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Tactics

Sea Control Through The Eyes of the Person Who Does It, Pt. 2

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The following article originally appeared in The Naval War College Review and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here. It will be republished in three parts, read Part One here. 

By Christofer Waldenström 

The Field of Sensors

To determine whether the field of safe travel is receding toward the minimum safety zone, the commander must be able to observe the objects present in the naval battlefield. Today, the naval battlefield comprises more than just the surface of the sea. Threats of all sorts can come from either beneath the surface or above it. The driver of a car determines from the pertinent visual field whether the field of safe travel is receding toward the minimum stopping zone.22 For a commander, however, it is not possible to perceive directly the elements of the operations area—the naval battlefields are far too vast. Instead, as noted above, the objects present have to be inferred, on the basis of sensor data.23

Thus, there exists a “field of sensors” that the commander uses to establish whether the field of safe travel approaches the edge of the minimum safety zone. The field of sensors is an objective spatial field the boundaries of which are determined by the union of the coverage of all sensors that provide data to the commander. The importance of the sensor field is also emphasized in one theory of perception-based tactics that has been advanced (though without discussion of its spatial dimensions).24 As the sensors that build up the field have different capabilities to detect and classify objects, the field of sensors will consequently consist of regions in which objects can be, variously, detected and classified with varying reliability. (These regions could be seen as fields in their own right, but for now we will leave them as is.) Nevertheless, to establish the boundary of the field of safe travel and determine whether it is receding toward the minimum safety zone, the commander must organize the field of sensors in such way that it is possible both to detect contacts and to classify them as nonhostile before they get inside the minimum safety zone.

Factors Limiting Detection

Several factors limit the detection of enemy units. First, terrain features can provide cover. Units that hide close to islands are difficult to detect with radar. In a similar way, a submarine that lies quietly on the bottom is difficult to distinguish from a rock formation with sonar. The weather is another factor: high waves make small targets difficult to detect; fog and rain reduce visibility for several sensors, such as visual, infrared, and radar; and temperature differences between layers in the atmosphere and in the water column influence how far sensors can see or hear. Yet another factor is stealth, or camouflage, whereby units are purposely designed to be difficult to detect with sensors. Sharp edges on a ship’s hull reflect radar waves in such ways that they do not return to the transmitting radar in detectable strength. Units are painted to blend into the background, propulsion systems are made silent, ships’ magnetic fields are neutralized, and exhaust gases are cooled—all to reduce the risk of detection. Being aware of these factors makes it possible for commanders to use them to advantage. Units might be positioned close to islands while protecting the field of safe travel, or the high-value units might select a route that will force the enemy units to move out at sea, thus making themselves possible to detect.

Factors Limiting Classification

To avoid being classified, the basic rule is to not emit signals that allow the enemy to distinguish a unit from other contacts around it. Often naval operations are conducted in areas where neutral or civilian vessels are present, and this makes it difficult to tell which contacts are hostile. To complicate matters, the enemy can take advantage of this. For example, an enemy unit can move in radar silence in normal shipping lanes and mimic the behavior of merchants, so as to be difficult to detect using radar and electronic support measures. Suppressing emissions, however, only works until the unit comes inside the range where the force commander would expect electronic support measures to classify its radar—no merchant ever travels radar silent. To detect potential threats the commander establishes a “picture” of the normal activities in the operations area. Behavior that deviates from the normal picture is suspect and will be monitored more closely. Thus, contacts that behave as other contacts do will be more difficult to classify.

The Field of Weapons

As mentioned above, the commander has three choices for handling a detected threat: move the high-value units away from the threat, take action to eliminate the threat, or receive the attack and defend. In the two latter cases the threat can be eliminated either by disabling it or by forcing it to retreat. Either way, the commander must have a weapon that can reach the target with the capability to harm it sufficiently. It is immaterial what type of weapon it is or from where it is launched, as long as it reaches the target and harms it sufficiently. Thus, the weapons carried by the commander’s subordinate units, or any other unit from which the commander can request fire support, create a “field of weapons” in which targets can be engaged. Like the field of sensors, the field of weapons is a spatial field, bounded by the union of the maximum weapon ranges carried by all units at the commander’s disposal. The field of weapons is further built up by the variety of weapons, which means that the field consists of different regions capable of handling different targets. For example, there will be regions capable of engaging large surface ships, regions capable of destroying antiship missiles, and other regions capable of handling submarines. Nevertheless, to prevent the high-value units from being sunk, the field of weapons must be organized in such way that it is possible to take action against hostile units and missiles before they get inside their corresponding minimum safety zones. For example, the threat posed by air-to-surface missiles can be dealt with by protecting two minimum safety zones. The commander can take out the enemy aircraft before they get a chance to launch the missile—that is, shoot down the aircraft before they enter the minimum safety zone created by the range of the missile they carry. If this fails the commander can take down the missiles before they hit the high-value units—that is, shoot down the missiles before they get inside the minimum safety zone created by the distance at which the missile can do damage to the high-value units.

It is now possible to specify how the fields of sensors and weapons work together: the field of sensors and the field of weapons must be organized in such a way that for each field of safe travel hostile units can be detected, classified, and neutralized before they enter the corresponding minimum safety zone. One scholar of naval tactics and scouting touches on what can serve as an illustration. Closest to the ships that should be protected is a zone of control where all enemies must be destroyed; outside the zone of control is a zone of influence or competition, something like a no-man’s-land.25 Outside the zone of influence is a zone of interest where one must be prepared against a detected enemy. Scouting in the first region seeks to target; in the second, to track; and in the third, to detect. Important to notice is that the field of sensors and the field of weapons are carried by, tied to, the commander’s units, which simultaneously bring the fields to bear with respect to all pairs of fields of safe travel and minimum safety zones. This complicates matters for the commander. As the fields of safe travel and minimum safety zones are stacked, actions taken to tackle a threat to one minimum safety zone may create problems for another. The competition of units between the pairs of minimum safety zones and fields of safe travel may lead to a situation where a managed air-warfare problem creates a subsurface problem. This bedevilment is not unknown to the naval warfare community: “The tactical commander is not playing three games of simultaneous chess; he is playing one game on three boards with pieces that may jump from one board to another.”26

To illustrate the problem, suppose that the situations in figure 3 occur simultaneously; there is both a surface and a subsurface threat to the high-value unit. In this case the field of sensors has to be organized so that contacts can be detected and classified in a circular field with a radius of a hundred kilometers (for the antiship missile, figure 3a) and also within a smaller and elliptical field (figure 3b, in the torpedo case). For example, radars and electronic support measures have to be deployed to detect and identify surface contacts, while sonar and magneticanomaly detection have to be used to secure the subsurface field. Accordingly, the field of weapons has to be organized so that contacts can be engaged before entering the respective minimum safety zones—antisubmarine weapons for subsurface threats and antiship weapons for surface threats.

Not only weapons can be used to shape the field of safe travel; another means to influence it is deception. Deception takes advantage of the inertia inherent in naval warfare. First, there is the physical inertia whereby a successful deception draws enemy forces away from an area, giving an opportunity to act in that area before the enemy can move back. Second, there is the cognitive inertia of the enemy commander. It takes some time before the deception is detected, which gives further time. Deception can, thus, be seen as a deliberate action within the enemy’s field of sensors to shape the field of safe travel to one’s own advantage. For successful deception it is necessary that commanders understand how their own actions will be picked up by the enemy’s field of sensors and that they be aware of both the enemy’s cognitive and physical inertia. The commander has to “play up” a plausible scenario in the enemy’s field of sensors and then give the enemy commander time to decide that action is needed to counter that scenario (cognitive inertia) and then further time to allow the enemy units to move in the wrong direction (physical inertia). The central role of inertia will be further discussed later.

Having defined the fundamental fields it is now possible to formulate what is required from commanders to establish sea control. The skill of securing control at sea consists largely in organizing a requisite set of pairs of correctly bounded minimum safety zones and corresponding fields of safe travel shaped to counter actual and potential threats, and in organizing the field of sensors and field of weapons in such way that that for each field of safe travel, hostile contacts can be detected, classified, and neutralized before they enter the corresponding minimum safety zone.

Factors Limiting the Field of Safe Travel

So far it has been said that it is the enemy that limits and shapes the field of safe travel. This is, however, not the whole truth. The field of safe travel is also shaped by other physical and psychological factors.

Terrain Features That Reduce Capability to Detect and Engage Targets

To be able to sink the high-value unit the enemy must detect, classify, and fire a weapon against it. All this must happen in rapid succession, or the high-value unit may slip out of the weapon’s kill zone. This means that to fire a weapon against the high-value unit the enemy must organize its field of sensors and its field of weapons so that they overlap the high-value unit at the time of weapon release. In this way the field of safe travel is built up by all the paths that take the high-value unit outside the intersection of the enemy’s field of sensors and the enemy’s field of weapons. This further means that the boundaries of the field of safe travel are determined in part by terrain regions where high-value units can go but enemy weapons cannot engage them—for example, an archipelago that provides protection against radar-guided missiles. The boundaries are also determined by the enemy’s capability to detect the high-value units, and thus terrain features can also delimit the field of safe travel in that they protect the high-value units from detection. For example, the archipelago mentioned above also provides protection against detection by helicopter-borne radar, as long as the ships move slowly. (If they start to move quickly, however, they will stand out from the clutter of islands.) It is also important to notice that a minimum safety zone is resized in the same way as the corresponding field of safe travel—if the enemy cannot see the high-value unit or has no weapon that can engage it, the enemy unit can be allowed closer in.

Terrain Regions Where Enemy Units Can Hide

Like enemy units, potential threats also throw out lines of clearance. One such potential threat is a terrain feature where the enemy might have concealed units and from which attacks can be launched (see figure 4a). Such regions—for example, islands where enemy units can hide close to land—contain potential threats. There may or may not be actual threats there, the objective field of safe travel may or may not be clear, but since commanders can only react to their subjective fields, the latter are properly shaped and limited by these barriers.

Terrain features that serve as good attack points for the enemy also radiate lines of clearance, and they shape the field of safe travel (a); enemy units may or may not be present. In (b) the field of safe travel is impinged by the potential location of enemy units. When an enemy unit slips out of the field of sensors, it creates an area of potential threat that grows as time passes. These potential threat areas also determine the boundaries of the commander’s subjective field, although here the enemy never encroached on the objective field and is now well clear of it.

Enemy Units That Are Spotted and Then Lost

Another potential threat that will radiate clearance lines arises from the movement of enemy units. It is possible for a contact that has been detected and classified to slip out of the field of sensors —for instance, by turning off its radar after being tracked by electronic support measures. The potential movement of such a unit shapes the field of safe travel. Suppose an enemy unit was detected at position p at time t (see figure 4b). As the enemy is outside the field of safe travel, it does not pose a threat to the commander at this time. Now, the contact slips out of the field of sensors, and contact with it is lost. As time passes and the commander fails to reestablish contact, the region where the unit can be is a circle that grows proportionally to the maximum speed of the enemy unit. Eventually the region grows to such a size that it is not possible for the force to pass without the minimum safety zone intersecting with it. In figure 4b the subjective field of safe travel is correctly shaped by the potential threat, but the objective field of safe travel is clear—the enemy unit has turned around and is heading away.

Legal Obstacles and Taboos

 The field of safe travel is also limited by international law. One such legal obstacle is the sea territory of neutral states. A neutral state has declared itself outside the conflict the commander is involved in, and this prohibits the parties of the conflict from using its sea territory for purposes of warfare. Such regions delimit the fields of safe travel and thus restrict where the commander’s units can move. On the other hand, they do not pose a threat to the high-value units and can safely be allowed to encroach on the minimum safety zone.

Neutral Units in the Operations Area

Today, as noted, naval operations take place in areas where neutral shipping is present. Like the sea territory of neutral states, neutral shipping is protected by international law. A consequence of this is that neutral shipping in the area also influences the shape of the field of safe travel. The commander is of course prohibited from attacking neutral merchants. This is not a problem in itself—if a certain contact is classified as neutral, we cannot engage it. Nevertheless, it has implications for where high-value units are allowed to move. As neutral shipping cannot be engaged, we are forbidden to use it for cover—for instance, to move so close to a merchant vessel as to make it difficult for the opponent to engage without risk of sinking the merchant. This means that neutral shipping creates “holes” in the field, where combatants are not allowed to move. If the commander does not track the merchant vessels continuously, these holes grow proportionally to the merchants’ maximum speed, as they do for enemy units spotted and then lost.

Mines

Mines shape the field in the same way that ships do. They can be seen as stationary ships with limited weapon ranges; the minimum safety zone for a mine would be the range at which a ship could pass it without being damaged if the mine detonated. Laying mines shapes the commander’s field, and the commander must react, either by taking another route or by actively reshaping the field—that is, by clearing the mines. Clearing mines has the same effect as taking out enemy ships; the field of safe travel expands into the area that has been cleared. Of course, the enemy can use this for purposes of deception, pretending to lay mines, sending a unit zigzagging through a strait, and making sure that the commander’s field of sensors picks this up. If the deception is successful, the commander’s subjective field is shaped incorrectly.

Dr. Waldenström works at the Institution of War Studies at the Swedish National Defence College. He is an officer in the Swedish Navy and holds an MSc in computer science and a PhD in computer and systems sciences. His dissertation focused on human factors in command and control and investigated a support system for naval warfare tasks. Currently he is working as lead scientist at the school’s war-gaming section, and his research focuses on learning aspects of war games.

References

22. Gibson and Crooks, “Theoretical FieldAnalysis of Automobile-Driving,” p. 457.

23. Intelligence reports from higher command are also included when constructing this operational view of the battlefield. This operational view of the battlefield is compiled by exchanging and merging sensor data, a partly manual and partly automatic process well known in all navies. The result is usually displayed as a map of the operations area overlaid with symbols representing the objects present in varying stages of classification— detected, classified, or identified.

24. T. Taylor, “A Basis for Tactical Thought,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (June 1982).

25. Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat.

26. Ibid., p. 196.

Featured Image: MEDITERRANEAN SEA (July 25, 2012) A plane captain signals to the pilot of an F/A-18C Hornet assigned to the Blue Blasters of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 34 on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Joshua E. Walters/Released)

Current Operations

Bringing Back Sea Control Week Concludes on CIMSEC

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By Dmitry Filipoff

This concludes our topic week where authors submitted their ideas on bringing back sea control in response to our Call for Articles. They covered a broad range of topics including capability trends, concepts of sea control, and how to evolve naval power. Below is a list of articles that featured during the topic week and we thank these authors for their contributions.

New Forms of Naval Operational Planning for Earning Command of the Seas by Bill Shafley

“Future operations against peer competitors will require a different mode of thinking to understand the nuances of employing a strike group’s combat power where near-constant tradeoffs are required between offense and defense. Staffs must refine their thinking and improve their methods in three ways to make planning for Sea Control operations more effective.”

Sea Control at the Tactical Level of War by Adam Humayun

“Sea control is about sinking these ships and aircraft, platforms that are growing in vulnerability and are harder to replace than their predecessors. A force that performs well in attrition will weaken, and in many dimensions of military power, perhaps even disarm an adversary. Destroying military assets that cannot be effectively replaced for years, and only after the political issues at hand have been resolved, grants sea control today a value well beyond its immediate military effects. The battlespace, concrete and conceptual, in which contenders will struggle for sea control thus needs to be carefully defined.”

Bringing Back Sea Power from the Deckplate on Up by Olivia Morrell

“When the Navy decided to change the policy on female hair standards, training was completed across the fleet, statements were put out by the Chief of Naval Operations, and questions were addressed by leadership. When incidents at sea occurred during the summer of 2017, ships and shore commands across the fleet took an operational pause to examine safety and training. Why then, is there not a training for Sailors regarding our strategic policies and involvements across the globe?”

For Sea Control, First Control the Electromagnetic Spectrum by Damien Dodge

“Lofty tactics and operations will perform sub-optimally and be disrupted through electronic attack unless the Navy builds a solid foundation in electromagnetic freedom of action. Fortuitously, these technologies creatively combined will lay the keel of advanced naval warfighting upon which future naval success will be built, launching a powerful, tough, and confident Navy into the turbulent waters of great power competition to seize sea control when and where she chooses.”

The Nature of Sea Control and Sea Denial by Dr. Ching Chang

“We may define sea control as acquiring and securing the privilege to utilize the maritime space in the period of time as expected. Nonetheless, whether the adversaries and neutral parties may use the same maritime space at the same time is not necessarily the concern of sea control approach. On the other hand, we may also define sea denial as excluding adversaries from utilizing the maritime space in an expected period of time and place of choosing. Integrating these two aspects of sea control and sea denial together and their effects on the nature of choice can serve as a foundation for maritime operational design for earning command of the sea.”

Merchant Warships and Creating a Modern 21st Century East Indiaman by Steve Wills

“The great mercantilist trading companies of the age of sail are long gone, but the idea that a heavily armed merchant ship might again more fully participate in naval warfare has new credence. The advent of the large, survivable container ship, with the potential for containerized weapon systems changes the calculus of the last century where merchant ships were soft targets requiring significant protection. If properly armed and crewed, U.S. owned and U.S. government chartered container ships have the potential to become powerful naval auxiliaries capable of defending themselves and presenting a significant risk to those that might attack them.”

Fighting For Sea Control in the Next War by Lars Wedin

“The issue of sea control in a major war brings forward a number of unknowns as well as known unknowns. This is only natural as the world has not experienced major naval war in today’s strategic and technological setting. It is also natural because war is a human affair and it is always characterized by uncertainty and friction. The one who believes that a naval war would imply fighting with most systems intact will be in for a big surprise.”

Adjusting to New Conditions for Command of the Seas by Theodore Bazinis

“Whatever character naval warfare takes on in the future sea control will always be the key to success. Being so essential one should understand its principles in order to gain sea control, but history abounds with cases where nations succeeded or failed. Some of those who initially failed were able to readjust their doctrines in time (and consequently their capabilities) to gain sea control and win.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected]. 

Featured Image: MEDITERRANEAN SEA (Aug. 11, 2018) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Carney (DDG 64) transits the Mediterranean Sea. Carney, forward-deployed to Rota, Spain, is on its fifth patrol in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations in support of regional allies and partners as well as U.S. national security interests in Europe and Africa. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Ryan U. Kledzik/Released)180811-N-UY653-386

Capability Analysis

Adjusting to New Conditions for Command of the Seas

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Sea Control Topic Week

By Theodore Bazinis

In a historical turn, the 2018 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States asserts that the world is returning to an era of great power competition. The 2018 NSS explicitly states that “after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition has returned.”  World history is a landscape of consecutive great power competition for hegemony and as the great navalist Alfred Thayer Mahan showed in his book The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, the one who commands the seas is the one who imposes the rules of the sea (most of the time at least). Even though the Mahanian term “Command of the Seas” is rather an ideal condition, in the real world we could substitute it with the term “sea control’’ which describes a temporary1 condition existing in a particular maritime area where one has freedom of action to fulfill goals and purposes.2 Sea control is a condition and a necessary operational function to achieve strategic goals.

Whatever character naval warfare takes on in the future sea control will always be the key to success. Being so essential one should understand its principles in order to gain sea control, but history abounds with cases where nations succeeded or failed. Some of those who initially failed were able to readjust their doctrines in time (and consequently their capabilities) to gain sea control and win.

The First World War revealed the insufficiency of the Mahanian doctrine (and thus the capabilities of the U.S. Navy), to fulfill U.S. strategic objectives. A doctrine designed to win a decisive battle in the Caribbean had resulted in building a fleet of heavy battlecruisers quite improper to gain sea control in the Atlantic Ocean dominated by German submarines. This resulted in an inability to protect sea lanes through which supplies were transported to European allies. The improvidence of Mahanian doctrine to anticipate the nature of the future war at sea (attrition instead of decisive battle) and mainly the inability to foresee the vital role that a new technological asset had (the submarine instead of big-gun warships), were the causes of the gap between ends and means. However, the U.S. realized this in time and procured lighter combatant crafts such as destroyers which were  more suitable units to assert protection of sea lanes, escort supply transport vessels, destroy enemy submarines, and finally to acquire sea control in a new context.

Just concluding that sea control is a dependent variable of proper capability is not new. But what does proper capability mean? Capability can be defined as the means that enable a Navy to fulfill strategic objectives, adjust to the particular demands of the operational environment, and encounter all possible expected threats.

The case of WWI highlights the dramatic influence that new technologies have in the ability to gain sea control. The introduction of submarines, aircraft carriers, and naval air forces expanded the physical dimensions of war at sea to include air and undersea domains. This in turn changed the number and the quality of threats a navy could encounter. A robust reform of existing doctrines was introduced and subsequently new capabilities for the fleet were required. The successful use of sea power has now come to be regarded as the best method of distributing capabilities and tactics across domains. A major consideration for gaining sea control during war was the quick adjustability of capabilities and tactics to operational conditions. However, changing tactics and tools in the midst of war will be difficult in the modern threat environment. That means that the planning of the fleet during peacetime is very critical.

Littorals (green/brown waters) rather than high seas (blue waters) are expected to be more essential in future maritime conflicts. They may feature anti-access strategies using mines,3 land-based precision guided munitions (of extended range or/and ballistic), diesel submarines,4 Special Forces, electronic warfare, space systems and cyber operations. As advanced capability proliferates, traditionally less powerful states in the littoral will be able to pursue sea control and sea denial in ways they have not been able to before.

In order to balance asymmetries in military power, states that feel weaker are also expected to use terrorist networks, criminal groups and/or state-incited paramilitary groups equipped with low cost but of high effectiveness light arms. They will also attempt hybrid tactics, exploiting high technological means (smart mines, cyber-attacks) and simple tactics (suicidal bomb attacks, old fashioned guided weapons) which base their success in the inability of the defender to deter attacks. The same effect is caused in complex geographic environments like littorals, island clusters, and archipelagic waters.

Non-Military Dimensions of Sea Control

Considering all abovementioned threats and characteristics of the international environment we need to procure fleets with proper capabilities to enable their successful response. Even though the ability to respond to advanced threats emerging in tactical level is essential however these capabilities should include the consideration that sea control operations are not just a summation of hard power but they should simultaneously shape a conducive strategic environment in which military acts will follow in a more favorable context. At the strategic level, executing information operations of an honest nature to further a narrative that legitimizes military acts to internal or international audiences, especially with respect to preserving international law.

Great powers could be questioning world order in the context of command of the seas. At sea this strategy is manifested by arbitrary interpretations of international law which (in many cases) attempt to negate freedom of navigation, by planning anti-access policies and/or provoking small scale crises to achieve political ends. International law is expected to exert vast influence (more than any other time in history) on rules of engagement and wartime conduct, especially in areas replete with commercial shipping and civilian crews. As a result this will limit freedom of action to operational commanders. Military actions should always take into consideration international law so as to assert the legitimacy of their actions.

In the operational level, executing legal warfare will be important to secure the legitimacy of military actions during war or crisis. Certain situations could limit or affect commanders’ decision-making procedure, for example when trying to clarify if existing assets are paramilitary groups such as maritime militia or genuine non-combatants. Legal confusion with respect to using force may result in civilian casualties which would then create undesirable legal and diplomatic consequences.

Conclusion

To conclude, sea control is the ultimate criterion that should be fulfilled in order to achieve strategic aims in and through the maritime environment. Although sea control is a military concern, it would be wrong to regard it as a bare result of military power and neglecting the realm of law or public opinion. New threats, new conditions, and new courses of action by opponents require fresh responses and capabilities. Rapid adjustability to the conditions, to the specific threats, and to the environment of operations should blossom as an organizing principle of naval planning.

Theodore Bazinis has an MA in International Relations. He is a researcher at the Institute of International Relations in Athens and a of member of the Maritime & Seapower Analysis Group. He also cooperates with Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies and Center of International Strategic Analysis (KEDISA).

Endnotes

[1] For a predetermined time.

[2] The highest level of Sea Control is to deny (the opponent) access in a particular area.

[3] As a retardant factor to time intensive operations / tasks.

[4] Advanced diesel electric submarines present the most challenging proposition due to their numbers and propensity to operate near or in littorals.

Featured Image:  The Vanguard-class submarine HMS Vigilant, one of four Royal Navy submarines armed with Trident missiles, is seen at Naval Base Clyde, also known as Faslane, in Scotland in January. (AP)

Capability Analysis

Fighting For Sea Control in the Next War

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Sea Control Topic Week

By Lars Wedin

The sea is growing ever more important. Conflicting interests make it a prime domain for future wars. Historically, securing command of the sea and exercising sea control has been an overall naval strategic objective and a prerequisite for the carrying out of other naval missions. Since the end of the Cold War, the West has been able to exercise Sea Control when so needed without having to fight for command of the sea.1 This comfortable situation is now going away – and it has already disappeared regarding a potential conflict with China.

The Notion of Sea Control

In general terms, sea control means being able to use the sea for one’s own interests while denying an adversary the same possibilities. The French Admiral Castex elegantly summed up what this means: “Depending on having control of the sea or not, one can or cannot

  • In an offensive mode, intercept maritime communications of the adversary and attack his territory from the sea,
  • In a defensive mode, assure his own communications and stop the enemy from attacking his country from the sea.”2

Castex also insists on the fact that “command of the sea is not absolute. It is simply relative, incomplete, and imperfect.”3

Already during World War II, a prerequisite for sea control was control of the air domain. Today it is more complicated. Land based aircraft and missiles – like the Chinese DF-21D, “carrier killer” missile – affect operations far from the coast. At the same time, naval missiles can strike far inland as showed by Russia when, on October 5-6, 2015, a land-attack cruise missile, Type 3M-14 Kalibr (NATO: Sizzler), was launched from corvettes in the Caspian Sea against targets in Syria.4 Hence, the coastal zone must also be under some control. Modern naval tactics are also heavily dependent on space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains.

To conclude, sea control still means being able to use the sea for one’s own interests but the concept as become much wider and immensely more complicated. The last major conflict at sea was World War II. Sea power has certainly been brought to bear many times since, but there has been no major war at sea since 1945. An analysis of some of the changes may be of importance in order to find out what is needed to secure command of the sea and exercising sea control today and tomorrow.

What Has Changed?

Globalization is one of the main strategic trends of today. People, ideas, money, and merchandise circulate relatively freely around the globe. Globalization, in turn, means a growing maritimization of global affairs as globalization to a large extent is driven by the sea linking continents and markets. Depending on the way of calculation (volume, weight, or value) some 80 and 90 percent of global commerce is transported on ships. With the delivery principle of just in time, enterprises and countries depend on the more or less daily delivery of merchandise.  Furthermore, 95 percent of electronic communications are also transited by sea in cables on the ocean floor. The flow of information in such cables could, however, be intercepted and probably manipulated by specialised submarines like the USS Jimmy Carter (SSN-23).5 With the ability to work on ever greater depths, minerals on the seabed become accessible. Seawater contains important substances for a range of industrial activities. The sea is a veritable pharmacy.6  Finally, for one billion people, fish is the main source of protein.

The sea in itself is also of vital strategic importance. Energy for our societies increasingly comes from thousands of oil and gas platforms, wind turbines, and wave energy converters. As more and more of a country’s energy comes from sea-based assets – platforms, wind turbines etc. – these become strategically important and potential targets requiring protection. Furthermore, this infrastructure constitutes a zone which is neither land, nor sea. Platforms may be used as staging points by small ships, craft, and small submarines – like the “Boghammers” during the war between Iran and Iraq 1980 – 88. They also constitute physical obstacles for navigation and may generally have an impact on tactics. Rotors of wind turbines, for instance, affect doppler radars with which most modern aircraft are equipped.

Corbett’s famous quote: “The object of naval warfare therefore is the control of communications …”7 is, consequently, not sufficient today. Modern sea control includes controlling the sea itself and its resources. But this fact will also cause conflicts regarding the “ownership” of these resources. The latent conflict between China and its neighbors including the U.S. regarding the Chinese “blue territory” (or “nine-dash line”) is a prime example.

It is quite possible to argue that the risk of a major war is quite low thanks to globalization and the interdependence that is one of its major results. However, the growing importance of the sea also means that conflicting interests at sea will increase in importance; in particular regarding the “freedom of the sea” and its antithesis “territorialization of the sea.” This also means that the risk of war by miscalculation cannot be disregarded.

Attacking and Defending Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs)

Being able to attack an adversary’s SLOCs while defending one’s own is traditionally one of the prime objectives for conquering the sea. The battle for control of SLOCs had a decisive impact during the two World Wars.

Today, the structure of the world’s merchant fleets has gone through important changes. The traditional close link between flag state, owner, and crew does not exist anymore. A ship may carry a Liberian flag, have a Croatian Captain while the crew is from the Philippines hired by a Cypriote management company, and chartered by a French company having its office in London. A large part of the international fleet sails under flags of convenience. This development is important as it is the flag state that is responsible for administrative, technical, and social matters of ships flying its flag.8 In a conflict, it is the flag state that should protect its ships – which obviously is not possible for a flag like, e.g., the one of the Marshall Islands. Would shipowners scramble to change registration into, for instance, the U.S. flag? Or vice versa? Insurance costs would certainly have a great impact on the flow of shipping in time of crisis and war. General shipping will certainly be reduced in zones threatened by war and produce economic shock. Ships flying flags of convenience will not go into harm’s way voluntarily or at least not for free.

A state can enlist the service of ships flying its flag in accordance with national laws. Such ships can then be sent to/through war zones in order to provide essential services. This will be particularly important for ships used for logistics and other transports of necessity for the war effort. In that case, they also need to be protected by the flag state and its allies. By definition, such defense is possible in areas where the flag state exercises sea control. On the other hand, such control is never complete. Convoys are hardly practical regarding today’s big ships – a 20,000 TEU container ship has a massive radar cross section. To defend such ships in contested waters would certainly be very difficult. Support ships of various sorts, on the other hand, need to have direct protection. Crews of such ships also could be given the training needed to cooperate with naval forces.

Naval Ships

Attrition is especially difficult to manage in war at sea. The U.S. lost 1,768 ships during World War II but on the other hand a Liberty cargo ship could be built in less than a week. That is not possible with today’s merchant ships, and especially warships. A lost ship will be difficult to replace during a modern war. This means that states need to have enough ships already in peacetime.

During World War II and immediately afterward, the U.S. built 24 Essex-class carriers. This is not possible today because arms are becoming ever more expensive. A certain saying says “In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy 3-1/2 days each per week except for leap years, when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day.”9 Also warships become ever costlier with reduced production runs. Trained personnel are scarce in an era of growing technological sophistication. The result is a trend toward minimal manning because of cost and the problem to recruit and retain qualified seamen and officers. Already today some states – notably the U.K. and Germany – cannot man all their ships.

The mix of naval ships – the Hi-Lo mix – seems to be an important area to study. All ships also need to be resilient in the case of damage and downgrading. Are today’s enormously expensive naval ships the best for a real war if they cannot be built in great numbers? How to expand the cadre of trained personnel when there is a risk of war? In wartime, damage control and downgraded systems require a lot of people. Consequently, navies need to be able to mobilize reserve personnel for wartime duty.

The result is that a lost naval ship and naval personnel will probably not be replaced during a war. The relatively small numbers of qualified ships make each one strategically more important. The loss of a major warship would be a national catastrophe, at least in the West. The result may be an aversion against risk-taking leading to tight government control of operations and tactics; with certain awkward results.

Network Centric Warfare

A modern carrier strike group consists of not only a number of surface ships but also aircraft of various types, and submarines. All this will be networked into a system of systems using, primarily, the electromagnetic spectrum. This means that the position of the force is relatively easy to pinpoint with electronic support measures (ESM) and that the force is susceptible to attack in the electromagnetic domains as well as by kinetic weapons. Being “silent” is of course a possibility but would pose difficulties for Command and Control (C2). Not using the network would also mean a severe loss of combat capacity. In reality, the choice of tactics in this regard will depend on the situation and, hence, be a variable during battle. If the network is resilient enough, it will give a great advantage when fleets are in contact. However, the network may, on the other hand, be downgraded by kinetic, electromagnetic, and cyber-attacks. Such a tactic would require ship commanders that are able to make decisions on their own (mission command), a rare quality in some navies.

Consequently, navies need to invest more in tactical training and the creation of trust between command levels. This also means that officers are allowed to make mistakes. The Zero-Defect Mentality, where it exists – must be abandoned.

What To Do

Sea control in a major war poses theoretical as well as practical, tactical and operational problems.

On the theoretical side there is a need to think through the issue of escalation into the nuclear domain. Would such an escalation be inevitable, just possible, or convenient? What about the Russian idea of “escalate to de-escalate?” Would sea control be relevant in a nuclear war, and could the nuclear exchange be limited to the maritime domain? What would the ecological impact of a nuclear war at sea be?  

Ammunition is an important issue. Modern precision guided munitions are expensive and the result of air warfare in conflicts shows that great amounts of ammunition needed. NATO air operations against Serbia in 1999 required 38,000 missions during 78 days of operations instead of a couple of days as planned for – and that against a very weak opponent. A modern Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) destroyer carries over 90 missiles of various sorts. In a major war, this might be a rather low number considering the difficulty of reloading in a war zone. Consequently, the logistics of munition will be a very important issue. The mix between defensive and offensive weapons will constitute a problematic decision. The reasoning above seems to imply a high degree of defensive weapons, but to win there must be strong offensive capacity. Would it be better to have a greater number of less sophisticated munitions? Does the railgun provide an answer to this question? In any case, there must be a lot of ammunition for reloading and that under combat conditions. The requirement for a high number of ammunition will also put a premium on the logistics chain. Damaged warships and aircraft need to be salvaged and repaired, if possible. Wounded crewmembers need qualified medical care. Support fleets like the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) with experienced crews would be very much in demand. Consequently, more funding should be diverted to logistics.

Conclusion

The issue of sea control in a major war brings forward a number of unknowns as well as known unknowns. This is only natural as the world has not experienced major naval war in today’s strategic and technological setting. It is also natural because war is a human affair and it is always characterized by uncertainty and friction. The one who believes that a naval war would imply fighting with most systems intact will be in for a big surprise.

Captain Lars Wedin (ret.) was appointed an officer in the Swedish Navy in 1969. A surface officer, he served on destroyers and fast-patrol boats and commanded several times at sea. He is a graduate from the Swedish and French naval war colleges. Wedin later served as a military advisor in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and as Chief of Concepts Branch in the EU Military Staff. His last appointment in uniform was as director of military history. Since retiring in 2004, he has worked as an independent researcher specializing in general and maritime strategy. He has written several books, among them Maritime Strategies for the 21st Century:The Contribution by Admiral Castex (Paris: Nuvis, 2016). Wedin is a member of the Royal Swedish Society of Naval Sciences, an associate member of the French Académie de marine, and a silver member of the U.S. Naval Institute.

References

[1] Robert C. Rubel, « Command of the Sea, An Old Concept Resurfaces in a New Form », Naval War College Review, Autumn 2012, vol 65, No 4. p. 30.

[2]Amiral [Raoul] Castex, Théories stratégiques, Paris, Institut de Stratégie Comparée et Économica, 1997. Vol V, P. 87.

[3] Castex, Théories stratégiques. vol I, p. 92.

[4] https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/iraq-syria-battlespace-october-2015. Accessed February 29, 2016.

[5] Joseph Le Gall, « Cyberguerre sur les mers », Marine & Océans no 241, octobre – novembre – décembre 2013. p. 63.

[6] Antoine Le Vavasseur, ”Océans, pharmacies du futur?”, Cargo Marine, 2015, No 6. p. 5.

[7] Sir Julian S.Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, London, Conway Maritime Press 1972 [1911]. P. xii.

[8] UNCLOS art 94.

[9] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augustine%27s_laws. Accessed April 16, 2016.

Featured Image: The flagship of the Royal Navy, the HMS Queen Elizabeth leaves the port of Gibraltar after her maiden overseas stop. (Royal Navy Photo)