Notes to the New Administration Week

By Jason Lancaster

The Navy’s annual 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan should be replaced with a congressionally-appropriated fleet act. This act would fund the construction of the fleet the nation needs. Over the past 10 years of annual 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans the fleet has shrank, not grown. U.S. shipbuilders lack the capability to build the required ships because there is little consistency in U.S. warship procurement.

Annual budget changes destroy consistency in the annual 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. The table below displays the ever-shrinking fleet. The fleet in fiscal year (FY) 27 and 44 are highlighted. FY44 was used instead of FY49 for consistency throughout the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans.

During the late 19^th century and early 20^th century, the United States, Imperial Germany, and Austria–Hungary used fleet acts to fund desired force designs. Congress funded the Two-Ocean Navy Act in 1940 to expand the fleet by more than 70 percent. One would think that the imperial governments of Imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary would only have to persuade their Kaiser, but both nations’ Chiefs of Navy had to have their shipbuilding plans approved by their respective parliaments.

The Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940 provides a framework for a similar congressional act. In 1940, Congress authorized:

(a) Capital ships, 385,000 tons
(b) Aircraft carriers, 200,000 tons
(c) Cruisers, 420,000 thousand tons
(d) Destroyers, 250,000 tons
(e) Submarines, 70,000 tons

This act provided significant funding for ships, munitions, and shipyard expansions. It would help give the Navy a running start on wartime expansion by the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor more than a year later.

In Imperial Germany, Admiral Tirpitz proposed a fleet act that requested a Navy of a certain size. This plan assumed a replacement ship for each battleship after it reached 25 years of service life. Tirpitz’ Fleet Acts were passed in 1898, 1900, 1908, and 1912. Tirpitz’ Fleet Acts were based principally on assessments of the UK Royal Navy’s strength and requirements to defend overseas colonies.

Austria-Hungary had a similar system. After Italy began building battleships, Admiral Montecuccoli’s initial fleet plan was denied due to domestic politics. Admiral Montecuccoli eventually persuaded a shipyard to produce the first two ships. He secured a personal loan of 32 million Austrian Crowns to begin construction on the Viribis Unitis and Tegethoff while promising the government would procure the ships the following year.

The Austro-Hungarian Navy dealt with partisan politics. Montecuccoli was an expert at balancing political factions to accomplish his fleet plan. Czech delegates publicly voted against the Navy bill for partisan reasons, but privately supported it. The Czech company Skoda Works produced steel armor and battleship guns, offering well-paying jobs for Bohemia and Moravia, but the central government was antagonistic toward Czech independence.

Today, we have witnessed the Navy attempt to back out of block buys designed to reduce cost because annual DoD budgets did not support additional ships for the navy. A fleet act would provide the steady demand signal for ships that would enable companies to invest in required materials to sustain affordable shipbuilding for the long term.

It took decades for the Navy to reach this state. It will take steady and consistent funding to return the Navy to its desired size. A fleet act could provide a more viable mechanism for adjusting the Navy’s force structure and making a generational investment in naval power compared to the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan, which has lost much of its usefulness.

Commander Jason Lancaster, USN, is a student at the National War College. He has served at sea in destroyers, amphibious ships, and a destroyer squadron. Ashore he has served as an instructor at the Surface Warfare Officers School, on the N5 at Commander, Naval Forces Korea, and in OPNAV N5.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official positions or opinions of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Featured Image: 1994 – A view of various ships under construction at the Ingalls Shipbuilding shipyard, Pascagoula, Mississippi. Front to back are the guided missile cruiser Port Royal (CG-73), the guided missile destroyer Stout (DDG-55) and the guided missile destroyer Mitscher (DDG-57). Inboard of Stout is the guided missile destroyer Ramage (DDG-61) and inboard of Mitscher is the guided missile destroyer Russell (DDG-59). (Photo via U.S. National Archives)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Francis Crozier

Time and time again the Navy seems to have to reckon with three irreconcilable questions:

1. What does the Navy want to do with its global reach?
2. What legitimate global interests does the Navy have?
3. Does the Navy have the logistical capability to stay in proximity to those interests?

Issues like these have stood out during Operation Prosperity Guardian, the U.S.-led effort to protect international shipping passing through the Red Sea. Two issues in particular stand out, with the first being the problems faced by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the second being the regular retasking and deployment extensions of warships.

The MSC backbone for fleet replenishment is often understaffed and underfunded, with few oilers in the 5^th fleet area of responsibility. USNS Alan Shepard and USNS Big Horn were taken out of action after running aground in May and September of last year, leaving only USNS Amelia Earhart to replenish coalition and U.S. warships.

The Navy is fortunate to have the ability to contract private oilers on short notice that are U.S.-Navy certified and capable of refueling warships at sea. But this service comes at triple the cost of contracting MSC oilers and cannot always be relied upon if a large naval conflict were to kick off. The MSC also cannot support a global Navy with global reach if it is actively sidelining vessels to ensure proper manning to those ships it deems critical to sustain operations. Contracting private oilers is a stop-gap and not a permanent solution.

Second, Operation Prosperity Guardian required repeated retasking of critical assets from theaters where arguably the U.S. has greater strategic interests. In order to allow the Eisenhower CSG to return to Norfolk, covering the Red Sea required retasking the Theodore Roosevelt CSG from her deployment to the 7^th Fleet area of responsibility. The Abraham Lincoln CSG was also retasked to the Middle East before they even entered the 7^th fleet AOR. These decisions left no operating CSG in the 7^th fleet for the first time since 2001, despite repeated Navy and administration pronouncements of China being the number one national security threat.

The Navy must choose its battles more carefully and come to grips with the limited resources it currently has. Repeatedly extending deployments for surface combatants and carriers critical to a war with China will result in long-term consequences for readiness, as exemplified by incidents like the delayed Boxer ARG deployment. The new administration should make a comprehensive reassessment of global force posture and consider optimizing the Navy’s presence against China, especially with the Navy focused on a potential conflict in 2027.

Francis Crozier is a pseudonym for a sailor who holds a Bachelors Degree in World Politics focusing on Russian Affairs and Economic Development from the Ohio State University. He currently serves as a Petty Officer Second Class on board a U.S. destroyer.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official positions or opinions of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Mitchell Parcell, a V-22 tiltrotor crew chief assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 165 (Reinforced), 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and a native of Montana, observes the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4) in the Luzon Strait Oct. 8, 2024. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Amelia Kang)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By David Ware

As a retired U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Customs and Border Protection Supervisor in Hawaii, I have done warrantless border searches of yachts and fishing vessels as well as large commercial vessels. We apprehended many violators with arrest warrants from all over the United States. Seizures of weapons, including an AK-47, were made. Illegal drugs were often encountered. Illegal immigrants were taken into custody.

Intelligence and enforcement must go hand-in-hand. Many of these small boats simply pop over the horizon without notice or warning. Customs, Coast Guard, and the state of Hawaii cooperated to ensure a seamless approach. That was 30 years ago. In 2003, everything changed with the creation of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In the aftermath of 9/11, Customs and Immigration inspections were combined into CBP, and their respective investigations were combined into Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)/Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). This was a mistake because Customs’ role in border security was subjugated to strictly admissibility and immigration issues. We became part of DHS, a government entity still trying to define its mission today in 2025.

The United States has an enormous coastline, including the Pacific, the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, and also the Great Lakes which we share with Canada. For political reasons, enforcement across the Great Lakes, including at the Port of Buffalo, NY, was curtailed several decades ago. But after 9/11, Customs reinforced the northern border before the southern border because it was considered more of a threat for terrorist penetration. There was also intelligence after the 9/11 attacks that suggested Al-Qaeda would put a weapon of mass destruction in a cargo container on a vessel, possibly coming across the Pacific from China or Japan, potentially into or via Hawaii.

What is concerning today is that the DHS intelligence and enforcement posture for national security purposes, for both large and small vessels, appears to have taken a backseat to focus strictly on immigration concerns. This creates a maritime security opening for adversaries to exploit.

Maritime security extends far beyond the continental United States. While illegal vessels come up from Mexico and Latin America on both the east and west coasts, the Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia seek to dominate and control the high seas in strategic waters near U.S. allies and territories. It is not just PLA Navy warships that threaten America, it is China’s comprehensive maritime power and gray zone strategy, which includes a substantial coast guard and paramilitary element for which we have no commensurate response. Consider Chinese vessels approaching the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands without a visa, or illegally entering Guam on boats. Both are U.S. territories of strategic value. Chinese coast guard vessels and maritime militia are also on the frontlines of encroaching upon U.S. partners and allies in day-to-day operations, and could serve many wartime roles as well.

The new administration should focus on maritime security, both at home and abroad, because it has long been neglected. The number one threat to maritime security is China. Unguarded seacoasts are America’s greatest vulnerability.

David Ware is a retired federal officer with 42 years of combined military and civilian federal service. He served in the U.S. Air Force, with service in the Philippines and Okinawa during the Vietnam War era. He has extensive experience dealing directly with Pacific nations and territories in Project Cook and the Customs Asia-Pacific Enforcement Reporting System (CAPERS). He is a retired U.S. Customs and Border Protection supervisor and analyst.

Featured Image: A Coast Guard Cutter Diligence pursuit team interdicts a “go-fast” boat suspected of smuggling illegal drugs (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Cutter Diligence/Released)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Roshan Kulatunga

China’s national security strategy is shrouded in secrecy, making it challenging to access clear policy documents that shed light on its strategic ambitions. This need for reliable intelligence is underscored by China’s increasing interest in the Indian Ocean region, an area that has become a focal point of concern for U.S. policymakers and military strategists. The potential expansion of Chinese influence in this critical maritime zone raises alarms about the implications for regional security and U.S. interests, necessitating the development of effective counter-strategies to address China’s pursuit of gray zone warfare.

Gray zone warfare refers to activities that fall between conventional warfare and peace, often involving subversive tactics that can destabilize adversaries without triggering open conflict. China’s approach involves a systematic infiltration of various sectors, including technology, academia, media, and even political domains, to gather intelligence and insights into the strategies of possible adversaries. This multifaceted approach allows China to build a nuanced understanding of U.S. capabilities and intentions while subtly undermining them.

Chinese interests in Sri Lanka has extended to various levels of society. There has been extensive infrastructure development projects focused on roads, airports, seaports, energy facilities, telecommunications, and water supply systems. Most of these projects are funded through loans, while some key strategic initiatives are structured as direct investments. A significant portion of this development is driven by Chinese involvement, including state-owned enterprises, private investors, contractors, and laborers. This involvement raises concerns about economic dependencies and geopolitical leverage. The noticeable presence of Chinese nationals across critical infrastructure projects, when hiring locals would have often been sufficient and even more beneficial to the host nation’s economy, highlights the need for a thorough assessment of their roles. It is essential to investigate any potential subversive tactics, such as economic coercion, intelligence gathering, or long-term strategic positioning, that could impact Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and regional security dynamics.

Despite the growing body of literature analyzing gray zone tactics, there remains a significant gap in research that delves deeply into the specific methodologies employed by China in executing these tactics. Understanding the precise methods of infiltration and influence is critical for developing effective countermeasures.

China’s strategy involves expanding its influence across diverse societal domains, from cultural exchanges to economic investments, which serve to extract valuable information and develop points of leverage against the United States and its allies. To effectively counter these actions, it is imperative for the U.S. to conduct a thorough evaluation of China’s gray zone activities and to create robust, comprehensive strategies that address the multifaceted nature of these threats.

In addition, the United States must strategically leverage its intelligence networks, tapping into various sectors of society to gather insights, enhance situational awareness, and bolster its response capabilities. By doing so, the U.S. can better prepare itself to confront the challenges posed by China’s expanding influence and protect its national interests in an increasingly competitive global environment.

The alliance between the United States and India represents a significant counterbalance to China’s influence in the Indian Ocean region. This partnership is characterized by a shared commitment to promoting stability and security in a region that is increasingly strategic in global affairs. To achieve its objectives, China effectively utilizes an extensive intelligence network that spans the region, allowing it to gather crucial information on military deployments, economic activities, and political developments. However, the covert nature of China’s security strategies presents a considerable challenge, often concealing the critical information needed to properly interpret the intent behind its actions.

In general, the security interests and posture of the United States can be anticipated with a fair degree of accuracy due to the democratic principles underpinning its foreign policies and strategic decisions. These democratic mechanisms promote transparency and debate, thereby enabling allies and adversaries alike to gauge potential U.S. responses and how they may impact the rules-based order. In contrast, China’s approach to security is characterized by a more secretive methodology, which often complicates external analysis and understanding of its strategic ambitions. This fundamental difference in approach underlines the contrasting philosophies that guide the United States and China in their respective security strategies. The U.S. must manage this asymmetry as it develops strategies to counter China’s gray zone tactics.

Commander (Dr.) Roshan Kulatunga (ret.) served 22 years of distinguished service in the Sri Lanka Navy. Throughout his career, he held prestigious positions both at sea and onshore, including serving as the Editor-in-Chief at the Defence Web within the Ministry of Defence in Sri Lanka. He earned his PhD in International Relations from the University of Peradeniya in Kandy, Sri Lanka.

Featured Image: PLA Navy cadets from the Naval University of Engineering conduct an overseas visit mission on a Bangladeshi navy vessel, Oct. 13, 2024. (Photo by Ming Yongsheng/Xinhua)