Tag Archives: E.U.

Africa, Capability Analysis, Strategic Outlook

West Africa: An Ounce of Prevention

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AMLEP in action: A joint U.S. and Sierra Leone law enforcement boarding team talk with the crew of a cargo ship.
AMLEP in action: A joint U.S. and Sierra Leone law enforcement boarding team talk with the crew of a cargo ship.

After a series of high-profile stand-offs with Somali pirates, the international community has directed a great deal of resources toward securing the Gulf of Aden. But with an increase in piracy and other criminal activities in the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea, some of which may be linked to terrorist networks, what role can the Atlantic community play in securing the coasts of West Africa?

On the one hand, the United States and European partners are making an important contribution in terms of equipment. In particular, vessels provided through the U.S. military’s Excess Defense Articles system have bolstered the capabilities of naval forces in the region. A recent example is the acquisition by the Nigerian Navy of a former U.S. Navy survey ship and a U.S. Coast Guard cutter, due to be delivered by early 2014. These donated vessels will go a long way to boosting capabilities, especially as at this time the Nigerian Navy is largely dependent on Seaward Defense Boats commissioned from the Indian shipyard Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers. The Indian Navy itself has decommissioned its own complement of Seaward Defense Boats because these vessels generate a disproportionately large maintenance overhead – the materials and method of construction leave the patrol craft with very low corrosion tolerance.

More than vessels and equipment, however, the naval forces of West African countries require training assistance. In this area, some training and joint exercises are being conducted by NATO and EU member states, but much of this is carried out on a bilateral, case-by-case basis. In April 2013, French and American military advisors provided training to Liberian Coast Guard personnel, including such topics as non-compliant vessel boarding, search and seizure tactics, weapons familiarization, and hull sweeps for mines and smuggling compartments. All of this mentorship and training was limited to a four-day port visit by a French frigate to Monrovia, the Liberian capital.

Other training opportunities take place intermittently. U.S. Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF) has introduced the Africa Partnership Station (APS) program, through which U.S. Navy and Coast Guard crews carry out mentoring initiatives similar to the Monrovia visit described above. The Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) sees personnel from the U.S. Coast Guard and relevant African institutions operating alongside one another for a slightly more sustained duration. Under this latter program, a U.S. Navy or Coast Guard vessel patrols the territorial waters of the African host country, carrying both an American boarding party and a boarding party from the host country, enhancing that country’s counter-piracy capabilities while also exposing the partner country’s personnel to U.S. Coast Guard best practices.

Although AMLEP benefits from a greater duration and depth of interaction, the exchanges are still too brief to develop naval forces that can operate independently in West Africa. More must be done in this area in order to avoid a scenario in which piracy interferes with shipping in the Gulf of Guinea to such an extent that NATO and its partners must field an intervention of the same scale and extent as Operation Ocean Shield, which continues to this day in the Gulf of Aden. To reduce reliance on Ocean Shield, the European Union has since 2012 mounted an ambitious training assistance mission, known as EUCAP NESTOR, with the objective of providing consistent and intensive training assistance to the maritime forces of such countries as Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya. The mission has 45 full-time staff members working in the countries – primarily Djibouti – and a planned capacity of 137. Begun with a mandate of two years, EUCAP NESTOR could be renewed until these East African states are able to take charge of policing the Gulf of Aden, replacing Ocean Shield.

Whereas EUCAP NESTOR was introduced in East Africa as a response to a full-blown crisis of pirate activity, a similar mission could be launched in West Africa as a preventative measure. The lessons that could be provided and the connections that could be forged in a two-year mandate would likely surpass what can be achieved in a four-day port visit. Whether such a training mission would be better carried out under the auspices of the EU or NATO is a matter of political debate. From a practical standpoint, however, committing resources to the sustained development of the Nigerian Navy, the Liberian Coast Guard, and other regional partners would be more cost-effective than the eventual alternative: the deployment of an Ocean Shield-style mission to the Gulf of Guinea.

Paul Pryce is a Junior Research Fellow at the Atlantic Council of Canada. Having previously worked with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, he has an active interest in both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ security issues.

Strategic Outlook

No South EU Sea

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Rafale fighters launch from the deck of the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle

By Peter Solomon

The South China Sea contains the second busiest trading route in the world: the Straight of Malacca. Vital to meeting the energy demand of China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, the supply flow through this region is comprised mainly of crude oil, liquefied natural gas, coal, and iron ore. On account of the territorial claim disputes that afflict the South China Sea, several militaries have been busy modernizing, namely China, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Overall, six nations claim partial or entire territorial rights over the South China Sea: China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Brunei. What’s at stake in the region is more than trade routes – a 2006 estimate by the United States Energy Information Administration revealed proven reserves of 26.7 billion barrels of oil in the South China Sea (about the same quantity as Oman, Qatar, Syria, and Yemen’s oil reserves combined), and proven reserves of natural gas amounting to 7.9 trillion cubic meters (about the same quantity as Saudi Arabia or the United States’ reserves). Due to the considerable value of the oil and natural gas, the potential for disagreement is exceptionally high and, therefore, the possibility of conflict over territory in the South China Sea cannot be understated.

 

Due to the magnitude of trade and investment conducts the European Union (EU) with Japan and South Korea, and the great prospects for enhancing economic relations, the EU has a great stake in the security of East Asia. About 18.1% (251.5 bn. Euros) of the EU’s exports are destined for East Asia, while a mere 3.3% go to other destinations in Asia. Additionally, the EU imports about 30.1% (452 bn. Euros) of its goods from East Asia compared to just 4.2% for the rest of Asia. It is easy to see that a good deal of the EU’s economic health depends upon trade with East Asia. Therefore, a key EU foreign policy security goal is to promote peace and stability in East Asia.

 

China is in the process of modernizing its People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to exert Chinese influence in the region. It is no secret that China is building up its power projection capabilities to counter-balance the presence of the United States defense forces in the Western Pacific. Due to Japan and South Korea’s geographic location and security ties, any conflict or disruption to stability in the South China Sea could have major impacts on East Asia. The EU’s concern, however, is in regards to Europe’s economic stake in the region and the EU’s identity as a normative power. Despite the EU’s promotion of peace and stability in East Asia, the institution’s lack of credible power projection capabilities in the region belie the EU’s ability to intervene in security issues in the region. 

 

Although an EU-led military operation would be unlikely in the Western Pacific, the importance of the region would compel individual nations to act to maintain law and order, or to preserve maritime safety, safeguarding their commercial interests in the region. In the event of a conflict it is entirely possible that EU member states would engage the region through the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO). Recent counter-piracy operations off the coast of Africa have set a precedent for maritime military action far from the traditional European area of operations. Additionally, Great Britain and France can still act on their own if it is in their best interests as both maintain competent navies with power projection capabilities, including the ability to deploy their own aircraft carriers.

 

In the case of a South China Sea conflict, Japan would be most certainly directly involved as its tankers transport 70% of Japan’s oil through this region. A confrontation would force Japan’s oil tankers to circumvent a conflict in the South China Sea by navigating around Indonesia into the Pacific Ocean. However, this option would be both expensive and laborious. Additionally, two-thirds of South Korean natural gas is shipped through the South China Sea on its way to the Korean peninsula. In regards to the European Union’s economic interests in East Asia, maritime security is crucial for Europe.

 

Currently, EU military capabilities consist of 13 battlegroups, which are “rapid response units” that consist of 1,500 troops each. EU member states rotate the responsibility of provisioning these units, two of which have always been on stand by since 2007. However, this force has never been deployed and it is difficult to say how the debt crisis will affect the EU’s research and development into new military capabilities. Given the budget cuts and focus on internal issues, the EU will likely continue to place the burden on the United States to maintain the status quo in the Western Pacific region. In the event of a crisis in the South China Sea, it would be the effects on the EU’s East Asian trading partners that would create the most potential to draw in the maritime forces of individual EU member states.

 

Whether or not the EU will cooperate in joint military expeditions with Japan or South Korea in the future is unknown. With regard to economics, EU-Japan and EU-South Korea economic ties are substantial, and significant cooperation in both relationships has led to the emergence of global economic partnerships via Free Trade Agreements with both nations. Through Japan and South Korea, the EU has established a gateway into East Asia’s vast markets and developed a role as a player in security issues, albeit a minimal role for the time being. Despite the EU’s current internal focus it cannot forget about its strategic partnership with Japan and South Korea.

 

This post is from our British partners at TheRiskyShift.com and can be found in its original form here.

Peter Solomon is a Master of Arts in International Political Economy candidate at King’s College London. Peter earned a bachelors degree from the University of Connecticut in English and Political Science.