Weekend Reading: 09 Nov 2013

For those who can’t get enough of our sometimes witty, sometimes prescient, sometimes just out-in-left-field writing there’s good news! Now you can spend the weekend reading more from our membership. Here’s what they’ve been up to:

Australia
Natalie Sambhi: Security Scholar: Two new round-ups on Indonesian defense and intelligence news stories

Canada
James Bridger: Foreign Policy: Rise and Fall of a Pirate King

Germany
Felix Seidlers: Seidlers Sicherheispolitik: Germany Needs a Permanent Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

Poland
Przemyslaw Krajewski: Viribus Unitis: Corvettes and Steadfast Jazz

U.S.
LT Will Spears, USN: JO Rules: Talk Like a Spartan
CDR Chuck Hill, USCG: Chuck Hill’s CG Blog: Norway Buying New SAR Helos
LT Scott Cheney-Peters, USNR: War on the Rocks: How to Not Go to War with China
William Yale: The Diplomat: Air Sea Battle: A Dangerous Unaffordable Threat
Dave Majumdar: USNI News: SR-72 is Only a Plane on Paper
ADM John Harvey (Ret.) and Bryan McGrath: Panel Discussion: Inaugural event at Hudson Institute’s Center for American Seapower
ADM James Stavridis (Ret.): Foreign Policy: Pirate Droves
Raymond Pritchet: Information Dissemination: American Decline
CDR Chris Rawley, USNR: NavalDrones: RAND on USVs
Joseph Hammond: Today’s Zaman: Energy Wars on the Caspain Basin

If you’re a member and don’t see your outside efforts above, be sure to email me at director@cimsec.org.

If you’re not a member (and you can check here) and would like to be you can fill out the short, simple, free memberhip application, which gives you access to all sorts of great things, like digital tote bags.

Sacred Cow: Military Pay and Benefits By the Numbers

This article is part of our “Sacred Cows Week.”

Commissary Special: 2-for-1 Children.
                 Commissary Special: 2-for-1 Children.

Cost of the all-volunteer force in its current form is unsustainable.  In the FY 2013 budget, the DoD cost of “taking care of people” consumes more than $250 billion or over 50 percent of the total DoD budget. An additional $200 billion is spent by organizations outside of DoD for programs within the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Labor, Education, and Treasury. [1]

In its July 2012 Study: Rebalancing Military Compensation: An Evidence-Based Approach , the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment concluded:  “Over the past decade, the cost per person in the active-duty force increased by 46 percent, excluding war funding and adjusting for inflation. If personnel costs continue growing at that rate and the overall defense budget remains flat with inflation, military personnel costs will consume the entire defense budget by 2039.[2]

Modifications to the pay and benefits will have to be made; however, the all-volunteer force is not going away.  Military Pay and Benefits and will remain a major factor in cost to the Federal Government and the Department of Defense, increasingly impacting resources available for force structure and weapon systems modernization.  The Reserve Policy Review Board (footnote 1 below) reported that in FY 13, the fully burdened total cost to the US government for an active component military person is $384,622 per year.  The total life cycle cost to the US government for an active component member is $10.3 million.

The 2013 DoD Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) review developed compensation savings options such as: changing military health care for retirement; changing how the basic allowance for housing is calculated; reducing the overseas cost-of-living adjustments; and, limiting military and civilian pay increases.  The SecDef did not recommend specific SCMR compensation changes but tasked the Chairman JCS to lead the development of compensation proposals that save almost $50 billion over the next decade.  Implementation would begin in the FY 2015 budget.  The SCMR identified more sweeping changes to meet sequester funding level targets to include eliminating civilian pensions for retired military personnel serving in civilian government service; ending subsidies for defense commissaries; and, restricting the availability of unemployment benefits.  These changes would save almost $100 billion over the next decade, but they would significantly impact the DoD workforce.

In addition to the aforementioned changes in DoD military and civilian pay and benefits being considered, two changes in DoD acquisition policy may offer savings to offset at least some of the more painful pay and benefit changes.

First, savings could be realized if the DoD acquisition process required the services to reflect the total cost to the federal government of manpower in their computations of total life cycle costs for alternative weapons system designs such as Navy combatants.  As an example, a DDG-1000 is to have a size crew of 142 sailors compared to approximately 300 on a DDG 51.  This DDG crew size reduction of 158 military personnel translates to approximately $1.6 billion life cycle cost avoidance per ship in military pay and benefits to the US government, and the Navy.

Second, savings could be realized by severely reducing the detailed requirements in the fifty-eight page Chairman JCS Instruction CJCSI 6212.01F, subject: Net Ready Key Performance Parameter.[3]  These requirements levied on all Defense acquisition programs add significant cost to each program; add workload for service, OSD and Joint Staff review; and, require contractors to support the OSD and Joint Staff processes.  Interoperability among service and agency systems is essential for effective military operations.  That said, the requirements in CJCSI 6212.01 are overwhelming in detail, adding significant cost but resulting in limited improvements in interoperability.  Interoperability can be achieved at dramatically lower cost to the department.

Richard Mosier is a former Naval aviator (VQ/VP).  He served as a career civil servant working for the Director of Naval Intelligence in the 1970s and the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff (OASD(C3I)), retiring from the government in 1997 as an SES.  From 1997 to 2010 worked as an engineer for a defense contractor.



[1] Reserve Forces Policy Board, Final Report to the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Eliminating Major Gaps in DoD Data on the Fully-Burdened and Life-Cycle Cost of Military Personnel: Cost Elements Should be Mandated by Policy, (RFPB Report FY13-02) dated January 7, 2013.

http://ra.defense.gov/rfpb/_documents/RFPB_Cost_Methodology_Final_Report_7Jan13.pdf

 

[2] Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Rebalancing Military Compensation: An Evidence-Based Approach, July 12, 2012, by Todd Harrison

http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2012/07/rebalancing-military-compensation-an-evidence-based-approach/

 

Why the United States Should Merge Its Ground Forces

Part of our Sacred Cow series, originally posted at USNI Blog.

Speaking at the Association of the United States Army on the 12th, Admiral James Winnefeld, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the audience that in future ground wars the tempo will be “shorter, faster-paced and much harder” because America’s adversaries will work to create a “fog of war.” Thus, the Admiral suggested that the Army “place more emphasis on the growth industry…of protecting American citizens abroad” in order to adapt to the fluid geostrategic environment.

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VCJCS Admiral James Winnefeld speaking at the Association of the United States Army on September 12th.

Indeed, since the sequestration went into effect in March, many defense experts have been debating what the future may hold for the Army, the Marine Corps and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Whatever their respective views may be on the utility of landpower in future wars, all seem to agree on one thing: that in the sequestration era, the ground components must fight leaner and smarter.

For John R. Deni, a research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, the answer seems to lie in the “Army-led military-to-military activities” which may provide stability in politically volatile regions “if only because most military forces around the globe are army-centric.”

Others beg to differ. Generals James Amos and Raymond Odierno and Admiral William McRaven seem to second Admiral Winnefeld’s claim when they argue that today “the need to conduct large-scale aid and consequence management missions, both within the United States and internationally, is certain to grow.” General James Amos, the Marine Corps Commandant, also recently echoes this view when he advocates a lighter but mobile Marine Corps because he believes tomorrow’s conflicts will likely involve “violent extremism, battles for influence, disruptive societal transitions, natural disaster, extremist messages and manipulative politics.”

However, if the United States Armed Forces is truly concerned about raising a cost-efficient and versatile ground force, it can merge the Army, the SOCOM and the Marine Corps into one unified service branch. This idea is not new. As far back as 1994, the late Colonel David Hackworth advocated the merger of the Army and the Marine Corps because their missions seemed to overlap. He went so far as to claim that the Department of Defense (DoD) could save “around $20 billion a year.” Nevertheless, absent in Hackworth’s column was a coherent blueprint for how the DoD could effectively unify its ground components into a cohesive service because Hackworth did not flesh out his strategic vision for what 21st Century wars may look like.

Which raises a very salient question as to what America’s strategic priorities should be. In a perceptive op-ed, Mark Fitzgerald, David Deptula and Gian P. Gentile aver that the United States must choose to go to “war as a last resort and not a policy option of first choice.” To this must be added another imperative. The United States Armed Forces must prioritize homeland defense as its primary mission and rethink the mistaken belief that the United States can somehow secure its interests through “lengthy military occupations of foreign lands.”

Thus, this newly merged service must redirect its focus towards countering cyber warfare and CBRNe (Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear and explosives) attacks and should work towards bolstering its counterterrorism (CT) capabilities. This is because, due to the convergence of the global community, the United States may be vulnerable to attacks from within by homegrown terrorists and drug cartels—all of which may wreak havoc and may even cripple America’s domestic infrastructures.

Reorientation of its mission focus may also require that the new service reconfigure its size. After all, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey wrote in Foreign Affairs, “Washington should remember that the size of the armed forces is not the most telling metric of their strength.” One solution is to adopt the so-called “Macgregor Transformation Model (MTM)” centered around the combat group concept which may reduce the strength of the new service “yet in the end produce a force that has greater combat capability…[and] more sustainable.” This model may provide the United States with a deployable fire brigade in the event of a national emergency or an international crisis. Already, the bases from which to adopt this viable model exist in the form of Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) and Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) of various sizes.

Should the United States decide that it needs to project its hard power abroad to guard its interests, it could deploy the Special Operations Forces (SOF) components of the new service in tandem with UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) to selectively target and neutralize potential threats. While the SOF and UAV surgical raids should not be viewed as substitutes for deft diplomacy, they can provide cheaper and selective power projection capabilities. Moreover, doing so could minimize the risks inherent in power projection and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) missions which may potentially mire the United States in messy and protracted conflicts.

Marines from MARSOC honing their rifle marksmanship skills. Photo by MARSOC Public Affairs

Last but not least, this new service could buttress interoperability and capabilities of allied forces around the globe through military-to-military exchanges. Although Deni was referring specifically to the Army-led initiatives when he suggested this, he may be correct that military-to-military engagements may help to promote America’s image abroad as a trusted guarantor of peace. But even more important, such activities may “mean fewer American boots on the ground.” However, implementing what the retired Marine General James Mattis refers to as the “proxy strategy” may be a better means by which the United States could “lead from behind.” Under this arrangement, while “America’s general visibility would decline,” its allies and proxies would police the trouble spots on its behalf.

Contrary to what many in the defense establishment believe, the austerity measures wrought by the sequestration have not been entirely negative. If anything, this perceived “crisis” has provided the much-needed impetus for innovative approaches to national defense. The proposed merger of the ground forces may provide the United States with most cost-effective and versatile service branch to defend the homeland and safeguard its interests abroad.

SSBN(X): Sacred Cow for a Reason

This article is part of our “Sacred Cows Week.”

By Grant Greenwell

SSBNXIn May 2009, President Obama disclosed the inventory of America’s strategic nuclear arsenal: 5,113 weapons. This was done in an attempt to 1) bring attention to smaller states with developing nuclear agendas and 2) pressure Russia to disclose its own nuclear numbers.  While the first objective is not quantifiable, and the second is partially complete (such as Russia cooperating with a recent Bulletin of Atomic Scientists study documenting worldwide nuclear arsenals), the startling revelation by President Obama brought to light one widely-known fact: the U.S. possesses a massive nuclear arsenal deployed in missile silos, bombers, and submarines around the world.

In the fiscally constrained environment the U.S. currently resides, many institutions are questioning the efficiency of not only the quantity of nuclear weapons, but also the delivery methods of such an arsenal. A recent Cato Institute white paper argued that the U.S. nuclear arsenal if deployed only in nuclear strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) would save the US $20b annually. The argument is predicated on a rivalry between the services in the early days of the Cold War to develop dominance in the field of nuclear weapon delivery (not unlike the Ballistic Missile Defense competition). Each service developed its own delivery method that was robust, survivable, and flexible to deliver a second-strike capability.  Of the three delivery methods of the Nuclear Triad, the SSBN is the most advantageous when it comes to survivability and mobility.

While some parties contend that disassembling the triad into a dyad or even monad eliminates the amplitude of U.S. deterrent strategy, all agree that the SSBN is the cornerstone of that strategy. That being said, the U.S. SSBN fleet is tired, with the first of 14 due to be decommissioned in 2027. A replacement fleet needs to be designed, approved, constructed, and tested in the next 14 years if the strategic deterrence ability of the SSBN fleet is to be continued.

Mr. Maxwell Cooper’s recent Proceedings article “The Future of Deterrence?  Ballistic Missile Defense” correctly cites that the current SSBN replacement (SSBN(X)) estimates are staggering when compared with the rest of the Navy’s shipbuilding budget – roughly $5b per SSBN(X) while the entire budget is roughly $21b/year over the next 30 years. Mr. Cooper further speculates (perhaps correctly) that the cost alone calls for the truncation – if not complete elimination – of the SSBN(X) in favor of vast increases in the BMD realm built around the existing Arleigh Burke platform.  He could not make a more dangerous assertion.

SSBN(X) remains a vital portion of our national maritime strategy as well as our nuclear deterrence strategy. If the SSBN force were to retire without replacement, the U.S. nuclear arsenal would be down nearly 1600 warheads that cannot be easily translated to the other portions of the triad. Additionally, the leg of the triad that is most survivable and mobile would be arrested, forcing our strategic resources to rely solely on fixed sites and aging bombers. Neither of these prospects are ideal, nor appealing. The argument is akin to whether US naval forces should rely on hard-kill (kinetic munitions) or soft-kill (electronic warfare (i.e., chaff decoys, jamming)) for defense. The answer is both, as should be the nuclear deterrent forces.

The U.S. Navy has signaled it agrees with this argument in the form of its FY14 budget.  In an effort to keep forward movement for the Ohio Replacement Program (ORP – formally SSBN(X)), the Navy requested $1.1b for additional research and development with the end goal of procuring a replacement fleet of 12 SSBNs. The Navy has also reasserted its commitment to the SSBN force in a surprising tactic: compromise. As Mr. Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists pointed out, the U.S. SSBN force is doing more with less. While the number of boats has remained the same for years, the deployment numbers are less, yet the nuclear deterrence mission has remained unchanged. In a nod to this trend, the Navy – with guidance from STRATCOM – has agreed to a decrease of the current 24-tube count to a 16-tube count for the future SSBN.

In addition to U.S. commitment to the next-generation SSBN force, their closest ally Britain has also started procuring its next ballistic boat, aptly named Successor that will carry its deterrent capability well into the 2040s.

The need to continues the SSBN fleet is evident and has been appropriately addressed by institutes, politicians, the U.S. Navy, and allies alike. The replacement plan has been programmed for and is projected to be completed in time to start the on-time retirement of the venerable Ohio class. It continues to remain the strongest platform in the US strategic deterrence strategy and as such is privileged to remain a “sacred cow.”

Grant Greenwell is the Director of Operations for CIMSEC since May of 2013. He is also a Surface Warfare Officer for the U.S. Navy and an active participant in American Mensa, the U.S. Naval Sea Cadet Corps, and the Surface Navy Association. His opinions do not represent the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, nor his aforementioned affiliates.

Featured Image: POULSBO, Wash. (Jan. 14, 2015) The ballistic-missile submarine USS Nevada (SSBN 733) transits the Puget Sound on its way to its homeport, Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Ahron Arendes)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.