By Pete McPhail, Arthur Speyer, Bret Rodgers, Steve Ostrosky, Jesse Burns, and Dan Marquis
Military decision-makers instinctively think in geographic terms. Southeast Asia’s complex economic, military, political, legal, and environmental layers are best portrayed visually. By spatially portraying information, troops can work their way through geography to comprehend the interaction of these complex layers.
The INDOPACOM AOR continues to be a primary focus of U.S. naval forces, and the area is of central importance to China. The strategic chokepoints and littorals of the region, such as the Malacca Strait, have major military and economic significance. Each chokepoint has different environmental factors, from size, location, and depth. Additional regional factors, such as piracy, are also strongly related to geography.
This map describes the strategic importance of Southeast Asian littoral geography to China’s interests. By studying the map the user sees correlations between China’s diplomatic and economic investments and chokepoint geography. This map may be used as a starting point for wargames and discussing policy options.
Click on the map below to view it more closely and hone in on the strategic chokepoints of the region.
The research team is an inter-disciplinary team of civilian Marine Corps regional analysts and geographers affiliated with the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity.
Featured Image: TANDUO BEACH, Malaysia (Nov. 11, 2015) U.S. Marine 1st Lt. Erik Glynn discusses troop movements with a Malaysian army platoon commander prior to rehearsing amphibious operations during Malaysia-United States Amphibious Exercise 2015. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Emmanuel Ramos/Released)
“There are two types of Arctic problems – the imaginary and the real. Of the two, the imaginary are the most real.” –Vilhjalmur Stefansson
This century will be a transformative one, where rules taken for granted in the international system have begun to rapidly evolve. One of the most fundamental evolutions that is occurring is the transformation of physical geography from climate change and the resulting geopolitical implications. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the thawing Arctic. The ongoing transformation of the Arctic from an inaccessible frozen wasteland to an accessible and untapped reserve creates not only a new contested space, but will create new strategic chokepoints and littoral operating environments. The United States, in concert with its allies, will need to invest in the ability to access and secure this environment in order to maintain sovereignty and security in this new world.
The Changing Arctic
The emerging Arctic will be radically different than the one that has permeated human history. Historically, the Arctic is a frozen ocean surrounded by continental landmasses that have tundra and polar desert biomes along the coastal plains and islands.1 What keeps the Arctic frozen has been partially attributed to the planetary climate patterns that keeps cold air and weather at the poles, the season-long polar night,2 and the fact that snow and ice frozen for multiple years has an extremely high albedo – it reflects sunlight and heat.3
The difference now is that the planet is warming, and those changes are the most dramatic at the poles. This affects the Arctic Ocean and its littorals in many ways. The first notable effect is on sea ice. Sea ice expands and contracts seasonally, with a core of permanent sea ice, or multi-year ice, being augmented by younger ice, which is less than two years old. The multi-year sea ice is thicker and reflects more sunlight which makes it harder to melt. The younger sea ice is less thick and darker, making it easier to melt. The average extent of the permanent sea ice has been contracting continuously since 1978,4 and according to the International Panel on Climate Change, the Arctic will be ice-free or at least navigable in the summer season between the 2030s and the 2050s.5
The New Arctic Geography – Trade Routes, Chokepoints, and Inland Waterways
The reality of this environment is that it is increasingly warming and accessible. This produces rapid change which encourages various actors to compete for control of new sea lanes, prospecting for new resource reserves, and inevitably settlement of the Arctic by populations pushed to the north by climate change. These emerging issues will create the potential for conflicting sovereignty claims and access rights, as well as the assurance of those rights through the exercise of national power. There are four distinct geopolitical regions where fresh access, opportunity, and potential for conflict will occur. They are the Open Arctic Ocean, the North American Arctic Littoral environment, the Eurasian Arctic Littoral Environment, and the Arctic Seafloor.
The Open Arctic Ocean has one critical potential sea lane and two major chokepoints. The major sea lane, which will not be open until the Arctic is at least seasonally ice free, is the Polar Sea Lane. This route spans from Europe to Asia and bisects the Arctic passing over the North Pole. The two major chokepoints here are the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap – long famous as a planned line of defense against the Soviet Northern Fleet’s access to the Atlantic Ocean during the Cold War,6 and along the Bering Strait and Sea between Alaska (United States) and the Chukotka Peninsula (Russian Federation).7The GIUK Gap sees a line cast between the islands of Greenland (Denmark), Iceland, the Faroe Islands (Denmark) and the Shetland and Orkney Islands (Scotland, United Kingdom),8the Norway-Svalbard Gap, and the Svalbard-Greenland Gap serving as strategic chokepoints.9 Within the Bering Sea, both the Bering Strait and the Aleutian Islands can serve as chokepoints that can control access between the Arctic and the Pacific.10
Arctic maritime shipping routes (Susie Harder, “Arctic Council- Arctic Maritime Shipping Assessment 2009,” United States Department of Commerce, National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration)
The North American Littoral Environment has two distinct regions. The first is in the eastern portion, characterized by a large number of islands and seaways, which consist of the island of Greenland – an autonomous territory of Denmark, and the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, largely contained in the federal territory of Nunavut, but also the Northwest Territories. The second, western portion, is one where coastal plains meet open ocean along Canada’s Yukon Territory, and the U.S. state of Alaska. The strategic trade route in this operating environment is the fabled Northwest Passage, which is rapidly becoming a reality with a seasonally ice-free or low-ice environment. The strategic chokepoints for this route start with the Labrador Sea and Barton Bay between the western coast of Greenland and the eastern/northern coast of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago’s largest island, Baffin Island.
The Eurasian Arctic Littoral is categorized as being largely coastal with the Eurasian mainland, but with a handful of Arctic Ocean islands which can serve as chokepoints, which are largely controlled by the Russian Federation, the exception being Svalbard – an archipelago controlled by Norway.
How the new Northern Sea route compares to the Suez Canal route for shipping from Rotterdam, Netherlands, to Dalian, China. (Wall Street Journal)
The strategic trade route in this region is the Northern Sea Route, which hugs the northern coast of Eurasia and provides a connection between Europe and Asia, and which is shorter than travel through the Suez Canal and Strait of Malacca. Chokepoints along this route include the Barents Sea gap between Norway and Svalbard, with Bear Island at the midpoint, and multiple chokepoints between Russian islands and archipelagos.
The Northern Sea Route is largely in operation already. A portion is open year-round to support domestic Russian commerce, and a remainder is open during the summer season which allows for trade between Europe and Asia. This route is open due to open waters and additional support from the Russian Federation’s fleet of 14 nuclear-powered icebreakers. China has also invested heavily into what they refer to as their Polar Silk Road, as part of their larger Belt and Road Initiative, including the construction of two more icebreakers. As the Arctic melts, this corridor will be able to accommodate significantly larger traffic flows. Such a shift will be fundamentally transformative to the Russian economy, allowing for Russia to achieve its centuries-old dream of holding blue water ports and subsequent access to global commerce.
An additional transformation to the Russian economy will be with inland waterways. The major inland waterways leading to the Arctic are the Ob’ River, the Yeinsei, and the Lena.
Fig. 16- The Lena River Drainage Basin (Source: Wikimedia Commons)
Access to blue water ports and commercial routes for these rivers will be fundamentally transformative to the Russian economy. Siberia is the most resource rich region within the Russian Federation, but extraction is oftentimes cost prohibitive, as the physical geography makes the construction of lengthy transportation corridors over land extremely difficult. Conversely, the implementation of large scale river transports moving from the heart of Russia to Arctic ports would dramatically lower the cost and risk of resource extraction, which will open up this traditional backwater to global commerce.11 With increasing commerce and infrastructure, this region will likely also see a population boom. Additionally, landlocked, but also resource-rich Kazakhstan and Mongolia will also have access to these inland waterways and Arctic ports, where this type of access would otherwise not exist.
The last region in the Arctic will be the seafloor itself, with potential fishing rights, crude oil, and other mineral resources at stake. Fundamental to this region is that it has never properly been mapped, and mapping the seabed is instrumental for states with Arctic coastlines to be able to claim sovereignty and exclusive access to these resources. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), territorial waters are limited to 12 nautical miles (nm), except for archipelagoes which are considered internal waterways, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) are limited to 200 nm for exploiting resources in the water such as seafood, and lastly rights to access mineral resources are limited by the continental shelf or the 200 nm EEZ, whichever is further.12 A lack of internationally recognized mapping of the Arctic seafloor has in the past and will in the future lead to conflicting claims, and possibly armed conflict itself.
One example for potentially conflicting claims was when the Russian Federation claimed sovereignty over the North Pole for mineral rights access in 2007. This claim was made based on the Russian assertion that the underwater Lomonosov Ridge, which runs across the Arctic seafloor between the East Siberian Shelf off the coast of the Russian Federation and the Lincoln Shelf off the coast of Greenland, was actually an extension of the East Siberian Shelf and thus subject to Russian sovereignty. Once this region is more accessible it will become a race to stake claims.
A shot from a video shows the view out of the porthole of a Russian miniature submarine as its robotic arm plants the Russian flag on the seabed 14,000 feet below the North Pole on August 2, 2007. (Reuters)
Policy Recommendations
The United States should continue with its longstanding policy of promoting clear international norms and standards when it comes to the emerging Arctic. The current risk is that peer competitors such as Russia and China will seek to exploit ambiguous norms, standards, or situations in order to make gains in economic or political power in the region. Bearing that in mind, the United States needs to be ready to leverage all tools of national power to protect U.S. interests. Part of that is building on and leveraging existing strengths.
The first most important policy the United States can pursue is by increasing funding for scientific research in the Arctic region, with a specific focus on international cooperation and recognition of results. Scientific research should focus on understanding the bathymetry (seafloor mapping) of the region that can be utilized as a diplomatic tool for international recognition of sovereignty claims as well as use of international waters. Promoting consensus prevents room for conflict.
The second policy the United States should pursue with its allies is full investment in the economic development of the Northwest Passage, bringing it into competition with the Northern Sea Route. This economic development would entail the economic development of ports in the Canadian arctic archipelago and development along the MacKenzie and Yukon River corridors. There would also be a need to invest in the construction of both a merchant and military icebreaker fleet, in order to facilitate and secure strategic trade routes. This development would provide an attractive alternative to the Northern Sea Route for the global shipping industry as the Arctic thaws.
The third policy the United States should pursue with its allies under the aegis of NATO is ensuring military superiority over the major strategic chokepoints in the Arctic. The primary focus would be on the GIUK Gap and the Aleutian Islands in particular, as routes that peer competitors Russia and China would have to rely upon converge at those two points. The GIUK, Norway-Svalbard, and Svalbard-Greenland Gaps being mostly open ocean would require a substantial naval blockade and air support to shut down traffic, similar to planning that defensive line during the Cold War, while the Aleutian Islands can rely on a chain of small outposts of anti-ship missiles with patrols preventing passage between the islands. The threat of force from NATO territory could serve as a deterrent from conflict, and as leverage in diplomatic negotiations in future conflicts that may arise. In this same vein, the United States should advocate for the establishment of a NATO Joint Forces Command – Arctic focused on consolidating NATO’s collective military power in the Arctic, coordinating the security of the Northwest Passage, and serving as a deterrent to conflict in the region.
Conclusion
The Arctic is evolving as the climate changes, and it is a change that will result in new opportunities for states to develop, as well as opportunities for regional conflict. Other actors have already taken action in the region, and the United States along with its allies cannot afford to be late to the game. The United States needs to rise to the challenge by promoting peaceful development through the promotion of international norms and standards, as well as ensuring the security of strategic trade and national sovereignty in coordination with allies.
Robert C. Rasmussen is a Foreign Affairs Specialist with the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, and holds an MA in International Relations from Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, as well as a BA in International Relations and Geography from the SUNY College at Geneseo. He actively served in the New York Guard (State Defense Force) from 2010-2016, including participation in the response to Superstorm Sandy in 2012. He has long had an interest in the Arctic stemming from his childhood experiences while his family was posted to Fort Wainwright in Fairbanks, Alaska. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the National Nuclear Security Administration or the U.S. Department of Energy.
References
1. UC Museum of Planetology, “The World’s Biomes,” University of California, Berkeley,
https://ucmp.berkeley.edu/exhibits/biomes/index.php, Acc: 3 May 2020.
2. Leibowitz, Kari, “The Norwegian Town Where the Sun Doesn’t Rise,” The Atlantic, 1 July 2015,
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/07/the-norwegian-town-where-the-sun-doesnt-rise/396746/, Acc: 3 May 2020.
3. National Snow & Ice Data Center, “Thermodynamics: Albedo,” University of Colorado- Boulder,” 3 April 2020, https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/seaice/processes/albedo.html, Acc: 3 May 2020.
4. National Snow & Ice Data Center, “Arctic Sea Ice News & Analysis,” University of Colorado- Boulder, 3 May 2020, http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/, Acc: 3 May 2020.
5. American Geophysical Union, “Ice-Free Arctic Summers Could Happen on the Earlier Side of Predictions,” 27 February 2019, https://phys.org/news/2019-02-ice-free-arctic-summers-earlier-side.html, Acc: 3 May 2020.
6. Alison, George, “What are Norwegian F-35s Doing in Iceland?” UK Defence Journal, 3 March 2020, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/what-are-norwegian-f-35s-doing-in-iceland/, Acc: 3 May 2020.
7. Alaska Seas and Watersheds K-12 Program, SeaGrant Alaska, “Map of Aleutian Islands and Bering Sea,” University of Alaska, Fairbanks,
http://aswc.seagrant.uaf.edu/grade-4/investigation-1/map-of-aleutians.html, Acc: 3 May 2020.
8. Alison, George, “What are Norwegian F-35s Doing in Iceland?” UK Defence Journal, 3 March 2020, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/what-are-norwegian-f-35s-doing-in-iceland/, Acc: 3 May 2020.
9. National Geographic Society, National Geographic World Atlas- 7th Edition, Washington: National Geographic Society, 2000.
10. Alaska Seas and Watersheds K-12 Program, SeaGrant Alaska, “Map of Aleutian Islands and Bering Sea,” University of Alaska, Fairbanks,
http://aswc.seagrant.uaf.edu/grade-4/investigation-1/map-of-aleutians.html, Acc: 3 May 2020.
11. Vorotkinov, Vladislav, “Dredging Will Connect Siberia with the Northern Sea Route,” Dredging & Port Construction, 12 February 2019,
https://dredgingandports.com/news/2019/dredging-will-connect-siberia-with-the-northern-sea-route/, Acc: 3 May 2020.
12. Kumar, Abishek, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Mariner Desk, 10 September 2018, https://www.marinerdesk.com/united-nations-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea-unclos/, Acc: 3 May 2020.
Featured Image: Coast Guard members assigned to the U.S. Coast Guard Station Valdez head back to station after recovering hazardous radioactive material from a civilian vessel in the Port of Valdez, Alaska, during exercise Arctic Eagle 2018, Feb. 24, 2018. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by 2nd Lt. Marisa Lindsay)
Naval theorist Milan Vego opens a chapter on chokepoint control with a quote from British Admiral Sir John Fisher, who stated that there are “five keys to the world. The Strait of Dover, the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Malacca, and the Cape of Good Hope. And every one one of these keys we hold.”1 Fisher spoke from an Anglo-centric view, but his point is evident that control of key chokepoints equated to control of national strategic interests. But a century later, with the technological advances in weapons and sensors, and the interconnectedness of the global economy, can such a claim be made today?
There are over 100 straits where international interest in the free flow of trade transcends the interests of the nearby littoral states. Not all of these maritime chokepoints are of equal importance. Military strategists often speak as Fisher did of strategic chokepoints, believing them to have significant geopolitical value and act as epicenters for maritime strategy, where the control of which is considered vital for success in maritime conflict. But are these chokepoints truly strategic? Does the success of a nation’s maritime strategy actually hinge on the control or loss of control of these narrow seas?
Perhaps the strategic value of any given chokepoint is overstated because the ability to truly “control” these chokepoints is significantly degraded in the current maritime threat environment. The focus should instead be placed on strategic seas, and not the connectors between them.
Strategic Versus Operational Significance
Before scuttling the idea of strategic straits, there should be a common understanding of the difference between the strategic and operational importance of maritime geography. Maritime strategy is the science and art of using all naval and non-naval sources of power at sea in support of the national military strategy, with military strategy being “the art and science of using or threatening to use military power to accomplish the political interests of a nation…”2 The 2018 National Defense Strategycalls for:
“A more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, combined with a robust constellation of allies and partners, will sustain American influence and ensure favorable balances of power that safeguard the free and open international order. Collectively, our force posture, alliance, and partnership architecture, and Department modernization will provide the capabilities and agility required to prevail in conflict and preserve peace through strength.”3
The focus on lethality, resilience, and lethality within an alliance and partnership architecture, combined with “lethal, agile, and resilient force posture and employment,”4 and “a global strategic environment [which] demands increased strategic flexibility and freedom of action,”5 indicate that fixed geographic positions like chokepoints have reduced strategic relevance in U.S. strategy.
Naval operations are defined as the “theory and practice of planning, preparing, and executing major naval operations aimed at accomplishing operational objectives.”6 While operational objectives are chosen to achieve strategic ends, there often are multiple operational options to a support strategy. The operational value of a chokepoint tends to be temporal and depends on the other operational factors of time, space, and force of the particular operation. A chokepoint with high operational value may have limited or no strategic value if other options exist to achieve the national political objectives.
Traditional Methods of Sea Control
The control of chokepoints has long been a primary way to control access to a given body of water. Revisiting Fisher’s assertion that there were five keys to the world, control of key straits meant control of the flow of global maritime traffic and, therefore, the strategic interest of most maritime nations. Warships and merchantmen during the age of sail depended on the prevailing winds for reliable propulsion and shore bases for routine resupply. These trade winds and shore bases funneled ships through specific shipping lanes, many of which transited the key chokepoints Fisher identified. Since transit of these chokepoints was essential, controlling them guaranteed control of merchant shipping and warship movement.
The emergence of steam propulsion removed reliance on the trade winds, but increased dependence on the shore bases that had been established in the age of sail, which were starting to serve as coaling stations. Thus, in Admiral Fisher’s time, his assertion was correct. But since World War II, dependence on shore basing for resupply has diminished. The U.S. Navy perfected at-sea replenishment during World War II, and merchantmen have significantly increased their unrefueled range, both of which reduced the reliance on shore stations and subsequent dependence on specific shipping lanes.
Chokepoints simplify several operational and tactical aspects of naval warfare by concentrating forces. This, in turn, limits the challenges of scouting and screening, because less sea space must be scouted and screened. The avenues of approach to the chokepoint are limited, so the party that controls the chokepoint can concentrate forces or make better use of limited forces available.
Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō’s defeat of Russia’s Second Pacific Squadron at the Tsushima Strait demonstrates how chokepoints simplify scouting. Togo did not know when the Russian fleet would arrive, nor did he wish to search for it in the open ocean. But he did know that the Russian fleet had to pass through the Tsushima Strait to reach its base at Vladivostok. This allowed Togo to concentrate his scouting force of cruisers in the strait and consolidate his battle line inside the Sea of Japan. But what if the Russians had entered the Sea of Japan through the La Pérouse Strait, Tsugaru Strait, or Strait of Tartary? In the 1890s, the limitations of coal-fired steam plants meant that traveling the extra 1000 or more miles without a coaling station made the Tsushima Strait the only choice. Today, however, at-sea logistics provide naval forces greater flexibility in entering strategic seas.
Changing Military Value of Chokepoints
Historically, chokepoints held strategic military value partly because they forced ships to transit within range of the weapons and sensors posted there, and made movements more predictable. Into the second decade of the twentieth century, optical sensors and coastal guns limited that range to or just beyond the horizon. Technological advances over the intervening century expanded that range immensely. First, aircraft extended scouting range, then, as aircraft improved, expanded the striking range of weapons well beyond the chokepoint’s horizon. The introduction of radar further enhanced scouting and early-warning capabilities, and space-based surveillance now allows for the searching of vast ocean areas independent of geographic chokepoints. The missile age added over-the-horizon, ship-killing weapons, with anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) marking the ultimate long-range strike capability.
Holding a chokepoint serves two fundamental purposes, one rooted in sea control and the other in sea denial. The sea denial case, often a strategy of the weaker navy, holds that by controlling the chokepoint, an adversary cannot access the seas on its opposite side. As Vego points out, this is often part of a larger, major defensive joint/combined operation and maybe one of several elements of a national defensive strategy to either bottle up an opponent’s naval force in its own narrow seas, or prevent an opponent’s naval force from entering a narrow sea where it could threaten the defending nation’s territory.7 In the sea control case, control of the chokepoint theoretically allows one to use their naval forces at the time and manner of their choosing within the chokepoint and in the seas controlled by the strait. That is to say, if a nation controls a chokepoint, naval forces and maritime trade can pass through that chokepoint freely at the discretion of the nation that controls it.8
In the current maritime threat environment, controlling the land and water in the vicinity of the chokepoint no longer represents the exclusive manner to control it. The focus on strategic chokepoints may have held when the range of weapons was barely over the horizon, but today an adversary no longer has to control the geographic entrance to strategically important seas to deny their use. Space-based sensors and long-range missile firepower allow an adversary to effectively close, or at least threaten closure of, geographic chokepoints without the traditional need to hold the immediate surrounding land or seas. “Holding” a geographic chokepoint no longer guarantees the use of the seas on either side, nor does it ensure safe passage through the chokepoint itself. Therefore, the U.S. Navy would be better served to focus more broadly on its ability to control or deny strategic seas than the strategic chokepoints of ages past.
Changing Economic Value of Chokepoints
Another element that gives a chokepoint strategic value is the volume of trade transiting the strait. Traditionally, blockades and maritime trade warfare have used control of chokepoints to great strategic effect. Britain’s control of the Dover Straits, combined with the North Sea Mine Barrage, closed all maritime trade to Germany during World War I and contributed to the fall of the Kaiser’s government in 1918. During World War II, the failure of the Axis powers to seize the Suez allowed Great Britain to continue using the canal for resupply of its empire. Would such action have the same strategic effects today?
Vertical and horizontal charts showing locations and densities of mine fields of the North Sea Mine barrage, issued in November and December 1918, after the fields were completed. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
Today, high trade volume certainly gives a strait economic value because these chokepoints often represent the shortest route from manufacturer to market and thus the cheapest transportation cost. But is controlling trade through a strait a viable strategic goal? Chris McMahon argues that maritime trade warfare is ineffective in today’s global economy. Among the many reasons he presents, he notes that the closing of chokepoints has no real impact on global trade.9 One of the most-often mentioned strategic chokepoints is the Strait of Malacca because it handles so much of the world’s maritime traffic. But how would closing the Strait of Malacca affect global trade? It would impact Singapore’s role in the global shipping market, certainly. But would the global shipping network be severely burdened by having to transit the Sunda Strait or the Lombok Strait? Would there be a cost increase, yes, but once the market adjusts for the increased cost, shipping will find a way to make it work.
Consider the wave of piracy off the Horn of Africa in the early 2000s, an area often discussed as a strategic chokepoint because of the volume of trade passing through the Arabian Sea. Shipping companies dealt with the insecurity of that maritime region in one of three ways – accept the risk and charge accordingly, arm themselves against pirates, or re-route ships around the Cape of Good Hope at increased cost and charge accordingly. In each case, maritime trade continued. Lord Fisher mentioned the Suez Canal as one of the keys to the world, but it has been closed on five occasions since it opened in 1869, including for eight years between 1967 and 1975. During that most recent closure, the cost of shipping around the Cape of Good Hope was markedly higher than the Suez route but presented no serious economic hardship to global consumers. Rerouting Pacific trade for a closed Strait of Malacca would have a similar minimal effect on the cost of global trade.10
Chokepoints Can Be Superseded
The demise of the strategic value of chokepoints is revealed by looking at some traditional strategic chokepoints of the past. One of Fisher’s keys to the world, British control of the Straits of Dover, seemingly kept Hilter’s Kriegsmarine bottled-up in the North Sea, much as it had the Kaiserliche Marine three decades before. But Germany negated the British advantage by conquering France and establishing bases in Brittany, unfettered by the Straits of Dover. To be sure, the straits still impeded access to merchant shipping and warship transit to the German homeland, but control of the strategic strait did not mean control of the German U-boats. Chokepoints can be bypassed.
During the Cold War, the water between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom – the so-called GIUK Gap – was a strategic chokepoint because Soviet ballistic-missile submarines had to pass through that gap to threaten the United States. The later development of longer-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles meant the submarines could remain in the Arctic to launch these weapons, thus limiting the strategic value of the GIUK Gap as a chokepoint. Chokepoints can be outranged.
The GIUK gap and major regional military bases. (Heritage Foundation)
Today, a resurgent China lays claim to the South China Sea (SCS) as its own internal waters. As discussed above, the Strait of Malacca has traditionally been a key to control of the SCS and, therefore, strategically important for trade between Europe and Asia. But the Strait of Malacca is not the only access route to the SCS, which can also be accessed through the much larger Luzon Strait and numerous passages through the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos. The PRC recognizes this and has adopted control mechanisms that do not depend on control of the chokepoints, but instead focuses on long-range anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) weapons and redundant fortified islands within the SCS.11
China’s A2/AD strategy in the SCS is important for two reasons. First, the assumption that physical control of a chokepoint guarantees use of the chokepoint is invalid in the face of PRC A2/AD weapons and sensors. Although the United States and its partner states may possess the land on either side of the Strait of Malacca, and have sufficient naval forces to patrol the strait, the PRC could nonetheless prevent free transit of the Strait of Malacca using ASBM and long-range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Furthermore, these long-range weapons based on the Chinese mainland or in the central SCS can contest the other straits leading into the SCS. Conversely, the reduced reliance of predictable trade routes for maritime traffic – both merchant and military – means they can easily bypass the Strait of Malacca if it were to be “controlled” by an opposing power.12 Chokepoints can be replaced.
Conclusion
The question then should not be “what are today’s strategic chokepoints?” but instead, “what are today’s strategic seas?” Control of chokepoints is only one of the ways to control a sea. Vego writes that there are two primary arenas of naval conflict: open ocean and narrow seas. While many characteristics differentiate the open ocean from the narrow sea, the predominant one is proximity to land.13 In narrow seas, the land influences many aspects of naval warfare, from the ability of naval vessels to maneuver to the threat from land-based weapons. As one moves further out to sea, maneuver space opens up and land-based threats dissipate, or so it would stand to reason.
The ability of naval forces to operate freely on the open ocean outside the threat of land-based weapons, whether missiles or aircraft, is greatly diminishing in the current threat environment. This, in turn, means an expansion of the areas previously considered narrow seas – even if not in all aspects. If the narrow seas have now broadened to cover a much higher portion of the world’s oceans, then the restrictive chokepoints once seen as strategic lose much of their relevance.
There may be operationally compelling reasons to control a chokepoint, but their strategic value is greatly diminished in an era of space-based sensors and proliferating long-range missiles. Control of a chokepoint no longer means the “keys to the world” as it did in Admiral Fisher’s day. Expending the time and force to control a chokepoint will likely not result in the strategic advantage sought, and worse, could fix forces to a geographic location when mobility is operationally necessary. The U.S. would be better served exercising more agile and dynamic mechanisms of strategic sea control and sea denial rather than focusing on the obsolete idea of strategic chokepoints.
Captain Jamie McGrath (ret.), retired from the U.S. Navy after 29 years as a nuclear-trained surface warfare officer. He now serves as a Deputy Commandant of Cadets at Virginia Tech and as an adjunct professor in the U.S. Naval War College’s College of Distance Education. Passionate about using history to inform today, his area of focus is U.S. naval history, 1919 to 1945, with emphasis on the interwar period. He holds a Bachelor’s in History from Virginia Tech, a Master’s in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College, and a Master’s in Military History from Norwich University.
References
1. Quoted in Milan Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice (Rutledge: London, 2016), 188.
2. Milan Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice (Rutledge: London, 2016), 2.
3. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Military Strategy of the United States of America (US Department of Defense: Washington, DC, 2018), 1.
4. Ibid., 7.
5. Ibid.
6. Milan Vego, Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice (Rutledge: London, 2017), 1.
7. Vego, Sea Denial, 301.
8. Vego, Sea Control, 188-9.
9. Christopher J. McMahon, “Maritime Trade Warfare,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 70: No. 3 (Summer 2017), 29-34.
10. Ibid., 29-30.
11. Naval War College Professor James Holmes argues that considering PRC sea power, their entire military must be considered and not just the PLAN, see James Holmes, “Visualize Chinese Sea Power,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings (June 2018). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/june/visualize-chinese-sea-power
12. McMahon, “Maritime Trade Warfare,” 29-30.
13. Vego, Sea Control, 18-20.
Featured Image: August 6, 1988, Egypt: An aerial port bow view of the aircraft carrier USS FORRESTAL (CV 59) transiting the Suez canal. A formation of crewmen spells out”108″on the bow to signify that the ship has been at sea for 108 consecutive days. (Photo by PH2 Buckner, USN/U.S. National Archives)
The primary objective of the game of Go is the control of territory. Players do this by laying stones in ways that maximize the connectedness of their own pieces, deny connectedness of enemy pieces, and in ways that mark out the most territory on the board. Open spaces next to any stone are called ‘liberties,’ and marks opportunity for connection or disconnection. Placing your stone on an enemy stone’s liberty cuts off your opponent’s options.
It is possible to capture enemy stones by taking away the last liberty of any group of connected or individual stones. Competitive stone laying where capture is the likely outcome is equated to a ‘fight.’ Novice players often focus on winning a fight with their opponent, as they spend several turns laying stones in ways that allow them to completely surround their opponent’s group. But the overall goal is not maximizing the amount of stones captured. Preoccupation with capturing stones will lead a player to lose momentum and initiative while their opponent spends those turns carving out territory, maximizing strategic control of the entire board, and ultimately winning the game.
This is the challenge the sea services face as they pursue the goals of the 2018 National Defense Strategy.1 As the United States embarks on a period of great power competition with potential adversaries, the Navy and Marine Corps are focused on achieving deterrence by denial through means of sea control and sea denial. While naval forces must be able to win a conventional conflict should one break out, the risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange puts a premium instead on convincing adversaries that conflict isn’t worth the risk. Defense planners seek this objective by constricting enemy maneuver and decision space, and by canalizing opponents toward de-escalatory off-ramps. While the risk of war is present, the goal is not to capture or kill enemy forces – it is instead to control territory to obtain a strategic victory without fighting – Sun Tzu’s acme of skill.
The littorals are home to key maritime terrain that will define this battle for control of the global commons. To date, the sea services have focused their efforts on developing mutually reinforcing operational concepts that will achieve sea control and sea denial in this space. Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) seeks to mass effects without massing forces, mitigating the vulnerabilities of U.S. Navy ships at the outset of any potential conflict by placing them as stand-off forces outside of an enemy’s Weapons Engagement Zone (WEZ) until threats have been reduced or sea control is achieved.2 Sea control will be initially achieved by Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), which will place Marine Corps teams as stand-in forces to persist forward inside the WEZ, where combinations of mobile sensors and shooters will deny enemy freedom of action in the maritime domain.3 With enemy A2/AD capabilities checked by stand-in forces, stand-off forces will once again enjoy freedom of maneuver in the area of operations. When applied to archipelagic defense, such as across the first island chain, these concepts are inherently about imposing high-threat chokepoints on an adversary from the littorals.
While bold and full of potential, EABO and DMO possess their own gaps. If naval forces were projecting the power of EABO and DMO on a Go board, or oban, there would be points where they would lack connectedness, and where an adversary would maintain liberties. To better explore means by which strategic chokepoints in the littorals can be controlled, the sea services must revitalize mine warfare.
Naval mine warfare (MIW) has played a significant role in every major American military conflict.4 If employed in support of sea control strategies under development by the Navy and Marine Corps, and should its full potential be leveraged by emerging technologies, MIW can serve as the lynchpin for deterring aggression in the maritime domain, and if necessary, for defeating adversaries at sea.
Where is Mine Warfare?
As sea control concepts, EABO and DMO are incredibly promising. They have generated great attention and energy from national security specialists and military thinkers, resulting in a high yield of thought pieces that have informed official military publications. This conversation has mostly focused on the integration of naval forces in support of DMO and EABO, new ways to employ existing capabilities for sea control, and what new capabilities need to be acquired or developed to provide sea denial.
But one topic that has not seen nearly enough discussion is the application of MIW in support of deterrence or denial. Most glaringly, official sea service documents are silent on the subject of MIW’s role in modern naval strategy. A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority2.0, which was revised explicitly to align with the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 NDS, does not even include the word ‘mine,’ let alone any MIW related subjects.5 The Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment concept passingly mentions the need to consider command and control operations for Navy mine warfare capabilities, and only mentions MIW twice more but in terms of mine countermeasures, not Navy MIW employment.6 All other official sea service publications are similarly glib on the topic. The only solid connection between the potential for MIW in reference to deterring China is made in a 2015 Foreign Affairs article discussing archipelagic defense, years before the release of the current NSS and NDS.7
The absence of mine warfare in these discussions should be shocking to maritime strategists given the incredible historical utility of MIW. Mines have damaged or sunk more ships over the past 125 years than all other weapon systems combined.8 The lack of consideration for MIW preceding its decisive employment in America’s wars is the repetition of an old tune. To take one example, prior to the start of the Second World War, the U.S. Navy hadn’t built a minesweeper in its history.9 By the war’s end, the U.S. had laid thousands of mines which sank hundreds of Japanese ships, critically disrupting Japanese maritime shipping.10 After years of stilted progress in the Vietnam War, the mining of Haiphong Harbor was a critical factor in compelling America’s enemies to start negotiating for an end to the war.11
September 17, 1992: RADM Raynor A. E. Taylor, commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command, center, briefs ADM David E. Jeremiah, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as Jeremiah studies a mine during his tour aboard the miscellaneous flagship USS LA SALLE (AGF-3). (National Archives)
Today, the pendulum has swung back in the direction of limited consideration for MIW. The U.S. Navy has only two types of mines in its inventory, the aircraft-laid Quickstrike and the Submarine-Laid Mobile Mine (SLMM). And despite a military technology renaissance that is characterized by autonomous systems, human-machine teaming, and the Internet of Things (IoT), scant energy has been directed toward pairing disruptive technologies with MIW, let alone for the purposes of sea control or sea denial. The most recent Navy-sponsored innovations in MIW, the Quickstrike-J, Quickstrike-ER, and the Hammerhead, only allow for more precise deployment of existing mine capacity.
MIW can critically reinforce control of key maritime terrain, particularly at strategic chokepoints in the littorals. This is possible by understanding the potential that MIW brings to the sea control and sea denial strategies under development by the Navy and Marine Corps, and by employing current and emerging technologies to support the new and repurposed force design.
Employing Mine Warfare in Sea Control
A critical aspect of sea control strategy is the control of key maritime terrain. This includes any area, ashore or at sea, that when controlled enables influence over the maneuver of others conducted in, on, or around that area. Imagine a small, concealed team of Marines operating from an Expeditionary Advanced Base (EAB) somewhere in the South China Sea, armed with a long-range precision fires system with a threat range of 300 nautical miles. By virtue of its location and the influence its weapon system has on maneuver around its location, this EAB force is occupying key maritime terrain and executing sea denial. By the same token, a U.S. Navy surface ship with a threat range around the Straits of Malacca would similarly provide sea control at key maritime terrain.
In the sea control envisioned by naval planners to execute the 2018 NDS, most writers have described a series of interlocking, mutually reinforcing threat envelopes presented by naval forces, comprised of teams of Marines ashore operating out of EABs, and small, distributed Navy platforms afloat.12 Used in the context of deterring China, such archipelagic defenses would provide the U.S. and its allies with significant influence over areas such as the South China Sea and East China Sea, limiting Chinese freedom of maneuver, providing a check against Chinese A2/AD, and providing entry for U.S. stand-off forces. While highly promising, the concepts are largely reliant on the deployment and persistence of naval forces in threatening forward areas, providing a vulnerability that adversaries will undoubtedly seek to exploit. In this construct, the enemy maintains liberties.
This is where mine warfare can fill the gap, and provide stand-in forces with significantly enhanced flexibility and greater ability to control the sea. Used in concert with the sea control concept described earlier, naval mines can expand and more robustly interconnect the threat envelope presented by naval stand-in forces, and fill in the gaps between forward archipelagic defenses.
An overview of stand-in and stand-off force employment, where mines could reinforce force posture at the seams of archipelagic defense. (credit: Thomas Mahken, et al/CSBA)
Imagine two EABs in the South China Sea. The sensors and shooters they employ provide some span of sea control, but those forces are targetable and the control they provide is dependent on their ability to sense and shoot. If these two EABs were connected by a series of mines, one of which also pressed itself forward of the EABs, not only is their control reinforced, but they also have a kind of picket that simultaneously provides sea control and force protection. If they were stones in the game of Go, they would have attained connectedness.
Further, mines offer more than a way to reinforce emerging force design concepts that support sea control, but might serve as a primary means by which to establish sea control and denial. Viewing this maritime strategy as deterrence in depth, stand-off forces are farthest out from our key maritime terrain until conditions are right. Stand-in forces are the next layer forward, persisting inside the WEZ and providing some level of sea control and a check against A2/AD. Finally, mines employed by stand-in forces are the most forward projected capability, providing sea denial and pressing enemy naval forces against the wall.
If this were a game of Go with the South China Sea as the board, U.S. mines could serve as the lynchpin in this series of stones that connect key maritime terrain across Singapore, the Riau Islands, the Spratly Islands, the Philippines, and through the Ryukyus toward Japan. Having occupied all of the opponent’s liberties, we gain control of the greatest amount of territory, deny the opponent options, and have the greatest leverage as the game unfolds.
Employing Mines for Sea Control in a Contested Environment
The final challenge is employing mines in strategic chokepoints in a contested environment. Adversaries will not idly stand by while U.S. naval forces deploy mines and restrict their freedom of maneuver. While existing mine deployment methods provide some capability, they are hardly ideal for an environment of competition, or where the first goal is deterrence rather than outright conflict. Thankfully, current and emerging technologies offer a plethora of means by which mines can be employed per the above framework.
Commander Timothy McGeehan and Commander Douglas Wahl (ret.) ably described potential applications of the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s (DARPA) Upward Falling Payload (UFP) program. DARPA developed the UFP to provide distributed, unmanned containers that could lie on the ocean floor for years at a time, providing materiel on demand in maritime theaters across the globe. McGeehan and Wahl envisioned applying the UFP to create a minefield on demand, replacing materiel with mines.13 Taking this a step further, and deliberately in line with DMO and EABO concepts, this capability could instead be deployed well before tensions escalate with potential adversaries, and should the need arise, be employed by naval stand-in forces who could use distributed command and control systems to maneuver these minefields wherever they would best support sea control and denial requirements. Further, the knowledge that such an asset could create a stranglehold in key maritime terrain would further deter aggression and escalation among adversaries.
Upward Falling Payload concept (DARPA graphic)
While promising, the UFP has its own vulnerabilities, and such mines may be detected and swept by adversaries. Another method of deploying maneuverable minefields is through a modification to the current mechanism used for deploying the Quickstrike-ER Mine. Currently, the Quickstrike-ER is dropped by an Air Force B-52 bomber, and moves onto target with an attached Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kit. While this provides a shallow-water mine that can be deployed outside of enemy anti-aircraft fire range, the Quickstrike-ER cannot be moved to another location. By combining the Quickstrike-ER package with that of the UFP, we can provide a maneuverable minefield that can be deployed on demand, that can be controlled by naval forces, and maneuvered as needed to best support sea control requirements.
Another method of deployment and employment of mines is by modifying the Expeditionary Mine Counter Measures (ExMCM) company, training and equipping it instead to execute mine warfare in key maritime terrain. The ExMCM company is trained to employ unmanned systems for the purposes of executing the MCM mission. While usually deploying its systems from rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIB), they recently validated the employment of Zodiac combat rubber raiding craft (CRRC) to conduct MCM in a clandestine environment.14 Pursuing this and similar clandestine insertion methods, a newly formed Expeditionary Mine Warfare (ExMIW) company could instead emplace and control fields of naval mines at key maritime terrain, in support of sea control and denial. Alternatively, Marines training for EABO might add this task to their mission profile.
Panama City, Fla. (May 14, 2016) — Engineman 2nd Class Jonathan Lavoie (left) and Aerographer’s Mate 1st Class Christopher Kyall (right), assigned to Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit 2 (MDSU) Unmanned Systems Platoon 204, lower a Mark 18 Mod. 2 unmanned underwater vehicle into the water during an Expeditionary Mine Countermeasure (ExMCM) certification exercise. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Charles Oki)
With ever increasing flexibility provided by automation and human-machine teaming, the possibilities for deployment are almost endless. While the sea services can be solution agnostic, the end state is a maneuverable naval mine that can be controlled by naval forces operating at strategic chokepoints in order to control key maritime terrain, deter adversary action, and if needed, to win the maritime fight.
Mine Warfare: A Pillar of Deterrence by Denial
The potential of mine warfare in major military conflict is a matter of historical record beyond repute. Despite this, the utility of MIW is often ignored by American military planners between periods of conflict. The direction of the NSS and the NDS to prepare for great power competition demands more from naval leaders. The development of MIW capabilities in support of deterrence by denial must begin today.
While DMO and EABO provide the essential building blocks of sea control and denial, their deterrent power can be exponentially increased through the integration of MIW. Whether deployed between EABs by ExMIW companies, activated from UFPs and maneuvered into place as the situation dictates, or fired into shallow waters with the modified Quickstrike-ER and moved as required by C2 systems, MIW is the most promising yet underdeveloped capability for today’s maritime strategists. With these and similar innovations, the sea services can deliver on the promise of sea control and deterrence by denial, and win this global game of Go.
4. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-15: Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare Operations (Washington, D.C.: Joint Force Development, 2018), IV-1.
5. United States Navy, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2018), 1.
6. US Navy and US Marine Corps, Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, Marine Corps: 2017), 11.
11. William Greer, “The 1972 Mining of Haiphong Harbor: A Case Study in Naval Mining and Diplomacy” (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, April 1997)
