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Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World

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By Sally DeBoer

Navarro, Peter. Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World. New York: Prometheus Books, 2015, 335pp. $19.95.

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Those focused on the realm of maritime security have watched China’s actions in the East and South China Seas with some combination of fascination and trepidation over the past several years. From land reclamation efforts on Johnson South Reef to “cabbage” strategy successes around Scarborough Shoal, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has repeatedly defied convention, their neighbors’ sovereignty, and yes, international law in their expansive effort to exercise control over the seas about the first and second island chains under the guise of historical righteousness. The impending arbitration ruling from the United Nations has tensions in the region at a fever pitch. Questions abound: Will China declare an ADIZ in the South China Sea, as they did in the East China Sea in November of 2013? Will a ruling in the Philippines’ favor spur China to double down on its expansion activity and militarism? Will there be war with China, and what might such a conflict look like? It is this last question, an overarching theme in any discussion of China’s militarization and the international community’s efforts to reckon with it, that author Peter Navarro seeks to address in his book Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World.

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Author Peter Navarro. Image courtesy of the author.

Navarro, a bestselling author and professor at the University of California Irvine’s Merge School of Business, takes a holistic and comprehensive approach to answering the question of whether or not a war with China will occur and, in the event of war, what form such a conflict might take. Perhaps most importantly, Navarro also details pathways to avoid conflict through means of diplomacy and deterrence. Navarro’s prose is engaging and moves at a rapid pace. Styled as a “geopolitical detective story,” Crouching Tiger’s text is widely accessible and consistently clear, making an issue that is opaque to most readers digestible. Each chapter begins with a multiple-choice question about the subject matter, which readers (detectives, as the book calls them) themselves are equipped to answer by its conclusion. The direct tone of the book should not be confused for simplicity, however. Navarro does not shy away from detail, addressing the complexity of great power politics head-on. Navarro’s argument is strengthened by the opinions and research of some of the world’s foremost scholars on geopolitics and China, with statements from the likes of the University of Chicago’s John Mearsheimer and the U.S. Naval War College’s Toshi Yoshihara woven throughout the text. Though short, Crouching Tiger is indeed quite dense, providing a truly sweeping account of the subject matter.

Crouching Tiger begins by setting the stage for the discussion, succinctly but completely outlining the schools of thought on great power politics, the history of China’s interactions with both the United States and the global system at large, and assessing the capabilities of the Chinese military. Navarro deftly characterizes China’s rapid military build-up in their quest for regional hegemony, covering topics from the DF-21 “carrier killer,” to China’s “Underground Great Wall” and truly staggering nuclear stockpile (this will come up again later.) Further, Crouching Tiger addresses China’s Anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities (demonstrated famously with the destruction of the PRC’s own FY1-C weather satellite in 2007), which leave the United States’ overhead constellations, on which it has become militarily, economically, and comprehensively dependent, at risk.

Moving quickly, Navarro then delves into possible “triggers, trip wires, and flash points” that could ignite a conflict between China, the U.S., and their various allies and defense treaty cosigners. Some of these triggers will be familiar to readers who keep an eye on the news in the South China Sea, while others, such as China’s territorial disputes with India and their possible implications for coming periods of water scarcity, are less well known. In the third section of the book, Surveying the Battlefield, Navarro provides a synopsis of U.S. vulnerabilities and strategies with regard to a notional conflict. Crouching Tiger’s final sections discuss possible “pathways to peace.” In a particularly effective section, Navarro gleefully dismantles the arguments for U.S. isolationism (which seem to grow louder by the day), peace through economic engagement (which provided no guarantee of peace in World War One), and traditional nuclear deterrence a-la USSR-U.S. Cold War relations. Crouching Tiger concludes with Navarro’s own strategies to avoid conflict and ensure peace.

If Navarro can be criticized for anything, it is that Crouching Tiger lands a little on the alarmist side. But perhaps in a nation that has tolerated the squeeze of sequestration, watched its military readiness decline as the U.S. Navy rides out the last of its Reagan-era investments, and where more than one politician on either side of the aisle has promoted isolationism (either directly or by reduced investment in defense) as a sound fiscal and geopolitical policy, a little alarmism may not be a bad thing. Indeed, if Navarro’s goal in publishing Crouching Tiger is to provide a wake up call to his readers about the stark realities and implications of U.S. policy, investment, and presence in the Asia-Pacific, he has done so with considerable aplomb. The text is not lengthy; some scholars of the Asia-Pacific may find that some of Navarro’s arguments lack some context. Despite this, a broad audience will find much to consider in the pages of Crouching Tiger. As such, this book comes highly recommended to readers from the most accomplished geopolitical scholars to high-level policymakers and diplomats. I will add my voice to this chorus.

Note: There is an accompanying film series for Crouching Tiger. Find more details at Crouching Tiger’s website.

Sally DeBoer is the Book Review Coordinator for CIMSEC. She can be reached at [email protected].

Book Review

Diplomatic Dimension of Maritime Challenges for India in the 21st Century

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Kumar, Yogendra. Diplomatic Dimension of Maritime Challenges for India in the 21st Century. New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2015, pp. 258, 995 Rs.

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By G. Parthasarathy

While the present discourse in India is largely on its civilizational past and on the contemporary challenges across its land borders, very little attention has been paid to the crucial and indeed imperative role of seafaring trade and maritime security, and indeed the entire spectrum of maritime affairs. Until recently, there has been little realization of the importance of these issues in safeguarding the Indian way of life and ensuring that India emerges as an increasingly influential power, dedicated to peace and cooperation with all. Even school textbooks contain very little information about India’s maritime traditions or the decline of India’s role in maritime trade with the advent of European Power across the world, particularly since the 18th century.

India’s maritime history began in the 3rd millennium BCE when the Indus Valley established maritime contacts with Mesopotamia. Following the Roman occupation of Egypt, trade flourished with the Roman Empire, not only with India’s west coast, but also with Tamil Pandyan Kings. The Chola Dynasty reached out beyond the shores of what is now Tamil Nadu between the Third and Thirteenth Centuries, extending its domain from Sri Lanka to Srivijaya (Indonesia) in Southeast Asia. Similar trade and maritime contacts flourished between rulers of Kalinga (Orissa) and the kingdoms of South and Southeast Asia, including Myanmar, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka.

Across India’s western shores, Quilon enjoyed growing trade links with the Phoenicians and Romans. Trade with Mesopotamia and the shores of Africa flourished.  Further north, the Marathas developed a maritime force that could challenge the ships of European powers like the Portugal and Britain until they inexplicably lost interest in maritime power. Trade flourished from western shores across the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean until European dominance of the sea lanes gained ascendancy. From the 18th century onward, India lapsed into a centuries long phase of ‘maritime blindness.’

India and China played a significant and even dominant role in world trade up to that point. India is estimated to have had the largest economy in the medieval world until the 16th century. English historian Angus Madison has estimated that India’s share in world income was then 27%, compared to Europe’s share of 23%. After three centuries worth of European domination, India’s share fell to 3% of the global economy. In 1950, China’s share in world trade was 1% and India’s was 1.9% – virtually double that of China. In 2014, India’s share of world trade had a fallen to 1.7 % while China’s had grown to 12.2%. This falling share of our world trade sadly reflects the relative decline of India’s regional influence in Asia and indeed globally since independence.

The book Diplomatic Dimension of Maritime Challenges for India in the 21st Century, by former diplomat Yogendra Kumar, carries out a detailed analysis of these factors while spelling out the challenges and prospects for a future Indian role in shaping the governance of maritime affairs in the coming decades. In this endeavor, he casts the spotlight on the civilizational dimension of India’s role as a reinvigorated maritime power which, as part of its contemporary diplomacy, aims to subserve the larger Indian foreign policy which finds its inspiration from the lofty ideals of the country’s freedom struggle.  While most diplomats tend to focus primarily on the diplomatic dimensions of maritime security, naval officers focus more on actual maritime power. Having served on the Faculty of India’s National Defence College and worked with the National Maritime Foundation in Delhi, the ambassador has brought his experience to bear on his meticulous research, and his handling, at a senior level in the Indian foreign office, of several multilateral institutions analyzed in his book. His intellectual inquiry not only spans India’s recent post-independence past, especially post-Cold War maritime history, but also offers insightful comments on the capacities and shortcomings of the relevant maritime agencies as they face myriad existing and over-the-horizon challenges to national security. These strategic challenges get compounded, geographically and paradigmatically, as the country charts its course to emerge as one of the fastest growing economies in the world. These challenges are also evaluated from the point of view of failed political power transitions since the end of the Cold War.

In addressing the diplomatic dimension of the country’s maritime challenges, the author holistically examines the evolution and the potential role of all the key maritime agencies in today’s unique circumstances, framed by deep geopolitical turbulence and uncertainty, paying extensive attention to the Indian Navy, the Coast Guard, the Coastal Police belonging to the country’s maritime provinces, the Indian shipping services, and the Department of Ocean Affairs. Whilst the Indian Navy remains the centerpiece of his narrative, the array of these agencies signifies that a favorable maritime order can only be shaped by the breadth of these organizations. Thus, approaching this effort in balance-of-power or zero-sum terms will be counter-productive, even in a shortened time horizon. The ambassador’s thought-provoking analysis of the security paradigm involves an examination of causative factors, ranging from the phenomenon of failed/failing states, the fragility of multilateral institutions, to the whole range of so-called ‘non-traditional’ security challenges induced by revolution of technology, including military technology. The author also, significantly, posits that maritime security is a subset of wider international security, especially of the littoral regions. He points at the deteriorating relations amongst the major powers, creating a worrying, de-stabilizing maritime salience. He analyzes the impact of these rapidly mutating constituent factors on the doctrines and structures of the Indian maritime agencies; introducing an interesting discussion on the recommended role and capacities of the Indian foreign office as well as other government structures. The leveraging of both hard and soft power maritime capabilities in diplomacy would help regional stabilization, resting on India’s benign image and its historically non-disruptive political consolidation model.

Quite naturally, as he discusses the entire threat spectrum of ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ maritime challenges, Kumar focuses on what we have done for the safety of our nationals living in our western neighborhood, where thousands have had to be evacuated from countries experiencing political instability and violence. India’s national maritime policies will also have to cater to the possibility of a much larger scale evacuation of Indian nationals should instability and violence spread to the Arab Gulf countries, where over 7 million Indians live, in addition to catering to the security of our sea lanes from where we get over 70% of our energy requirements of oil and gas. He also focuses on challenges posed by an emerging and assertive China as it proceeds with its ”One Belt One Road” initiative across our shores; in his discussion on naval grand strategy for India, the ambassador offers an interesting take as to how this challenge can be ‘finessed.’ The high seas are, after all, vast areas where powers can both cooperate and contend.

The most significant aspect of Mr. Kumar’s book on maritime challenges is his focus of attention on what needs to be done for restructuring institutions and building maritime capabilities in shipyards and research institutions,to meet the forthcoming challenges and opportunities in coming decades. With its ambitious plans for more Aircraft Carriers as well as both attack and ballistic missile submarines, the Indian navy has fortunately been more far-sighted that the other armed services in realizing that military power cannot be built primarily on imports of crucial defense equipment. Yogendra Kumar has quite appropriately noted that for the foreseeable future, India’s concentration will be on the sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean. He also notes that in maritime affairs, there is need for both regional and global institutions in order for trade across the high seas remains unaffected. While institutions are being built for trade and cooperation across the Indian Ocean, India cannot ignore that over 40% of its exports are routed through the South China Sea, now the focus of escalating rivalries over maritime boundaries. As he reviews these governance mechanisms, the author makes concrete suggestions to make them, especially those concerning the Indian Ocean, capable of multilateral efforts and of thought leadership to stabilize and buttress the maritime order for salutary effect on the global security paradigm as a whole. His approach of ‘fore grounding’ the ‘non-traditional security’ agenda for these institutions over that of ‘traditional security’ agenda in their activities offers considerable food for thought for the proponents of hardcore security doctrines.

For that last-named reason, Yogendra Kumar’s meticulous study of maritime institutions, strategies and diplomacy is “essential reading,” not just for scholars and lay readers, but also for every young officer who wishes to make the Navy a fulfilling career.

G. Parthasarathy is a strategic analyst and columnist. He last served as the India‘s High Commissioner to Pakistan. He has also been Indian Ambassador to Myanmar and High Commissioner to Australia and Cyprus, with  earlier diplomatic tenures in Moscow, Washington and Karachi. During his diplomatic career, he has been Adviser to both India‘s Foreign Secretary and former Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi.

Book Review

Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates

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Kilmeade, Brian, and Don Yaeger. Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates: The Forgotten War That Changed American History. New York City: Sentinel, 2015, 256 pp. $21.00

Book Cover photo

By Commander Greg Smith, USN

Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates is an exciting account of an often overlooked but formative chapter in the history of American foreign policy and U.S. naval heritage. While even amateur naval historians recognize the names of heroes like Decatur and Preble, and every Marine sings the words “to the shores of Tripoli” while standing at attention, few recall the decade-long struggle and humiliations endured before achieving the honorable outcome that is taken for granted today. As the world’s sole superpower with a naval force of nuclear powered aircraft carriers and submarines, it is often difficult to examine the early struggles of the United States Navy without assuming that victory was a foregone conclusion. Brian Kilmeade and Don Yaeger, however, convincingly convey the narrow margin by which the victory over the Barbary pirates was gained and the many diplomatic, military, and personal setbacks that were overcome along the way. They also capture the bravery and determination of the American Sailors, Marines, and Statesmen who ensured a favorable conclusion of the Barbary Wars for the nascent United States. For these reasons alone, Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates deserves to be on every commander’s recommended reading list for all ranks, especially in the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.  

The book also explores several themes that are of recurring interest to CIMSEC’s readership: from justifications for force structure and naval presence, to the need for judgment and initiative in naval leaders, and to the role of the Navy in diplomacy. The thoroughly enjoyable book makes strong arguments for U.S. naval presence and the need for the United States to a “play a military role in overseas affairs,” without significant discussion of counter-arguments or allusions to alternative analyses. Although this may ultimately leave military historians and other scholars and theorists unsatisfied, these shortcomings seem to be by design, enabling the authors to maintain an exciting pace and to focus on the heroism of the characters from whom “the world would learn that in America failure is not an option.”  

Naval Presence and the Size of the Fleet

Kilmeade and Yaeger make a strong case that Thomas Jefferson was among the first American officials to recognize the need for a strong and persistent forward naval presence to protect American interests.  In his role as American minister to France in 1785, Jefferson was an official advocate for Americans enslaved by Algerian pirates. He recognized that the United States could neither afford the tribute demanded by the Barbary States, nor could they cease trading with nations of the Mediterranean. Jefferson’s solution was patrols by armed American vessels in the Mediterranean; that vision would not be realized for another sixteen years. Initially, Jefferson did not convince fellow diplomat John Adams, Congress, or the President, who were pursuing a policy of neutrality and willing to pay the price (i.e. annual tribute to Barbary pirates) for peace. It was not until ten American vessels were captured in 1793 that there was enough support to pass the Naval Act of 1794 to build six frigates to respond to the “depredations committed by Algerine corsairs.”

Although the more academically sophisticated arguments for seapower made by Samuel Huntington[1] in 1954 or more recently by CAPT Robert Rubel (ret) [2] and Seth Cropsey will be more edifying for CIMSEC’s regular audience, the arguments in Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates are self-evident, convincing, and accessible even to those who have shown little interest in strategic or maritime thinking. Thus, the book is a worthy read not only for the naval enthusiast but also for the accountant brother-in-law who balks at the Navy’s shipbuilding budget, to the family isolationist who argues that U.S. naval presence is always provocative and never stabilizing, or for the West Point graduate who just doesn’t get it. 

Naval Leadership

Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates provides many case studies on naval leadership. The book examines many successful and unsuccessful commanders and diplomats who must carry out national policies and execute military operations with little communication and guidance. 

LT Presely O'Bannon
LT Presely O’Bannon.

While it is rare to execute any coordinated action today without communication before, during, and after each mission, the authors remind us that orders from the United States to commanders in the Mediterranean routinely took three months to arrive in theater. This made seeking guidance during a crisis, like the grounding of the USS Philadelphia in Tripoli harbor, impossible. Incidents like these formed the basis for naval principles like the absolute responsibility of commanding officers, the requirement to understand the commander’s intent, and centralized command and decentralized execution that continue to serve as the foundation for naval conduct. Looking at the 21st century battlespace, where instantaneous and continuous communications are often assumed for our naval and air forces, it is worth pondering how well we still adhere to these principles and how much decision making and execution would suffer should those communications be disrupted in combat. Kilmeade and Yaeger make clear that in the absence of higher guidance those who represented the country well were those guided by a commitment to personal and national honor. 

The authors also assert that throughout the Barbary Wars, successful naval leaders demonstrated superior judgment and initiative. The authors contrast the risk-averse and lazy Commodore Richard Morris, who brought his wife on deployment and failed to impose a worthy blockade of Tripoli, with the decisive actions of Commodore Edward Preble, who quickly gained an “honorable peace” with Morocco, achieving a “significant victory” in a manner reminiscent of Sun-Tzu—“without firing a shot.” 

Edward Preble by Rembrandt Peale. Courtesy of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum Collection, Public Domain
Edward Preble by Rembrandt Peale. Courtesy of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum Collection, Public Domain.

The authors also recount the bold manner with which Preble overcame the loss of the USS Philadelphia by a subordinate commander.  Preble and the young nation found an invaluable asset in the bravery, skill, and leadership of Lieutenant Stephen Decatur. The leadership, persistence, and vision of William Eaton are credited with the successful execution of the elaborate plan to raise and march an army from Alexandria, Egypt to defeat the Bashaw of Tripoli. The success of Eaton’s 600-mile desert march that resulted in capture of the city of Derne, “one of the most remarkable military assaults in U.S. military history,” was in no small part due to the bravery and skill of Lieutenant Presley O’Bannon and his seven U.S. Marines. 

Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates provides a fresh look at leaders whose actions significantly shaped the character of the nascent Navy and Marine Corps and whose impact is still visible today. The book also recalls some of the earliest collaboration between military power and diplomacy in the implementation of U.S. foreign policy.

Diplomacy and the Military

Kilmeade and Yaeger recount the first attempt to support diplomacy with a display of naval power in 1800, when the USS George Washington became the first American warship to enter the Mediterranean. In spite of the bolstered confidence of U.S. Consul to Algiers, Richard O’Brien, and the clear display of American resolve, the incident resulted in humiliation for the United States due to a combination of insufficient force and naiveté on the part of the George Washington’s commander, the 27-year old Captain William Bainbridge. Still, naval forces represented a level of commitment and national resolve that provides significant leverage for diplomatic efforts.  

As with the U.S. consuls to the Barbary States 200 years ago, diplomats today are often strong proponents of American naval power. In February, a former U.S. Ambassador to Singapore argued that cutting the number of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) would damage U.S. diplomacy. Of course, the requirements for fighting a modern naval battle are often different than those for diplomatic shows of the flag, assurances to allies, and demonstrations of resolve. Still, even when the latter was the primary justification for the existence of the fleet in 1794, getting the right-sized force was a significant challenge. Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates also demonstrates that, in addition to the right number of ships, success requires the right policies and military leadership to successfully support diplomatic efforts.  

The book also highlights a natural tension between military and diplomatic elements of national power through its account of the termination of the war with Tripoli in 1805. After achieving an impressive victory at Derne, Colonel William Eaton and Lieutenant O’Bannon prepared to take Tripoli to depose the Bashaw. Before they could do so, however, U.S. Consul Tobias Lear, negotiated a termination to the conflict with terms that were ultimately ungratifying to Eaton, the military commander whose men had sacrificed much blood for a peace that allowed the Bashaw to remain in power.

Although the authors’ treatment of the relationship between military power and diplomacy seems to suggest that the solution to bolstering diplomacy is always more military power, one does not have to accept that premise to appreciate the books’ account of early cooperation to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. 

Few today recall the risks that were taken by the men of the naval and diplomatic services to defend the honor of the young United States against the extortion of the Barbary pirates, but Brian Kilmeade and Don Yaeger do a great service by remedying that situation.  At the time that Thomas Jefferson was dealing the pirates from the Barbary States – Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli—the confrontation was far from a foregone conclusion. Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates details how visionary leadership from Thomas Jefferson, William Eaton, and Edward Preble as well as the bold and daring initiative from Stephen Decatur and Presley O’Bannon enabled the young United States to prevail. The story explores the connection between naval presence and security, illustrates the need for judgment and initiative in executing distributed military operations, and the role of the Navy in foreign policy. It is worth reading and keeping on your bookshelf.

Commander Smith is a career naval flight officer and a former commanding officer of Patrol Squadron 26 (VP-26). He is currently serving as the Federal Executive Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University – Applied Physics Lab (APL). The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the views of the Navy or APL.

[1] Huntington, Samuel P. “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy.” United States Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 50, Number 5. May 1954, 491.

[2] Rubel, Robert C. “National Policy and the Post-systemic Navy,” Naval War College Review Vol. 66, No. 4 Autumn 2013, 12.

Book Review

A Conversation with G. William Weatherly, Author of Sheppard of the Argonne

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By Sally DeBoer

CIMSEC Book Review coordinator Sally DeBoer interviewed G. William Weatherly (the nautical pen name for Captain George Jackson, USN Retired), author of the World War Two epic thriller Sheppard of the Argonne. Read the CIMSEC book review here.

SD: Sir, it is an honor to speak with you today. Before we get started talking about your book, could you provide some background on your career in the Naval service?

GWW: I commanded three submarines: the USS Shark, the USS Billfish, and the Pre-commissioning unit of the SSBN USS Rhode Island. After that I went the US Naval War College as Chairman of the Joint Military Operations department. I had about 2000 students that came through for the Joint Professional Military Education program.

SD: What audience did you intend for your work? Did you have a specific reader in mind when you were writing?

GWW: Yes and No. Clearly, it appeals to people who are interested in the Second World War and specifically the Navy. I wrote it to try to bring back to life the war at sea as we approach the 75th anniversary of some of the major battles. I wanted to incorporate more than would be allowed by historical fiction alone, so I took my main character and put him in command of a ship in a difficult operational scenario. Readers see interactions with submarines and aircraft, then eventually a big gun battle between capital ships, which was a very rare thing in the war.

SD: That was my next question! Sheppard of the Argonne is an alternative history, taking place in a world where the Five-Power Treaty (aka the Washington Naval Treaty) was never signed, leaving nations’ ability to develop their naval forces unhindered. Why did you choose to pursue an alternative history?

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Click on the image to learn more about Sheppard of the Argonne.

GWW: When I was in high school, I wrote a term paper on the Washington Naval Treaty and was enthralled with the idea of “what if?” What if it hadn’t been signed and the development of ships and technology, which had been proceeding very rapidly, was allowed to continue? This was the genesis of the idea of having an alternative history. I read a lot of history, looking for places where things could have occurred that were “almost, but not quite,” and analyzing what the downstream effects might have been. I have recently read a lot of books by Professor Marder, who has done a marvelous job of documenting the British admiralty between about 1900-1940 and the decisions that they made. There is a specific example of where the British had the right idea with the Dardanelles, but the admiral in charge was not forceful enough to act in a way that could have affected the outcome of the First World War.

SD: Your writing is very technical and detailed. From describing systems themselves to the engagements between forces, Sheppard of the Argonne paints extremely clear and accurate pictures. Why did you include this level of detail?

GWW: I am an engineer by training! I went to the University of Wisconsin and majored in nuclear engineering, thinking it would help me with Admiral Rickover, which turned out to be a very bad decision! He did not like people who had majored in his subject area. Somehow he managed to accept me and the rest, as they say, is history.

SD: Do you have any funny Admiral Rickover stories? I know he is quite an iconoclast.

GWW: He managed to give me quite a grilling and tried to set me up on a date with some of his secretaries, who came in to evaluate whether I was handsome or not. But the real Rickover story occurred several years later when I was serving on his staff. After interview days, I would debrief the candidates as they finished the interview with the admiral and scribble down their answers. At the end of the day I had to go down and describe to Admiral Rickover what had gone on that day. He usually just asked “did they complain?” (No.) But one day he asked “What did they say?” As you can imagine everything at Naval Reactors was quite literal…that meant I had to report to him all 66 pages of notes verbatim. I decided to start with what I presumed would be a “safe” comment, in which a candidate stated he now “had his Rickover story!” The admiral stopped what he was doing (never a good sign) leaned back in his rocking chair to ask me “Oh, what is a Rickover story?” So I had to explain to him what a Rickover story was. I think this was kind of a test to see how I would respond. After I had successfully defined what a “Rickover Story” was, he asked me if I knew any. Of course, I did (Yes, sir!) so I had to spend fifteen minutes telling Admiral Rickover “Admiral Rickover Stories.”

SD: Oh wow, I can imagine that was quite the challenge! This relates to my next question. Are any of the characters in Argonne inspired by individuals you met during your time in the service?

GWW: They are from the standpoint that the protagonist, Sheppard, is a compendium of all the great naval officers that I knew, and how they responded to leadership problems. He is also a flawed character as a result of what happened to him at the fictional battle of Pearl Harbor, where he lost many of his men. That has affected him greatly.

SD: The characters in Sheppard of the Argonne, particularly the protagonist, Capt. Sheppard McCloud, are well drawn and diverse. At times, Capt. McCloud faces situations in which there are no perfect answers. Is this reflective of your experience in command?

GWW: Yes. I think that every naval officer faces times when there are really no good answers, and you have to work your way through them. Sheppard is actually using operational planning in that he has a mission that has been assigned, and the main path through which he would accomplish that, the main battery, isn’t working. So he has to come up with something else using the capabilities that are under his control to accomplish his mission. His mission is not to sink the German fleet, only to stop them, so he is able to accomplish his mission by stopping them.

SD: We also see Captain McCloud face some unique leadership challenges; his men regard him in high esteem. For our readers in the Naval service, what lessons do you think they can draw from this example?

GWW: I think the best one that can be drawn is absolute honesty and treating everyone, regardless of their rank, with respect. All of the men that are working for him have risen to that. There are a couple of characters (from Sheppard’s previous command) who have made it their life’s work to take care of Sheppard. One character, Petty Officer Cruz, was the one who helped save an injured Sheppard on Shenandoah; he is bound and determined to take care of Sheppard. He sets up this really marvelous use of talent from the deck gang, maybe you’d call them “rednecks,” who are really good at shooting birds on the fly with a .22 Remington. Their skill with that leads to exceptional performance from Cruz’s 40mm mount. When you show people respect [like Sheppard does] and give them some latitude to exercise their initiative, the results can be really quite exceptional.

SD: That was something that really stuck out to me. About three quarters of the way through the book, the topic of micromanagement comes up. Something that really stuck out to me about Sheppard is that he lets his wardroom, chiefs, and crew do their jobs independent of his input, unless it is needed, and to Sheppard’s great benefit.

GWW: Yes, I deliberately put another character in command of the other battle cruiser that maybe didn’t deserve command but achieved it through political connections. His micromanagement style just creates one problem after another for him, beginning when they are leaving Norfolk and one of his sailors fails to cut in enough air when they start a boiler, creating a situation where a determined submariner knew they were coming.

SD: We always like to know what our authors are reading. What is the most recent book you’ve read, and can you recommend any “must reads” to our audience here at CIMSEC?

GWW: I don’t have any “must reads,” as I think everyone will gravitate toward their own interests. As I mentioned, I just finished reading Professor Marder’s books, there are six volumes right now. I just started “Billy Mitchell and his War Against the Navy,” which is pretty interesting, I learned some things about Billy Mitchell. He had some very good ideas but went about trying to get them accomplished via the wrong methods. Everyone knows about him bombing battleships but he was trying very hard to campaign for a unified air force modeled after the RAF after the end of the First World War.

SD: Finally, can we expect to read more about Sheppard McCloud soon? Might this be a series?

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Captain Jackson, a.k.a G. William Weatherly

GWW: The second book, which I am finishing up right now, is called Sheppard and the French Rescue. I allude to it in the book when Admiral Hamilton is giving the strategic perspective of Rommel having turned westward, inciting fear that the French colonies will soon be under Axis control. There is a French fleet near Oran in Algeria, and President Roosevelt (in the second book) decides that they have to save or incapacitate that fleet, because if the Germans get control of it, the allies will lose the war. The situation I set up is more of a difficult Atlantic naval war in addition to the war in the Pacific, [which in the stories] follows pretty much traditional lines. The third book is about half done and I have an outline for a fourth. I love to write and I think, fundamentally, I am a storyteller…at least good enough to be dismissed from Admiral Rickover’s presence without too much damage to my career!

SD: Yes I would say that’s about the toughest test any author could face! Is there anything else you’d like our readers at CIMSEC to know about your book?

GWW: In terms of WWII, DoD statistics show that about 16 million people served in the armed forces or related activities out of a population of 130 million. There were a great many veterans, and the thing that struck me was that they rarely if ever talked about their battle experiences. It hasn’t been until recently, as they have gotten much older, that they have begun to open up and done oral histories etc. One of the characteristics that I learned about PTSD is that it is actually a very common phenomenon. In the Second World War, anyone that showed the symptoms of post-traumatic stress was shunned or considered a coward. There was a very famous incident of Gen Patton slapping a soldier in Sicily that was suffering from PTSD. One of the things that I wanted to bring to light with this book was how post-traumatic stress affected people then, and how they had to deal with it in private. As the book alludes, the only person that knows something is wrong with Sheppard is his wife, Evelyn, but she really can’t do anything. Early in the book Sheppard has a flashback, and is also plagued by nightmares. He is desperately afraid of betraying his fears to his men while sleep talking…he does not want them to doubt his abilities as a leader.

SD: Thank you all for reading today and thank you, Captain Jackson, for taking time out of your schedule to talk with CIMSEC. If you would like to find out more about Sheppard of the Argonne, you can purchase a copy here.

Sally DeBoer is the Book and Publication Review Coordinator for CIMSEC.  She can be reached at [email protected].