strategies: Overcoming Power Imbalances to Contest Sea Control

1 Comment

By Alex Crosby

According to Julian Corbett, “[T]he object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.”1 However, naval warfare innately favors stronger naval powers in their pursuit of command of the sea. This institutional bias can drive weaker naval powers to act in less traditional manners, with the effects bordering on dangerously destabilizing to the involved security environment. Likewise, weaker naval powers can become increasingly receptive to the establishment of innovative and unique options to achieve the relative parity necessary for contesting command of the sea.

First, weaker naval powers can use asymmetric naval warfare in the form of devastating technologies and surprise shifts in strategy. Second, weaker naval powers can leverage coalitions to increase relative combat power and threaten secondary theaters to diffuse the adversary’s combat power. Finally, weaker naval powers can inflict cumulative attrition along distant sea lines of communication. These options, singularly or together, can enable a weaker naval power to contest command of the sea against a stronger naval power.

Asymmetric Naval Warfare

A weaker naval power can use asymmetric naval warfare to contest the command of the sea through the integration of devastating technologies. For example, during the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese leveraged two unique warfighting capabilities to undermine relative Russian naval superiority. First, the Japanese Navy used naval mines to offensively damage or destroy Russian ships attempting to leave Port Arthur.2, 3 Additionally, the placement of mines provided a means of sea denial, allowing Japanese ships to contest and control the waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula with limited demand for direct naval engagements.

Second, the Japanese Navy used destroyers armed with torpedoes in close-proximity attacks on the Russian battleships of Port Arthur.4 This asymmetric employment of small naval assets with lethal firepower proved to be a devastating surprise against Russian ships expecting significant force-on-force engagements. This technology combination, mines and torpedo-equipped destroyers, is an example of how a relatively weaker naval force can contest command of the sea, especially in littoral waters.

Another means of asymmetric warfare that a weaker naval power can leverage for contesting command of the sea is a surprise shift in strategy. An example of this is the strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare focused on commerce targets that the German Navy used during the early stages of the Second World War. Early in the conflict, Germany identified the sea lines of communication crossing the Atlantic Ocean from the United States as critical for continued Allied efforts in the European and North African theaters.5 Germany concentrated its well-trained and disciplined submarine force and associated combat power into wolf packs to target this vulnerability. The primary objective of these wolf packs was to attrit as much tonnage of Allied shipping as possible, with the desired effect of exceeding the rate at which the Allies could replace their respective shipping fleets.6, 7 Germany was able to have significant successes during the early stages of the war, particularly by focusing these wolf packs off the east coast of the United States. This placement and intensity of submarine forces instilled a corresponding fear into the American populace and directly contested command of the sea.8, 9

In the early period of the war, the German strategy was definitively effective against the desired target set. Thus, a strategy such as unrestricted submarine warfare can be particularly useful in contesting command of the sea when the adversary is unsensitized to that type of warfare and remains slow in implementing tactics or technology necessary for countering.10 Asymmetric naval warfare, either through the employment of devastating technologies or the employment of surprise strategies, has the potential to be a force multiplier for weaker naval powers in contesting command of the sea.

Leveraging Coalitions

A weaker naval power can further contest command of the sea by leveraging coalitions, mainly through the increase of combat power parity to surpass that of an adversary’s superior naval strength. During the Peloponnesian War, Sparta represented a predominantly land-centric power compared to the naval-centric Athens in a conflict dominated by the maritime domain. Assessing its accurate position as the weaker naval power, Sparta sought allies that possessed naval strength to increase the combined power of the Peloponnesian League to contest Athens’s claim on command of the sea.11 Additionally, Sparta leveraged the Persian willingness to export naval capabilities in exchange for economic and diplomatic trades further to increase the naval strength of the Peloponnesian League.12 The Spartan increase in maritime power through a combination of direct and indirect coalitions had the additional effect of instilling strategic paranoia in Athenian leadership. This fear of Sparta, and more specifically the fear of Sicilian states joining the Peloponnesian League, caused Athens to overextend its naval power for a resource-draining expedition.13 The alignment of combined naval strength against the Delian League ultimately proved decisive for turning the tide of the Peloponnesian War in favor of the Spartan-led coalition.

A weaker naval power can also leverage coalitions, and the increase in combined naval power, to threaten a stronger adversary in secondary theaters and diffuse their combat power to more manageable levels. The American Revolution is an example of this situation, where the American colonies gained the critical maritime support of France. This coalition represented relative combined naval power that exceeded that of the British Navy and continued to increase throughout the remainder of the war.14, 15 Additionally, the France’s colonial garrison forces and associated sea lines of communication in proximity to British global equities diffused British naval power to relatively weaker concentrations.16 This reduction in the British Navy’s ability to mass combat power was further compounded with France’s entry into the conflict. The threat posed by France spurred Britain to allocate significant naval power for the defense of the British Isles from invasion, altering the primary strategic objective of the entire war.17, 18 The combined effort of France and the Thirteen Colonies displayed the importance of several weaker naval powers forming a coalition against a stronger naval power and the strategic dilemma it can manifest for an overextended adversary.

Inflicting Cumulative Attrition Along Distant Sea Lines of Communication

Finally, a weaker naval power can contest command of the sea by inflicting cumulative attrition along distant sea lines of communication. During the Second World War, the Japanese Navy identified the vast distances of the Pacific Ocean as a critical operation factor that presented several advantages to achieving command of the sea. The tyranny of distance associated with any sea lines of communication required by a transiting American force would be vulnerable to Japanese exploitation. Specifically, Japan planned for the expected significant quantities of merchant shipping to be a central target set of its strategy for degrading American naval power to more manageable levels.19 Additionally, the extreme distances of the Pacific Ocean would, at least in the initial stages of the conflict, prevent the American Pacific Fleet from massing to its maximum combat potential. Based on the detriments the distances would inflict on American naval operations, the Japanese aimed to inflict cumulative attrition with a defined strategy.

The Japanese Navy implemented a wait-and-react strategy, which was planned to involve a series of naval engagements far from Japanese centers of gravity to attrite the American Pacific Fleet.20 In addition to these minor naval engagements, the wait-and-react strategy relied upon the garrisoning of island strongholds. These strongholds would allow the concentration of air and naval offensive combat power to attrite a westward-moving American naval force further. The projection of Japanese combat power would have directly threatened the massing of American naval strength, both of warships and the associated merchant shipping.21 Through this added attrition of sea lines of communication, the American naval power was intended to have been decreased to matching or weaker status than the Japanese Navy. This risk reduction would then have enabled a decisive fleet-on-fleet engagement, allowing Japan to gain command of the sea.22 Despite the distances of the Pacific Ocean and its status as a relatively weaker naval power, the Japanese Navy formulated a strategy with the potential to inflict enough cumulative attrition for decisive effects.

An Argument For Joint Force Integration

Some might argue that a better option for a weaker naval power to contest command of the sea would be the integration of the joint force against the threats posed by a stronger naval power. Julian Corbett in particular proclaimed the value of joint integration to achieve maritime objectives such as contesting command of the sea.23 The coordination of joint firepower is critical to mass enough effects to contend with a stronger naval power, which is especially pertinent with the introduction of modern technology.24

Additionally, the influence of devastating offensive firepower, including over the horizon targeting capabilities, validates the insufficiency of mono-domain action from the sea. The combination of a multi-domain aggregation of firepower is a near necessity for a weaker naval power to have any legitimate chance at contesting command of the sea.25

Conclusion

Joint operations, while important in a general sense, and critical for first rate navies, are not the best option for weaker powers to contest command of the sea. Joint operations are resource-intensive and could prove more burdensome than helpful for a weaker naval power. Additionally, joint interoperability would likely be nonetheless reliant on the previous factors of asymmetric naval warfare, coalition leveraging, and attrition of distance sea lines of communication in order to be effective. Conversely, joint interoperability is not a prerequisite for those different factors. Asymmetric naval warfare can be conducted regardless of a joint force in a variety of ways, especially when possessing devastating technologies and employing surprise shifts in strategy that undermine an adversary’s understanding of the maritime environment.

Coalitions can be leveraged to increase relative combat power and threaten an adversary’s secondary theaters without the demand of a joint force. Distant sea lines of communication can be harassed and attacked to inflict cumulative attrition absent a joint force. Even a small, unique advantage has the benefiting possibility of supporting the instillment of innovation and growth towards multilateralism, all caused by existential concerns with the maritime domain.

Ultimately, a weaker naval power has a multitude of options when it comes to contesting command of the sea against a stronger naval power without needed to rely on joint operations. 

Lieutenant Commander Alex Crosby, an active duty naval intelligence officer, began his career as a surface warfare officer. His assignments have included the USS Lassen (DDG-82), USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7), U.S. Seventh Fleet, and the Office of Naval Intelligence, with multiple deployments supporting naval expeditionary and special warfare commands. He is a Maritime Advanced Warfighting School graduate and an Intelligence Operations Warfare Tactics Instructor. He has masters’ degrees from the American Military University and the Naval War College.

References

1. Corbett, Julian S. “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.” London: Longman, Green, 1911. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, reprint, 1988. 62.

2. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. “Retrospect upon the War between Japan and Russia.” In Naval Administration and Warfare. Boston: Little, Brown, 1918. 147 

3. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. “Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941”, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. 101.

4. Corbett, “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,” 149.

5. Matloff, Maurice. “Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945.” In Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Peter Paret, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. 679.

6. Murray, Williamson and Alan R. Millett. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. 236.

7. Baer, George W. “One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990”. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. 192.

8. Ibid., 194.

9. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. Paperback edition. New York: Free Press, 2006. 61-62.

10. Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 250-251.

11. Strassler, Robert B., ed. The Landmark Thucydides. New York: The Free Press, 1996. 1.121.2.

12. Nash, John. “Sea Power in the Peloponnesian War.” Naval War College Review, vol. 71, no.1 (Winter 2018). 129.

13. Strassler, ed. “The Landmark Thucydides,” 6.11.

14. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, 505.

15. O’Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. 343.

16. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, 520.

17. O’Shaughnessy, “The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire,” 14.

18. Mackesy, Piers. “British Strategy in the War of American Independence.” Yale Review, vol. 52 (1963). 555.

19. James, D. Clayton. “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War.” In Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Peter Paret, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. 717.

20. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. 464.

21. Lee, Bradford A. “A Pivotal Campaign in a Peripheral Theatre: Guadalcanal and World War II in the Pacific.” In Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare. Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, eds. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. 84-85.

22. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941, 464.

23. Corbett, “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,” 15. 

24. Corbett, Julian S. “Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905”. Vol. 2. Annapolis and Newport: Naval Institute Press and Naval War College Press, 1994. 382.

25. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941, 484.

Featured Image: SOUTH CHINA SEA (April 22, 2023) – F/A-18F Super Hornets from the “Mighty Shrikes” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 94 fly in formation above the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68). (U.S. Navy photo)