Tag Archives: Syria

Events, History

Battle of Litani River: Maritime Challenges in the Levant

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Figure 1As the Syrian conflict drags on well into its third year, military planners continue weighing the differing contingency options and courses of action.  How do Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Israel protect themselves from a pre-emptive strike from the Baathist regime?  Is Russia providing advanced weaponry to the regime?  Will one or some of the various terrorist groups residing within Syria gain control of chemical weapons?  What exactly is the Russian navy doing in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea?  Who is the “opposition”?

The difficult limited choices (boots on the ground, non-fly zone, etc.) and the projection of future scenarios must be a heavy burden for military leadership that claim areas of responsibility for operations in Syria and around the Levant region.  Yet, the common military (and political) dialogue fails to discuss a very real sequel to any military campaign in Syria – What will happen in Lebanon? 

This “Switzerland of the Middle East” is a dynamic and aggravated area, susceptible to flare up and strife. Does it matter?  To the Israelis: of course it does, just look at the recent history of operations in Lebanon.  To the US: they have been involved in Lebanon (continually) since the early 1980s.  The recognized border between Lebanon and Israel is a memorial to the frozen conflict of which is just pending Hizbollah and/or Syria’s next move.

In June 1941, the Allies conducted a Syria-Lebanon campaign (known as Operation Exporter) of which little is written. British, Palestinians, Jordanians, Indians, Australians, and the “Free French” conducted an invasion of Vichy-controlled Syria and Lebanon, ultimately resulting in a victory, with the Free French General Catroux being placed in charge of Syria-Lebanon.  Shortly after, Catroux named both Syria and Lebanon free nations. Lebanon declared its independence in November 1943 with Syria claiming independence two months later.

In this campaign, Australian commandos as part of the British Layforce – an ad hoc assortment of special forces – conducted an amphibious raid into Lebanon through the southern Litani River area in an effort to seize key nodes (bridges and high terrain) in advance of the main force, driving north from Palestine towards Beirut.  The amphibious force was to coordinate with the 21st Brigade’s attack on the Litani River position, through an amphibious assault from sea near the mouth of the river. They were to secure the north and south banks of the river and prevent an enemy demolition of the Qasmiye bridge, allowing the 21st brigade to advance towards Beirut.  The landing force met unforeseen challenges posed both from their adversary as well as their own command and control.  These likewise hold lessons for naval planners contemplating operations in the region today.  

Limited Intelligence

The overall campaign commander, Field Marshal Henry Wilson, was unable to detail the force structure up to 10 days prior to the assault.  There were limited amount of intel handbooks to provide information on Lebanese and Syrian roads, towns, people, and enemy forces. The allied forces only had broad maps (1:200,000) of the area of operations and no prior intelligence on beach landing sites.  In response to this intel gap, action officers conducted a reconnaissance trip to Haifa to inquire on weather.  Finding that the landing area had heavy surf at 300yds from the beach, and given the dates of the pending assault, a landing was not assessed as favorable.

While the information available to naval planners has grown in the last 70 years, given ISR limitations and a robust Syrian air-defense posture, limited actionable intelligence will most likely still present a challenge.  Despite a recent Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) of Lebanon, the increased conflict in Syria and multi-national interest in the region pose a much more complicated environment and larger quantity of unknowns.

Conflicting Command Relationships

The senior officer of the amphibious force, consisting of the landing ship HMS Glengyle and destroyers HMS Hotspur, HMS Iris, and HMS Coventry, serving as escorts, delegated responsibility of landing boats to the commanding officer of the amphibious ship CAPT Petrie, RN.  Upon conversing with the other ship captains (who all recommended against a landing) CAPT Petrie decided to recover the boats and return to Port Said.  This decision was not concurred by Col Pedder, the Amphibious Landing Force commander, who argued that the risk was worth taking to maintain surprise (moonlight had showed their presence), but the decision was made to reverse course nonetheless.  The ships returned to Port Said on the afternoon of 09 June, and after a brief meeting decided to get underway and attempt the landing again – early the next morning.  The force returned at 0300 to the same spot (four miles west of the coast) and launched the operation under a full moon in calm weather. Various landing parties came under immediate fire upon arriving at the beach and many felt that the previous night’s loitering tipped off the enemy to their intentions.  Additionally, when the main force (X) arrived south of the Litani River they observed that the enemy had already demolished the Qasmiye bridge.

While the decision to delay the landing had been delegated to CAPT Petrie, he also had a responsibility to report to his senior officer that landing force commander did not concur with the decision.  Communication limitations may have hindered such a correspondence, but this hotly contested command relationship is another reminder of the inherent risks that are always involved in amphibious operations.

 

HMS Glengyle
                                                                                                     HMS Glengyle

Naval history books are filled with command and control mistakes during amphibious operations and Allied forces in World War II learned hard lessons in their gradual development of effective amphibious task force/landing force relationships.  Given the uniqueness of the Levant region and the Eastern Mediterranean there are multiple commands who may be involved.  Recent western-coalition amphibious exercises (i.e. Bold Alligator) found persistent errors in command relationships and no common understanding of an appropriate chain of command.  U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command, and NATO all have operational area boundaries that meet in the Levant Region. Given the complexity of the area and environment, unless lessons of the past are understood, accepted, and acted upon the same issues may continue to haunt future amphibious operations in an around the Litani.

Faulty Navigation Skills

Two of the three landing parties (X and Z) had difficulties finding the correct landing site, resulting in the main effort (X party) landing one mile south of the intended objective and south of the Litani River, whereas the supporting effort (Z party) landed on the unintended side of the enemy forces.  This is not the first early morning amphibious operation (see Gallipoli) in which the leading guide used an incorrect navigational aid (small house vice a bridge).  Despite advances in GPS technology, the lack of updated environmental information and infrequent operations in this area should cause amphibious force planners to expect a comparable level of complexity. 

Six minutes after landing, a battery of field guns including 75mm guns, 81mm mortars and heavy machine guns opened fire on X party’s beach.  This may be viewed as irrelevant in light of today’s advanced equipment, but a friendly reminder that the 11 Scottish Commando’s arrival on the hillcrest overlooking the Litani river met with immediate friendly artillery fire should strike note of caution in maritime planners. 

Lack of Air Support and Coastal Shore Bombardment

Vichy French recon planes made repeated flights over the landing forces, while their destroyers moved down the Lebanese coast, firing into landing parties positions.  Despite ineffective shore bombardment on Z party, the X party sustained direct hits on troops and artillery with no effective friendly ship counter-fire.  It is unfathomable to think that two enemy French destroyers were able to freely maneuver on the coast, disrupting landing force operations, while three allied destroyers and one cruiser were assigned as escorts. 

This scenario easily translates to today’s operations and high-priority Ballistic Missile Defense platforms.  In the Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2AD) environment (easily framed in the Eastern Mediterranean) planners should be asking more than just strategic imperatives and instead  should be asking commanders for operational priorities.  Who is the main effort?  Who is supporting?  In response to the Syrian conflict, will a Lebanon amphibious operation ever be the top priority or will naval forces be asked to conduct multi-functional missions that overlap C2 relationships, confuse capabilities and responsibilities, and fail to achieve mission success?

From a Naval perspective the Levant region is ripe with challenges: small maneuver space in the Eastern Mediterranean, only 3 choke-point entries (Gibraltar, Suez, Bosphorus), and a concave coastline that presents decreased distance from coastal-defense cruise missiles and coastal batteries, as well as, various territorial water space considerations.  The amateur maritime planner may quickly consider these challenges as important for the status quo mission of maritime strike and ballistic missile defense, but with a bit more time invested a planner would quickly surmise that the Levant’s maritime domain is much more of a challenge for potential amphibious operations.

References:  McHarg, Ian “Litani River.” United Kingdom, 2011. www.litaniriver.com

@NavalPlanner is an experienced strategic and operational military planner. He strives to share his perspective on operational art and planning with fellow maritime enthusiasts on his blog.

Strategic Outlook

Could a Blockade be the Next Step? A Legal Primer on a Centuries-Old Strategy

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With the focus on Syria calming over the past couple of weeks due to the advent of a deal between the U.S. and Russia to allow Syria to give up their chemical weapons, contemplation on other issues related to the Syrian civil war is in order.

The Washington Post a few weeks ago reported on a very interesting maritime security element related to the Syria story – the shipping of arms from Russian and Russian controlled ports in Ukraine to Syria. Commenting on a report published by C4ADS, the Post provides an intriguing story on how the Russians have been supplying Assad with shipments of arms – such as tanks, helicopters, and rocket launchers. Also, if you haven’t already, please read the excellent commentary on this issue written by LCDR Mark Munson. Notwithstanding any deal regarding chemical weapons, the arms shipments that help sustain the Assad regime will continue to obstruct a sustainable peace in the conflict and in the region. This maritime security issue provides an opportunity for decision makers to explore creative solutions. Any discussion on how to dismantle the arms trade, however, would be lacking imagination if it did not include the classic naval blockade.

File:Blockade of Toulon, 1810-1814.jpg
                  Toulon: the scene of our BLOCKADE!

From the Royal Navy’s blockade of Cadiz in 1797 to Israel’s blockade of Gaza in 2009, a blockade is a time-tested method. An important consideration if the U.S. were to blockade Syria, however, is that a blockade is generally considered an act of war. Because President Obama and most of the U.S. population have an unfavorable view of war with Syria, history may be able to provide an alternative.

In July 2013, the Department of Justice released a cache of old Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memos from 1933-1937. As a brief introduction, OLC provides the President and others in the Executive authoritative legal opinions, many of constitutional relevance. This office is most famous recently for producing the torture memos of the Bush administration. One of the little gems hidden in the stack of memorandum opinions titled “Authority of the President to Blockade Cuba.” Interestingly, this opinion was dated January 25, 1961, almost 22 months before the Cuban Missile Crisis. Nevertheless, the OLC memorandum opinion provides an interpretation of international law that would apply even today if the U.S. Navy was to blockade Syria. The memorandum opinion states:

“At the outset it should be noted that both courts and commentators are agreed that a blockade involves a state of war; i.e., it is the right of a belligerent alone…The United States is not in a state of war with Cuba in the traditional sense….Accordingly, the principles of international law, as presently developed and followed by the United States, would seem to furnish no legal justification for the imposition by this government of a blockade of Cuba.”

Simply exchanging “Cuba” with “Syria” would suggest that a blockade to stop the arms flowing in from Russia would be illegal under international law – unless the U.S. is willing to go to war with Syria. However, the memorandum provides a potential alternative to justifying a blockade:

“In this posture, we turn to the question whether it is, nevertheless, possible to argue that a blockade of Cuba is justifiable. That the United States is engaged in a “cold war” with major communist nations and with Cuba is plain. To keep communist imperialism from engulfing the United States is a matter of vital national interest.”

The memorandum further explains by quoting Doris Graber:

“Interventions undertaken to further these interests were lawful if those who authorized them believed that intervention was a last re-sort to safeguard the nation from extreme peril and proper means of intervention were used. . . .”

Doris A. Graber, Crisis Diplomacy: A History of U.S. Intervention Policies and Practices 211–12 (1959).”

So, put another way, it seems as if the existence of the “cold war” was sufficient to allow the U.S. to intervene and blockade Cuba.

What does this mean in the Syria context? If decision makers were to seriously consider legally blockading Syria to prevent support to the Assad regime, they would be required to meet the following:

a. Analogize the “cold war” with the “war on terror” (which commentators have done in the past),
b. Fit the civil war in Syria into the global war on terror, and
c. Strengthen the connection between intervention in Syria with “safeguarding [this nation or our allies] from extreme peril.

If decision-makers can successfully meet these three requirements, then the U.S. could potentially be legally justified in unilaterally blockading Syria. This, however, doesn’t mean that it would be prudent or feasible to do so.

LT Dennis Harbin is a surface warfare officer and is enrolled at Penn State Law in the Navy’s Law Education Program. The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy. This article is for informational purposes only and not for the purpose of providing legal advice.

Podcast

Sea Control: First Podcast

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CIMSEC-LogoSea Control- Doyle Hodges Interview (Download)

So, as required of millennials (or people who know millennials) with opinions, we’ve started a weekly (we hope) podcast. Think of it as your moment of PowerPoint Rehab.  Our first episode is with Doyle Hodges, author of the 1998 USNI Article, “Listen to the JO’s“. We intended to talk about leadership, which we made a great college try of. In the end, we segwayed into sea stories, technology, and other things. I am easily distracted and he has a beard. What do you expect? I suppose that’s at least ONE advantage of the “Next Slide” button.

If you have any suggestions, want to get involved, or have ideas for the show, email me at NEXTWAR@CIMSEC.ORG. If I know what I’m doing (which I don’t) it may be on Itunes soon.

Capability Analysis

The Odessa Network

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Unlike the Odessa File, there are no Nazis in the Odessa Network
Unlike the Odessa File, there are no Nazis in the Odessa Network

The think-tank C4ADS recently published a new study, The Odessa Network: Mapping Facilitators of Russian and Ukrainian Arms Transfers, which analyzed commercial maritime networks linked to the Russian state and their involvement in arms shipments, particularly those to Bashar al-Assad’s forces in Syria fighting in that ongoing Civil War.

The report received some additional publicity when it formed the meat of a 7 September Washington Post story, with discussion especially devoted towards the report’s analysis of Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, claiming that vessels likely carrying arms from the Ukrainian port of Oktyabrsk were turning off AIS when traveling to Syria.

The analysis conducted by Tom Wallace and Farley Mesko is certainly interesting and provides an in-depth look at commercial maritime networks and practices not generally seen outside of specialist literature on the shipping industry.  The work does leave some questions unanswered and makes unwarranted conclusions based on the available data, however:

  • The piece goes into great detail to lay out the various networks that Russia uses to ship arms, composed of interlocking companies headed and/or controlled by individuals with links to the state.  What’s unclear is why that should be considered unusual or bad.  Shell companies, convoluted ownership, and Flags of Convenience are commonplace for a variety reasons (many business-related) in the maritime industry.  It is not much of a “So What” to reveal that cronies in the maritime industry would be the facilitators used by Putin’s Russia to ship weapons to a pariah state. (Of note for those interested in topics like Flags of Convenience, Rodney Carlisle’s Sovereignty for Sale is a good read which explains the creation of the famous Panamanian and Liberian registries and provides context on why ship “ownership” is rarely straightforward in the maritime industry).
  • Russian arms shipments to Assad’s forces in Syria are clearly “bad,” but the implication in the Odessa Network study is that not only is Russia doing something bad, but that they are also doing it in a particularly devious and underhanded way.  The data provided by Wallace and Mesko only proves, however, that Russia is choosing to use “discreet” means to ship weapons to Syria.  It’s not clear that the Odessa Network’s ties to the Russian state or its business practices are that particularly egregious or unusual within the maritime industry.
  • The authors look at both publicly available data regarding Russian arms shipments as well as AIS data.  According to available data for ships/shipments, they note that “publicly known maritime weapons shipments from Russia to Syria” departed from “northern Russian ports of St. Petersburg or Kaliningrad.”  They then claim, however, based on the curious absence of AIS data for Russian ships in the eastern Mediterranean originating in Oktyabrsk, that there is “a strong circumstantial case that these ships and companies are moving weapons or other sensitive cargo to the Assad regime.”  The argument is inconsistent.  On one hand they make a case that operational security concerns or potential EU pressure on the Ukrainian government is stopping the use of Oktyabrsk as a transshipment site for Syria-bound arms, while on the other hand claiming that nefarious Russian intent is demonstrated by ships originating in Oktyabrsk deliberately not broadcasting AIS data when traveling to Syria.  Can both these assertions be true at the same time?
  • While certainly suspicious, is it actually illegal to turn off AIS as these Russia ships have allegedly done? The authors point out that there is the possibility that data may not be available in certain locations due to a lack of receivers, but also note that the eastern Mediterranean is not exactly an isolated area, and that AIS on these ships seems to work quite well everywhere else in the world.  According to the UN’s International Maritime Organization (IMO), “all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on international voyages and all passenger ships irrespective of size” shall “maintain AIS in operation at all times except where international agreements, rules or standards provide for the protection of navigational information.”  These rules were implemented as part of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, as part of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).  Although there is no real chance that these rules could be enforced against Russian ships since they are adopted and enforced by IMO member states themselves, are these ships doing something illegal by not using AIS properly?  Could operators of these vessels be subject to penalties?  Could enforcement of these rules be a round-about way to stop Russian arms shipments to Syria?

Despite my minor criticism above, this sort of analysis is welcome and could be applied to a variety of other maritime issues.  More publicly available detailed network analysis of the commercial networks benefiting from oil theft in West Africa or Somali piracy  could provide new, non-kinetic policy or law enforcement options in the fight against these illicit activities afloat.  Similarly, the methods toward which Iran has been driven by sanctions to facilitate its oil exports could be a useful subject of interest to analysts and policy-makers alike.

Lieutenant Commander Mark Munson is a Naval Intelligence officer currently serving on the OPNAV staff. He has previously served at Naval Special Warfare Group FOUR, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and onboard USS ESSEX (LHD 2).  The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official viewpoints or policies of the Department of Defense or the US Government.