We discuss the Warrior Writers exhibit at the USNA Museum with Director Claude Berube. We also take some time out to discuss his new book, Syren’s Song – second in the Connor Stark Series.
This post originally appeared on Navy Grade 36 Bureaucrat. It can be found in its original form here.
At first glance, the recently released Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy looks like a rehash of a lot of old points about the US’ position on Pacific matters. But upon closer examination, there is a key shift in language that those of us who watch the region will take note of. Here are ten things you might have missed:
1. It calls out the Senate directly on UNCLOS, but doesn’t address ISA.
Normally DoD publications don’t delve too much into policy matters with Congress. But it’s hard to say that about this statement:
“This is why the United States operates consistent with – even though the U.S. Senate has yet to provide its advice and consent – the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”
UNCLOS was originally opposed due to the International Seabed Authority (ISA), which does such un-American things like taxing sea bed mining for distribution to other countries and mandating technology transfer. The military normally focuses on the navigation portion of UNCLOS, which it has abided by since the Regan era. The problem comes when the US is encouraging nations to use UNCLOS while not actually having ratified the treaty. There isn’t an easy solution, short of removing the ISA from UNCLOS, but expect to see UNCLOS ratification cries in the near future.
2. It calls out everyone on the South China Sea.
It’s not just China. Every claimant in the South China Seas has issues. This document clearly spells that out, taking away a talking point from the PRC that the US is overlooking the other countries to focus on China. But it pulls no punches on China, going after the “so-called Nine-Dash Line” as an excessive claim.
3. It spells out why the Senkakus became a problem.
Most people view the Senkakus as a bunch of rocks that China and Japan hold in dispute. Very few know that the Japanese government bought them in order to prevent the Governor of Tokyo from buying them. This was actually an attempt to prevent a clash with China, since the Governor was rightwing and would likely have stoked the issue. This narrative has been lost to China’s narrative about how Japan “changed the status quo,” so it’s good to see it spelled out here.
4. It puts India as a model for dispute resolution.
Comparing the India/Bangladesh maritime dispute resolution to what is occurring in the South China Sea is no accident. This document clearly spells out US support to India, likely in an attempt to spur continued Indian investment in their “Look East” strategy.
5. It denies territorial sea around reclaimed islands.
This is big.
“At least some of these features were not naturally formed areas of land that were above water at high tide and, thus, under international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention, cannot generate any maritime zones (e.g., territorial seas or exclusive economic zones). Artificial islands built on such features could, at most, generate 500-meter safety zones, which must be established in conformity with requirements specified in the Law of the Sea Convention.”
This is a clear US denial of any Chinese territorial claim of these features. This has been implied before, but not ever strongly stated. On that same note…
6. Freedom of Navigation (FON) is coming to you.
One paragraph in particular tells us to expect more FON operations:
“Over the past two years, the Department has undertaken an effort to reinvigorate our Freedom of Navigation program, in concert with the Department of State, to ensure that we regularly and consistently challenge excessive maritime claims.”
Coming on the heels of stating that PRC reclaimed land is an excessive claim, this is a really good sign, although realize that future FON operations will likely include challenges to all claimants (and make diplomatic efforts interesting).
7. It accuses China of changing the status quo.
If you sit on a beach, you’ll watch the waves crash against rocks. The seawater slowly erodes the rocks until they split open at seams you couldn’t have seen before. This is analogous to China’s strategy in the East and South China Seas. They have slowly worn away at seams around every other claimant, always claiming to “maintain the status quo” when in reality they are waiting for the other claimant to make the first move, then instantly cry that they are the victim. Scarborough Reef is a classic example, yet the media has essentially ignored the issue. Luckily, this document calls it out, stating “China is unilaterally altering the physical status quo in the region.”
8. It calls out A2/AD and how we would stop any short war.
It gives vague language to DoD efforts to combat A2/AD, but it does say that it’s happening, with “robotics, autonomous systems, miniaturization, big data, and additive manufacturing.” It also later mentions that we’ll be dispersing around the Pacific, into more Japanese bases and places like Australia. This complicates PRC targeting. Will the PRC risk war with the US if we have units spread out everywhere? They don’t have enough missiles to hit everything, and striking into a country like Australia means that any sort of “short, sharp war” on their part quickly expands…something that will cause a lot of angst on their end.
9. It calls out information sharing with allies.
“This is why DoD is working closely with partners in the Asia-Pacific region to encourage greater information sharing and the establishment of a regional maritime domain awareness network that could provide a common operating picture and real-time dissemination of data.”
I’ve long argued that sharing data with allies is too hard. At the CJOS-COE we worked hard to make Carrier Strike Groups use networks that supported integrating ships from non-“Five Eyes” countries, like Germany and Norway. We proved that successfully, and in the Pacific we’ve integrated South Korean and Japanese ships before. But what about Malaysia? Indonesia? Brunei? We get some play at RIMPAC, but not enough. The disaster that was ABDA in World War 2 wasn’t that long ago. We need to get friendly nation integration right before any shooting starts.
10. It’s got great graphics.
From the scale model of Fiery Cross Reef reclamation to a very nice and detailed map of South China Sea features, this is one of the few documents that uses more than just pretty pictures of military equipment. Well done to the authors who picked quality illustrations to help drive their points home…almost as good as my choice of memes 🙂
Ryan Haag is the Hawaii CIMSEC President and an Information Warfare Officer navigating the uncharted waters of the Information Dominance Corps. He can be reached through his blog at The Navy’s Grade 36 Bureaucrat.
By Alex Calvo and Pol Molas
The logistical side to the US Pivot to the Pacific. One of the aspects not often discussed of the US “Pivot to the Pacific” is that it is not just combat forces (US Army, US Air Force, US Navy and US Marine Corps) moving, but also the Military Sealift Command, which constitutes the cornerstone of logistical support for US operations all over the world. Just to get an idea of its size, if this command’s ships belonged to another nation they would be the fourth-largest navy in the world. As a consequence, NATO European members must reinforce their logistical capabilities.
The best-prepared naval forces to achieve this are the Royal Navy (the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, to be more precise) and France’s Marine Nationale. Germany is beginning to boost her global-scale force projection capabilities, limited to date due to well-known historical reasons. Now, the economic crisis and ensuing budget cuts are providing added impetus to the development of shared capabilities. While there is a growing pressing to achieve this, it is nothing new. For example, we can mention the United Kingdom and the Netherlands as a model of force integration, with their UK/NL Landing Force. By the way, there is a Catalan angle to this. Anglo-Dutch cooperation in amphibious operations dates back to the 1704 landing in Gibraltar, where a 350-strong Catalan battalion under General Bassett also took part. Therefore, should a future Catalan contingent join the UK/NL Landing Force, they would just be coming back home. Another significant example are the three Baltic Republics, which combine their naval forces in the BALTRON (Baltic Naval Squadron).
Barcelona and Tarragona Harbours: two key dual-use infrastructurs in the Western Mediterranean. When we talk logistics, one of its key elements are ports. It is precisely when countries are pondering how to cut costs that the concept of dual-use infrastructures comes to the fore. In this area, the ports of Barcelona and Tarragona can make a much greater contribution that they do at present. Right now, other than the occasional port visit by the US and other Allied navies, they are not the permanent home of any Spanish Navy unit. Furthermore, despite healthy growth in terms of tonnage, much of their necessary connecting infrastructure remains incomplete. In particular, a European gauge connection to the French railway network. However, in addition to featuring in plans for a future Catalan Navy, they could also become an strategic asset for NATO, being home to a portion of the Atlantic Alliance’s logistical units in the Mediterranean Theatre.
It is not just a matter of size. Both infrastructures are located in areas sporting a concentration of industry and transportation links. These links must certainly be improved, in line with the EU’s 2013 decision to confirm the “Mediterranean Corridor” as a key element of the Old Continent’s transportation networks. This label refers to a railroad transportation axis connecting cities and ports along the Spanish southern and eastern seaboards to France. Since most EU member states also belong to NATO, there is no reason to expect any discrepancy between the two organizations when it comes to the logistical map of Europe.
The benefits on the civilian economic front of completing this infrastructure have already been explained at length by myriad economists, such as for example Ramon Tremosa, currently serving as member of the European Parliament, who has written extensively on the project and worked hard as a lawmaker to see it come to fruition. This explains the support of the French Government and the European Commission, which have rejected alternative proposals to drill a tunnel in the Central Pyrenees, connecting Spain and France through the Aragon region. From a naval logistics perspective, this alternative plan would not have benefited NATO and allied navies to the same extent, since it would have meant bypassing Tarragona and Barcelona. The benefits of the “Mediterranean Corridor”, on the other hand, also extend to the field of defense. For example, should NATO’s Response Force (NRF) need to project one of its battle groups in a crisis scenario, we may ask ourselves whether Toulon, Marseilles, and Naples harbors would suffice. While it would not be impossible, it may make it harder to label it a rapid-reaction force.
The Pivot to the Pacific rests on a strong NATO and a secure Mediterranean. The US Pivot to the Pacific, and more widely the growing coordination among the maritime democracies in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region, are based on the assumption that the Mediterranean will be secured by NATO. Thus, any move reinforcing security in this body of water has a direct, positive, impact on the struggle for the rule of law at sea in the Indian-Pacific Region. A struggle, let us be realistic about it, that is surely to be bitterly tested in the future ahead. As a historical reminder of the connection between the two regions, we may mention the failed British strategy to defend Singapore. Built at a time of scarce resources, the naval base was supposed to provide the necessary facilities for a strong naval and air force to be moved in the event of a crisis, without the expense involved in a permanent presence. However, the need to protect home waters, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean, meant that all that London could send were HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, sunk by Japanese land-based naval aircraft in the South China Sea in the opening days of the Second World War in the Pacific.
Conclusions. Barcelona and Tarragona are key dual-use facilities in the Western Mediterranean, whose naval logistical potential to date has not been fully exploited. Their worth will multiply once the “Mediterranean Corridor”, backed by Paris and Brussels, is completed. Their potential contribution to NATO is growing as pressure on defense budgets forces countries to get as much bang for the buck as possible, and as moves to reinforce the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region make it imperative to fully secure the Mediterranean.
Alex Calvo is a guest professor at Nagoya University (Japan) and member of CIMSEC, Pol Molas is a naval analyst and regular contributor to the Blau Naval blog
Welcome to the August 2015 Members’ Roundup! Last month CIMSEC members have examined a range of major maritime security issues, including the new U.S. DoD Asia-Pacific maritime strategy, Iranian capabilities in the Persian Gulf, and NATO’s northern threat from Russia in the Arctic.
Beginning in the Western Pacific, Bryan Clark gave a presentation at the Hudson Institute concerning the missile threat China poses to U.S. regional allies and U.S. forward deployed forces. The discussion centered on China’s missiles and their ability to deter U.S. regional influence, primarily through limiting the operational capabilities of U.S. surface fleets in conflict. Harry Kazianis, for The National Interest, provides further details regarding the Chinese missile threat by describing the challenge U.S. sea-based interceptors, such as the Aegis based SM-3 and SM-2 Block 4, will have in engaging ballistic and conventional missiles such as China’s DF-26 or DF-21D. For further reading, Zachary Keck, also for The National Interest, identifies additional Chinese missiles posing threats to U.S. forces in the Western Pacific.
CIMSEC’s founder, Scott Cheney-Peters, along with members BJ Armstrong and Bryan McGrath, contributed to CSIS’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) with commentary on the new DoD Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy. The review offers an evaluation of the pace at which U.S. military capacity in the region is being strengthened relative to China. Also provided was an analysis of the strategic importance of distinguishing conflict and coercion in the region. BJ Armstrong further analyzed the new DoD strategy in his article for War on the Rocks, where he also provided a historical context for U.S. naval operations in the Asia-Pacific.
Scott also joined Harry and The Diplomat‘s Shannon Tiezzi for a panel discussion on the latest South China Sea developments hosted by the Project for the Study of the 21st Century. You can watch their chat here.
Continuing on China and Asia-Pacific regional security issues, James Goldrick for The Interpreter, discusses the challenges the Taiwanese Navy faces regarding China and a high-level threat environment. Mr. Goldrick identifies key features of Taiwan’s future acquisition program for the Navy – emphasizing submarine hulls and major systems, guided missile destroyers, fast attack missile-carrying catamarans and mine warfare technologies.
A refreshing perspective offered by Vijay Sakhuja in the Nikkei Asian Review considers joint Search and Rescue (SAR) operations as a platform for increased inter-governmental relations in the South China Sea. With regional pressures reaching critical levels, he contends joint SAR operations would reduce tensions by creating a safer maritime environment while also promoting regional dialogue and cooperation.
Leaving the Asia-Pacific, another Zachary Keck National Interest article considers the U.S. Navy’s strategy to combat Iran’s asymmetric naval doctrine. Mr. Keck highlights capability improvements being implemented to date to overcome the challenges faced at joint war game exercise Millennium Challenge 02 (MC02), including deployment of Longbow Hellfire Missiles aboard Littoral Combat Ships. Also from The National Interest, Robert Farley delivers an overview of Iranian weapons and tactics that provide Iran with aspects of strategic influence in the gulf region, including C-802 cruise missiles and irregular warfare strategies.
To conclude the August roundup, ADM. James Stavridis, for Foreign Policy, provides insight on current NATO defense capabilities while emphasizing the increase in Russian military operations in the Arctic. ADM. Stavridis describes Russia’s aggressive territorial claims near the Lomonosov Ridge, increased air patrols and the establishing of Arctic Brigades, as well as NATO’s capability to respond to an increasing Northern threat.
Members of CIMSEC were also active elsewhere during August:
At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on the NextWar blog or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to [email protected].
