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By Major Ahmed Mujuthaba

The Maldives: an Asiatic trinket trickling down from the tip of southern India in the middle of the blue economy’s hub. Even though it is popular for its crystalline waters and sun bathed beaches, recently Maldives has been appearing on the minds and finds of security strategists. So why have strategists shifted their gaze to this tiny tourist destination all of a sudden? Two reasons: India and China.

To learn more about the verities behind Chinese and Indian interests in Maldives, it is imperative to spare some ink on its geopolitics. Maldives is a marine resource-bound nation with its authoritative territories, when combined, consist of 98% sea. The 2% of land is comprised of approximately 1190 islands with a size of no more than 14 kilometers (8.7 miles) and elevating less than 1.5 meters (5 foot) above sea level. These islands are spread on the Indian Ocean from north to south for 863 kilometers (from latitudes 07° 06’ N to 00° 42’ S centered on longitude 73°E), conjoined into rings of islands known as atolls.

206jh_asia_map — A regional map indicating the location of Maldives.

Due to its vastly resourceful and untouched marine environment, the Maldives obtain most of its foreign revenue from selling its serene and scenic beauty through tourism. Maldives’ tourism is one of the most high-end tourist industries in the world. This industry takes a bountiful slice of 42% from the nation’s GDP and accounts for 60% of its foreign income receipts.

To cater to this growing tourist industry the Maldives has gone into private and/or foreign partnerships to develop holiday resorts on uninhabited islands. The unique system of one-resort one-island has been successfully fending for the population since its introduction in 1972. As the country imports most of the required essentials, successful sustenance of the tourism industry is crucial for the population.

Kurumba-Maldives — A tourist location at Kurumba, Maldives.

Notwithstanding this booming tourist industry, the Maldives remains a vulnerable nation in voluminous ways. Some of these vulnerabilities can be fanned down to a number of areas.

First and foremost is its economic dependence on tourism, which fluctuates wildly when the world economy slumps even an inch. Second is the country’s dependence on foreign imports, which stresses whenever diplomacy or economy strains. Third is the limited and strained basic services and facilities such as health, power and water, where the latter two have a cascading effect based on global oil prices.

Fourth is the lack of skilled human resources to meet the demands of growing industries in the country, which is compensated by an expatriate population accounting for over a fourth of the locals. Fifth is the constraint on security forces to prevent or counter any conventional aggression towards the country’s sovereignty.

Foreign aid and assistance is an important requisite for alleviating these vulnerabilities. Hence, a robust and charismatic foreign policy remains an essential tool for the development of Maldives.

India, being the largest and closest resourceful neighbor to the Maldives, has enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship with the small island state for years. The highlight of Indian assistance was witnessed during the 1988 November 3^rd incident, when mercenaries led by a Maldivian businessman attempted to take-over the government of President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom in an armed coup. On the request of the president of Maldives, the government of India rushed its army paratroopers and naval units to subdue the mercenaries.

Indian commandos escort the captured leader of the attempted coup in 1988.

Other notable influxes of Indian assistance include the opening of the nation’s largest hospital in 1995, the gifting of a ‘Trinket’ class fast attack craft (FAC) in 2006, the gifting of a ‘Dhruv’ helicopter in 2010, the opening of the country’s first military hospital in 2012, and opening of the Maldives National University’s Faculty of Hospitality and Tourism Studies (FHTS) building in 2014.

India’s footprint remains conspicuous in the Maldives in economic, diplomatic, and military aspects. Though this may be so, winds have not been always fair and seas neither calm between India and Maldives. In 2012, the government of Maldives prematurely scrapped an Indian investment made in the Maldives, which was also the largest foreign investment ever made in the island nation, amounting to USD $511 million.

This move demonstrated to New Delhi that Maldives was capable of making unilateral stances in a sovereign manner, whether it may or may not harm Indian interests. In the following year, the new government led by the current president, Mr. Yameen A. Gayoom initiated mechanisms to pacify the strained relations between the two nations.

Upon taking office, President Yameen made his first state visit to India in 2014, signifying the importance of maintaining close ties with India. But it was the subsequent visits he made to China that took away the gaze of the foreign media. President Yameen made three official visits to China in 2014. In a reciprocal move, the Chinese president Xi Jinping made history in September 2014 by being the first Chinese president to visit Maldives. These interactions are encouraging to strategists desirous in their quest to find China’s next possible ‘pearl.’

It is a well-known fact that China has been modernizing and expanding its navy (PLAN) at a rapid pace, aiming to shift its traditional territorial focus more towards the sea. The PLAN’s ambitious ventures into the Indian Ocean is not a new topic in such forums. China has been expanding its influence in the Indo-Pacific region, spanning from the East China Sea through the South China Sea, into the Indian Ocean to Djibouti.

Even though no major maritime infrastructure has been built in the Maldives by China to qualify it as a ‘pearl’ strategists think otherwise. It is believed the Chinese may actually use the backdrop of soft-power measures to gain leverage for potential military intent in the future.

Is this true? Could the Chinese have or even benefit from a naval presence in Maldives? And will the government of Maldives embrace Chinese military presence in the country?

To rectify the question of whether China could use its soft-power on Maldives to expand into the Indian Ocean may be a complex one to untangle. Theoretically speaking, soft-power is the mechanism employed by most developed and even developing nations to project their power over other nations. This may include, but is not limited to, financial loans, aid grants, and even expansion of cultural ties through interactions at varying levels.

Soft-power can be used as a pretext in diplomacy by providing so much aid to the receiver, that when the donor asks for a favor, the receiver may not have much of a bargaining capability. The whole idea is to increase the dependency of as many recipient nations as possible towards the donor state. In the developing world this tactic is not only employed by China, but India is also known to engage in soft-power diplomacy.

Until recently, India has accounted for most of Maldives’ foreign grants, but as of 2014 it was taken over by China. In 2015, the Chinese started building a bridge in Maldives, between the capital Male’ and the airport island of Hulhule. The cost of the bridge is estimated at USD $300 million. This and many more development projects are on the upswing in the Maldives through Chinese aid. Are all these soft-power measures unto Maldives because of a strategic value for China?

Unfolding the drawing board of the ‘String of Pearls’, the Chinese already have developed ports in Sitwe, Chittagong, Hambantota, and in Gwadar while a port in Djibouti is also being developed. Does building a port in Maldives have significance for China?

Looking into this picture through a strategic scope, the Maldives remains in the security grid of India, the latter being the net security provider for the region. Any conventional threat towards India from the soil of Maldives will take moments for Indian forces to respond and neutralize.

Maldives also remains under the surveillance grid of India, making any potential act of aggression from within the Maldives a challenge. The two countries have strong military ties resulting in a number of interactions at multiple levels. These includes security cooperation agreements, joint military exercises, and joint military operations.

The Chinese have already invested in a deep-sea port in the proximity of Maldives, which is the port in Hambantota. Strategists believe this port may be used as a naval base by the PLAN in the future. Investing in another port a few hundred miles apart may not serve as a feasible option for China. Furthermore, Chinese officials have also downplayed any plans to establish a naval base in Maldives.

Maldives President Abdullah Yameen meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping. — Maldives President Yameen meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2014.

Taking all this into account, one may not be wise to test India’s tolerance if either Sri Lanka or Maldives decides to permanently provide bases for PLAN. Even if a port is built in Maldives by China, the possibility is that it would be utilised as an operation turn-around (OTR) base by the PLAN.

Finally, would the Maldives ally with an extra-regional power against India? To deliberate on this question, President Yameen, during his address on the Armed Forces Day celebrations in 2014, emphasized his averseness to any extra-regional military foothold in the Indian Ocean region.

Regardless of the statement, in 2015 September, a huge media furor broke out when Maldives revised its constitution with regards to foreign land acquisition. Media disregarded the fact that one of the revised articles, article 302, states that land can only be acquired for investments over a billion dollars, which can be translated as high-end economic investments. Despite this, Maldives was accused by foreign media of paving the way for the Chinese military.

Eventually, Maldives attempted to calm the fears of its neighbors by exchanging diplomatic visits in the process, clearly expressing that Maldives had no intention of destabilizing the region. If one actually looks at the history of Maldives, it did not fare too well with the British after a base in the southern atoll of Addu was provided to RAF in 1941. The eventual independence of Maldives was centered on the agreed evacuation of this RAF base. It would be incongruous for Maldives to get tangled in such a mess again.

Even though the Chinese have embarked on a renewed aggressive aid mechanism in the Maldives, it is still unlikely to hinder Indian footprints in the Maldives, definitely not in the near future. Indian military, social, and economic engagements in Maldives will still out-weigh any extra-regional power for years to come.

As a sovereign state, the Maldives has every right to pursue economic opportunities and other interests from regional or extra-regional donors and partners. As the competition over the control of the Indian Ocean intensifies, a daunting task remains for the leadership of Maldives and its diplomats to responsibly balance the power plays of India and China. The existing rhetoric of an ‘Indophobic’ Maldives does not seem to bear any substantive overt evidence. Rather, Maldives is seen to pursue a path of favoring none over the other.

Major Ahmed Mujuthaba is a career Coast Guard officer in the Maldives National Defence Force. He has served as the Operations Officer of Coast Guard and as the Desk Officer for India at the Ministry of Defence and National Security. He is specialized in salvage diving from the PLAN Submarine Academy, Qingdao and is also a graduate of the Indian Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. You can follow him on Twitter: @mujuthaba.

The views and opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the Maldives National Defence Force or the Government of Maldives.

Featured Image: Malé, the capital of the Maldives.

Asia-Pacific

India-China Competition Across the Indo-Pacific

April 26, 2016 Guest Author Leave a comment

India’s Role in the Asia-Pacific Topic Week

By David Scott

India and the People’s Republic of China are encountering each other across the Indo-Pacific, the predominantly maritime region spanning the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Harsh Pant’s prognosis in March 2016 is persuasive that “the turf war between the two navies, as both nations seek greater roles in regional [Indo-Pacific] dynamics, is set to grow.” Both countries are developing blue water long distance naval capabilities, and adopting Mahanian-style seapower strategies for power projection. Implicit competition in what has been dubbed “a new great game for influence in the Indo-Pacific” between these two rising powers is the order of the day in the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, the West Pacific, and the South Pacific.

Indian Ocean

India has long held an implicit view of natural regional preeminence, based on its central geographical location in the Indian Ocean, whereby the Indian Ocean should somehow be India’s Ocean, which was the title of David Brewster’s book, complete with the subtitle The Story of India’s Bid for Regional Leadership. The challenge, or “wake up call” (Kapila), for India is China’s increasing Indian Ocean presence on the military, diplomatic, and economic fronts. Militarily this is shown through the deployment of the Chinese navy into the Indian Ocean. Diplomatically this is shown through China’s pursuit of littoral states and its “cheque book diplomacy” among the micro-island states of the Indian Ocean basin. Economically this is shown through China’s recent Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative which it has pushed since November 2014.

These events have generated widespread fears for India of a so-called string of pearls drive by China, denied of course by Beijing, to establish staging posts across the Indian Ocean. Pakistan’s port of Gwadar, now being run by the China Overseas Ports Holding Company Ltd (COPHCL), is one key irritant for India, as it provides a potential deep water berth for the Chinese navy. This growing Chinese presence across the Indian Ocean feeds into that other India strategic fear of encirclement, by a hostile China along its disputed northern border, ensconced in an equally hostile proxy state to its West in Pakistan, penetrating neighbours like Nepal, (previously) Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and deploying naval forces to its South. India’s counter has been multi-pronged: building up the Iranian port of Chabahar as a “checkmate” (Sakhuja) to China building up Gwadar, strengthening its own outreach to South Asian neighbours, strengthening its own outreach to Indian Ocean island states, pushing its own naval presence, and keeping China out of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Of further significance are India’s bilateral MALABAR exercises with the US operating in the Indian Ocean since the mid-1990s, which also included Australia and Japan in 2007, and which again also involved Japan in 2015 and 2016. These are indeed “aimed at countering growing Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean” (Singh 2015), with China denouncing them as dangerous (Global Times). What can be called India’s maritime-led “counter-containment” (Rehman) of China can be seen elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific, through what has been dubbed India’s own necklace of diamonds network of maritime-centred security partnerships.

Sailors assigned to the guided-missile destroyer USS Halsey (DDG 97) stand in ranks as the Indian navy destroyer Sapura (F-48) pulls alongside Halsey during a Malabar 2012 exercise. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Christopher Farrington.

South China Sea

The next part of the Indo-Pacific where India and China come up against each other is in the South China Sea, where India’s Act East policy “meets” (Chang) China’s southern drive. Whereas the Indian Ocean is India’s strategic backyard into which China is coming, the situation is reversed in the South China Sea which is China’s strategic backyard into which India is coming. The key feature here is that most of the sea is claimed as Chinese, supposedly from “time immemorial,”under China’s 9-dash line which encloses around 80% of the waters and includes the two groups of the Paracels and Spratly islands. The Paracels remain in dispute between China and Vietnam. The Spratlys (which mostly consist of atolls, rocks and reefs rather than proper “islands” as defined under UNCLOS criteria) remain in dispute between China (Beijing and Taiwan), Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei (waters) and Indonesia (waters).

The South China Sea serves as India’s “maritime gateway to the Pacific” (Chaturvedy). While it has avoided taking any stance on sovereignty issues, India’s response to China’s increasingly assertive push in these waters has been six-fold. Firstly India continues to reiterate its support for adherence to international law and to open transit in regional forums like the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia Summit (EAS). This has been an implicit criticism of China. Secondly, India has pushed this line on the South China Sea in bilateral security discussions with the US, Japan, and Australia, and also in the India-US-Japan and the India-Japan-Australia trilateral mechanisms set up in 2011 and 2016 respectively. China has rejected all such discussions as outside interference. Thirdly, India has reinforced security ties with the Philippines and above all with Vietnam. Although there is official denial by India that such security strengthening is related to China, in reality it represents a degree of tacit balancing by India and these partners with China in mind. India’s strengthening security links with Vietnam continue to have a strong maritime flavour as India has provided supplies to the Vietnamese navy and Vietnam has provided berthing facilities for India at Cam Ranh Bay. The logic here is a Vietnam card being played against China by India to match the Pakistan card playable against India by China. Fourthly, since 2011, India has signed agreements with Vietnam whereby India’s national state company Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) has conducted explorations in various waters within the South China Sea controlled by Vietnam as well as waters such as Block 128 that are also claimed by China. This has attracted vociferous Chinese denunciations. Fifthly, India has carried out joint SIMBEX exercises in the South China Sea with Singapore on a biannual basis since 2005. Sixthly, the Indian navy has been deploying regularly into the South China Sea since 2000. All of these aspects of growing Indian presence in the South China Sea can be seen as a response to growing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. India may not be able to stop this growing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, but it can apply countervailing pressure through going into China’s own backyard.

Blocks 127 and 128 in the South China Sea, where the India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation is looking to explore for oil. Block 128 measures 7,058 square kilometers.

West Pacific

China views the West Pacific through the prism of what it calls the “first island chain” (diyi daolian) running from Japan, the Ryukyu chain, Taiwan and the Philippines; and the “second island chain” (dier daolian) running down from Japan, the Bonin islands, the Mariana islands, and the US stronghold of Guam. Chinese maritime doctrine aims to achieve penetration of the first island chain and ultimately the second island chain. Deployment of the Chinese navy beyond the first island chain into the West Pacific has become an increasingly common occurrence since 2004, and is of rising concern to Japan and the US, who have sought out India as a fellow security partner.

With regard to India, a key feature is that the Indian navy has also been deploying into the West Pacific since 2007, “to counter China” (Joseph). Particularly significant have been bilateral naval exercises carried out in the Western Pacific by India with the US in 2007 and 2011, the bilateral naval exercise with Japan in JIMEX 2014, and the trilateral naval exercises with the US and Japan in 2009, 2014, and 2016. It is officially denied that such exercises are aimed at China, but in reality they represent another tacit degree of balancing.

South Pacific

Beijing’s initial interest in the South Pacific is competition with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition as the legitimate government of China, in which a “cheque book diplomacy” war has been in operation for the past few decades. The Pacific islands’ vast Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) also offer lucrative fishing grounds for deep sea fishing and seabed mineral resources. These waters are very distant for regular Chinese naval operations, although headlines were made when two Chinese warships visited Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Tonga in September 2010.

India is involved in a catch-up operation in the South Pacific, in part to “counter” (Ganapathy) China’s earlier established presence. China has been a Dialogue Partner with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) since 1989, while India has been one since 2003. China set up the China-Pacific Islands Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum (CPICEDCF) in 2006, while India set up its Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC) in 2014. Narendra Modi’s visit to Fiji in November 2014 was not only predated by Wen Jiabao’s visit in 2006, but was also immediately followed by President Xi Jinping’s own visit three days later. China enjoyed satellite tracking facilities at Kiribati from 1997-2008, which served a dual purpose of enabling spying on the American missile range at Kwajalein atoll in the Marshall Islands, some 600 miles away, while India more recently announced in 2015 that it was setting up a space research and satellite monitoring station in Fiji.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi being welcomed by his Fijian counterpart Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama at Nausori International Airport as he arrives in Fiji on Wednesday. (PTI Photo) — Prime Minister Narendra Modi being welcomed by his Fijian counterpart Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama at Nausori International Airport as he arrives in Fiji in November, 2014. (PTI Photo)

Conclusions

So far the China-India picture is one of competition, rather on the lines of the 2012 book by Raja Mohan entitled Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo–Pacific. Are there any signs of cooperation? Not very much it would seem in the Indo-Pacific. India and China are both members of de facto Indo-Pacific bodies like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit. However, in these venues India had generally expressed similar, though more obliquely expressed, concerns about Chinese policies in the South China Sea alongside Japan, Australia, and the United States.

There are some signs of China-India cooperation at the global level. Both states seek a multipolar international order, both powers seek reform of hitherto Western-dominated international institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and both states have a similar environmental stance, of “differentiated responsibilities” on international obligations. However, competition is more evident at the regional level. Admittedly there is some convergence in the anti-piracy operations that both countries, along with others, have been carrying out in the Gulf of Aden since 2011. However, India is generally more concerned about Chinese intentions across the Indo-Pacific and about being encircled by China. In turn, China’s own continuing “anti-encirclement struggle” (Garver) remains fraught in light of ever strengthening Indian security links across the Indo-Pacific with Australia, Vietnam, Japan, and the US in particular.

It is true that direct bilateral maritime discussions started between India and China in the shape of their Maritime Dialogue mechanism, which met for the first time in February 2016. However, with little recorded about the actual discussions there, let alone absence of tangible agreements on anything, this remains a mechanism still to prove itself in the long term as anything more than a diplomatic sop. Meanwhile ongoing Indo-Pacific maritime friction between China and India remains more probable in the short to medium term.

David Scott is an ongoing consultant-analyst and prolific writer on India and China foreign policy, having retired from teaching at Brunel University in 2015. He can be contacted at [email protected].

Asia-Pacific

How The Indian Ocean Remains Central to India’s Emerging Aspirations

April 26, 2016 Guest Author 3 Comments

India’s Role in the Asia-Pacific Topic Week

By Vidya Sagar Reddy

The visit of United States (US) Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter to India has provided grounds for once again debating the facts and history of bilateral relations between these two countries and the implications on relations with China and the emerging world order. The convergence between the two parties to sign the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in the near future was the primary instrument of play in this debate. This visit has broader maritime relevance amid similar developments this month emphasizing India’s vision and attitude towards the Indian Ocean.

Sustaining present or higher growth trends for the coming three decades is the central economic strategy of New Delhi if India were to become an economic superpower. Maritime trade and connectivity is perhaps the critical enabler of this strategy, as it was historically when the subcontinent maintained one of the highest GDPs in the world. Enumerating this, India organised the first Maritime India Summit in Mumbai recently which featured about 240 projects with investment potential of $66 billion in the next five years.

The National Perspective Plan for Sagaramala programme, a model of port-led development, has also been released. The Indian ports are undergoing modernisation along with their feeder transportation links – road, rail and inland waterways. These corridors will enable seamless transportation of goods and services from Indian hinterlands to overseas destinations.

Safe maritime connectivity, external trading, and overseas investments require India develop political confidence in its neighborhood and a dedicated navy to ensure secure seas. China is a key factor influencing India’s decisions regarding these domains of development.

India, Iran, and Afghanistan finalised the text for agreement on developing the port of Chabahar this month. This gateway port will boost regional trade and connectivity, and will allow India to secure access to Afghanistan where it is setting up basic infrastructure and shares Kabul’s security concerns.

On the other hand, the development of the Gwadar port by China in Pakistan has raised objections from the local people of Balochistan. India is concerned about the setting up of transportation links in the sensitive Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) to China, who is worried about the safety of its workers. The probability of Gwadar functioning as a naval base, forming a node in China’s String of Pearls, has negative implications to regional stability.

In a separate development, the Maldivian President declared on his visit to India an ‘India first’ foreign policy in an attempt to revive the souring relationship caused by internal political turmoil as well as the passing of a controversial law that would grant China rights to land reclamation.

In Sri Lanka, the Colombo Port City Project has now morphed into a financial, business, and logistics hub welcoming large scale Indian investments. The ratio of investments from Sri Lanka and China were clarified and the entities that will be in charge of operations were named. Clarifications on this project were aimed at addressing India’s security concerns due to increased presence of China’s economic and naval assets in the country and aimed to welcome India as a partner in the project.

Concept image of the Colombo Port City Project.

The primary concern about China’s projects in the Indian Ocean under the Maritime Silk Road initiative is the possibility for turning these ports into strategic assets countering India’s natural advantages in the region. China could increase its naval presence in the Indian Ocean while citing protection of investments, anti-piracy operations, and humanitarian assistance to its citizens while rejecting international cooperation.

China’s provocative actions in the South China Sea disregarding international norms and calls for peaceful settlement of boundary disputes go against India’s quest for maintaining the status quo and consenting to international adjudications on maritime boundary disputes, such as those peacefully resolved with Bangladesh. China continues to disregard India’s sensitivities with respect to Pakistan and PoK. It has yet to settle land border disputes with India despite concluding similar agreements with 12 other neighboring countries.

The Indian Navy (IN), the principal guarantor of India’s maritime security, has encountered threatening postures from China’s warships. Two Chinese destroyers and an anti-submarine helicopter allegedly forced an Indian submarine to surface near Somalia. There were 22 “contacts” with Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean through 2013, according to data provided by the US military.

In 2011, a Chinese fishing trawler was intercepted and pushed into international waters by the IN when it tried to monitor telemetry signals off Balasore, India’s missile testing range. India is also deeply aware of China’s unprofessional treatment of INS Airavat as it trasited the South China Sea (SCS) near Vietnam. China’s declarations like the “Indian Ocean is not India’s Ocean” certainly do not help build a positive environment.

These developments are factored into India’s decision to build a blue water navy with the Indian Ocean designated as its primary area of responsibility. Indian and American interests converge on protecting sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean and upholding peace and stability in its littoral while adhering to international norms. As the US is in need of such a partner like India, India needs technological assistance that the US can provide for building an advanced network-centric navy capable of executing these objectives.

A maritime security dialogue will be initiated between the two countries. Regular discussions will be held on submarine safety and anti-submarine warfare techniques. India could acquire the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) from the US in ongoing discussions on aircraft carrier technology transfers. EMALS can launch a variety of manned and unmanned aircraft far more efficiently than the catapult system. India and the US will also exchange data on commercial shipping.

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter speaks with Indian Naval Officers as he tours Indian Naval Station Karwar as part of a visit to the Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, April 11, 2016. Carter is visiting India to solidify the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.(Photo by Senior Master Sgt. Adrian Cadiz)(Released) — Secretary of Defense Ash Carter speaks with Indian Naval Officers as he tours Indian Naval Station Karwar as part of a visit to the Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, April 11, 2016. (Photo by Senior Master Sgt. Adrian Cadiz)(Released)

The LEMOA will simplify replenishment requests by either military at one another’s bases. It would help the American and Indian navies to respond swiftly to non-traditional threats like piracy and terrorism on high seas; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations across the Indian Ocean, especially West Asia; and enhance compatibility of personnel and systems. India’s concerns will be taken into consideration to include provisions that deny supply of armament as well as absolve it from supporting US military operations against friendly countries.

This multi-vectored maritime relationship aims to enhance India’s capacity for fulfilling its role as the net security provider in the Indian Ocean. This is the primary objective and therefore the rebuttal to considering joint patrols with the US in the SCS. India will assume its responsibility for upholding wider regional peace and stability after a careful assessment of its political priorities and relevant capacity commensurate with the dynamics of an emerging multipolar Asia within a multipolar world order.

Vidya Sagar Reddy is a researcher at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Featured Image: Indian Ocean by National Geographic.

Asia-Pacific

India as the Pivotal Power of the 21st Century Security Order

April 25, 2016 Guest Author 1 Comment

India’s Role in the Asia-Pacific Topic Week

By MAJ Chad M. Pillai

“As the United States and China become great power rivals, the direction in which India tilts could determine the course of geopolitics in Eurasia in the twenty-first century. India, in other words, looms as the ultimate pivot state.”

Robert D. Kaplan (The Revenge of Geography)

I remember reading these words several years ago and thinking back to my trip to India in 1998 at the height of the nuclear testing crisis by India and Pakistan. During that trip, I took the opportunity to interview several Indian scholars on India’s ascent as a nuclear power and its implications. Those interviews produce two key themes: (1) India’s nuclear weapons program was designed as a deterrent to China, not Pakistan as many claimed, since China went nuclear in the 1950s and fought a border war with India in 1962; and (2) a disbelief of U.S. relations with an Islamic military dictatorship in Pakistan and Communist China at the expense of the world’s largest democracy.[1] In order to accept these two observations, especially if India becomes the strategic pivot nation, the U.S. must acknowledge India’s relationship with, as Seth Cropsey described in his New American Grand Strategy article, the triple hegemonic threats in the Eurasian landmass: Iran, Russia, and China.

India and Iran’s relationship dates thousands of years from when the ancient Persian Empires and Indian Empires ruled the territories from Mesopotamia to the tip of India – occasional rivals during the period of the Indian Mughal (Sunni) Empire. Modern day Afghanistan served as the buffer zone and trade route between these two civilizations. During the period of the of Colonial British-Russian Rivalry (The Great Game), the landmass between the Persians and British India served as a strategic buffer, and later provided the foundation for India’s relationship with Russia after “The Partition of 1947” that split India and Pakistan.[2]

1814 map of Central Asia, where great power competition between Russia and the British became known as The Great Game.Source: Wikipedia.

India’s relationship with Russia dates to the Cold War after it gained independence from the United Kingdom. Initially, India was a champion of the “Non-Aligned Movement” seeking not to get entangled between the two superpowers. The decline in U.S.-Indian relations during the Johnson administration pushed India into the Soviet sphere due to differences regarding the Vietnam War, India’s stance on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Indo-Pakistani tensions, and economic underperformance. The U.S. military relationship with Pakistan further alienated India which required India to invest heavily in Soviet armaments. India’s and Russia’s relationship has continued despite the end of the Cold War, primarily in foreign military sales and development (ex. Co-Russian and Indian joint Stealth Fighter venture).

The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, a product of a joint venture between Indian and Russian defense firms. Source: Wikipedia.

India has expanded military relations with the United States as it sees China as a growing security challenge. Additionally, Indians prefer their cultural (Bollywood and Hollywood) and linguistic (large Indian English speaking population) similarities to the United States.[3] In fact, C. Raja Mohan wrote a statement in his book Crossing the Rubicon by then External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh issued ahead of President Clinton’s visit of ‘five wasted decades’ and his “reflection on the fact that the world’s two great democracies found it impossible to engage in any substantive cooperation-either economic or political in the country’s first fifty years.”

As the two most populous nations on earth, the unique and recent strategic rivalry between India and China, as Robert Kaplan stated, has no history behind it. They are two ancient civilizations separated by the Himalayan Mountain range that traded, passed religious and cultural knowledge back and forth in the peripheral zones (Afghan region of the Silk and Spice Route and South East Asia where we see a mixed Indian-Chinese influence among populations, linguistics, and cuisine), but have no known history of major warfare between the two save for brief conflict in 1962. What is driving the emerging competition between India and China is their re-emergence on top of the global economy. As Robyn Meredith states in her book The Elephant and the Dragon: The Rise of India and China and What it Means for All of Us that “after a centurylong hiatus, India and China are moving back toward their historic equilibrium in the global economy, and that this is producing tectonic shifts in economics as well as in geopolitics.” It is projected that India’s population will exceed China’s and both will continue to modernize and create ever greater demand for consumer goods to meet the needs and desires of their vast populations. As a result, the Achilles Heel and source of emerging friction is the need to secure access to energy from Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa to fuel their economic growth.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “China is the world’s second-largest consumer of oil and moved from second-largest net importer of oil to the largest in 2014.” Meanwhile, “India was the fourth-largest consumer of crude oil and petroleum products in the world in 2013, after the United States, China, and Japan. The country depends heavily on imported crude oil, mostly from the Middle East.” While much has been written of China’s activities in Africa to secure energy and mineral rights, less has been shared about India’s competition, though less successful, in the same arena. A significant lag in its competitiveness is China’s reliance on state-owned enterprises that offer better terms due to government guarantee vs. India’s reliance on its private sector and smaller state owned enterprises. Despite this, India has also been working with Central Asian States and Iran to develop the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline and the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline with recent Indian investment ventures in Iranian oil and gas fields in the range of $20 billion. To offset the competition for energy, both countries have invested heavily in renewable energy resources such as wind and solar.

India’s strategic geography provides it a long-term competitive advantage over China due to its position between the world’s key energy chokepoints. According to the IEA World Oil Transit Chokepoints Report, “world chokepoints for maritime transit of oil are a critical part of global energy security. About 63% of the world’s oil production moves on maritime routes. The Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca are the world’s most important strategic chokepoints by volume of oil transit.” India’s strategic relationship with Iran and South East Asian nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia, along with its control of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, place it in a formidable position to disrupt China’s access to its energy markets in the Middle East and Africa. China has been trying to offset its ‘Malacca Dilemma” by establishing economic-security ventures known as its “String of Pearls” to include expanded ventures with Pakistan, Burma, and Sri Lanka.

shipmap_image — India’s geography provides it excellent positioning to influence critical sea lines of communication. Source: Shipmap.org.

The ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and ‘String of Pearls” will drive each nation to invest in their missile arsenal (nuclear and non-nuclear), naval power, and airpower. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance 2016, China accounts for 41% and India for 13.5% of all defense spending in Asia. Further comparisons between the two show China spent $145 Billion (US Dollars) vs. India’s $47 Billion (US Dollars) in 2015. Analyzing their naval power, China has the edge in numbers with more submarines (61 = 4 SSBNs and 57 SSNs), more combatant ships (74 including one carrier), and mine warfare (49). India currently fields a navy with 14 submarines, 28 combatant (two carriers to China’s one), and 6 mine warfare ships. However, its ability to influence the Strait of Malacca provides India the competitive advantage, especially if its efforts are combined with U.S., Australian, Japanese, and coalition nations to offset China’s numerical superiority. Additionally, China will face its own A2/AD threat environment in the India Ocean as India expands its medium and long range missiles.

As the United States increasingly faces challenges to its global power by Iran, Russia, and China, its relationship with India will grow in strategic importance. While India may never become a true ally of the U.S. due to its strategic relations with the other three powers, its role as a strategic pivot or fulcrum can provide a source of stability and balance. Its democratic and cultural values align it with the United States and the West, but geography and history place India squarely within the context of its Eurasian neighbors.

MAJ Chad M. Pillai is a U.S. Army Strategist. He has published articles and blogs in Military Review, Small Wars Journal, Infinity Journal, The Strategy Bridge, Offizier, War on the Rocks, and CIMSEC. He received his Masters in International Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in 2009. This article was influenced by his Asian Energy Security and South Asian International Relations courses at SAIS.

[1] In 1998, I took a trip to India for my adopted father’s mother’s death that coincided with the nuclear testing. As a result, I proposed an extra credit project for my ROTC instructor to study the security implications and worked on it further during my internship at the Department of State that summer semester.

[2] The strategic implications of the 1947 Partition continue in today’s conflict in Afghanistan as Pakistan views India’s relationship with the Afghan Government with suspicion and fears Indian encirclement if it loses its strategic maneuver space among the Afghan Pashtu regions. Recommend “The Great Defile” by Diana Preston to learn more of the British Indian (manned primarily by Punjabis – Modern Pakistanis) Army’s misadventures during the Afghan Wars of 1838-1842.

[3] Indians prefer to study in the United States and migrate. One current state governor and one former state governor are of Indian descent.

Featured Image: Prime Minister Modi speaks from the Red Fort in New Delhi on India’s 69th Independence Day in 2015.

Center for International Maritime Security

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