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Neither Fish nor Fowl: China’s Development of a Nuclear Battery AIP Submarine

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By Dr. Sarah Kirchberger and CAPT Christopher P. Carlson, USN (Ret)

On September 27, 2024, news broke that a previously unreported new type of Chinese nuclear-powered submarine, dubbed the “Type 041,” had suffered a major mishap at its fitting out pier at the Wuchang shipyard in Wuhan, according to unnamed Pentagon sources. Submarine expert Thomas Shugart had previously spotted an unknown submarine with a distinct x-shaped stern at Wuchang Shipyard from satellite imagery taken on 26 April 2024, and days later reported unusual crane activity at the same pier location from June 2024 imagery, speculating that the new boat suffered a serious incident.

Even more intriguing and consequential than the question of whether a submarine incident of some sort actually did occur at Wuchang or not, is however another issue: What type of “nuclear-powered submarine” could this new design possibly be?

China watchers were quick to point out that the Wuchang Shipyard in Wuhan had not hitherto built any nuclear submarines, although the shipyard’s facilities were completely rebuilt at a new location (from 2012-2020) and massively enlarged. All Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) have so far been constructed exclusively at the Bohai Shipyard at Huludao. The imagery of the new submarine makes it clear it is too small for a SSN, and is similar in size to China’s Type 039A/B/C Yuan series of conventionally powered submarines. Another interesting indicator was the reported type number – “041” – which is a continuation of the traditional numbering scheme carried by China’s diesel-electric submarines. By contrast, China’s nuclear-powered subs, whether SSNs or SSBNs, all have official type numbers starting with “09.” The next-generation Type 095 SSN and Type 096 SSBN are possibly already under construction at the Bohai Shipyard in Huludao, and there is no plausible suggestion that the smaller, unknown boat observed in Wuhan could represent either of those two platforms, given the larger estimated displacement of the Type 095 and Type 096 compared with the previous generation of Chinese SSNs and SSBNs.

A new type of nuclear battery AIP propulsion?

It would have been easy to dismiss the news of a supposedly nuclear-powered Type 041 submarine built in Wuhan as misinformation, were it not for the fact that several years earlier Chinese sources had hinted at a project for developing small, low power auxiliary nuclear reactors for conventional submarines, replacing the Stirling engine air-independent power system (AIP) that China developed based on a technology transfer from Sweden during the 1980s. A 2017 report by Richard D. Fisher described some details of such a plan based on slides from an academic lecture given by retired Rear Admiral Zhao Dengping.

Despite successfully developing a Stirling engine-based AIP system, China is known to have struggled with developing a more advanced, fuel cell-based AIP system as is currently in use with the German, South Korean and Singaporean navies, among others. Neither has China deployed lithium-ion batteries aboard its submarines, as pioneered by Japan. Here, Chinese analyses have stressed unresolved issues regarding the danger of thermal runaway, which poses heightened risks of a severe fire aboard a submerged submarine.

In light of such technical challenges, China may have decided to forgo developing high power density fuel cells or even more powerful Stirling engines for submarine applications, even though lithium-ion batteries are probably still on the table, opting for a different solution altogether by developing a nuclear battery.

Interestingly, as reported by R.D. Fisher, Rear Admiral Zhao Dengping’s lecture slides described just such a nuclear battery project. Of the presentation slides posted online, three dealt specifically with a small-scale nuclear reactor for conventional submarine platforms. One slide showed a basic schematic diagram that depicted a possible layout of the nuclear-powered electric propulsion plant. The reactor itself is described as a low pressure, low temperature design that employs natural circulation in the primary loop. Steam is generated, however, through an intermediate loop that appears to be in a separate compartment, which is then sent to a secondary loop with a conventional steam driven turbine generator in yet another compartment. While this design suggests an emphasis on safety, it does so at the expense of internal volume requirements and thermodynamic efficiency.

It is reasonable to ask if these slides accurately reflect Chinese intentions. With the benefit of hindsight, the response would be a confident “yes” because every slide posted from RADM Zhao’s lecture showed a platform or system that was then in service, undergoing testing, or was in the advanced research and development stage. For example, Zhao presented a slide that discussed a large deck amphibious assault ship – larger than the Type 075. The computer-generated graphic on the slide is very similar to the Type 076 currently under construction at the new Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard on Changxing Island. Another slide depicted an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) engagement launched from a surface ship. This too has come to fruition when a video of a Type 055 launching an ASBM was posted in April 2022. These two examples of a platform or system that hadn’t been known to exist in 2017, but became evident years later, demand that the small reactor concept be taken seriously.

Some seven years after RADM Zhao’s slides became public, on 24 April 2024, a Chinese news article claimed that, in honor of the 75th birthday of the PLA Navy, a “new nuclear-powered submarine installed with a domestically produced small nuclear reactor” and based on the hull design of the conventionally powered “Type 039C” AIP sub was in development at the Wuchang shipyard in Wuhan. Note, this article came out a mere two days before the satellite images of the shipyard were taken and subsequently analyzed by Tom Shugart. The article compares the new Type 041 submarine design to an enlarged French Rubis class and states that its submerged displacement would be around 4,000 tons and thus larger than the Rubis, allowing it to integrate more capable sensor and weapon systems. The article describes the small auxiliary reactor as a “low-temperature, low-pressure, subcritical nuclear reactor” to “directly charge” the boat’s battery rather than drive the propeller. This describes a nuclear battery AIP system that allows the battery to be charged continuously while the boat is submerged and would eliminate the need to surface every 20 days as in the case of China’s Stirling AIP submarines.

The article goes on to say the first one or two units of the Type 041 would likely be used as prototypes for weeding out technical issues before any further units would be produced. It speculates that if the development is successful, even older conventional submarines could be gradually retrofitted with a nuclear battery AIP system. The article states that this could potentially transform China’s conventional submarine fleet into a fully nuclear-powered fleet. Despite some questionable technical conclusions by the author, the article is consistent with Zhao’s lecture material.

What is a nuclear battery?

The reference to a “small” reactor on the Type 041 should be understood in the context of existing submarine reactors, which produce between 70 – 190 megawatts of thermal power (MWt) depending on the design and all belong to the category of microreactors. These reactors are defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency as having a power generation capability of less than 50 megawatts of electrical power (MWe), or approximately 220 MWt. Most microreactors are in the 1 – 20 MWe (≈6 – 125 MWt) range; the nuclear battery resides at the bottom end of this category. Nuclear batteries are loosely defined as nuclear reactors that produce up to 20 MWt or approximately 3 MWe. These reactors are indeed “small” in comparison to those on larger SSNs and SSBNs and can fit into a Type 039A/B/C submarine pressure hull that is about 7.1 meters in diameter.

While rather scarce, nuclear batteries have been used in submarine and submersible designs before: the American NR-1 (≈1 MWt), the Soviet Project 651E Juliett with the VAU-6 (4.9 MWt) boiling water reactor, the Project 20120 Sarov, and the collection of deep-diving submersibles of the Soviet/Russian Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research or GUGI, including Project 1851 X-Ray, Project 1851.1 Paltus, Project 1910 Uniform, and Project 1083.1 Losharik, reported to have a pressurized water reactor in the 10 – 15 MWt range. Lastly, Canada conducted considerable research in the late 1980s to develop a “baby nuke” submarine using an Autonomous Marine Power Source or AMPS-1000 powerplant with a maximum design power of 10.8 MWt.

Based on RADM Zhao’s description that the small reactor being considered operates at low pressure and low temperature, it is reasonable to assume a maximum thermal power rating of 10 – 11 MW – consistent with Soviet and Canadian experience. The thermodynamic efficiency would be on the low side for historical nuclear batteries, around 12% – 13%, due to the losses involved with the additional intermediate steam generation loop as shown in the system diagram slide. Despite the low efficiency, such a nuclear power plant could generate about 1.3 MWe, four to five times that of any conventional AIP system. The hull size of the Type 041 revealed in satellite imagery is sufficiently large to accommodate the design as shown, but even with the additional 7 meters in length, the Stirling engines and cryogenic oxygen storage would have to be removed to free up additional volume.

Operational advantages of a nuclear battery

All types of advanced conventional AIP propulsion systems, whether fuel cell, Stirling engine, or steam turbine based, offer extended submerged endurance to small and medium size submarines when compared with traditional diesel-electric propulsion systems, such as that fitted to the Project 636M Kilo-class China imported from Russia. The latter typically needs to come up to snorkeling depth every day for two to three hours to recharge its batteries, assuming a 10% – 12% indiscretion rate, thus greatly increasing the risk of detection. At best, a Kilo-class submarine can stay submerged at slow speed for about three days before needing to snorkel. Chinese analysts have in the past lamented the fact that this limitation exposes Chinese submarines to adversary anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces just when they are about to reach deeper diving depths in the Okinawa Trough after leaving port in East China. Any AIP system would help to alleviate this predicament, but the maximum submerged transit speed of a submarine utilizing a conventional AIP system is still only 4 – 6 knots. A nuclear battery AIP system as described above could support submerged transit speeds of up to 9 – 10 knots while meeting all hotel loads and the electrical power requirements of the nuclear plant auxiliaries.

Another advantage that is often not discussed is that there is ample electrical power available to outfit a Type 041 with a full spectrum of atmospheric control equipment. Conventional AIP boats still need to ventilate daily to renew the atmosphere with fresh air, unless the crew relies on a limited supply of consumable chemical systems to purge carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide from the atmosphere. Oxygen isn’t a problem as the crew can vent off a little from the AIP cryogenic oxygen tank to support their needs. A Type 041 can feasibly be fitted with compact oxygen generators, carbon dioxide scrubbers, and carbon monoxide-hydrogen burners, thereby giving the submarine complete independence from outside air.

Lastly, despite what the advertising brochures say, conventional AIP systems do not charge submarine storage batteries well. They can keep a fully charged battery topped off, but recharging a battery that has been significantly discharged is really not a viable option. Russian brochure data on the Project 636 Kilo states that it would take about 12 hours to recharge a completely discharged battery; this is with most of the output of two 1.5 MW DC generators run by the diesel engines. A conventional AIP system would be hard pressed to produce even a tenth of the power that diesel-driven DC generators can provide – this means multiple days to fully recharge a very low battery. A nuclear battery AIP system would be more capable of recharging a battery, but it will still take longer than using the diesel-driven DC generators. The main advantage in this case is the nuclear AIP system could support sufficient speeds to move the submarine clear of a possible ASW threat so that the diesel generators could be used to recharge the battery.

This severe limitation is why most AIP submarine crews tend to operate their boat like a traditional diesel-electric submarine for as long as they can, holding the AIP system in reserve for those tactical situations that demand greater stealth. By contrast, a nuclear battery AIP system turns this operating concept on its head. The crew can rely on the reactor to meet all their operating needs, allowing them to hold the battery in reserve to deal with those rare occasions where higher speed sprints are required to approach a target. In other words, a “SSn,” if you will, can patrol like a larger nuclear attack submarine, but because it lacks high-speed endurance would have to resort to conventional submarine approach tactics as the situation demands.

Due to their smaller size and comparative quietness, a SSn is better suited than larger SSNs to area-denial missions in shallow, coastal waters where the environment would make it difficult to detect a nuclear battery AIP platform; this makes them likewise useful for intelligence and mining missions. Whenever greater speed and longer steaming distances are required, however – for instance when hunting an adversary carrier strike group or tracking and trailing SSBNs on the high seas – their limitations render the SSn unsuitable. China, in light of its complex maritime geography of shallow littorals, does have an enduring requirement to operate both smaller coastal submarines for area denial missions in the Near Seas, as well as larger SSNs and SSBNs for its nuclear deterrence and missions in the Far Seas.

Could China have developed a nuclear battery AIP alone?

China has had difficulties in designing modern, reliable, and safe nuclear reactors for its next generation SSNs and SSBNs and reportedly has turned to Russian assistance in the recent past. This raises the question whether Russian help was also involved in developing China’s nuclear battery AIP submarine propulsion. Although open-source information falls short of a definitive answer, some indications hint at Russian assistance.

Firstly, the Soviet Union, and later Russia, have the most operational experience with this type of propulsion plant. The Soviet and Russian navies have operated nine relevant submarines, including the Project 651E Juliett and the Project 20120 Sarov, with the majority assigned to GUGI. Given that most of these nuclear battery plants were designed and built in the 1980s, Russia’s defense establishment would likely feel comfortable in sharing detailed design information on the older systems as well as providing technical support to China’s endeavors.

Secondly, Russia has previously transferred other types of nuclear propulsion technology to China. CMSI reported in 2023 that an agreement concluded in 2010 between Rosatom and the China Atomic Energy Agency for the expansion of Russian-Chinese joint nuclear power programs – including floating nuclear power plants – gave China “access to detailed technical information on the nuclear reactors Russia was installing on their nuclear power barges and new icebreakers.” These reactors either didn’t fully address China’s military needs or were too large for installation aboard a submarine, but nonetheless this transfer indicates a general willingness of Russia to provide China sensitive nuclear reactor technology.

Thirdly, there have been announcements that China and Russia are collaborating on a novel type of small submarine design. Already in 2015, reports indicated a Chinese interest in procuring four Lada-class submarines from Russia – a purchase that was never followed through in light of the Lada-class’s vexing technical issues. However, on August 25, 2020, quoting an official representative of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC), Russian state media announced that Russia and China were “jointly designing a new generation non-nuclear submarine.”

Although no further public information about this new type of jointly developed conventional submarine has since been disclosed, in October 2020, Vladimir Putin gave an intriguing answer to a question on Russian-Chinese relations at the 17th Valdai Annual Meeting:

“We have achieved a high level of cooperation in the defence industry—I am not only talking about the exchange or the purchase and sale of military products, but the sharing of technologies, which is perhaps most important. There are also very sensitive issues here. I will not speak publicly about them now, but our Chinese friends are aware of them. Undoubtedly, cooperation between Russia and China is boosting the defence potential of the Chinese People’s Army, which is in the interests of Russia as well as China.”

Though the nature of these “very sensitive” technologies remains unclear, submarine technology certainly fits the description, and in September 2024, news reports indeed indicated that Russia was supporting China with improving the nuclear propulsion plant of its next-generation Type 096 SSBN.

Fourth and lastly, Russia and China have for several years steadily enhanced their collaboration in sensitive anti-submarine warfare related technology areas – including fiber-optic hydrophones and underwater communication. This could be related to a general trend in their subsurface warfare cooperation.

Could the jointly developed Russian-Chinese “new generation non-nuclear submarine” be the Type 041? The apparent contradiction between the Russian statements and the arguments presented in this article could be accounted for if neither the Chinese nor the Russians consider this a traditional nuclear submarine, but a conventional submarine that uses a nuclear battery AIP system. Semantics? Perhaps, but this premise would also provide a rationale as to why the Type 041 was constructed at Wuchang instead of Huludao.

At this stage, it is not possible to determine whether the reported nuclear-powered Type 041 submarine spotted at Wuchang is related to the joint submarine collaboration that was announced in 2020. This new submarine could be solely a Chinese project, or a Chinese project that received some technical aid from Russia. None of these possibilities can be excluded.

The mutual benefits of collaboration on sensitive submarine technology

Russia, despite its superiority in the field of building nuclear submarines, has long struggled to develop AIP propulsion for its smaller conventional submarines. Russian industry representatives have envied China’s successful Stirling engine-based AIP system, going so far as to admit that the Rubin Design Bureau, when trying to develop fuel cell AIP and lithium-ion battery technology at the same time, was spreading itself too thinly and therefore did not succeed.

China, for its part, has lagged behind Russia in nuclear propulsion technology and has in the past received help from Russia in that area. The known transfers of Russian nuclear reactor technology might therefore just be the tip of the iceberg. There are thus clearly potential synergies that could be exploited. Joining forces to improve Chinese AIP with a small auxiliary nuclear reactor might be a project in which both sides could bring their respective strengths to the table while each profiting from a common submarine design. This hypothesis needs to be evaluated in the light of future information as it becomes available.

Since at least 2023, there has been speculation about the possibility that Russia might opt to rejuvenate its war-depleted fleet by ordering naval vessels from Chinese shipyards, which can offer competitive prices and superior production capacity, even for highly complex warships, when compared with cash-strapped Russian yards. On July 5, 2023, a Chinese news article reported a visit by Russia’s Navy Commander-in-Chief Yevmenov to the Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai. The article frankly discussed the possibility that Russia might opt for Chinese shipyard orders to solve its production capacity problems – noting however that this would be possible only “if Russia can overcome its pride.” A joint submarine design could, however, be produced in parallel by Chinese and Russian shipyards.

Opting for an advanced, nuclear battery AIP design would also make operational sense for Russia, not least because the whole concept originated from the Soviet Union in the 1970s.

Russia is at a disadvantage vis-à-vis NATO submarines in the shallow and confined undersea domain of the Baltic Sea, where its traditional nuclear-powered submarines can’t operate as efficiently as in deeper water. For that theater alone, a more capable, smaller AIP submarine would be desirable – and likewise for the Black Sea, Barents Sea, and parts of the Arctic Ocean, where Russia also routinely encounters NATO navies. In particular the recent Norwegian-German Type 212CD class submarine cooperation would be a serious concern for Russia on its northern flank. The pressure of having to meet those challenges, against the backdrop of Russia’s increasingly lopsided dependency on Chinese political and economic support due its war against Ukraine and Russia’s reduced shipbuilding production capacity, may have induced Russia to agree to a joint development of nuclear battery AIP submarines.

Even without an official agreement, there is the possibility that Russia’s arms industries could be faced with a brain drain of Russian specialists towards China, as Russia’s economic crisis worsens. There could thus be informal, behind-the-scenes Russian involvement even in a “purely indigenous” Chinese submarine program.

Conclusion

So far, the limited information on a new Type 041 submarine spotted on satellite imagery at Wuchang Shipyard yields more questions than answers. The above musings should be treated as hypotheses, to be revised as new data emerges. However, given the rapid modernization of China’s military, and particularly its navy, it seems advisable to keep an eye on the likelihood that the Type 041 submarine could be sporting a novel, auxiliary nuclear powerplant in place of the Stirling engine previously employed in its AIP propulsion system. Furthermore, such an improvement may have been derived from Soviet (and now Russian) technology, which pioneered auxiliary nuclear batteries for submarines during the 1980s. And if that were the case, the Type 041 may be the outcome of a Russian-Chinese collaboration on a new type of conventional submarine as announced by Russian state media in 2020.

Lastly, even if the Type 041 is indeed a novel kind of nuclear-powered small submarine, the Chinese SSN and SSBN programs (Type 095 and 096) will almost certainly continue because they are independent submarine development projects that are designed for distinctly different operational roles. Indeed, suggestions that the reported flooding casualty suffered by the Type 041 constitutes a major setback in China’s nuclear submarine program is overstated. The development of a smaller nuclear AIP submarine is completely segregated from the Type 095 and 096 production effort – an effort the Huludao Shipyard was enhanced to meet. At worst, the Type 041 mishap is a minor speedbump in China’s overall submarine modernization plans.

If the theories on the nuclear battery propulsion system presented above are confirmed, then the Type 041 SSn is neither fish, nor fowl. It would possess some, but not all, of the benefits associated with a traditional nuclear-powered attack submarine. In short, it would be a tertium quid – a third something – designed to specifically address China’s geographical and geopolitical concerns in the Near Seas.

Dr Sarah Kirchberger is Director of the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK) and Vice President of the German Maritime Institute (DMI). She is the author of Assessing China’s Naval Power and editor of Russia-China Relations: Emerging Alliance or Eternal Rivals?. Formerly an Assistant Professor of Sinology at the University of Hamburg, she has also served as a naval analyst with shipbuilder TKMS. She holds a M.A. and a PhD in Sinology from the University of Hamburg. 

Christopher Carlson is a retired U.S. Navy Reserve captain and Department of Defense naval systems engineer. He began his navy career as a submariner and transitioned to the scientific and technical intelligence field in both his reserve capacity and in his civilian job. He is one of the co-designers, with Larry Bond, of the Admiralty Trilogy series of tactical naval wargames – Harpoon V, Command at Sea, Fear God & Dread Nought, and Dawn of the Battleship. He has also authored numerous articles in the Admiralty Trilogy’s bi-annual journal, The Naval SITREP, on naval technology and combat modeling.

Featured Image: A PLA Navy submarine steams during a training exercise in the Yellow Sea. (PLA photo)

Capability Analysis

Land Force Integration: The Army’s Contribution to Deterring China

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By Major General James B. Bartholomees III 

Chinese Coast Guard vessels are ramming Philippine Coast Guard ships at an alarming rate in the South China Sea. Chinese military planes are increasing dangerous intercepts with U.S., Allied and partner planes over the international waters of East Asia. While the high-profile use of military ships and planes is concerning, China is building and training a joint military force designed with one overarching objective in mind—to seize land areas from its neighbors. 

U.S. naval and air forces have been contesting China’s maritime and air threats for years. But they alone cannot deny China the ends of its military strategy either through gray zone tactics or use of force. With significant U.S. Army investments in long range fires systems, and lessons of harsh ground combat in the war in Ukraine, the role of land forces in the Indo-Pacific is becoming more apparent. To deter China from seizing terrain as part of the long-term strategic competition, while assuring our regional allies, U.S. Army Pacific is complementing maritime and air forces by improving the ability to defend key terrain, including the sovereign territory of the United States and its Allies. This can be accomplished by increasing the scale and frequency of campaigning activities forward in the region involving long-range fires systems, pre-positioning equipment and supplies, and capitalizing on favorable policy developments.

U.S. Army Pacific is strengthening its multi-domain capabilities to support joint operations in the Indo-Pacific region. By increasing the scale and frequency of campaigning activities, namely regional exercises that involve long-range fires systems, the Army aims to bolster Allies’ and the joint force’s abilities to counter maritime and air threats. This approach, developed through the U.S. Army’s multi-domain operations doctrine and implemented by newly formed Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs), integrates land-based offensive and defensive capabilities with space, cyber, electronic warfare, and information operations.

Recently a Multi-Domain Task Force deployed its new Typhon Mid-Range Capability to Northern Luzon in the Philippines. Typhon is a mobile land-based anti-ship missile system capable of launching the Navy’s SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles. Typhon offers complementary capability to the Philippines’ BrahMos antiship missile batteries coming online. The deployment demonstrated U.S. commitment to a mutual defense treaty ally faced with escalating threats. This is particularly important as the Armed Forces of the Philippines shifts its focus from counterinsurgency operations in Mindanao to a new strategy of comprehensive archipelagic defense. MDTFs are also employing terrestrial sensors, high-altitude balloons, and deep-sensing platforms in the Indo-Pacific.

A Mid-Range Capability (MRC) Launcher from Charlie Battery, 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, Long Range Fires Battalion, 1st Multi-Domain Task Force arrives as part of the capability’s first deployment into theater on Northern Luzon, Philippines, April 7, 2024. (U.S. Army photo by Capt. Ryan DeBooy)

This new formation is applying lessons from recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East to drive experimentation with advanced technologies. This strategy enhances U.S. military effectiveness and empowers Allied nations with capacity to develop their own land-based long-range fires capabilities—critical for defending their sovereign areas—contributing to a more robust regional defense posture against potential adversaries like China.

U.S. Army Pacific is positioning critical sustainment equipment and supplies in Allied nations so that the U.S. is ready to meet its mutual defense treaty obligations and support U.S. joint forces. The tyranny of distance from the Continental United States to the “First Island Chain” of Japan – Taiwan – Philippines requires positioning essential equipment and supplies before any fast-moving crisis. For contingency purposes, the Army has pre-prepositioned stocks across the globe in locations such as the Middle East, Poland, Japan and Korea. These pre-positioned stocks provide a unique set of sustainment capabilities to the joint force to include Common User Land Transport (CULT), ship-to-shore fueling capability, bulk water purification and storage, vertical and horizontal engineering, field feeding, maintenance services, contracting and large-scale medical capabilities across a host of disciplines.

The Army also provides watercraft and causeways that the joint force relies upon for intra-theater sealift as well as ship-to-shore movements. U.S. Army Pacific is equipped with purpose-designed, theater-enabling commands to run these functions in support of the joint force, Allies and partners. For exercises and deployments, pre-positioned equipment and supplies in critical locations reduce commercial vessel movement costs and support the economies of vital U.S. Allies. Pre-positioning equipment and supply in the Philippines and Australia, for example, rather than on ships at sea, also enables the U.S. joint force to respond faster and more effectively to their international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief needs during natural events such as cyclones, typhoons, floods and landslides. Investment in pre-positioned equipment and supplies on our Allies’ soil allows the U.S. military to provide a range of options to protect and safeguard our friends in the region.

The U.S. Departments of Defense and State have matured existing policy agreements with many countries allowing the Army to tangibly improve the joint force’s ability to meet Mutual Defense Treaty obligations. The new reality of China’s land seizure capability combined with their increasing ties with Russia have informed our diplomatic and military support to allies and partners. Current agreements provide sufficient authority to increase exercise scope and duration as well as storage of military equipment and supplies, but often nations choose to support agreements based on their political will. 

Persistent engagement, collaboration, and routine communication are critical to earning and maintaining our allied and partner militaries’ trust. From information sharing with the Philippines on maritime threats to their economic exclusion zones, to network development with the Japanese in command post exercises and missile defense, the U.S. Army is building trusting relationships. In stark contrast to China’s bullying tactics, the U.S. Army works with local populations and governments to gain and retain freedom of action in the competitive space, giving joint and combined forces an edge should they have to transition to crisis or conflict.

Members of the Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) conduct operations. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Philip Velez)

Critics will question why allies and partners would be willing to grant access and basing short of a crisis. Because they will seek support when we least expect it – and we must be strategically vigilant in positioning forces and equipment ahead of a crisis. In competition short of war, land forces translate political legitimacy into military advantage through campaigning: the logical and sequential arrangement of operations, activities, and investments. These recommendations position U.S. Army forces to support Allies in anticipation of their requests for assistance, and at the invitation of the host nation under existing agreements. These simple actions strengthen our critical alliances – a value that China fails to bring into any of its transactional relationships.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General (retired) Mark Milley believed that “preparing for war is expensive,” but “there is nothing more expensive than fighting a war.” The forementioned costs would be far less than U.S. blood and treasure spilled in conflict with China. General Flynn, Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific, often reiterates that “our goal is no war.” To protect our allies and prevent another future conflict, U.S. land forces must complement maritime and air forces by increasing the scale and frequency of exercises involving long-range fires systems, pre-positioning equipment, and capitalizing on policy developments. U.S. air and sea power alone will not deter. Controlling physical land areas and nonphysical areas (e.g., human and information dimensions) directly supports freedom of the seas, in times of competition, or command of the sea in wartime. Alongside Marine Corps stand-in forces and U.S. special operations forces, Army forces can help secure key terrain in maritime Asia. Land force integration is essential to preventing war and winning the long-term strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.

Major General James B. Bartholomees III currently serves as the Chief of Staff of U.S. Army Pacific. He previously served as the Operations Officer of U.S. Army Pacific and his previous commands include the 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) and 2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. MG Bartholomees holds a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering from the United States Military Academy and a Masters in National Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

References

ADM Samuel J. Paparo, USN, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Change of Command speech, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, (May 3, 2024). 

Josh Luckenbaugh, “Army Has Role to Play in Air Force’s Agile Combat Concept,” National Defense Magazine (September 12, 2024).

General Charles Flynn and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Devine, “Mobilize Land Power to Contain China’s Maritime Ambitions” USNI Proceedings (September 2024). 

“2022 National Defense Strategy,” U.S. Department of Defense. 

Doll, A., et al., The Backbone of U.S. Joint Operations: Army Roles in the Indo-Pacific, Rand (May 5, 2023).

Frederick, B. et al. Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces, Rand (February 4, 2020).

Chris Panella, “The US Army put on a sudden show of force out on the far edge of Alaska to send the message it can as Russia and China partner in the Pacific,” Business Insider, (September 14, 2024).

Watts, S., et al., Assessing the Value of Overseas Military Campaigning in Strategic Competition, Rand (December 13, 2022).

Wong, J. P., et al., New Directions for Projecting Land Power in the Indo-Pacific: Contexts, Constraints, and Concepts, Rand (December 20, 2022).

Featured Image: Soldiers observe a live fire during Rim of the Pacific 2018 at Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands. (Sgt. 1st Class Claudio Tejada/Army)

2027 War Readiness Week

To Prepare for Pacific War by 2027, the United States Must Harden its Southern Flank

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2027 War Readiness Week

By Henry Ziemer

The United States’ foundations as a global great power rest in no small part on its status as a regional hegemon. No single country in the Western Hemisphere can make a serious bid to balance Washington’s economic and military might, to say nothing of competing with the close but often-overlooked bonds of trade, culture, and family which constitute vital elements of U.S. strength in the region. Because they are so easily forgotten however, the United States has shown an alarming willingness to take its position in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) for granted. The 2022 National Security Strategy proudly proclaims that “No region impacts the United States more directly than the Western Hemisphere,” but the U.S. defense posture in LAC is at risk of being outflanked by extra-hemispheric competitors, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) first among them.

While the PRC has led with economic engagement in its approach to LAC countries, military considerations have not been far behind. China has funded dual-use civilian and military infrastructure, most notably ports and satellite ground stations throughout the region. Today, Chinese-owned or operated ports dot the coastlines of LAC countries, secretive satellite ground stations collect signals intelligence in Argentina, and potentially Cuba, and PRC-supplied weapons have made their way into the hands of dictatorial regimes like Venezuela. In the event of a Pacific War, these capabilities and more would likely be leveraged by China to collect intelligence on and disrupt U.S. operations within the Western Hemisphere, as well as leverage its soft power within the region to court influence and keep LAC governments neutral or even sway some towards overt support of Beijing’s position in the conflict. While it remains improbable that China would seek to contest the Western Hemisphere theater with the United States by 2027, the combination of these hybrid tactics could severely undermine the United States’ position in the very region most critical for U.S. physical security.

Fortunately, the next three years present a number of opportunities for the United States to meaningfully strengthen its southern flank. Specifically, the United States should prioritize better coordination between its Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and strengthen ties with regional allies such as Colombia and Argentina. Finally, any strategy aimed at countering China’s expansion in LAC must incorporate a resource-backed counteroffer to PRC investment in strategic sectors like ports, telecommunications, and power generation.

Why LAC Matters to the PRC

China’s relations within its own “near abroad” understandably figure heavily in most analyses of potential Indo-Pacific conflicts and their outcomes. To a lesser extent, scholars have also looked to Africa and the Middle East as regions that would be critical to secure China’s energy imports during a conflict. Even less understood, however, is the importance that the Western Hemisphere holds for the PRC and its ability to wage war from an ocean away. This is a major blind spot, as LAC has emerged over the past two decades as a keystone region for China’s economy and industry, exemplified by Brazil’s longtime status as the single largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment.

LAC, and particularly South America, is a vital source of natural resources to China. While the Middle East is crucial for China’s energy supply, the Americas are a linchpin of China’s food and mineral imports. In 2022, Brazil alone accounted for nearly 23 percent of China’s food imports, and nearly 60 percent of its soybean imports in particular. Maintaining access to LAC’s rich agricultural industry will be critical for China to continue to feed its 1.4 billion inhabitants in the event of a major conflagration.

LAC is also a key supplier of critical minerals to China, especially copper and lithium. Chile and Peru together accounted for half of China’s copper imports in 2022, while as of May 2024 Chile and Argentina provided a staggering 97.7 percent of China’s lithium carbonate. These minerals are essential for China’s economy as a whole, but also its defense sector as they are instrumental in everything from high-capacity batteries used to sustain fleets of autonomous systems, to the wiring and interconnects needed for basic vehicles and communications systems. More high-end capabilities depend on a staggering variety of rare minerals and metals, such as niobium, a critical component in advanced aeronautics and hypersonic missiles. Brazil sits roughly 94 percent of global niobium reserves, leading the PRC to assiduously cultivate an ownership stake over roughly a quarter of Brazilian niobium production.

Finally, China, like Russia, has almost certainly realized the benefits that a presence within the Western Hemisphere can accrue in terms of capacity for horizontal escalation. Moscow, under the so-called Primakov Doctrine has practiced this frequently, pursuing military maneuvers in the Western Hemisphere as a tit-for-tat escalation in response to U.S. support for Ukraine. In July 2024 for instance, Russia dispatched two naval flotillas to Cuba and Venezuela in direct response to U.S. easing of restrictions on long-range strikes by Ukraine into Russian territory. For China, the cultivation of dual-use infrastructure, combined with support for anti-U.S. authoritarian regimes like Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, would surely prove an asset in the event of war in the Indo-Pacific.

Understanding the Risks

China’s current position in the Western Hemisphere presents three key wartime risks for the United States: (1) control over ports and maritime choke points, (2) dual use of space infrastructure to degrade U.S. space capabilities and threaten the homeland, and (3) disinformation and diplomatic pressure towards U.S. allies and partners.

The first risk is potentially the most proximate and decisive in the event of a major conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese state-owned or based firms currently own or operate at least twelve ports across the LAC region. This includes the ports of Balboa and Cristobal, located on either side of the Panama Canal. The ports are leased and operated by Hutchison Ports, a Hong Kong-based private company which acquired the sites in 1997. While even at the time observers raised concerns over the potential for the Chinese government to exercise undue influence over Hutchison’s operations along this critical maritime artery, over the past decade the PRC’s steady erosion of Hong Kong’s independence only elevates this risk. Indeed, in 2017 a slew of laws, notably the National Intelligence Law, National Defense Mobilization Law, and National Defense Transportation Law, underscored that the Chinese government can enlist the services of any private company for the purpose of nebulously-defined national security interests. Two PRC state-owned companies, the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC), were also part of the winning bid to build the $1.3 billion fourth bridge over the canal, a major undertaking which (after serious delays) has at last begun to move forward.

The confluence of PRC infrastructure and China’s impressive soft power influence in Panama opens up a potential nightmare scenario for the United States in the event of an Indo-Pacific war. In such a scenario, China could either directly, or through a proxy, sabotage port infrastructure on either side of the canal, disrupting or entirely preventing transit through the choke point for a period of time. Not only would this serious impact U.S. trade and shipping, it would cripple the United States’ ability to quickly shift forces between Atlantic and Pacific theaters. With current wargames suggesting the first phases of a naval clash would result in major losses, the added weeks it would take for reinforcements to transit around the Strait of Magellan rather than through the Canal Zone could prove decisive.

Maritime traffic backed up near the Panama Canal in August 2023. (NASA photo)

While loss of the Panama Canal is one of the most clear-cut risks presented by China’s power position in LAC ports, it is by no means the only way China could leverage maritime infrastructure to its advantage. Ports by their nature collect massive amounts of data on the shape and flow of international trade. The PRC’s planned port and special economic zone in Antigua, together with other PRC-controlled ports, may grant Beijing a one-of-a-kind window into commerce moving throughout the eastern Caribbean and the sea lines of communication which run through it. In the case of ports directly owned or operated by PRC-based firms, like the Brazilian port of Paranaguá or the planned Peruvian megaport of Chancay, this intelligence-gathering capacity could be turned into an operational capability by strategically delaying or seizing key shipments to snarl supply chains for key goods and apply economic pressure on the United States and allies. Finally, presence in regional ports may allow the PRC to carry out more sensitive sabotage operations targeting associated maritime infrastructure, particularly the undersea cables which comprise the backbone of global internet communications. While perhaps not decisive in their own right, China’s position in LAC ports could accord it a host of benefits that are currently underappreciated in planning around a potential Pacific conflict.

Ports are not the only dual-use infrastructure of note. In recent years, reports have highlighted a proliferation of PRC-operated space infrastructure stretching from the very tip of the Southern Cone through Venezuela, and potentially even into the Caribbean. Most notable among these is the Espacio Lejano Research Station operated by the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) and located in Neuquén, Argentina. Authorized in 2014 under the government of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the site has become notorious as a “black box” which even Argentine government authorities struggle to gain access to. To date, two inspections have been conducted of the facility, one in 2019 and another more recently under the Milei administration in April 2024 – indicating that serious political will is needed to gain access. In both cases, the Argentine delegation coordinated with the Chinese embassy prior to arrival, and the overall inspection process was relatively perfunctory, doing little to assuage U.S. or Argentine concerns about the facility’s potential for military use.

Neuquén was notably also the first ground station operated by the PRC outside Chinese territory and capable of providing telemetry tracking and control (TT&C) which enables the maneuver and operation of satellites and other orbital vehicles. The facility’s strategic location in the southern hemisphere was also particularly important to supply TT&C capabilities for China’s Chang’e 4 and 5 lunar probes. Neuquén, and similar ground stations in turn compliment China’s growing space presence in Antarctica where in 2023 the PRC announced plans to begin construction of a new dual-use satellite ground station at its Zhongshan research base. TT&C is not just important for satellites and other scientific craft, it is vital for the operation of hypersonic glide vehicles, which conduct complex maneuvers that depend on ground data links for guidance and to better evade missile defenses. China, which according the Congressional Research Service, has conducted 20 times as many hypersonic weapon tests as the United States, could use this network of ground stations in the event of a conflict to strike at the United States from the south, in doing so evading U.S. missile defenses which are primarily concentrated on northern approaches. Chinese space infrastructure in LAC could furthermore help the PRC collect key data on the orbits and locations of satellites in doing so enabling PRC anti-satellite warfare capabilities during a Pacific war scenario.

The final risk involves PRC use of diplomatic influence alongside dis- or mis-information campaigns to shape the political environment in LAC to its favor in the event of a war with the United States. Key targets in such a scenario would likely be the seven LAC countries which still recognize Taiwan instead of the PRC. Beijing would undoubtedly seek to isolate and pressure these countries to shift their recognition prior to or even during a PRC invasion of the island. China could cooperate with other U.S. adversaries to magnify the effect of its disinformation campaigns. According to one report, in Argentina, Chinese and Russian media outlets work in concert with one another to produce “a virtuous cycle of disinformation.” Critically, these efforts would not need to actively sway countries into fully backing China’s campaign (with the exception of those regimes like Venezuela and Nicaragua likely predisposed to do so already), but would instead merely need to convince governments to remain on the sidelines. 

China could also use its economic heft as the number one or two trading partner for a majority of LAC countries to ensure neutrality, if not support from countries in the region. Again, the case of Russia proves instructive of how an authoritarian regime can deploy messaging and economic pressure to compel LAC governments. Shortly after his inauguration, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa proposed selling $200 million in legacy Russian and Soviet weaponry to the United States in exchange for new equipment (the United States would presumably pass the weapons it received along to Ukraine). Moscow retaliated by threatening phytosanitary restrictions on Ecuadorian banana imports, while launching a media push to claim that if the deal moved forward, Ecuador would make itself a belligerent on the side of Ukraine. The pressure worked, Noboa relented, and Ecuador’s banana exports continued apace. China, which carries significantly more economic weight in the region than Russia could prove a frightening prospect indeed for any government considering taking a vocal stance against the PRC in wartime. 

Taken together, the PRC has quietly amassed a host of capabilities within the Western Hemisphere to give it both tactical and strategic advantages against the United States in the event of a crisis or conflict in the Indo-Pacific. The United States, for its part, has been slow to react to the scope of this threat and adjust priorities in LAC accordingly.

Bolstering Readiness in the United States’ Shared Neighborhood

There are a number of steps the United States can and should take between now and 2027 to gird itself and its regional allies in preparation for potential conflict with China.

Better Integrate SOUTHCOM in Pacific War Planning: A lack of integration across U.S. combatant commands risks cultivating a myopic view of Pacific war. Given the PRC and PLA’s global ambitions, any future conflict with China is unlikely to be restricted solely to one theater. As the above sections have illustrated, there are a number of areas where China could pursue a horizontal escalation strategy to gain an edge against the United States. Fostering greater exchange and intelligence sharing across combatant commands should be a priority to ensure the United States is ready to fight and win a war on multiple fronts. One early step could be to create a designated role for SOUTHCOM in key Pacific exercises like the Rim of the Pacific maritime warfare exercise. LAC militaries such as Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, already participate in this exercise. Carving out a greater role for SOUTHCOM could help bolster U.S. defense ties with regional militaries and build closer partnerships across combatant commands.

Another area for increased cooperation could be a cross-cutting effort across SOUTHCOM, INDOPACOM, and partner governments to tackle illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, a threat which plagues communities and ecosystems across the Pacific. While not directly applicable in a warfighting scenario, such an effort would serve to build greater partnership and information sharing between combatant commands, and build goodwill among partners throughout the Pacific domain. 

Double Down on Defense Cooperation: While China has made headway in defense cooperation activities, the United States remains by far the preeminent security partner for the vast majority of LAC countries. However, more can be done to strengthen these ties and build partner capacity to respond to potential malign PRC activity in the hemisphere. One easy step would be to amend the Department of Defense’s Section 312 and 321 requirements that foreign military education training focus on “developing countries.” The Department of Defense’s current standards for designating a country as “developing” prevent partners like Chile, Panama, Uruguay, and most recently Guyana, from benefiting from U.S. training programs. Amending these to include a more nuanced standard would open the door to a much wider array of military-to-military engagement.

Furthermore, the United States should seek to rise to the occasion in cases where LAC governments have already expressed interest in a closer security partnership. Ecuador, which is currently contemplating reversing a constitutional prohibition on foreign military basing to allow for a reopening of the former U.S. naval base at Manta could be a key ally in this effort. Argentina, which is currently pursuing an ambitious military modernization effort, and has expressed a desire to rise to NATO Global Partner status, could be another.

Harden Allies Against Chinese Economic Coercion: China’s investments in critical infrastructure throughout the region pose risks not only for the United States, but its LAC allies and partners as well. For instance, two PRC based companies, China Three Gorges Corporation and China Southern Power Grid International, now collectively control the entirety of Lima, Peru’s power supply. Combined with the forthcoming port of Chancay, China has a number of vectors through which it can apply pressure against a Peruvian government seeking to pursue a policy against Beijing’s interests. The State Department could lead a regionwide effort with allies and partners to map and evaluate risks posted by Chinese investments in critical infrastructure. The findings of this review should also be passed along to the U.S. Development Finance Corporation for review and to help prioritize investments aimed at reducing the amount of influence China can wield over LAC government through its infrastructure projects and trade links.

Conclusion

Future conflicts will not be constrained to a single geographic region. In the event of a Pacific war between the PRC and United States, LAC will almost undoubtedly find itself a zone of contention, whether it wishes it or not. Failure to incorporate this understanding into U.S. contingency planning for such a conflict therefore creates risks not just for the United States itself, but also its regional allies and partners who may find themselves in the crosshairs of PRC coercive efforts. There is still time to patch key vulnerabilities in the region, but a recognition LAC’s important role in future global crises cannot come soon enough.

Henry Ziemer is an Associate Fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His research focuses on great power competition, transnational organized crime, as well as security and defense in the Western Hemisphere. His writing and commentary have been featured in CSIS, War on the Rocks, the Financial Times, and The Wall Street Journal.

Featured Image: The Panama Canal. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Red Sea Topic Week

Panda Express: A Proposed Convoy Operation in the Red Sea

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Red Sea Topic Week

By Clay Robinson

It was a sunny morning with calm seas on March 6, 2024, a fine day for sailing the tranquil waters of the Gulf of Aden. The crew of M/V True Confidence, however, were on edge: less than 10 hours before, their ship had come under attack from a Houthi-launched Iranian missile. Through sheer luck, the missile missed its intended target, and the ship continued its westerly journey bound for Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. At 11:34 AM, the crew’s luck ran out: another Houthi missile ripped through the deck house, exploding in a massive fire ball that set the bridge ablaze.1 Two innocent civilian mariners were killed and four more critically injured. The captain ordered the fifteen surviving crew to abandon ship, leaving it adrift and in flames, yet another victim of the Houthis’ senseless and indiscriminate violence. 

Red Sea Fast Pass: Chinese Opportunism

Even as the tumultuous situation in the Red Sea takes ever more deadly and dangerous turns, China continues to sit idly by and reap the economic and diplomatic benefits thanks to the Houthis’ Iranian patronage and their own calculated self-interest. While much of the world’s shipping has been forced to take longer and more expensive routes to avoid Houthi missiles in the Red Sea, Chinese shipping continued virtually undisturbed, protected as it were under a modern day “non-aggression pact” between China and Houthi forces.2 However, just a few days after the Houthis granted this assurance to China that their ships would not be targeted in exchange for political support, on March 23, 2024, a Houthi missile struck the Chinese-owned M/V Huang Pu.3 Houthi spokesmen were unusually tight-lipped4 after this attack, likely the result of severe chastisement behind the scenes by both China and Iran, and will take extra efforts to avoid targeting Chinese shipping in the future.

It is not clear yet whether this Houthi attack should be attributed to an administrative oversight, missing that M/V Huang Pu’s ownership had recently transferred to China. Or perhaps the Houthis were targeting another vessel nearby. Either way, the safest place to transit the Red Sea is now onboard Chinese-owned ships.

The combination of the Houthi’s public agreement with China to not target their shipping and the likely private reprimand after striking the M/V Huang Pu sets up a scenario whereby Chinese shipping will be getting a free pass through the Red Sea. That provides China a significant competitive advantage at the precise moment its economy is starting to falter. There is a way, however, to both remove that advantage and force China to abide by its international obligations.

The time has come to exact a cost on this unbridled Chinese opportunism.

Panda Express: A Proposed Convoy Operation

The idea is simple: vulnerable multinational commercial vessels would closely shadow Chinese ships as they transit safely past Houthi missile launchers in a convoy-type operation. The Houthis, knowing their targeting is lacking, would refrain from shooting lest they accidentally hit a Chinese ship and anger both Beijing and Tehran. The U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces or the European Union Naval Forces’ Operation Aspides are the most obvious candidates to organize such a convoy – nicknamed Panda Express – but arguably it could be self-organizing or organized under an alternative multinational coalition. The shipping industry could institute a loosely organized program to surreptitiously appropriate passive escort of commercial vessels by Chinese vessels sharing the same shipping lanes. In short, these vessels will shadow Chinese vessels at a safe but proximate distance such as to keep the Chinese vessel between them and the direction of the Houthi missile threat. A limited handful of multinational commercial vessels will transit under the shield of the security that each of the Chinese vessels enjoy, taking advantage of a reliable and predictable, yet passive escort courtesy of China.

The current situation (Figure 1) consists of multinational commercial vessels transiting independently under the impressive but less-than-omnipresent protection of the multinational warships participating in Operation Prosperity Guardian and Operation Aspides. These warships endeavor to intercept Houthi missiles and attack drones targeting commercial shipping.

Figure 1: Status quo of Operation Prosperity Guardian. (Author graphic)

A brief vignette will serve as an example of what Panda Express might accomplish. Prior to a southbound transit of the Red Sea, a multinational commercial vessel will loiter temporarily at the southern end of the Suez Canal, awaiting the passage of another southbound Chinese vessel. This will occur ostensibly every few hours as an average of over five Chinese vessels transit the Suez Canal per day.5 The multinational vessel will then take station on the starboard quarter of the Chinese vessel at a safe distance, but in close proximity such that a sort of passive, perhaps even unwitting, screen of the vessel by the Chinese vessel will occur (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Panda Express concept. (Author graphic)

Some might argue that Panda Express would put innocent civilian mariners at risk by shadowing Chinese merchant vessels, and from a practical standpoint, that threat would exist. But therein lies its value as a deterrent because the Houthis have already stated that they will not attack Chinese shipping. As the two vessels reach the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, air defense vessels of Operation Prosperity Guardian and Operation Aspides can provide a more robust ability to detect and engage any Houthi missile that might be close enough to discern the multinational vessels from the Chinese one. Once through the western reaches of the Gulf of Aden and outside the threat area, the vessel can once again resume navigating independently.

Panda Express leverages opportunities fomented by China for both a protective and influence advantage. This concept is not an evaluation of the technical aspects of a possible tactical advantage on a notional battlefield. Assessments would need to be made about just how close these vessels would have to transit near their Chinese escorts to achieve sufficiently low levels of probability hit (PH) or probability of kill (PK) for inbound Houthi missiles. Similarly, there would be limits to how many vessels could safely transit in company with each Chinese vessel. This concept is rather about taking advantage of the deterrent value of the present situation and using it as a way to exact diplomatic costs on China for sticking to its opportunistic agenda in the Middle East. This is a way to erode China’s economic and diplomatic advantages by highlighting China’s malign opportunism and providing safe passage through the Red Sea. Panda Express is a low cost, legal, and pragmatic way to compete with China.

What will Panda Express accomplish? This escort tactic would begin to serve as a strategic deterrent against Houthi attacks in three ways. First and foremost, the risk of the Houthis accidentally hitting a Chinese vessel while targeting other vessels one would be too great, and it would deter attacks on any ships traveling in close company with Chinese ships. Additionally, Panda Express could reduce the strain on the contingent of warships supporting Operation Prosperity Guardian and Operation Aspides that are spread very thin by helping to better position these assets in order to more efficiently focus their layered defense on the places where they can be most effective. Lastly, diplomatically, China could be held accountable for malign hedging behavior and an opportunistic silent partnership with Iran. Panda Express could drive China to increase pressure on Iran to rein in all Houthi attacks, not just prevent attacks on Chinese vessels.

How long could Panda Express be sustained? There are risks to be sure, but most are worth accepting. China might stop sending its ships through the Red Sea, but this is extremely unlikely. The Suez Canal and Red Sea serve as the primary route for China’s westward shipments of goods, including around 60% of its exports to Europe, representing one-tenth of the Suez Canal’s annual traffic.6 China cannot afford to avoid the Red Sea route altogether.

The maritime shipping industry can determine that the cost of loitering at the entrances to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to wait for Chinese escort are too high. Yes, loitering temporarily for a few hours costs some money, but it is also likely to be far less than transiting around the Capes of Africa.

All this cat and mouse activity on the high seas might lead to collisions between vessels, but these are professional mariners with years of experience plying these waters. They can handle it. And, if Chinese ships were to be instructed to somehow attempt to disrupt this passive escort program, it will only cost them more in time and money.

China: A Silent Partner in the Axis of Insecurity

Is Panda Express worth it? Some points to consider: Chinese leaders have repeatedly claimed they hold very little sway over Iran, and by extension the Houthis; however, several key factors seem to indicate otherwise, and China’s opportunistic fingerprints are all over the Red Sea crisis. China asked Iran to rein in the Houthis.7 China is not alone in asking Houthis to cease the attacks.8 Yet, the Houthis publicly stated only Chinese and Russian ships have a free pass.9

China knows its ships are safe, too. Despite having a significant naval presence in the region, China has kept its Naval Escort Task Force (NETF) out of the Red Sea, choosing instead to loiter in the safer waters of the eastern Gulf of Aden. In late February, the Chinese Defense Ministry denied the 46th NETF deployment is related to the Red Sea crisis and reiterated that it is a “regular escort operation.”10 That none of these NETF vessels are needed in the Red Sea to ensure the safe passage of Chinese shipping is proof China knows its vessels are exempt from Houthi attack.

China does indeed have influence over Iran and, by extension, the Houthis in what has now become an “Axis of Insecurity.” Panda Express would reduce the likelihood of new attacks like that on M/V True Confidence and M/V Huang Pu and put direct pressure on China to either explain to the court of international opinion why shadowing Chinese vessels is a safe tactic, or influence Iran and the Houthis to end their aggression in the Red Sea altogether. Either way, China loses, and the rest of the world wins. It’s time to order Panda Express.

Commander Clay Robinson is a retired surface warfare officer and antiterrorism/force protection specialist. He has worked for the U.S. Department of Defense since 2017 as a strategic planning specialist and is currently an Adjunct History Instructor with the U.S. Naval Community College. He served on board the USS Russell (DDG-59), USS Laboon (DDG-58), and USS Nitze (DDG-94), and commanded Maritime Civil Affairs Squadron One (MCAS-1).

Endnotes

1. Jonathan Saul, “Ship evacuated after first civilian fatalities in Houthis’ Red Sea attacks,” Reuters, March 7, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ship-evacuated-after-first-civilian-fatalities-houthis-red-sea-attacks-2024-03-07/.

2. Sam Dagher and Mohammed Hatem, “Yemen’s Houthis Tell China, Russia Their Ships Won’t Be Targeted,” Bloomberg, March 21, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-21/china-russia-reach-agreement-with-yemen-s-houthis-on-red-sea-ships

3. Luther Ray Abel, “Chinese Tanker Struck by Houthi Missile,” National Review, March 24, 2024, https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/chinese-tanker-struck-by-houthi-missile/

4. Heather Mongilio, “Chinese Tanker Hit with Houthi Missile in the Red Sea,” USNI New, March 24, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/03/24/chinese-tanker-hit-with-houthi-missile-in-the-red-sea

5. “Suez Canal Blocking Could Hike Freight Fees between China and Europe If Not Cleared Soon: Analyst,” Global Times, March 24, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1219372.shtml.

6. Amr Salah Mohamed, “China’s growing maritime presence in Egypt’s ports and the Suez Canal,” Middle East Institute, November 3, 2023, https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-growing-maritime-presence-egypts-ports-and-suez-canal.

7. Parisa Hafezi and Andrew Hayley, “Exclusive: China presses Iran to rein in Houthi attacks in Red Sea, sources say,” Reuters, January 25, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/china-presses-iran-rein-houthi-attacks-red-sea-sources-say-2024-01-26/.

8. Burak Bir, “24 countries condemn Houthi attacks in Red Sea,” Anadolu Agency (AA), January 24, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/24-countries-condemn-houthi-attacks-in-red-sea/3117236.

9. “China and Russia Get a Free Pass Through Houthis’ Red Sea Blockade,” The Maritime Executive, January 23, 2024,

https://maritime-executive.com/article/china-and-russia-get-a-free-pass-through-houthis-red-sea-blockade.

10. Zhao Ziwen, “Why China’s Red Sea diplomatic mission is unlikely to stop Houthi shipping attacks,” South China Morning Post, March 4, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3253641/why-chinas-red-sea-diplomatic-mission-unlikely-stop-houthi-shipping-attacks.

Featured Image: Photo of the MV True Confidence after it was struck by a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile in the western Gulf of Aden, March 6, 2024. (Photo courtesy U.S. Central Command)