Tag Archives: Force Planning

Asia-Pacific, Capability Analysis, History, New Initiatives, North America

‘Indo-Asia Pacific’ Explained: An Assessment of US Maritime Strategy 2015

1 Comment
CIMSEC content is and always will be free; consider a voluntary monthly donation to offset our operational costs. As always, it is your support and patronage that have allowed us to build this community – and we are incredibly grateful.

Select a Donation Option (USD)

Enter Donation Amount (USD)

In March 2015, the United States published a new maritime strategy document titled ‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’ (Strategy-2015). It supersedes the one of the same title published eight years ago in October 2007 (Strategy-2007). It is the first maritime strategy to be released after the US announced its ‘Rebalance to Asia’ in 2011, and comes amidst seminal developments with far-reaching geopolitical and security ramifications. This view-point attempts to analyze Strategy-2015, including in comparison to Strategy-2007.

Jointness and Political Interface

Strategy-07 was the first-ever combined strategy of the three US Sea Services (Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard). Strategy-2015 maintains this feature, with is appropriate since the maritime environment is essentially ‘joint’’, and therefore, any strategy relating to the maritime realm cannot be a single-service articulation. Besides, due to fiscal uncertainties the US is facing today, an inter-service synergy is necessary to avoid duplication of resources and optimise investments for capability development.

Notably, unlike the 2007 document, the new strategy contains a ‘Preface’ by the Secretary of the Navy, which indicates an enhanced political interface with the Sea Services, possibly in terms of both oversight and support of the higher national leadership.

Indo-Asia-Pacific

The new strategy contains an explicit focus on the region that it calls the “Indo-Asia-Pacific.” While US officials have been increasingly using this phrase, the 2015 Strategy document is the first official articulation. The inference is two-fold:

• First, it denotes the realisation of the ‘inadequacy’ of ‘Asia-Pacific’ to address the emerging geopolitical, economic and security dynamics of the rising Asia.

• Second, while the phrase ‘Indo-Pacific’ has become more prevalent in Asia since 2007, the US preference to use “Indo-Asia-Pacific” indicates that it wishes to be part of Asia’s ‘rise’ and derive the attendant gains.

Ends, Ways and Means

The term ‘strategy’ is defined as an articulation of ‘ways’ and ‘means’ to achieve the ‘ends’. In this context, Strategy-07 was merely a ‘primer’ to strategy. It referred to ‘ends’ in very broad terms, without going into specifics of security challenges. It avoided naming countries, either as adversaries, or allies and partners. While it mentioned maritime threats like piracy, it did not contextualize these with specific areas. It was also frugal in expounding on the ‘ways’ and ‘means.’

In comparison, Strategy-15 is a detailed articulation. It echoes the spirit of the US ‘Rebalance’ policy in terms of China’s naval ascendency as both an opportunity and a challenge. It seeks to temper Beijing’s revisionist stance and dissuade its politico-military assertiveness through multifaceted engagement. It is also more forthright in defining the “military challenges”, such as the “Russian military modernization (and) aggression” and the (Chinese) “anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities that challenge our global maritime access….” Furthermore, it is more explicit on the ‘geography’ of piracy, the effects of religious radicalism and the fundamentalist groups. In terms of the ‘ways’ and ‘means’ too, Strategy-2015 reveals as much as a document in the public domain possibly can. It provides much detail on the US plans to allocate forces for the ‘Rebalance.’

Strategic and Operational Access

Since the middle of 20th century when the US rose to superpower status with the ability to influence events worldwide, unimpeded strategic access to the global commons and freedom of operational manoeuvre have been the cornerstones of its military strategy.

While Strategy-2007 did acknowledge the operational salience of dominating the realms of space, cyber and the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum – as integral to sea control, for instance – it conceived strategic access largely in the geospatial context: sea, land and air. Strategy-2015 goes beyond this to seek access and freedom of action in any domain—the sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace, as well as in the EM spectrum. In all likelihood, this is a declaration meant to counter China’s declaratory policy of A2/AD in the western Pacific, including the asymmetric challenges in the space, cyber and EM domains that Chinese military forces may impose upon their US counterparts.

Forward Presence and Partnership

Strategy-2007 had laid much emphasis on forward presence of the US Sea Services as essential for a major power like the US that seeks inter alia to shape developments in its areas of interest, be better prepared to respond to adverse contingencies, deter and dissuade potential adversaries, reassure allies and friends.

While maintaining the emphasis on forward presence, Strategy-2015 also explains how the US intends to achieve this more effectively, both operationally and fiscally. It adds that the forward naval presence would enable a quick and seamless access to the US joint military forces, if and when the occasion demands.

Given that resource limitations envisaged by the US Sea Services, ‘forward naval presence’ is closely enmeshed with the need to develop partnerships with local maritime forces. The Thousand Ship Navy (TSN) concept propounded by the US Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Mike Mullen in 2005 was rephrased as the ‘Global Maritime Partnership’ (GMP) initiative in Strategy-2007. As a set of informal arrangements, the GMP was also intended to “send powerful messages to would-be aggressors that we will act with others to ensure collective security….”

Strategy-2015 furthers the appeal for the partnership, now rephrased as a “global network of navies.” The document effectively communicates to the potential partners the rationale for such “plug and play” cooperation with the US forces sans “commitment.”

Force Design and Employment

Strategy-2015 describes “a force that balances warfighting readiness with our Nation’s current and future fiscal challenges.” This statement seems to be the mainstay of the force design and employment strategy of US Sea Services.

Strategy-2007 had laid down the intent to “tailor” maritime forces “to meet the unique and evolving requirements particular to each geographic region.” Strategy-2015, possibly driven by fiscal prudence, seems to have adopted a less ‘ambitious’ approach. It aims only to “align (existing) capability, capacity, and platforms to regional mission demands…by ensuring that our most modern and technologically advanced forces are located where their combat power is needed most.” It also seeks to enhance the effectiveness of naval forces by employing “new warfighting concepts… and…. innovation.” The innovations stipulated by the document include increasing forward-basing of forces “to reduce costly rotations…” and developing modular platforms like Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) to enable swapping mission modules in lieu of costly ship rotations.

In sum, Strategy-2015 is not only a quantum improvement over the preceding strategy document of 2007, but also sets a model for the other existing and emerging major powers to emulate in the interest of transparency in military concepts and capability development. Such transparency is essential among maritime-military forces that operate in the international medium, and particularly those belonging to the “Indo-Asia-Pacific” region that is becoming increasingly volatile, as recent developments indicate.

Captain Gurpreet S Khurana, PhD is the Executive Director, National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Indian Navy, the NMF or the Government of India. He can be reached at gurpreet.bulbul@gmail.com.

Capability Analysis

OK, Explain Again Just Why the American Taxpayer Should Pay For All This (Series Finale)

1 Comment
CIMSEC content is and always will be free; consider a voluntary monthly donation to offset our operational costs. As always, it is your support and patronage that have allowed us to build this community – and we are incredibly grateful.

Select a Donation Option (USD)

Enter Donation Amount (USD)

OK, Explain Again Just Why the American Taxpayer Should Pay For All This

This article, the sixth of the series, presents reasons why Congress and the American taxpayer should pay for all the drones, buoys, railguns and the additional necessary ships to deploy them at sea introduced earlier in the series. Some of the justifications briefly discussed below are sure to be familiar to the reader, some less so. In either event, please feel free to mentally rearrange them according to your own priorities. Read Part One, Part Two, Part Three, Part Four, Part Five. 

Expensive Assets

These are not inexpensive assets that can be squeezed into the Navy’s spending plans somehow. With a likely cost of $3 billion plus for the CVLN and CARN classes, less the cost of at least one, possibly two DDGs that a CARN replaces in a carrier task force and $2 billion plus cost for an AORH, Congress and the American taxpayer are going to have to be persuaded to purchase these as additional assets for the Navy. So why should they do so?

Deterrence

Adding large quantities of ISR and ASW drones along with a dozen, or more, railguns as a matter of routine will provide a credible defense against the increasing A2AD threat the Navy faces. Presenting a potential adversary with overwhelming force in a potential area of conflict is a time proven technique for preventing conflict and promoting dialogue. It should also be noted that while these additional assets are expensive, combined they are still less than half the construction cost of just the CVN being protected, much less the air wing embarked aboard.

Protection

For CVNs

Much of the surface warfare assets the Navy possesses are routinely dedicated to protecting other critical ship classes and their embarked sailors. The CVNs operating in their dedicated task forces normally find themselves free to go where they please given the protection against air, submarine and surface threats the surrounding ships provide. Adding a CVLN and a CARN to this operating procedure is simply adding to a proven recipe by countering the increasingly formidable A2AD assets other nations are steadily acquiring.

For amphibious assaults

The Marine Corp routinely catches a ride on an ARG provided by the Navy. Most of the time there is no need to provide the extra protection provided by the suggested new ship classes. Come the big moment though, both during the few days leading up to and then during an amphibious assault placing a CARN, an AORH and a Zumwalt class destroyer between the opposing forces ashore and the ARG can very substantially improve the chances of success and measurably lower the anticipated casualty rates amongst the Marines making the landing. By providing substantial ASW assets in the coastal waters involved, numerous ISR and target spotting assets from the AORH, formidable fire support abilities from the CARN and Zumwalt and substantial anti-missile, rocket or artillery shell protection courtesy of the twelve railguns the new ship classes will significantly improve the Navy’s ability to support an amphibious invasion. Plus the Marines making the ride ashore will be able to start from just over the horizon thanks to the presence of multiple targeting drones and railguns instead of the much discussed fifty mile seasick inducing slog currently anticipated.

Ally reassurance

Protecting the carrier strike groups also means reassuring our allies that we will be able to fulfill the defense commitments we have made, particularly in the Western Pacific. However, building and deploying the means to allow the fleet to go where it wants is a globally useful capability, allowing the U.S. to confidently assert it will be there in time of need.

Multi-polar world

We live in a multi-polar geopolitical structure. China, Russia, India, Europe, the Gulf States, Brazil and others already are jostling with the U.S. for influence and trade. Including a China who already is in some respects, and will remain our economic equal in world affairs. This economic equivalence is something the U.S. has not had to deal with since our enormous industrial expansion in the last three decades of the 19th Century. We need to refresh our thinking with some of the concepts that worked well for us as we dealt with Great Britain, the existing economic power back then.

That said being a rival is not the same as being an enemy. There certainly are many areas where the U.S. and China will find ways to cooperate to our mutual benefit. We are certain to jostle each other though, especially in China’s immediate area as that proud civilization looks to ‘put things right’ after their many difficulties of the last two centuries. As mentioned above, we want to deter everyone in the area from using violence to bring about change, instead encouraging patience while the various nations involved discover mutually acceptable adjustments via discussion.

Playing defense to maintain the world as it is

There are other issues that come with being in a multi-polar world. In the new global circumstances the U.S., and the Navy in particular, need to execute defense, and first things first, keep our ships afloat. Something we have not had to overly concern ourselves with since the demise of the Soviet Union or the destruction of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the 1940s. Increasingly we will no longer be able to exercise the freedom of the seas and engage in whatever activity we want, whenever we want to. Russia is already building a submarine and long-range bomber force to potentially contest our passage. Others, China in particular, will be able to invest steadily increasing resources in military assets that make sense for their geo-political situation. Investments that mean the U.S Navy may have to fight our way across the North Pacific or North Atlantic before we commence operations at the location of our choice.

Hawaii has to eat

Our geography as a nation includes Hawaii, control of which easily translates into the control of the bulk of the Pacific Ocean. Yet Hawaii is a series of islands, thousands of miles from the mainland with a population of 1.4 million. Again, the change to a multi-polar world means we have to give thought to just how we can ensure the population on the islands can eat when trouble arrives. Russia already has the submarine assets needed to threaten mining or torpedoing ships crossing the North Pacific. Obviously the naval assets based at Pearl Harbor and the West Coast should be able to prevent that. However, we can no longer just take it for granted. The Navy needs to consciously add this to its long list of missions to accomplish.

The same issues apply to Guam, though the much smaller population can be fed by air if necessary, which means the mission is more one of being able to get our needed fuel and ammunition supplies delivered. Once more, the local air and naval forces should be able to ensure it happens. This is an area where the rise in China’s capabilities means we cannot take free passage for granted there either.

Maritime Commons

Protecting the global commons to ensure free passage of American trade was one of the primary reasons the U.S navy was originally built in the 18th Century. The need, a global need in the 21st Century, continues unabated.

Blockade

Occasionally over the years the U.S. has chosen to impose a blockade during a dispute. This is a capability, or more importantly for our relationship with China, a potential capability that we need to maintain. And the world needs to be reminded of on occasion.

Protection

As many others have noted over the last few years, a British citizen in the 19th Century could travel the world secure in the realization that the local government, regardless of whether it got along well with London or not, was not going to antagonize Britain by harming, or allowing to be harmed, the traveling Brit. A benefit that transferred to American citizens as a result of our overwhelming victory in 1945.

Unfortunately, in growing numbers of places in the world this benefit no longer exists due to the inability of many local governments to provide law and order within their borders for anyone, much less wandering Americans. This means that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corp have to face the reality that just as in the ‘olden days’ of the 18th and 19th Centuries, they are on call to provide basic protection to Americans all across the globe.

Rescue

The need for the Navy and Marine Corp to provide rescue service as needed has never gone away. And given the monotonous regularity of severe weather events, civil disturbances and the endless list of troubles that arise, this is certainly not going to change.

AORH uses

The AORH class suggested earlier in this series of articles was quite consciously designed to be capable of taking on some of the responsibilities, new and old, mentioned above. First among these was to be flagship capable, coupled with the resupply abilities and the substantial ASW and special forces capabilities built into the design.

These abilities are capable of being useful undertaking missions beyond the obvious applications in the Gulf, South China Sea and Northeast Asia. In addition, an ice-strengthened version of an AORH is very well suited to leading a small task force of frigates on ASW duty in the Arctic. It can also be used as the centerpiece for an old-fashioned hunter killer group prosecuting submarines or to provide transoceanic convoy protection in either the North Pacific or North Atlantic.

Current Political Impasse

As for the likelihood of persuading the current Congress to pay for this the Navy needs to be frank. The additional spending being asked for here are additional dollars for additional capabilities. Beyond some small incremental steps, most of the needed dollars will not fit inside the spending limits in place over the next few years. It is intended as a long term plan, to be funded as a recovering economy allows, with the big ticket items being built starting in the 202os and extending into the late 2030s.

For the economy is slowly growing and just as importantly the deficit is in notable decline. There are multiple reasons for this and there is good reason to believe they will continue to positively impact the deficit. A growing economy, the impact fracking is having on energy production, the beginning of the return of some manufacturing to North America from China due to higher wages there, the fact that Medicare costs are much less onerous than forecast five years ago, Obamacare is not costing nearly as much as feared when it was passed, and ending the Bush-era tax cuts are having a real impact on the actual deficit as well as on the, far larger, feared one.

So the enormous fear factor that was driving the deficit reduction hawks back in 2010/11 is in the process of dissipating, being replaced with some truly old-fashioned value driven politics. It is important to note that the Republic has been down this road before. After both the Revolutionary War and the Civil War Congress chose to slowly bring down an enormous deficit by running small annual surpluses. In essence, some variation of this strategy, regardless of how fiercely you espouse the ‘value’ part of balanced budgets, is what we are going to have to do as we deal with the left over Cold War debt and the enormous additional debt load piled on post 9/11 and due to the Great Recession.

Die Hard Yankee Frugality

Or depending on one’s viewpoint, good old-fashioned small town frugality, skinflints, True Blue small town values defending America from corrupt Big City mentalities, etc. The reader should feel free at this point to insert the variation(s) he hears most often where he lives. This cultural attribute came to the New World with the Pilgrims and remains a vigorous part of American culture. It has not, and will not be, departing from our political discussions. Or budgeting decisions.

So, how should we address those who hold this belief? In my experience, when trying to influence or alter decisions made by those operating from this position, argument and persuasion can work. If. Actually two ifs. Big ones. First a resolution to the revenue versus budget issue forcing hard choices has to be visible to the individual you are working with. And it is they that have to see it; regardless of how obvious it is to you, they are the ones that have to see, understand and agree. Then you need a plan dealing with anticipated results and consequences that you can clearly articulate, including how you will execute the plan, deal with the known potential problems and be convincing about being able to complete the task on time and most importantly, within the agreed upon budget.

Mid-America Teary-Eyed Balanced Budget Goodness

Across much of interior America another strong cultural value, the Intrinsic Goodness of Balancing Your Budget also accompanied some of the earliest English settlers of North America. Over the centuries this value has also been passed on to succeeding generations over family dinner tables, political discussions at the local diner or at the town’s barbershop. The at times teary-eyed value some of it’s current believers place in it can be almost moving to observe by someone who considers it merely another number. Plus, minus or zero each have meaning, yet no particular cultural Goodness.

To the True Believers amongst us it constitutes one of life’s bedrock values though. And it is not departing the American political scene either. Which means it will strongly impact budgeting issues far into the future as well.

However, unlike those professing Yankee Frugality, True Believers are virtually impervious to discussion and argument. Sometimes they will patiently listen to you and your points, still no matter how cogent and persuasive one might be, True Believers, once they start their decision making process, will cycle back and check your argument against various values and beliefs they hold. And if they find your argument in conflict with one of their values, for the purposes of this article, the Intrinsic Goodness of Balancing Your Budget, your suggested plan will be rejected.

Any additional information you might provide tends to ultimately provoke something along the line of this real life quote. “You are just trying to confuse me with facts,” responded one individual a few years ago. Global warming was the topic that day rather than the budget and the end result was, “I have my faith (in the rightness of their belief – not really a conclusion, a belief) and I will not change my position.”

This attribute is very much in play when discussing the current budget situation. Unfortunately it is, in my experience anyway, impervious to analysis and discussion. All those carefully honed arguments and points of persuasion potentially useful when speaking with those convinced of the value of frugality will only be considered by True Believers after the budget is balanced. Maybe.

Their faith in the correctness of the uttermost value of balanced budgets can be trumped by another value however. Not by many though, as it ranks high in their pantheon. Historically of course the value to use was the need for defense. Whether national defense from other nations, personal defense against crime or terrorism or preserving orderly and lawful procedures when discussing social issues, over the decades this has proven an effective approach.

Unfortunately the current spending debate has been embroiled in the revolt of a significant number of voters, primarily though not entirely, conservative Republicans, over the blatant abuse of this trump value during the second Bush administration. Vice President Cheney was incorrect when he claimed there were no electoral consequences to running vast deficits. There are, both economic and political, a truth that is not going away.

A significant portion of their political base could, and did for a while, accept the national defense against terrorism argument after 9/11. However subsequent failures to control Federal spending, under a Republican President, Senate and House no less infuriated them. Fury then became something close to horror after the Salomon Brothers debacle unleashed a need for massive federal deficits to restore the economy.

So after years of serious abuse of the national defense trump value, its use with those who fervently believe in the Intrinsic Goodness of Balancing Your Budget has been heavily invalidated. For a significant portion of the American electorate the call for a return to this basic value remains a hot button issue. It is five years on from the revolt that took place in 2010 and the fury and horror seem to have been replaced with a grim resolve to never allow spending to run out of control again. And balance the budget.

This implies, barring a serious political change in the House in a future election year, we may well have to wait for the sanctified day when the Federal government takes in more revenue than it spends before any substantive increases in spending, or allocations for substantial new abilities for the U.S. Navy can be expected.

In all likelihood this means it will not be until sometime in the 2020s before much of what has been suggested in terms of shipbuilding, i.e. the new AORH, CVLN and CARN class ships and large quantities of the associated drones and buoys, can obtain the political support needed for the substantial sums needed.

Count Our Blessings

It is always useful to Count Your Blessings though. The bulk of the resistance in Congress is to additional spending, with no more than the usual amount of Congressional meddling in the details of departmental, including DOD, spending. Just figure out a way to get things done within the dollar amount allotted is a frequently expressed desire by many in the House.

Nor is there any value based or carefully analyzed opposition to new equipment programs from any of the services. So while the suggested ship classes and drones will provoke a fierce defense of spending limits, there is no reason to anticipate Congressional opposition to the new equipment if the Navy develops a coherent plan including them. As suggested above in all probability the big items will not be affordable until sometime in the 2020s, nonetheless if the items are part of a long term acquisition plan it will merely be a question of waiting for funds to become available rather than overcoming fierce opposition to the plans and equipment.

So have a long-term plan in place

This means the U.S. Navy needs to have that forward looking plan in hand, constantly being updated as various improvements in doctrine, sensors and drones are developed. And be ready when additional funds become available, rice bowl pointed upwards as the saying goes. Whether the motivation to Congress is a perceived problem somewhere across the globe, the occasional Congressional compromise over something or other that includes extra funds for some department, a call for ‘shovel ready’ projects when recessions hit, or the slippery processes of logrolling; having a plan in place will allow the extra funds to be applied far more beneficially to the Navy’s, and the countries, benefit than a haphazard purchase of a few more of this and that.

Honor the Premise

In the end though, funding for the U.S. Navy, and all other Federal government departments, is only going to grow as fast as the economy. Which will happen, meaning any plan including the suggestions made in this series of articles will have to be implemented over a period of many years. Into the late 2030s or mid-2040s before the last of nine ship CARN build for instance. The early 2030s for eleven AORHs and the same for a six ship CVLN build are also reasonable build out expectations at this point.

Clearly the time to start to work on such a plan is now.

Jan Musil is a Vietnam era Navy veteran, disenchanted ex-corporate middle manager and long time entrepreneur currently working as an author of science fiction novels. He is also a long-standing student of navies in general, post-1930 ship construction thinking, design hopes versus actual results and fleet composition debates of the twentieth century.

Capability Analysis

Is There a Class of Armored Cruisers in the U.S. Navy’s Future? (Part Four)

4 Comments

Is There a Class of Armored Cruisers in the U.S. Navy’s Future?

 

CARN class jpeg

Sketch by Jan Musil. Hand drawn on quarter-inch graph paper. Each square equals twenty by twenty feet.

This article, the fourth of the series, presents a suggestion on how to incorporate the new railgun technology into the fleet in an efficient and effective manner. Railguns, when used as a complement to the various UAVs, UUVs and Fire Scouts discussed earlier will provide the fleet with a potent AAW weapon. Read Part One, Part Two, Part Three.

Interestingly enough, the most important piece of information concerning the new railgun is a number. A single round of ammunition costs $10,000. Eighteen inches of railroad tie shaped steel (which costs less than $200) fitted with the wonders of modern microelectronics provides a startling contrast with the $1M+ cost of the missiles the Navy currently uses against incoming aircraft and missiles. A contrast that is even more in the Navy’s favor since any future opponent will be spending comparable sums for their attack missiles and substantially more for hypersonic cruise missiles.

There are no explosives purchased with the $10,000. This means hundreds of rounds of railroad ties and microelectronics can be safely stored in a ship’s magazine. This is a substantial advantage compared to the VLS missiles in current use by navies around the globe, most of which require specialized loading facilities to reload their missile tubes. In contrast, a railgun-equipped ship can take a much larger ammunition load to sea with it, and reload the magazine at sea if necessary.

The next relevant parameter of the new railgun is its range. At 65 miles this is far less than many long-range missiles, though still quite useful against incoming aircraft and missiles. Note that with an ISR drone or Hawkeye providing over-the-horizon targeting information, a surface ship equipped with a railgun can shoot down incoming aircraft such as the Russian Bear (Tu-95) reconnaissance aircraft before the intruder can lock in on the firing ship. The same is true for any attacking aircraft carrying long-range strike missiles.

This highlights the importance to both sides of providing accurate targeting information first. It also means, strategically, at its heart the railgun in the 21st century maritime environment is a defensive weapon: well positioned to provide defensive fire against incoming attacks, but with an offensive punch limited to sixty-five miles.

That said, with the ability to fire every five seconds the railgun can be very effective, particularly when utilized in quantity when escorting carrier strike groups or when placed between a hostile shore and an ARG.

So far we have noted the positive distinguishing capabilities of the railgun but there are three significant difficulties that come with fielding the weapon. Foremost is the enormous amount of electrical power discharged by the gun when firing. This means any ship equipped with a railgun needs substantial electric power generating capabilities, something certainly beyond the abilities of the DDGs and CCGs currently in the fleet.

Secondly, using these vast amounts of electricity means a large capacitor needs to be located on the deck below the railgun. Large does mean large in this application. No little white pieces of ceramic plugged into a circuit board will do here. The necessary equipment is physically massive and in need of protection from the elements. They will be taking up a substantial amount of space just below the main deck where the railgun has to be mounted, probably one per gun.

The third problem is that all the energy dissipated in launching a round generates heat. Lots and lots of it. Most, but not all, of the energy used to launch the eighteen inches of steel will be recovered back into the ships capacitor, but enough will be lost that the launching rails flexing as the railgun is fired simply must be exposed to the elements so the heat will dissipate in the air. No sailors or flammables nearby please.

The inevitable follow up conclusion means a railgun equipped ship is going to be impossible to hide from opponent’s infrared sensors. Regardless of how stealthy versus radar the ship is, all of that heat is going to stand out like the sun itself to incoming aircraft and missiles equipped with infrared targeting systems, which means it is almost a certainty the firing ship is going to get hit if subjected to a seriously prosecuted attack.

Armor

This ship is not going to be able to hide in a cloud of chaff, it will be heading into the incoming missile strike, placing its full broadside in a position to fire and it will be considered a high priority target.

Unlike almost all naval ships built across the globe since the end of WW2, this class needs to be built with the assumption that incoming missiles will hit it, the plural is intentional, and be able to survive the multiple collections of missile slag and burning fuel and the occasional warhead detonation. Just as we built the 44 gun class of frigates back in the 1780s to be thick hulled in order to survive the gunnery practices of the time, armored up the ironclads of the Civil War and multiple classes of ships intended for the main battle line of the last half of the 19th Century and first half of the 20th Century, we need to built this class to ‘take a licking and keep on ticking’.

Topside armor should cover most of the ship, but the prime purpose of this armor will be to shed missile slag, i.e. what is left of the incoming missile after being intercepted and its fuel. The impact of the metal missile parts is not the prime danger to be protected against here. It is the fuel, and the accompanying fires after impact that is the true danger. So the topside armor needs to keep the slag and fuel on the outside of the ship, hopefully allowing gravity to carry much of the burning fuel to the gunnels and overboard; in the process vastly easing the firefighting teams job in putting out any fires that have started.

Additional armor, probably using a combination of layered materials and empty space, is appropriate for selected topside compartments that need to be protected against a successful missile warhead detonation. Whether it is sailors or equipment that is being protected, only some compartments will need beefed up exterior armor.

After that the CARN (cruiser gun armor, nuclear powered) will need to adapt the principles of the ‘armored citadel’ concepts developed a century ago for battleships to the needs of securing the two, possibly three, nuclear reactors aboard and their associated pumps and other equipment. Whether this is best done with one internal armor layer or two will keep the engineers debating for quite a while as the CARN is designed.

CARN Equipment

So what should the new 25k+ ton armored cruiser have aboard? Nuclear propulsion is an unavoidable necessity given the enormous amounts of power each railgun requires; every five seconds when engaged. Since the primary use of the CARN will be to accompany the fleet’s carriers to provide defensive AAW capabilities, this is actually an advantage for both strategic and tactical reasons. Depending on the amount of power twelve railguns firing broadsides will require, two or three of the standardized nuclear plants being installed in the new carriers should work just fine.

Lots of armor and nuclear power are unavoidable. The following basic list of desired equipment should provide the reader with a good idea of what the CARN should go to sea with.

12 railguns mounted in six dual mounts. In the attached sketch A and B mounts are placed forward of the bridge while C, D, E and F mounts are located starting roughly amidships and extend back to the helicopter deck. Dual mounts are suggested since the large size of the capacitors that need to be located directly below each railgun will in practice utilize the full 120 feet of beam provided. Obviously if the capacitors are even larger than this, then single mounts will have to be employed. Let’s hope not as doubling up makes for a much more efficient ship class.

36 VLS tubes capable of a varying load out of ASW, SM-2, SM-6 and long-range strike missiles as the mission at hand calls for.

4 CIWS with one located in the bow, a pair port and starboard amidships and one aft, just behind F mount.

12 rolling missile launchers for close in defense. It will be no secret the CARN is in the task force so a substantial number of the incoming missiles will be using infrared targeting, either in place of, or as a supplement to radar. So adding half dozen rolling missile packs to port and another half a dozen to starboard will provide plenty of localized missile defenses for both the CARN and the task force as whole.

2 ISR drones if VTOL capable. None if VTOL capability is not available

2 Seahawk helicopters

This suggested list very deliberately reduces the VLS and ASW capabilities aboard to a bare minimum. Good ship design concentrates on the primary mission the class needs to accomplish. In the case of the CARN that is absolutely, positively AAW.

In the next article we will examine how adding UAVs, UUVs, Fire Scouts, buoys and railguns in quantity to the fleet can substantially enhance the Navy’s ability to survive in the increasingly hostile A2AD world of the 21st Century. Read Part Five here.

Jan Musil is a Vietnam era Navy veteran, disenchanted ex-corporate middle manager and long time entrepreneur currently working as an author of science fiction novels. He is also a long-standing student of navies in general, post-1930 ship construction thinking, design hopes versus actual results and fleet composition debates of the twentieth century.

CIMSEC content is and always will be free; consider a voluntary monthly donation to offset our operational costs. As always, it is your support and patronage that have allowed us to build this community – and we are incredibly grateful.

Select a Donation Option (USD)

Enter Donation Amount (USD)

Capability Analysis

Where is the U.S. Navy Going To Put Them All? (Part Three)

2 Comments

Where is the U.S. Navy Going To Put Them All?

Part 3: Two New Ship Classes.

Sketch by Jan Musil. Hand drawn on quarter-inch graph paper. Each square equals twenty by twenty feet.

This article, the third of the series, presents two ship classes that can be used to take to sea the various UAVs, UUVs and buoys suggested in the previous two articles. These ships can provide the space needed to operate, maintain and hangar the equipment as well as house the necessary sailors. Read Part One, Part Two.

The first class, the CVLN (carrier aviation light, nuclear powered), is intended to operate with the two main carrier task forces, providing a home for the many ISR drones, UUVs, UAVs and buoys needed in the increasingly dangerous A2AD environment and to prosecute ASW. The second suggested class, the AORH (auxiliary oiler replenishment helicopter), is intentionally designed to routinely operate far from a CSG, frequently in association with either allied or local navies. The AORH is expressly designed to carry out a wide variety of missions with substantially lower initial construction costs and lower lifetime operating costs.

CVLN class

The intent of the CVLN class is to provide a deep blue sea platform that can operate, in fact come to be seen as needed to operate, with the two primary carrier task forces the U.S. Navy operates. Currently these task forces are almost always on station in the Western Pacific or the Gulf region. Adding a CVLN to the task force provides a home for the ISR drones, so useful in a contested A2AD environment as well as a home for the additional ASW assets the UUVs and Fire Scouts bring to the fleet.

By making the new platform nuclear powered the ship will be able to keep up with the CVNs, in both a strategic as well as a tactical sense. If the President suddenly needs a carrier strike group hundreds or thousands of miles away from their current position, the CVLN will be a fast complement to the CSG. A CVLN that can keep up with the CSGs affords the task force some very useful ASW protection both in transit and upon arrival. In addition, it will provide a permanent arc of ISR drones on the search, locate, transmit and target mission.

As for the tactical use of speed, in naval combat close almost always doesn’t count, and being able to accelerate over a 5-15 minute period at nuclear powered speeds can be just enough to survive an incoming strike. And once more, it allows the CVLN to keep up with the CVNs.

While building a nuclear powered CVLN is of course more expensive initially, once lifetime construction, operating and maintenance costs are considered, it should be notably less costly than an oil powered ship. Installing two of the existing nuclear reactors in use with the new CVNs aboard should provide plenty of power to move 45k tons around effectively and efficiently.

An obvious existing ship class to consider as a starting point for the new CVLN is the existing LHA/LHD design, but tweaked to accommodate nuclear power. If a canted flight deck and catapult were deemed necessary another alternative would be to revisit the old Midway class for design ideas.

CVLN Equipment

So how should the CVLN be equipped? A ski jump or canted flight deck should certainly be considered, although even if the ISR drone is fixed wing it should be small enough to launch off an LHD-style ship. If some of the modified S-3 Vikings or new refueling drones are going to be carried, then the extra expense of a canted flight deck will have to be incurred. Either way, the following, rather basic list of desired equipment should provide the reader with a good idea of what the CVLN will be accomplishing.

The navy should investigate whether it is practical to install one railgun, probably on the fight deck just before the island, aboard a CVLN. Obvious problems to be solved include insuring enough power is available, providing the space for the needed large capacitor just below the railgun and meeting the usual cost-to-benefit analysis applied to any new feature sent to sea.

2 CIWS mounted fore and aft and at least one RAM missile launcher for anti-missile defense are necessities.

15+ ISR drones with traditional jet engines or upgraded Osprey tilt-rotors are needed to execute the search, locate, network and target mission.

4+ UUVs plus the needed docking/launching buoys needed to get them in and out of the water.

15+ Fire Scouts and around 75 ASW oriented TIF Buoys.

4+ Seahawks

1 SAR team with associated equipment.

AORH class

The second suggested choice for the U.S. Navy to add is a ship class based on a modified AOR sized and double hulled design without a full flight deck, approximately 25k tons and oil powered. This class is intended to provide very substantial helicopter and VTOL launching and servicing capabilities, for ASW, amphibious, special-ops or other missions and then executing these missions over the years alongside a large variety of allied nation navies; hence the built in patrol boat capabilities as well as at least one UNREP station port and starboard.

The AORH is a solution to use, at a much lower cost than a CVLN in locations where a carrier task force is not present across the globe, especially in the Arctic, South China Sea, Gulf region and perhaps Northeastern Asia. These are obvious locations to homeport one of each of these ships permanently, but a standard rotation of three ships, perhaps only two ice-strengthened ones are needed for the Arctic, should be built for each requirement.

Reading the list of suggested equipment and capabilities below should provide a good grasp of the variety of missions, and not just ASW or amphibious, this class of ships will be capable of. The abilities this class will provide will substantially augment the small surface force combatants nations in the area already possess.

There has not been a great deal published on what the newly designated Arctic Command is going to deploy. Or do. As far as the U.S. Navy is concerned, my suggestion is to use ice-strengthened versions of what we already have and focus on the only realistic threat, submarines, that the fleet is likely to encounter up there. Let the Air Force provide air cover and if it comes to it, aerial strike capabilities out of Alaska or Greenland. As for ASW or ASuW capabilities, a task force composed of an AORH serving as flagship, 2-3 of the new ASW frigates, a Los Angeles class SSN and a Coast Guard icebreaker on an as needed basis should be ample to meet the nations needs up there.

As for more substantial portions of the fleet, there simply are not enough targets to justify the routine presence of a CCG or DDG. As for an amphibious ship, the American taxpayer as well as our Arctic neighbors should be asking just who we intend to invade up there. There simply is no need for these kinds of assets.

Operating in the Arctic is a new reality that the U.S. Navy has to add to its long list missions to accomplish. But a very limited list of ice-strengthened surface assets concentrating on the ASW mission, a SSN and Air Force provided top cover should handily do the job.

AORH equipment

Once more the following, rather basic list, of desired equipment should provide the reader with a good idea of what the double hulled, AORH should be equipped with.

A gun of some sort and since we have lots of 5-inch guns available one of these will probably be installed. One of the OTO-Melara 76mm family would also function well, possibly even be preferable over the 5-inch gun.

4 CIWS and at least 2 RAM missile launchers, and room for more should be considered if feasible. These are not going to be stealthy ships; they will be sailing in harm’s way, often in littoral waters and WILL be considered high value targets.

4+ ISR drones IF fitted with the new engine upgrade for the Osprey, allowing them to function as a VTOL capable airframe. Without VTOL capabilities the AORH will operate with the ScanEagle like the rest of the fleet.

4+ UUV drones plus the needed docking/launching buoys needed to get them in and out of the water.

15+ Fire Scouts and around 75 ASW oriented TIF Buoys.

4+ Seahawks

Flagship capable in the sense of having both working as well as berthing space aboard for a small task force commander’s team, which will occasionally be multinational.

1 SAR team with associated equipment.

This class will almost certainly be tasked from time to time with hosting Seals and Special Operations teams and their equipment as they come and go on their missions. Ample berthing, operating and maintenance spaces need to be designed into the class. In addition, room for the necessary crane capacity should be available to handle:

2 25’ Mark V.1 Patrol Boats and 2 Mark VI 85’ Patrol Boats

OR

4-6+ Mark V.1 Patrol Boats

The ability to berth and support a company of Marines.

The ability to support the operations of 2-4 of the Marines CH-53E/K helicopters.

Plus the ability to berth and operate on a add something, drop something off basis, whatever additional helicopters or small amphibs the Marine Corp might want to bring aboard.

Summation

The new abilities unmanned flight brings to the fleet are potentially very useful. But as discussed above, achieving the benefits frequently requires the use of the new drones in quantity. The suggested ship classes are two possible ways to get the needed UAVs, UUVs and buoys into the fleet. Another choice is certainly possible though and now is a good time to start discussing the topic.

In the next article we will examine how the Navy can add the railgun to the fleet in quantity and make use of its distinctive qualities in an effective manner. Read Part Four here.

Jan Musil is a Vietnam era Navy veteran, disenchanted ex-corporate middle manager and long time entrepreneur currently working as an author of science fiction novels. He is also a long-standing student of navies in general, post-1930 ship construction thinking, design hopes versus actual results and fleet composition debates of the twentieth century.

CIMSEC content is and always will be free; consider a voluntary monthly donation to offset our operational costs. As always, it is your support and patronage that have allowed us to build this community – and we are incredibly grateful.

Select a Donation Option (USD)

Enter Donation Amount (USD)