Editor’s Note: CIMSECian James Bridger has a good piece up at USNI’s News and Analysis site debunking some of the myths of the “rise” in Gulf of Guinea piracy and placing the latest incidents, including the kidnapping of two American mariners on Oct 23rd in their proper context. Check it out here:
Kidnapped Americans in Context: The Shifting Forms of Nigerian Piracy
By Scott Cheney Peters and Przemyslaw Krajewski
Last month, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a Washington, DC, think tank, released the intriguing report “Game Changers: Disruptive Technology and U.S. Defense Strategy.” The analysis contained within is a result of a series of wargames done in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Defense. What follows are two views on the value, highlights, and weaknesses in the work.
Scott:
For regular visitors to this site, a good part of Game Changers serves as a familiar retread covering technologies through to hold the most promise of upsetting the current way of war. Additive manufacturing, autonomous drones, directed energy, cyber capabilities, and human performance modification (HPM) are all evaluated for their potential to drastically affect how future militaries function and wars are fought. Admittedly we have not talked much about HPM beyond human-machine interaction, such as augmented reality devices.* If you have not had a chance to read up on these topics, the report serves as a nice primer.
As for the purpose of the work, the key argument is that the U.S. should not rest on its laurels in science and technology (S&T) investments because it has, post-WWII, relied on a qualitative over quantitative military. If the qualitative edge slips, the thinking goes, the military’s edge over potential adversaries slips. The take-away is that “technological dominance is a strategic choice.” Unfortunately, having had this dominance for some time there is an inertia-inducing temptation to believe that it will always be so, necessitating that the U.S. actively guard against a desire to rest on its laurels. The report intriguingly argues that this complacency is compounded by the fact that a technologically dominant power has less incentive to develop revolutionary tech because it would be relatively less useful than for a weaker power.
The authors sound two additional warnings. First, thanks to globalization they note it has never been easier for competitors and even non-state actors to access disruptive technology and nip at the heels of American technological dominance. It is certainly true that information-sharing advances have enabled technology diffusion. Yet some tech, even when accessible, requires a high-degree of expertise and training to be used, or requires specialized components and rare material. Nuclear weapons come to mind. Even in these cases info-sharing lowers the barriers, but it does not completely remove them.
The second point is more of a double-edged sword, and that’s how the commercial sector will drive the development of much of the innovation in these technologies. On one hand, this leaves the same tech more accessible to groups of varied motives, as noted above. On the other, it means that private investments will advance the tech that the military wants. But not all the way. In many instances the larger commercial market will prove more lucrative, leaving a gap in specifications between the commercial supply and military demand, so the authors are correct to note that the military must retain the capability to “translate key technologies from the commercial world and apply them to tomor¬row’s military challenges.” Unstated, but also important, is the ability to identify early on what those key gaps will be (certainly no easy task) so that the military can continue to exploit the latest advances. As the report later notes, the potential for a new tech to be game-changing falls within is short time-frame.
My biggest disappointment with the report was that the analytical framework for explaining what makes a new technology a game-changer was somewhat muddled. There’s a disconnect between figures, introduced-but-unexplained terms, and the text of the report. I assume that these were explained in more detail during the series of wargames, but for those without access to that background the result is a little bit confusing. It does raise some interesting points about cultural factors that can act as hindrances to tech adoption, and the broader point comes through, that even with the emergence of a revolutionary technology a series of other factors must converge to make it useful and utilized to game-changing effect in the military. But it would be interesting to learn more about the thinking behind particularly the “perspectives” and “congruence” factors.
LT Scott Cheney-Peters is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve and the former editor of Surface Warfare magazine. He is the founding director of the Center for International Maritime Security and holds a master’s degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.
*Full disclosure, Andrew Herr, whose work on HPM is cited is a former classmate of mine and friend, while fellow CIMSECian Matt Hipple and I had the honor of having our Proceedings article on naval applications of 3d-printing cited.
Prezymek:
The title of CNAS’ new report might more appropriately be called “Looking Beyond Technology.” Faith in technology is so strong in this document that the authors make technology the central theme of American dominance? in spite of the fact that the otherwise-excellent arguments presented show something different. The authors admit that technology by itself is not a game-changer—it needs to be applied under specific circumstances:
“The framework includes four primary areas that all must converge for a technology to be truly game changing: congruence, perspectives, societal values and organizational culture and time. The core elements of a game-changing technology are the technology itself, a concept for its use and a relevant problem.”
This raises a series of questions: Why the stress on technology and not on the concept, relevant problem, or other conditions described so well? Does a technology itself possess inherent attributes making it a game changer? If not, is it possible that ANY technology could become a game changer given the right circumstances? Or maybe the best model to use would be Aristotle’s golden mean and the interaction of a technology and a concept? To better understand the subject the authors offer some examples. One of them is Blitzkrieg:
“Blitzkrieg is a clear example of how such congruence works: integrating fast tanks, aircraft and two-way radios into an operational concept of advanced maneuver warfare obviated the largely defensive technologies of Germany’s opponents (most famously, France’s Maginot Line).”
There is no need here to search for the game-changing technology. Tanks, airplanes, and radio were not only well known to Germany’s opponents but were invented by them. Blitzkrieg is, in fact a tactical concept and the one which wasn’t successful from the beginning so needed refinement in many exercises. Williamson Murray in his essay, “May 1940: Contingency and Fragility of the German RMA,” offers an interesting comment on this military innovation:
“For French and British officers in summer 1940, the Germans had clearly developed a revolutionary style of war. But to some German officers the secret of German success was the careful evolutionary development of concepts that had their origins in the battles of the First World War.”
Downplaying the role of concept is visible in another example in the report, that of aircraft carriers:
“The adoption of these platforms by new actors may be disruptive, or may increase competition in terms of power projection, but is not fundamentally game changing.”
I agree. It was Germany’s adoption of tanks, planes, and radio in the case of Blitzkrieg, but how they used them. But what will happen if U.S. adversaries would merge carriers with an innovative concept of operations? Would the aircraft carrier become a game changer again?
There are many technical innovations that offer U.S. qualitative advantage. During the Cold War cruise missiles, MLRS, IDF Tornado strike fighters among others offered possibility to counterbalance quantitative superiority of Warsaw Pact armies. But these were also blended together with a deep-strike concept allowing the U.S. to isolate first echelons from reinforcements, thus avoiding immediate overwhelming numbers of defenders.
Paradoxically, the report offers remedy to its own concentration on technology. In the very beginning there is a phrase, “Whether a stone or a drone, it simply becomes a tool we apply to a task.” We should never forget that technology, however useful and important, it is just a tool in the hands of a man. As the military thinks about the future, my recommendation is to empower tactics-oriented naval officers who possess a basic understanding of the implications technology brings to tactical situations. Such officers, willing to think through the tactical advantages emerging technologies could bring, offer the best chance to keep a technical advantage, if that is a pillar of strategy.
Przemek Krajewski, alias Viribus Unitis, is a blogger in Poland. His area of interest is the broad context of purpose and structure for navies and promoting discussions on these subjects in his country.
A continuation of The Hunt for Strategic September, analysis on the relevance of strategic guidance to today’s maritime strategy(ies). As part of the week we have encouraged our friendly international contributors to provide some perspective on their national and alliance strategic guidance issues.
In an earlier article for CIMSEC, I argued that in order for the U.S.-South Korean alliance to effectively counter threats emanating from North Korea (DPRK), South Korea (ROK) must gradually move away from its Army-centric culture to accommodate jointness among the four services. In particular, as Liam Stoker has noted, naval power may offer the “best possible means of ensuring the region’s safety without triggering any further escalation.”
The appointment last week of former ROK Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Choi Yoon-hee as the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff seems to augur a shift in focus in the ROK’s strategic orientation. Given that the ROK’s clashes with the DPRK have occurred near the contested Northern Limit Line throughout the late 1990s and 2000s, President Park Geun-hye’s appointment of Admiral Choi as Chairman of ROK JCS seems to be appropriate. Indeed, during his confirmation hearings two weeks prior, Admiral Choi repeatedly vowed retaliatory measures in the event of another DPRK provocation.
Furthermore, by tapping Admiral Choi to head the ROK JCS, President Park also appeared to signal that she is mindful of the feverish East Asian naval race. The ongoing naval race among three East Asian naval powers (China, Japan, and South Korea) is rooted in historical grievances over Japan’s wartime atrocities and fierce competition for limited energy resources. These two factors may explain the ROK’s increased spending to bolster its naval might.
Indeed, the ROK Navy has become a great regional naval power in the span of a decade. The ROKN fields an amphibious assault ship, the Dokdo, with a 653 feet-long (199 meters) flight deck. The ship, named after disputed islets claimed by both the ROK and Japan, is supposedly capable of deploying a Marine infantry battalion for any contingencies as they arise. Given that aircraft carriers may offer operational and strategic flexibility for the ROK Armed Forces, it is perhaps unsurprising that “funding was restored in 2012” for a second Dokdo-type aircraft carrier and more in 2012 and that Admiral Choi has also expressed interest in aircraft carrier programs. Moreover, the ROKN hassteadily increased its submarine fleet in response to the growing asymmetric threats emanating from North Korea and Japan’s alleged expansionist tendencies. As the Korea Times reported last Wednesday, the ROKN has also requested three Aegis destroyers to be completed between 2020 and 2025 to deal with the DPRK nuclear threats and the naval race with its East Asian neighbors.
Thus, at a glance, it would appear that the ROK has built an impressive navy supposedly capable of offering the Republic with a wide range of options to ensure strategic and operational flexibility. However, this has led some analysts to question the utility and raisons d’être for such maintaining such an expensive force.
Kyle Mizokami, for example, argues South Korea’s navy is impressive, yet pointless. He may be correct to note that the ROK “has prematurely shifted resources from defending against a hostile North Korea to defeating exaggerated sea-based threats from abroad.” After all, at a time when Kim Jŏng-ŭn has repeatedly threatened both the ROK and Japan, it may be far-fetched to assume that Japan may “wrest Dokdo/Takeshima away by force.” It would also make no sense to purchase “inferior version of the Aegis combat system software that is useless against ballistic missiles” which does not necessarily boost its naval might.
However, what Mizokami may not understand is that the seemingly impressive posturing of the ROKN does not necessarily mean the expansion of the Navy at the expense of diminishing Army’s capabilities. As my January piece for the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs and Michael Raska’s East Asia Forum article argue, the greatest barriers to service excellence for the ROKN may be South Korea’s uneven defense spending, and operational and institutional handicaps within the conservative ROK officer corps. One telling indication which bears this out may be the fact that the expansion of the ROKN and Admiral Choi’s chairmanship of the ROK JCS did not lead to the reduction of either the budget allocated for the ROK Army or of the existing 39 ROK Army divisions in place.
Moreover, if, as Mizokami argues, the ROK seems bent on pursuing strategic parity with Japan—and to a lesser extent, China—I should point out that it does not even possess the wherewithal to successfully meet this goal. As I notedin late August, in order for the ROK to achieve regional strategic parity with its powerful neighbors, South Korea must spend at least 90% of what its rivals spend on their national defense. That is, the ROK’s $31.8 billion defense budget is still substantially smaller than Japan’s $46.4 billion. If anything, one could argue that the ROK’s supposedly “questionable” strategic priorities have as much to do with political posturing and show aimed at domestic audience as much as they are reactions to perceived threats posed by its powerful neighbors.
Finally, neither the ROK military planners nor Mizokami seem to take into account the importance of adroit diplomatic maneuvers to offset tension in East Asia. In light of the fact that the United States appears reluctant to reverse its decision to hand over the wartime Operational Control (OPCON) in 2015, the ROK may have no other recourse but to deftly balance its sticks with diplomatic carrots to avert a catastrophic war on the Korean peninsula.
In short, it remains yet to be seen whether the ROK will successfully expand the scope of its strategic focus from its current preoccupation with the Army to include its naval and air capabilities. One cannot assume that this transformation can be made overnight because of an appointment of a Navy admiral to the top military post, or for that matter, because it has sought to gradually bolster its naval capabilities. Nor can one assume that they are misdirected since a service branch must possess versatility to adapt to any contingencies as they arise. Instead, a balanced operational and strategic priority which encompasses the ground, air and maritime domain in tandem with deft diplomacy may be what the ROK truly needs to ensure lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and in East Asia.
Photo credit: U.S. Forces Korea, SinoDefence, ITV
Jeong Lee is a freelance writer and is also a Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat’s Asia-Pacific Desk. Lee’s writings on US defense and foreign policy issues and inter-Korean affairs have appeared on various online publications including East Asia Forum, the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, the World Outline and CIMSEC’s NextWar blog. This article appeared in its original form at RealClearDefense on October 24th, 2013.
USCG Mobile Training Branch member, James Daffer, has traveled the world. We talk with him about what he’s seen in the world of capacity building for maritime security abroad, soft power and relationship building, cultural challenges when working amongst different peoples, and stories about his travels. SC Episode 6 – USCG Adventures (Download)
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