Notes to the New CNO Series

By Richard Mosier

The Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept is totally dependent on radiofrequency (RF) communications to connect military assets across the space, air, land, and sea domains. This plethora of RF emissions from U.S. radars, communications systems, data links, and navigation aids presents a lucrative signals intelligence target that could undermine JADC2.

While net-centric concepts such as JADC2 enjoy broad endorsement, the elephant in the room is the underlying risk associated with adversary intelligence collection and exploitation. RF emissions present the best source for channeling enemy wide-area search, classification, and tracking. If U.S. emissions are sufficiently frequent, they provide the basis for maintaining the track continuity required for targeting long-range anti-ship missile strikes. The U.S. should not underestimate the ability of adversaries to take full advantage of the RF opportunity presented by U.S. net-centric operations.

In contrast with the JADC2 concept, service concepts such as Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) are based on the force being hard-to-find. Recognizing the risk of enemy exploitation of RF emissions, the hard-to-find objective is achieved in large measure through operating in RF silence.

The JADC2 net-centric concept and concepts based on being hard-to-find both make sense, but need to be made more complementary. If the enemy does not know where U.S. units are located, the strategy would be to operate in RF silence to remain hard-to-find, thereby avoiding premature engagements and maintaining the advantage of surprise. When the hard-to-find strategy fails and the U.S. force is facing attack, the strategy would be to rapidly transition to unconstrained RF emissions to leverage the substantial advantage of net-centric operations.

The Navy should request that the Defense Intelligence Agency conduct an assessment, with Navy, NSA, and NRO participation, of the risk of Chinese exploitation of JADC2 RF emissions. If the risk is assessed as high, it would serve to persuade JADC2 advocates of the risks of enemy exploitation of RF emissions, the necessity to conduct some phases of operations in RF silence, and the need for modifications to the JADC2 concept to integrate both.

Richard Mosier is a retired defense contractor systems engineer, Naval Flight Officer, OPNAV N2 civilian analyst, and OSD SES 4 responsible for oversight of tactical intelligence systems and leadership of major defense analyses on UAVs, signals intelligence, and C4ISR.

Featured Image: ATLANTIC OCEAN (Feb. 18, 2019) An E-2D Hawkeye assigned to the “Bluetails” of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron (VAW) 121 performs an arrested landing on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Amber Smalley/Released)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Michael D. Purzycki

The civilian-military divide is often framed as a problem of cultural misunderstanding. And certainly, in an era where most Americans have not served in the military, it is natural that those who have served would feel misunderstood by those whose safety and freedom they defend. However, there is another aspect of the divide, one that if addressed forthrightly by military leadership, can narrow the gap in a more tangible way.

Given that the military is one of the most highly regarded public institutions in American society, its members are well-positioned to ask for material sacrifice from the general public. This would give civilians a chance to go beyond saying, “Thank you for your service,” and contribute in a financially meaningful way to the nation’s defenses. In an era of frequent budgetary uncertainty, any step that could help ensure a reliably funded military is worth considering.

For example, the Navy could point to the amount of petroleum it would need at its disposal to fight and win a conflict with the People’s Liberation Army over the fate of Taiwan. It could then ask Congress for a specific number of barrels of petroleum to be taken out of the civilian economy and added to Navy reserves, to ensure there is no gap between the fuel needed and the fuel available for contingencies. In the process of this request, it could quantify the increase in gasoline prices American drivers could expect to experience. Similar initiatives could be applied to other militarily significant resources and assets.

Even the people of a famously tax-averse country like the United States might accept financial sacrifice to help the troops. While today’s Americans do not have to sacrifice to nearly the extent the World War II generation did, direct requests for contribution to the armed services could help revive some of the spirit of America’s greatest military triumph. Evoking past Americans’ experience of rationing, Victory Gardens, war bonds, and the introduction of income tax withholding, while asking today’s Americans to endure a little pain at the pump, could narrow the civ-mil divide as well as help prepare the nation for future major conflict. As politically difficult as requests for sacrifice from ordinary Americans will be, scrambling to adequately resource America’s defenses in the midst of a war would likely be even more difficult.

Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army. In addition to CIMSEC, he has been published in Divergent Options, Merion West, the Washington Monthly, Wisdom of Crowds, Charged Affairs, Braver Angels, and more. He can be found on Twitter at @MDPurzycki. The views expressed here are his own.

Featured Image: SEA OF JAPAN (Oct. 3, 2023) Sailors load a MK-46 torpedo into a surface vessel torpedo tube on the boat deck aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Shoup (DDG 86) while conducting routine operations in the Sea of Japan, October 3. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Donavan K. Patubo)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Commander Art Valeri

The “Get Real Get Better” campaign initiated a transformative process to address performance shortfalls in the spirit of increasing readiness. However, the practical method of achieving that readiness deserves more attention in considering broad naval mission sets and thoughtfully influencing change within the Navy.

Addressing such a varied group of personnel and missions across the spectrum of being, and supporting, the warfighter is challenging. It may prove beneficial to widen the scope beyond a negatively focused look at poor performance at sea. Although the study of catastrophic failures is absolutely necessary, other industries suggest ways to improve organizational performance. An interdisciplinary approach might uncover the behaviors and practices of units delivering preferred outcomes despite limited resources across both line and staff communities. The Navy might appreciate ways to emulate success as equally valuable in our approach to readiness, rather than strive to narrowly avoid irreversible failure. As much as we “embrace the red,” we might also “perceive the green.” Although difficult, we might even aspire to rediscover a tolerance toward recoverable failures as opportunities to learn.

A key contributor to unit success includes the intentional creation of organizational and cultural environments conducive to learning. The ability to learn is arguably the main attribute with the potential to produce warfighting victory. Across the Navy, such victory might represent better surgical outcomes in the operating room, improved liaison relationships with partner nations, and commanding officers unafraid to emphasize boundary spanning, all of which reinforce asymmetric advantages. Although often a short-term advantage, a reliance on superior technology is not enough to ensure victory. Institutions should sense and steer the mechanisms that support individual and organizational learning, manage the barriers and pitfalls that inhibit this learning, and invest in better learning and leading methods.

For the Navy, this approach requires a new way of thinking. It must be permissive in nature and firmly grounded in becoming a learning organization. To effect such a change, a doctrinal publication formally instituting learning as a strategic priority is a necessary and natural complement to Naval Doctrinal Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfare as a first step. This articulated position would serve to orient all naval communities to embrace, value, and reward those activities necessary to our survival despite modern and forthcoming challenges. Without such a fundamental reference to socialize these concepts into the organization, the bureaucracy which is the U.S.  Navy might unintentionally stifle performance, slow its momentum, and limit its potential to make progress. The Navy must become a better learning organization if it is to realize its warfighting potential and sustain its competitive edge.

Commander (Dr.) Art Valeri is an Operative Dentist and Naval Postgraduate School PMBA student stationed at NMRTC Great Lakes serving as Dental Department Head, Zachary and Elizabeth Fisher Medical and Dental Clinic, Captain James A. Lovell Federal Health Care Center, North Chicago, IL.

Featured Image: Naval Aircrewman (Helicopter) 3rd Class Taquan West, assigned to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 5, keeps watch over the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) and the fast combat support ship USNS Arctic (T-AOE-8) on June 28, 2022. (U.S. Navy Photo)