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Asia-Pacific, Territorial and Law of the Sea Disputes

The Chinese Coast Guard to Build World’s Largest Offshore Patrol Vessel – And More

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Since its formation in 2013 by the consolidation of four previously independent agencies into a single entity (notably excluding the SAR agency), the Chinese Coast Guard has been experiencing phenomenal growth and has become China’s instrument of choice in its “small stick diplomacy” push to claim most of both the South China Sea and the East China Sea.
They commissioned two 4,000 cutters in January alone. It appears the growth will continue. The Wuchang Shipbuilding Industry Company has just been awarded a contract for four new 5,000 ton cutters, and China Ship-building Industry Corporation has been contracted to build two additional surveillance ships, one of 10,000 tons and another of 4,000-tons.
The US Coast Guard’s largest patrol cutters are the 418 foot, 4,500 ton full load Bertholf Class National Security Cutters. The illustration that accompanies the story of the four new 5,000 ton cutters shows a ship, in many ways similar to the National Security Cutter. It appears there is a medium caliber gun on the bow. (This would be a significant but not unexpected change for the Chinese Coast Guard.) There is a frame over what appears to be a stern ramp not unlike that on the NSC. The hull shape also appears similar to the NSC.
Japanese Coast Guard Cutter Shikishima, this class of two are currently the largest offshore patrol vessels in the world. Photo from Japanese Wikipedia; ja:ファイル:JapanCoastGuard Shikishima.jpg
Japanese Coast Guard Cutter Shikishima, this class of two are currently the largest offshore patrol vessels in the world. Photo from Japanese Wikipedia.

The “10,000 ton” cutter is likely to look similar to the Japanese Coast Guard’s two 492 foot, 9,350 full load, Shikishima class high endurance helicopter carrying cutters seen in the illustration above, but they may actually be much larger. Comparing their new ship to the Japanese cutters, the displacement of the Japanese ships was quoted as 6,500 tons, their light displacement. If the 10,000 tons quoted for the Chinese cutter is also light displacement, it could approach 15,000 tons full load. As reported here the new Chinese OPV will have a 76mm gun, two 30mm guns, facilities to support two Z-8 helicopters, and a top speed of 25 knots.

The size of the helicopters is notable. The Z-8 is a large, three engine, 13,000 kg helicopter based on the Aérospatiale SA 321 Super Frelon. The transport version of this helicopter can transport 38 fully equipped troops. The same airframe is also used for SAR, ASW, and vertical replenishment.
Undoubtedly the new vessels tonnage would give it an advantage in any sort of “shoving match” with vessels of other coast guards, but why so large?
The original justification for the Japanese cutters was to escort plutonium shipments between Japan and Europe, but the second cutter was built long after that operation was suspended, so clearly the Japanese saw a different justification for the second ship of the class.
Even so the Chinese ship may prove larger still. Other than prestige, why so large? China’s EEZ is small (877,019 sq km) compared to that of the US (11,351,000 sq km) or even Japan (4,479,358 sq km). Even adding the EEZ of Taiwan and other areas claimed by China, but disputed by others (3,000,000 sq km), the total is only about 3,877,019 sq km, and patrolling it does not require the long transits involved in patrolling the US or even the Japanese EEZ.
10,000 tons is about the size of a WWII attack transport, and with its potential to embark two large helicopters, China’s new large cutter could certainly exceeds the capability of WWII destroyer and destroyer escort based fast transports (APD). Using its helicopters and boats it could quickly land at least an infantry company, as could many of the smaller cutters. Chinese Coast Guard ships are already a common sight throughout the contested areas of the South China and East China Seas. Will Asia wake up some morning to learn there have been Chinese garrisons landed throughout the contested areas, by the now all too familiar Chinese Coast Guard Cutters.
Chuck Hill blogs at http://chuckhillscgblog.net/. He retired from the Coast Guard after 22 years service. Assignments included four ships, Rescue Coordination Center New Orleans, CG HQ, Fleet Training Group San Diego, Naval War College, and Maritime Defense Zone Pacific/Pacific Area Ops/Readiness/Plans. Along the way he became the first Coast Guard officer to complete the Tactical Action Officer (TAO) course and also completed the Naval Control of Shipping course. He has had a life long interest in naval ships and history.
Europe, Global Analysis

Escape from Sochi: Montreux Convention Considerations and the Moneyball Fleet

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Snake Plissken: A good solution for a 1 person rescue, not a 10,000 person NEO.
Snake Plissken: A good solution for a 1 person rescue, not a 10,000 person NEO.

The Russians are not ready to host the Olympic Games.  Everything from the hotel roofs to the perimeter security leaks like a sieve.  10,000 American Citizens are going to be in town for the games and will need to get out quickly in the event of a terrorist attack or public health emergency.

We are one day from the Opening Ceremonies of the 22nd  Winter Olympics and the early reporting from Sochi is damning: active kinetic security operations against Chechen forces are underway, wanted posters of known terrorists litter public places and the tap water has been deemed unsafe to bathe with, let alone drink.  In response to the potential threat against Americans visiting Sochi for the games—and recognizing the constraints of warship tonnage permitted to cross the Turkish Straits by the Montreux Convention—the United States’ European Command (EUCOM) has deployed the 6th Fleet Flag Ship, USS Mt. Whitney (LCC-20) and the guided missile frigate, USS Taylor (FFG-50) to the Black Sea. While bolstering the regional command and control (C2) / multi-agency liaison capability, the deployment of these two ships does little to provide additional sources of emergency egress to American citizens in Sochi due to their limited passenger capacity, small flight decks and absence of well-decks.  There is, however, a way to meet both operational requirements and the requirements set forth in the Montreux Convention: THINK MONEYBALL

Montreux Convention Primer

montreux

“The Montreux [Switzerland] Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits” was a 1936 agreement (subsequently amended) giving Turkey sovereign control of the Bosporus Straits and Dardanelles—the waterway passages from the Mediterranean Sea (Aegean Sea) to the Black Sea.  The agreement was negotiated by Australia, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Japan, the USSR, the UK, Turkey, and Yugoslavia as a strictly enforced body of regulations for vessel transits of the straits replacing the previously unrestricted navigation protocol under the 1923 League of Nations Treaty of Lausanne.  The convention places limitations on the number, types and tonnage of warships, overall tonnage of merchants / warships permitted to cross into the Black Sea by non-Black Sea bordering countries both individually and as a whole at any one time.

The Sabermetrics of Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

Distilled to its essence, NEO is concerned with the removal of civilians from an at-risk location and transporting them somewhere more secure as expeditiously and safely as possible.  In order to achieve the speed and safety requirements, naval task forces engaged in NEO should have the following capabilities:

2006 Lebanon NEO during Israel – Hezbollah War, USS Nashville (LPD-13)
2006 Lebanon NEO during Israel – Hezbollah War, USS Nashville (LPD-13)

– Surge-ready command and control spaces sufficient to plan and execute a joint, multi-agency (potentially multi-lateral), multi-axis NEO

– A flight deck capable of landing CH-53s, MV-22s, CH-47s, MH-60s – a variety of versatile helos

– A well deck capable of embarking Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) / Landing Craft Utility (LCU)

– A fleet surgical team with operating rooms, triage, and isolation

– Overflow berthing / open spaces to erect large numbers of cots

– Messing and sanitary capacity for hundreds of evacuees

– The ability to embark Naval Expeditionary Combat Command / special warfare personnel for the conduct of security operations and / or special operations

Moneyball: Deploying the Right Ships for Sochi (and Building Smarter Task Forces for the Future)

Turkey has been an extremely unreliable partner over the past eleven years.  As demonstrated by their reneging on a commitment to allow the US Army’s 4th Infantry Division to attack Iraq in 2003 as well as their preventing the USNS Comfort from entering the Straits to deliver Georgia humanitarian aid during the South Ossetia War with Russia in 2008, the United States should not count on Turkey to waive Montreux Convention limitations on tonnage and numbers of warships in the event of an evacuation contingency.  The 6th Fleet Commander (COMSIXTHFLT) needs to plan with forces on station in the Black Sea without an expectation of reinforcements.

ships
Moneyball: Major surface combatants that are Montreux Compliant look sexy and deliver “Credible Presence,” but lack the sabermetrics necessary to conduct a large scale NEO.

Whereas “Moneyball” is usually tied to limitations of budget, in this case it is tied to limitations of tonnage and numbers of ships.  COMSIXTHFLT needs to squeeze the maximum NEO sabermetrics into his Sochi Task Force.  To that end, I have highlighted the LCS-1, LPD-17, JHSV-1 and MLP-1 as ideal candidates for a Sochi NEO.  While the LCC-19 is an ideal C2 platform for coordinating a multi-lateral, multi-agency, Joint NEO—it lacks a sufficient flight deck / well deck to make a large contribution to the transport of evacuees.  Single mission ships went out of vogue generations ago, and make even less sense for a Sochi NEO—especially when you consider that command / liaison elements can embark an LPD-17, JHSV-1 or MLP-1 to exercise C2 while the respective ships are actively participating in LCAC / helicopter  transport of evacuees.

Beaches and piers provide prime egress points for a Sochi NEO
Beaches and piers provide prime egress points for a Sochi NEO

A good NEO plan is all about options of egress (i.e. fleeing in an orderly fashion).  Sochi International Airport features only two runways and is highly susceptible to uncooperative wind patterns that routinely halt flight operations.  In the event that the 2014 Winter Olympics turns into “Escape from Sochi,” the 6th Fleet ships on station in the Black Sea will need to exercise an organic NEO capability beyond C2 and liaison.  Going forward, NEO Task Forces should organize and plan around a sabermetric list of requirements that is agnostic to hull types and otherwise irrelevant traditional warfighting mission sets.

 

Nicolas di Leonardo is a member of the Expeditionary Warfare Division on the Chief of Naval Operations Staff, as well as a graduate student of the Naval War College.  The opinions expressed here within are solely his, and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the Expeditionary Warfare Division or the Naval War College.

Arctic, Global Analysis

Staying Ahead of the Arctic Thaw

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Based on the warming trend in the Arctic Region, large portions of the Arctic Ocean are projected to be seasonally ice free by mid-century; between 2030 and 2050.  This warming trend carries with it the risks and opportunities associated with seasonal access to the Arctic Ocean, rivers, and coastline which includes mineral deposits, petroleum resources, fishing stocks, and economically advantageous shipping routes.  The central question is how the United States should prepare for the effects of a potential seasonal thaw of Arctic ice by mid-century.

US National Interest

Seasonal access to the Arctic Ocean significantly impacts US national interests.  It has the potential to increase national economic security, encourage global economic stability, and create new theaters for global leadership in international cooperation.

arctic1The Arctic region is estimated to have over $1 trillion worth of precious minerals and the equivalent to 812 billion barrels of oil.  All of which will become increasingly available for extraction.  The U.S. could make great strides toward energy independence by developing these resources within its Arctic territory and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Actors and Governance

1.         Actors

The actors involved in strategic prepositioning for the Arctic thaw fall into two categories.  The Primary Actors hold legal rights to Arctic territory in accordance with internationally accepted legal structures.  These include the Arctic Nations (United States, Russia, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark) and indigenous populations (Athabasca, Inuit, Saami, etc.).  Influential Actors have significant stakes in Arctic policy outcomes but do not hold legal rights.  While some such actors may not yet be apparent, the most obvious are large environmental advocacy groups and multinational corporations in the energy, mining, shipping, and fishing industries.

2.         Governance

Governance in the Arctic Region, particularly the maritime domain, remains in nascent form.  The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) broadly applies international law but does not address unique requirements for Arctic shipping.  For example, there are no ship construction specifications or crew proficiency requirements for sailing within proximity to ice fields.  Under the United Nations charter, the International Maritime Organization has begun to analyze potential Arctic regulatory actions.

The Arctic Council was established in 1996 as an intergovernmental forum to coordinate Arctic policy and resolve disputes diplomatically. This forum does not establish international law but provides a venue for Arctic Nations to settle bilateral or multilateral disputes as well as coordinate initiatives to be brought before the International Maritime Organization.

At the national level, laws pertaining to environmental protection and the rights of indigenous peoples produce a complicated legal landscape the policy makers will have to navigate in coming years.  Shell’s recent decision to postpone drilling operations in the Alaskan Arctic highlights this tension.

Considerations

1.         Unclear Impacts of the Thaw

While a seasonal ice-free thaw by mid-century is generally accepted, several second order effects remain controversial or unpredictable.  The total magnitude of shipping traffic, intensity of mineral and oil extraction, as well as weather impacts on fishing stocks and agricultural growing conditions are not commonly understood.

arctic2Most shipping estimates focus on the economically viable trans-Arctic shipping traffic between North Asia and Europe.  By 2030, 1.4 million TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) could be transported across the Arctic on 480 total transits.  By 2050, a potential 2.5 million TEU could be transported across the Arctic on 850 total transits.  The wide array of other potential waterborne activities (i.e., commercial fishing, offshore drilling/exploration service traffic, and tourism) is not adequately captured in shipping estimates.

The Arctic warming trend could increase fishing stocks and shift populations northward, thus bringing with it commercial fishing fleets.  This trend also may improve agricultural growing conditions across the Siberian plain and allow waterborne bulk transport of product via Arctic rivers.  All of these activities could sharply increase the seasonal shipping density in the Arctic.

2.         Delicate and Extreme Environment

The Arctic is an extremely fragile ecosystem.  The risk of ecological disasters associated with resource extraction and transport will greatly impact the legal framework as well as rate and costs of development for exploitation of Arctic natural resources.

Human disasters will be just as likely.  As Arctic infrastructure and maritime traffic increases, so increases the need for responding to human distress.  Relief or Search and Rescue efforts in a region with significant radio interference and decreased satellite and GPS coverage will require a multi-national collaboration.

Policy Path Options

The United States can choose from three policy paths: a market-led policy, a regulatory-led, or a blended policy.  A market-led path would place the government in more of a reactionary role by regulating as industries develop.  A regulatory-led path would establish constraints or enablers ahead of industry to guide market development.  The blended path would regulate areas of critical priority ahead of industry but otherwise allow the markets to develop naturally.

Potential Naval Efforts

While national policy seeks to minimize the militarization of the Arctic, the United States Navy could still play a significant role in the development and organization of Arctic maritime shipping management.

1.         Lead an Interagency effort to develop infrastructure and regulations to ensure safe navigations of Arctic waters.

At the national level, the Navy could identify site and asset requirements for comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness across all U.S. arctic territory and EEZ to include weather and ice forecasting suitable for navigation.  Once these requirements are identified, the Navy could lead efforts to construct a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the U.S. Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management in order to develop definitions of roles and responsibilities as well as set the framework for burden sharing agreements.

2.         Develop multilateral opportunities to enhance disaster response.

At the international level, the Navy could lead the effort to build an increasingly complex set of Search and Rescue and Emergency Response training exercises that include multiple U.S. agencies as well as those from other Arctic Nations.

The aforementioned efforts would ultimately lead to the development of an International Arctic Management Center.  This center, with operational nodes near the Bering Strait and Iceland-UK Gap, would be multinational and interagency in nature.  The primary roles of this center would be to manage safe shipping transit throughout the Arctic and coordinate multinational emergency response efforts.  Management of shipping would include organization of convoys as well as activation and dynamic adjustment of approved shipping corridors based on traffic density, weather, and ice.

Proactive international management of commercial activities in the Arctic will greatly reduce the risk of catastrophic events and improve response to those that occur.  Additionally, coordination efforts stand to strengthen cooperation and relations across all Arctic and participant nations, including Russia.

 

Ryan Leary is a U.S. naval officer and Federal Executive Fellow at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.  His opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, or any command.

Future Tech

Sub-Par: Designing a Better (and Cheaper) SEAL Delivery System

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U.S. Navy Special Warfare operators hold a unique role in the Special Operations community: conducting missions covertly, from the sea, and back out again, without notice. And with America’s land wars winding down, Navy SEALs can once again focus on littoral operations in hostile and dangerous locales. To aid in this end, Northrop Grumman’s Electric Boat division is developing a new submersible to insert SEALs quickly and quietly, all while staying dry and ready for the mission ahead.

If this sounds like a familiar concept, that’s because it’s been done before. Recognizing the need for a dry submersible superior to the current SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV), the U.S. Government and Northrop Grumman developed the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) in the late 90’s. However, in true government fashion, poor design and massive cost overruns doomed the program, which ended fittingly with a fire onboard the only ASDS in 2008. The new incarnation hopes to avoid previous pitfalls and help to usher in a new era of cheaper, commercially developed craft for future U.S. Navy operations.

The Special Warfare community voiced concern regarding wet-submersible insertion (i.e., SEAL Delivery Vehicle) in the early 1980s. Exposed to extreme sea and air temperatures during SDV or free swim insertion, teams wasted precious time refocusing and recovering once landing ashore. As a result, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and Northrop Grumman teamed up to develop a dry mini-sub which could be launched from submarines, allowing team members to conserve energy, stay dry, and maintain 100% physical readiness upon hitting the beach to execute tasking. The Navy ordered six ASDSs, with the first becoming operational in 2003.

Too good to be true? You bet. In the same vein as current projects, the ASDS suffered from poor design, ranging from noisy propellers to weak lithium batteries. Repairs and redesign of ASDS-1 ballooned the budget from a total cost of $527 million to almost $2 billion, effectively cancelling the program. ASDS-1 continued in service before catching fire in November 2008, causing SOCOM to permanently jettison the program shortly thereafter.

As involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan winds down, SEALs will find themselves focused once again on the maritime and littoral environments. Electric Boat and SOCOM have joined forces to develop a new dry submersible, known as of now as User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) 3. Still in the planning stages, UOES 3 will be in the testing stages through 2015, most likely entering service shortly after. With the failure of ASDS undoubtedly fresh on the minds of researchers, these shortcomings should play a large role in the design of UOES 3.

The Navy is keen on tightening its belt in these frugal financial times, and finding detours around expensive new projects is a great way to save a buck. Electric Boat is planning just that – even partnering with a civilian firm, using commercial concepts to keep costs low. Along with UOES 3, the Navy’s newest Special Operations transport and Mobile Landing Platform are also joint military-civilian ventures, and it may only be a matter of time until UOES 3 is launched from one of these vessels.

Naval Special Warfare needs a dry submersible to keep operators safe and focused on the mission at hand. ASDS was doomed by poor engineering and skyrocketing repair costs; hopefully the fusion of civilian and military engineers can provide the vessel required by operators at a price required by American taxpayers.

LTJG Brett Davis is a U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer, runs the blog ClearedHot, and is trying to figure out how Twitter actually works.  He holds an M.A. in International Relations from Northeastern University and these views are entirely his own.