The rise, fall, and rebirth of the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) is a bizarre and thrilling story that I have been following, to the point of obsession, for the last two years. As CIMSEC readers are surely aware, one is hard pressed to find a report on Somali piracy that does not advocate an onshore solution for this maritime crime.
PMPF marines and their expat-piloted Alouette III helicopter
When it came to actually establishing security and rooting out pirate bases in the autonomous region of Puntland however, it was not NATO, the EU, the U.S, or U.K. that took the lead, but a South African private military company financed by the United Arab Emirates.
The PMPF has earned international praise for denying pirate gangs an onshore sanctuary and for rescuing hostage mariners, but has also been labeled an unaccountable private army by UN monitors. Despite international pressure, financial arrears, and pirate infiltration the PMPF and its South African mentors continue to march on. With piracy now largely eliminated, the marines appear to have engaged a new foe—the Islamist insurgents of al-Shabaab.
Note: The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their governments, militaries, employers or the Center for International Maritime Security.
While the consensus seems to be that Somali piracy is in a terminal decline, over the weekend the Washington Post’sWonkblog highlighted an interesting academic study from last year that attempted to determine the costs of Somali piracy since 2008. The bottom line, from economists Timothy Besley, Thiemo Fetzer and Hannes Mueller, was that piracy increased the cost for shipping bulk cargo through the region 8%, with a 14% seasonal discount between December-February and June-September when the monsoon causes sea states to be less hospitable to pirates.
Of particular interest is the economist’s attempt to measure how efficient piracy has been as a method of transferring wealth from the rest of the world to Somalia. According to their analysis, pirates generating a total in $120M in annual ransoms would possibly drive industry to spend up to ten times that amount on insurance and onboard security. Theoretically, Somalia could get the same amount of money from an .8% tax on charters than the 8% increased costs faced by shippers.
Piracy has driven some economic growth in Somalia, with one study arguing that ransoms received in 2009 were five times greater than the budget of Puntland. Such development has been uneven however and did not benefit all Somalis. Intriguingly, economic growth and development measured in terms such as construction, urbanization, and light emissions measured through overhead imagery showed significant growth in major Puntland cities like Bossasso, rather than main Puntland pirate bases like Eyl and Hobyo.
Although ransoms as a wealth transfer are a “thought experiment” which the authors don’t necessarily advocate as policy, there is a clear subtext that aid for effective security forces would be a cheaper method to achieve the security needed to eliminate piracy than paying ransoms or funding afloat counter-piracy task forces. They cite Stig Hansen’s compelling argument that the triggering event for the explosion of piracy in recent years was the Puntland economic crisis in 2008, during which the government of the semi-autonomous region suspended pay to the police and militia responsible for border security.
Of course while a tax on trade to fund a wealth transfer to Somalia may have been a much more efficient way of combating piracy than the current combined approach of naval forces afloat, industry best practices, a Kenyan invasion of Somalia, and the funding of AMISOM troops (in a previous article in Proceedings I vainly attempted to compare the relative costs and benefits of counter-piracy task forces afloat and security forces in Somalia), it does not square with any accepted notion of freedom of navigation in international waters. While an effective Somali government would certainly have the right to regulate economic activity in its Exclusive Economic Zone (commonly listed narratives for the start of piracy in the region include grassroots local efforts to regulate illegal fishing and toxic waste disposal by foreigners in Somali waters), impeding or taxing commercial shipping traversing international waters adjacent to Somalia would be unacceptable to the international community.
Lieutenant Commander Mark Munson is a Naval Intelligence officer currently serving on the OPNAV staff. He has previously served at Naval Special Warfare Group FOUR, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and onboard USS Essex (LHD 2). The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official viewpoints or policies of the Department of Defense or the US Government.
While Somali piracy may have been significantly down in 2012, another type of illicit activity in the Gulf of Aden has continued to increase. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 107,500 people fled Africa for Yemen via the sea in 2012. This was an increase from 103,000 in 2011 and the most since these statistics were first collected in 2006. The majority of the refugees in 2012 were Ethiopian, and they braved dangerous conditions which are estimated to have left at least 100 dead or lost at sea.
The growth in human smuggling over the last year was actually less than between 2010 and 2011, when the number of refugees crossing the Gulf increased from 53,000 to 103,000. That growth has generally been attributed to the increasing number of Ethiopian migrants, which greatly outnumber all other nationalities. Until 2009, most people smuggled across the Gulf were Somalis.
By LCDR Claude Berube, USNR; LT Chad Hutchins, USN; and N.R. Jenzen-Jones
The following is a guest post inspired by the questions in our Maritime Futures Project. For more information on the contributors, click here. Note: The opinions and views expressed in these posts are those of the authors alone and are presented in their personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of their parent institution U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, any other agency, or any other foreign government.
1. What manner of broad trends are emerging in pirate activities, and how will these develop in the future? Where will we see continued, increased, or emerging piracy over the next 5-10 years?
Piracy in the 21st Century: The Long Ladder Ahead
From a macro perspective, piracy will increase worldwide as western navies continue to contract in size and non-state actors become super-empowered. Piracy will remain and even flourish in regions of diminished state maritime security caused by land-based conditions. Half of the National Intelligence Council’s recent Global Trends 2030 top-ten countries of high-risk destabilized governments have significant coastlines – Niger, Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia, and Yemen. Destabilized nations will offer opportunities to pirate criminal networks as state navies – particularly Western navies – do not have sufficient assets or comparative interests to exert necessary influence. West Africa will pose a continuing challenge if steps are not taken to curb piracy in the region; significant national interests exist there for many nations, including the US, China, and many European nations. Energy security will be a key factor in the decision to support counter-piracy strategies in West Africa.
Since its origins, four things have had to be present for piracy to exist: (1) Non-existent or weak government on land, (2) Ungoverned territorial seas, (3) Access to shipping lanes, and (4) Access to boats, manpower, and arms. It’s important to continually watch any coastal nation which meets these criteria, no matter the size, for developing signs of pirate activity.
2. Which response strategies will best limit or curtail pirate activity over the next 5-10 years?
Specific to Somali piracy, current efforts – including coalition forces, independently operating platforms, industry employment of Best Management Practices, and the increased use of armed guards, have been sufficiently effective as evidenced by the decrease in attacks on commercial ships in the Gulf of Aden. Continued success will however hinge on the sustained availability of coalition forces, which is in turn based on the comparative threats faced by participating states and the impact of their economies and debts to future military operations, acquisitions, and maintenance. Because of the uncertainty of state naval presence, industry will either return to a pre-2008 level of ‘acceptance of risk’ in the region, turn increasingly to armed guards and other private sector capabilities, or rely more on alternative powers such as India and, especially, China. Broader, cooperative international engagement will be necessary. Land-based engagement strategies will also be increasingly important, but will be largely dependent on access, funding, and political will. The U.S. Department of State is beginning to move in this direction now.
3. Which vessels in Western navies should we be looking to for their utility in conducting counter-piracy operations?
Will the Coalition hold?
Policymakers may ask if the best use of a billion dollar warship is as a platform against modern pirates. While surface warships are a flexible asset, with helicopter detachments providing extended range and tactical small boats for boarding, they come at a price. Depending on future budgets, Western navies could turn to smaller ships with UAVs or inexpensively modified commercial platforms. The U.S. Navy, in concert with European navies, could explore building a piracy squadron of ships such as the Sea Fighter (FSF-1) to work in concert with a dedicated mothership. Modular design of mission-specific ‘packages’ may provide another opportunity to decrease operating costs and use next-generation vessels more effectively.
4. What advice would you give to a smaller nation on the counter-piracy specific maritime investments it should pursue, and why?
Smaller nations in destabilized regions rarely have the economic capacity to support a viable counter-piracy force, leaving them with two options. The first option is to work with larger nations interested in capacity building. Larger nations and their industries have a need for stability on the high seas for global commerce. There are a number of capability development programs offered by nations including the U.S. and China. In Africa, in particular, programs such as African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) and Africa Partnership Station (APS) have had some success, but need to be expanded and better integrated into the broader counter-piracy strategy.
The second option is to employ vetted, credible maritime security companies which may provide a less-expensive alternative in the long-term. Maritime security companies have had some success in Africa, providing specific training and personnel where capability gaps exist. Employing private companies allows countries to focus on nascent piracy, or threats such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing or oil bunkering, which may be considered less serious by major powers. The use of private security companies is generally compatible with working with larger nations, and opportunities for third-party funding may arise in the future.
