Midshipman Natalie Schirmacher is a third year student at Villanova University and has studied abroad in Amman, Jordan and Buenos Aires, Argentina. Her experiences in NROTC and studying abroad led her to write for Proceedings about the need for more variety in study abroad programs.
The “Get Real Get Better” campaign initiated a transformative process to address performance shortfalls in the spirit of increasing readiness. However, the practical method of achieving that readiness deserves more attention in considering broad naval mission sets and thoughtfully influencing change within the Navy.
Addressing such a varied group of personnel and missions across the spectrum of being, and supporting, the warfighter is challenging. It may prove beneficial to widen the scope beyond a negatively focused look at poor performance at sea. Although the study of catastrophic failures is absolutely necessary, other industries suggest ways to improve organizational performance. An interdisciplinary approach might uncover the behaviors and practices of units delivering preferred outcomes despite limited resources across both line and staff communities. The Navy might appreciate ways to emulate success as equally valuable in our approach to readiness, rather than strive to narrowly avoid irreversible failure. As much as we “embrace the red,” we might also “perceive the green.” Although difficult, we might even aspire to rediscover a tolerance toward recoverable failures as opportunities to learn.
A key contributor to unit success includes the intentional creation of organizational and cultural environments conducive to learning. The ability to learn is arguably the main attribute with the potential to produce warfighting victory. Across the Navy, such victory might represent better surgical outcomes in the operating room, improved liaison relationships with partner nations, and commanding officers unafraid to emphasize boundary spanning, all of which reinforce asymmetric advantages. Although often a short-term advantage, a reliance on superior technology is not enough to ensure victory. Institutions should sense and steer the mechanisms that support individual and organizational learning, manage the barriers and pitfalls that inhibit this learning, and invest in better learning and leading methods.
For the Navy, this approach requires a new way of thinking. It must be permissive in nature and firmly grounded in becoming a learning organization. To effect such a change, a doctrinal publication formally instituting learning as a strategic priority is a necessary and natural complement to Naval Doctrinal Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfare as a first step. This articulated position would serve to orient all naval communities to embrace, value, and reward those activities necessary to our survival despite modern and forthcoming challenges. Without such a fundamental reference to socialize these concepts into the organization, the bureaucracy which is the U.S. Navy might unintentionally stifle performance, slow its momentum, and limit its potential to make progress. The Navy must become a better learning organization if it is to realize its warfighting potential and sustain its competitive edge.
Commander (Dr.) Art Valeri is an Operative Dentist and Naval Postgraduate School PMBA student stationed at NMRTC Great Lakes serving as Dental Department Head, Zachary and Elizabeth Fisher Medical and Dental Clinic, Captain James A. Lovell Federal Health Care Center, North Chicago, IL.
Featured Image: Naval Aircrewman (Helicopter) 3rd Class Taquan West, assigned to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 5, keeps watch over the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) and the fast combat support ship USNS Arctic (T-AOE-8) on June 28, 2022. (U.S. Navy Photo)
In past wars, small and well-armed ships, such as destroyer escorts, torpedo boats, and riverine craft have been a necessary complement to large combatant force structure. This need is being exacerbated by the U.S. Navy’s currently small yet top-heavy fleet structure. This contrasts with the force structure and operational concepts of Chinese maritime forces, which have been highlighted by the intrusions of PRC naval, Coast Guard, and maritime militia ships into the territorial waters of the Philippines. The Philippine Navy has only three ships to meet these threats, creating demands for U.S. naval presence that is already stretched thin among its relatively few large combatants. China’s numerous small combatants and maritime auxiliary forces would surely have important wartime roles to play as well, and U.S. large combatants may not be available to address these threats.
Innovation in maritime warfare is strategically significant, continuous, difficult to achieve, and must fight its way through an existing paradigm. Often, by the time innovation is adopted, another construct is appearing on the horizon, resulting in a continuous tail-chase. The U.S. Navy continues to push after esoteric technologies, rather than adopting near-term and less costly capabilities. The proposal here, in support of the bi-modal fleet concept featuring a mix of sea denial and sea control vessels, is the LMACC (Lightly Manned Automated Combat Capability) system. This small combatant vessel concept extends autonomy, machine learning, resilient comms, and passive sensor fusion within a cloud shared by a flotilla or other forces.
The bi-modal fleet structure includes a combination of small, crewed, and autonomous systems working as a networked flotilla. The crewed LMACCs and uncrewed autonomous surface vessels can be built and armed for much lower costs and greater capability than the cost of building one or two more destroyers or frigates. In this systems view, it is the holistic flotilla network that is the capability, rather than the individual platform. The uncrewed vessels act as sensors, and the LMACCs serve as decision arbiters and weapons carriers.
LMACC will also serve a critical function in developing future combat leaders. In today’s destroyer-centric surface fleet, platform command opportunities only appear after more than a decade of service. LMACC is intended as an O-3 command, affording naval officers an opportunity to command earlier in their careers and develop critical leadership skills, including initiative, adaptability, and tactical acumen. Autonomous systems will become increasingly important, but cultivating warrior skillsets earlier in careers will be central to victory.
LMACC is the culmination of three years of research and development at the Naval Postgraduate School, via OPNAV N96F sponsorship with the Naval Research Program (NRP). It is now being considered as an Innovation Capstone Program (ICP), for potential transition to an industry partner for prototype acquisition. At an estimated cost of about $100 million per ship, built in small yards, it is much more affordable than other Navy surface combatants, and will invigorate diversification of the shipbuilding industrial base.
Small warships have a long history in the U.S. Navy, and are poised to offer an evolutionary leap in capability. Small, highly automated, lightly crewed, blue water warships will help offset the capabilities of competing fleets and ensure enduring maritime superiority for the U.S. Navy. It is time to fund and build a prototype of the LMACC and its flotilla innovations.
Dr. Shelley Gallup is a retired surface warfare officer. As an Associate Research Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Dr. Gallup has spent 25 years assisting the Navy in developing large-scale experiments at sea. His current work includes research in human-machine partnerships, the role of emergence in combat at sea, and leads the small warship LMACC project at NPS.
Featured Image: The Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10) leads the formation in a photo exercise with the unmanned surface vessels Ranger and the USV Mariner during Integrated Battle Problem (IBP) 23.2, Sep. 7, 2023. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jesse Monford)
There are vital Indian Ocean insights regarding island states, strategic vulnerabilities related to transnational crime caused by climate change, and the usefulness of U.S. naval operations that merit the next CNO’s (Chief of Naval Operations) attention. These insights align with the commitment to ensuring the U.S. Navy remains the preeminent global fighting force and a trusted defender of rules-based order.
Island states in the Indian Ocean region face unique geopolitical and environmental challenges. Their limited landmass, vulnerability to rising sea levels, and dependence on maritime resources create a delicate equilibrium that can be disrupted by climate change. It is essential to recognize that these states often find themselves in the crosshairs of great power competition, making them susceptible to both geopolitical pressures and environmental threats. Understanding their circumstances and forging partnerships based on mutual interests and security is crucial.
Climate change is transforming the security landscape in the Indian Ocean. It is having a profound impact in fomenting transnational maritime crimes, particularly illegal fishing, human smuggling, drug trafficking, and piracy. Island states are specifically vulnerable to these crimes, which often exploit their maritime boundaries and limited capacity. Recognizing these strategic vulnerabilities and their potential to destabilize the region is paramount.
The U.S. Navy’s enduring commitment to maintaining rules-based order is commendable. In the context of the Indian Ocean and its challenges, it is imperative to adapt U.S naval operations to address transnational threats driven by climate change. This includes enhancing maritime domain awareness, fostering regional cooperation, and developing capabilities for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations. Additionally, considering the dynamic nature of these challenges, agility and innovation must be integral to U.S. Navy readiness.
The U.S. Navy’s global reach extends to the Indian Ocean, where it operates alongside allies and partners. Strengthening these relationships is essential to ensuring regional stability. Collaborating with regional maritime forces, international organizations, and island states can bolster the U.S. Navy’s collective ability to address security challenges arising from climate change.
As the next CNO leads U.S. naval operations into this decisive decade, I request that they closely consider the intricate web of challenges and opportunities presented by the Indian Ocean region. It is a space where U.S. naval power can make a significant difference, not only in terms of security, but also in fostering stability, prosperity, and resilience among island states. By acknowledging these complexities and acting with foresight, the U.S. Navy can continue to be the world’s most powerful force, securing U.S. interests and promoting peace across the seas.
Commander Amila Prasanga is Military Research Officer at the Institute of National Security Studies, the premier Sri Lankan think tank on national security, established and functioning under the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence. The opinions expressed are his own and are not necessarily reflective of the views of the institute or the Ministry of Defence.
Featured Image: Aerial photo taken on May 5, 2021 shows the Colombo Port City in Colombo, Sri Lanka. (Photo via Xinhua)