Flotilla Notes Series

By Barney Rubel

Management, defined as the effective use of resources, is a process and skill that permeates the preparation and execution of warfighting. Commanders can prioritize several specific areas to improve their warfighting management.

Time management is essential. As the CO of a strike fighter squadron, I practiced time management in terms of how much flight time I devoted to different mission areas. There were a limited number of flight hours available during the turnaround cycle based on budgets and the cost of fuel. A Hornet outfit had to be competent in both air-to-air and air-to-ground operations, and these skills were perishable. Of course, there was also carrier qualification, instrument qualification, and other areas that placed demands on time. As CO I had to balance all of these in the context of the individual capabilities, limitations, and idiosyncrasies of my pilots, and with due regard for safety. The goal was to produce a combat ready squadron by the time our carrier sailed on cruise.

In a real sense, all of this was an exercise in risk management. There was never enough time both in terms of actual calendar days and flight hours to bring everyone up to the highest level of capability. I had to decide where to take risks in mission area competency and make calculated tradeoffs. This usually resulted in a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” situation down the line somewhere, but this is inherent to risk management in warfighting. This whole process works better if commanders go into it with a plan based on either direct operational experience, or at least a rational theory of how the unit will be expected to fight.

Naval aviation took decades to get risk management right with respect to mishaps. Prior to the late 1980s, mishap rates were brutal. In 1954 for example, the Navy and Marine Corps suffered 776 Class A mishaps, losing 535 personnel. When I transitioned from the A-7 world to the F-18 world I discovered “operational risk management.” The strike fighter community balanced risk and reward in terms of warfighting readiness at the type level, resulting in a more conservative approach to day-to-day operations. This did not mean that aggressiveness was sacrificed. It just meant that the criterion for accepting risk was grounded in preserving aircraft and crew for warfighting. The big lesson learned was the need to establish the right criterion for judgment in the management of risk. In my A-7 days the criterion was meeting the flight schedule at almost all costs. In my F-18 tour, it was preserving warfighting capability until needed.

We used to disparage management and extol leadership. After decades of naval aviation service, I learned that effective leadership at all levels requires competent management. Poor management increases what Carl von Clausewitz calls friction, which can take the form of dissipating effort down unproductive avenues, and by being forced to recover from messes caused by bad management in the midst of combat. Effective warfighting management will ultimately help minimize the friction experienced in war.

Robert C. Rubel is a retired Navy captain and professor emeritus of the Naval War College. He served on active duty in the Navy as a light attack/strike fighter aviator. At the Naval War College he served in various positions, including planning and decision-making instructor, joint education adviser, chairman of the Wargaming Department, and dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. On occasion he served as a special adviser to the 31st Chief of Naval Operations. He has published over thirty journal articles and several book chapters.

Featured Image: ATLANTIC OCEAN (Aug. 4, 2017) An F/A-18F Super Hornet, attached to the “Blacklions” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 213 and carrying U.K. Carrier Strike Group Commander Cdre. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Hank Gettys/Released)

Flotilla Notes Series

By Capt. Matthew Sharpe (ret.) and GSCM Rich Feldman (ret.)

In Mask of Command, historian John Keegan identified cohesion as the fundamental attribute of Alexander’s Macedonian army. Cohesion united the will and spirit of the commander with that of his closest subordinate leaders, the men Alexander called his “Companions.” Alexander met frequently – often boisterously – with his Companions.

This was no process-driven board or cell. As Keegan explains, “[Alexander did not use] his circle of friends as a sounding-board for his plans. That was not their function; it was personality and character that were under test when Alexander was among his close Companions, the test of quickness of wit, sharpness of retort, memory for an apt phrase, skill in making insult, boast or flattery, capacity to see deep into the bottom of a glass, and no heeltaps.”

With Alexander and his Companions as a model, a select group of officers and enlisted leaders aboard USS San Jacinto (CG 56) met periodically to break bread, bond as warriors, and develop a shared vision of mission success. We called it the War Council.

The membership of San Jac’s War Council was strictly defined. It consisted of the command triad (commanding officer, executive officer, and command master chief), the department heads, and the departmental leading chief petty officers. No substitutes were allowed into War Council meetings. If a principal was unavailable, the seat remained empty.

The War Council served four purposes. First, to build shared awareness of the challenges and opportunities that lay ahead in San Jac’s mission – awareness that crossed department boundaries and was shared by the officers’ wardroom and the chiefs’ mess alike. Second, it provided a forum for innovation, an environment to discuss new and better ways to accomplish tasks. Third, it served to empower War Council members. Each had an equal voice, and rank did not determine the value of a leader’s input. Fourth, it sought to encourage division officers and junior petty officers to aspire to lead departments and ships. Junior warriors could look at the members and think, “I want to be able to do that.”

In one session, the War Council met for lunch with Vice Admiral Phil Cullom. San Jac was preparing for an engagement mission in Africa and Admiral Cullom had written the most recent Navy strategy on engagement. As conversation flowed freely and candidly, STGC Chris Lowden, Weapons Department Leading Chief Petty Officer, asked the admiral, “Since our mission is to influence people in the nations we visit, how can we assess the progress and success of our mission through their eyes, not our own?”

That question – that moment – captured the spirit and purpose of the War Council. The sentiment was contagious. People constructively challenged themselves and each other for the sake of mission success. This mindset – that the War Council actively cultivated – provided a positive impact throughout the ship.

Matthew Sharpe is a former U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer who commanded USS San Jacinto from 2007-2009. He lives and works in Virginia Beach and serves as an advisor to men’s Bible Study Fellowship (BSF) classes across the state. 

Richard Feldman is a former U.S. Navy Senior Enlisted Leader and member of San Jacinto’s War Council as Engineering Department Leading Chief.  He lives in Virginia Beach and continues to serve the Navy as an Engineering Technician for NSWC-Philadelphia Division. 

Featured Image: ATLANTIC OCEAN (June 6, 2012) The guided-missile cruiser USS San Jacinto (CG 56) approaches the amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) for a fueling at sea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Tommy Lamkin/Released)

Flotilla Notes Series

By Doug Kettler

In the era of renewed great power competition, calls for reform have resulted from a perception that the U.S. military has lost its warfighting focus.¹ However, in this era, warfighting is more than delivering “warheads on foreheads.”² There is a spectrum of interdependent functions that each organization must cultivate to ensure competitive focus. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum states, “Rather than a world either at peace or at war, the competition continuum describes a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.”³ Warfighting focus should be reframed as competition focus. The challenge for leaders is to ensure that their organizations understand that the competition is already underway.

The first duty of a military leader is to ensure their unit is prepared for combat. However, when viewed through the lens of the competition continuum, units must also be prepared to conduct operations short of armed conflict. The first practical step leaders can take to emphasize the competition continuum in their organization is to educate themselves on the Joint Force’s shift to the competition continuum and campaigning mindset. Next, study doctrine, contingency plans, and tactical guidance. Stay abreast of exercise after-action reports and lessons learned. Leaders must ensure that they understand how their organization fits into not just the war plan, but the whole competition continuum.

Leaders can then spread their knowledge throughout the organization by emphasizing the competition continuum in daily activities. Leaders must ensure their organizations understand how they fit into other parts of the continuum, and cultivate skillsets related to competing below the threshold of war. These activities may include close encounters with harassing maritime militia and conventional forces, calibrated intervention in tense standoffs between allied and competitor vessels, or engaging in high-profile strait transits and freedom of navigation operations. The competition continuum points to how a wide variety of non-combat related activities have a competitive effect in the operating environment. Therefore, these activities deserve a deliberate measure of emphasis on how leaders prepare their forces.

Daily, routine activities must also be connected to the competition continuum. Educating subordinates on information security pays dividends at all levels of competition. Maintaining ready platforms results in well-kept units that assure partners and intimidate adversaries. Liberty and basing in foreign countries are opportunities for cooperation with allies and partners, and incidents can have strategic consequences. Multi-national exercises expand force capacity in armed conflict. Loading weapons beyond the minimum proficiency requirement is necessary to stress processes and prepare for armed conflict. A professional radio exchange with a potential adversary maintains credibility. All of these activities have a bearing on the competitive environment, and leaders must be able to relate the value of their operational activities to the competition at large.

Leaders are challenged to shift subordinate perspectives to think through normal processes at all levels of competition. Exercises and training must focus on difficult combat scenarios as well as grey zone interactions. Leaders and crews must work with weapons schools and warfighting development centers to stay informed of the latest in tactical development, and to update tactics and procedures for both combat and competition below armed conflict. In addition to training, routine methods of communication, maintenance parts sourcing, and operational security all require scrutiny to ensure functionality throughout the spectrum of conflict. Leaders must plan for and exercise backup procedures to routine tasks ahead of time, so that material and personnel losses do not cripple warfighting capability in the midst of combat. Leaders must never let their organizations feel comfortable with their current processes and warfighting ability, and must inculcate a focus on continuous learning and refinement.

The competition continuum presents a new perspective and a helpful framework that leaders can use to prepare their organizations. Every individual and organization must be prepared to engage at all levels of competition.

Douglas Kettler is a Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy and a P-8A Weapons and Tactics Instructor. He holds a B.A. from the University of California, Los Angeles, and a M.S. from the University of Arkansas. He is currently a student in the College of Naval Warfare at the U.S. Naval War College. His latest operational assignment was as the Operations Officer for Patrol Squadron FOUR ZERO. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent the position of the U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, or Department of Defense.

References

1. Conrad Crane, “Too Fragile to Fight: Could the U.S. Military Withstand a War of Attrition,” War on the Rocks, May 9, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/too-fragile-to-fight-could-the-u-s-military-withstand-a-war-of-attrition/. See this article as an example of calls to be more prepared for the changing character of war.

2. Anna Mulrine, “Warheads on Foreheads,” in Air and Space Forces Magazine, (Oct 1, 2008), https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/1008warheads/

3. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019), 2, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_19.pdf

Featured Image: June 23, 2022 – A PLA fighter jet in the course of conducting a coercive and risky intercept against a U.S. asset in the South China Sea, including by approaching a distance of just 40 feet before repeatedly flying above and below the U.S. aircraft and flashing its weapons. (U.S. INDOPACOM photo)