Notes to the New Administration Week

By Andrew Tenbusch and Trevor Phillips-Levine

Dear Secretary-Designate Phelan,

Much like constructing an investment portfolio, developing a balanced naval force involves spreading risk and resources across complementary assets. While large, heavily armed, and exquisitely equipped warships deliver formidable returns in terms of deterrence and combat power, they are also expensive to build, crew, and maintain. They are also difficult to integrate with smaller, less capable partner navies. To remain both cost-effective and globally engaged, the U.S. Navy needs a balanced mix of high-end capital ships and smaller, more economical vessels, even if the latter are inherently less armed and defended. This tradeoff is not only acceptable but strategically beneficial, given the Navy’s role in day-to-day operations.

In naval terms, the “high-end” segment of the fleet—supercarriers, large amphibious assault ships, submarines, and destroyers—constitutes our “blue-chip” investments, yielding substantial deterrent and warfighting value when employed in crises or conflict. However, operating them continuously for routine missions equates to wearing down premium assets on relatively low-threat tasks, akin to using golden sledgehammers to drive nails.

While high-end platforms remain critical, the Navy’s attempts to field smaller, lower-end ships have encountered pitfalls, as illustrated by the Littoral Combat Ships and the Constellation-class frigate (FFG-62) program. Originally envisioned as a cost-effective adaptation of the European multi-purpose frigate (Fregata Europea Multi-Missione (FREMM)), it was supposed to benefit from an existing hull design and propulsion system. Instead, design changes aimed at countering peer adversaries’ capabilities have ballooned the ship’s complexity, resulting in only about fifteen percent commonality with its FREMM predecessor and significant cost, schedule, and performance risks.

Yet these frigates should not need the same level of capability as a destroyer. Their true value lies in handling missions along the low-intensity end of the competition continuum, where their inherent affordability, simplicity, and smaller crew requirements deliver operational efficiency. By assigning them to daily presence tasks and maritime security operations, the Navy can conserve its more capable vessels for high-risk scenarios, preserving their readiness and deterring potential adversaries without incurring excessive operating costs.

Moreover, the Constellation-class frigate, like the Littoral Combat Ship, operates well within the environments where global partnership-building occurs, particularly alongside allied navies that field similarly-sized and equipped ships. These lower-end combatants facilitate trust-building exercises and joint patrols, strengthening alliances in ways that large, capital-intensive platforms sometimes cannot. And if conflict were ever to break out, they could reposition to conduct maritime interdiction, protect sea lines of communication, or support operations in secondary theaters, freeing the Navy’s high-end assets to focus on major combat.

As Secretary of the Navy, you have the unique opportunity to apply an investor’s mindset to our naval force design: prioritizing strategic returns, hedging against risk, and maximizing the value of every platform. By recalibrating the fleet to feature both capital-intensive “blue-chip” combatants and smaller, relatively lower-cost “growth” vessels, you can ensure the Navy remains agile across the full competition continuum. This portfolio-style approach not only delivers sustainable presence and alliance-building on a global scale, but also preserves high-end readiness for critical moments when exquisite capability proves indispensable. In doing so, you will champion a modernized sea power strategy that delivers robust dividends to the nation while smartly managing limited resources.

Andrew “Kramer” Tenbusch is an FA-18 weapons systems officer currently assigned to Strike Fighter Wing Pacific. He previously served as a fellow with the Halsey Alfa Advanced Research Group at the U.S. Naval War College.

Trevor “Mrs.” Phillips-Levine is a naval aviator currently assigned to U.S. 7th Fleet. He is a CIMSEC Senior Editor.

The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official positions or opinions of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Featured Image: SOUTH CHINA SEA (Sept. 7, 2021) An F-35C Lightning II, assigned to the “Argonauts” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 147, launches from the flight deck of Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) while the carrier transits the South China Sea with Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Tulsa (LCS 16).

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Major Christopher “Pink Sheets” Lowe, USMC

The U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy find themselves having to reevaluate and evolve their relationship to execute the concepts of Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). While not exactly new concepts, LOCE and EABO have not been put into practice by the Marine Corps and Navy in major operations since the Pacific campaign of World War II. There has been a major focus on amphibious lift inside the weapons engagement zone (WEZ) of the adversary, but this leaves a gap in the intermediate zone in which Marines and equipment must be transported from larger hubs in the United States or allied countries to points in which they transition into the WEZ. To increase the capability of the naval expeditionary force to meet the demands across the global maritime commons and in non-permissive maritime environments, the Navy should acquire at least 30 Lewis B Puller (ESB-3)-class Expeditionary Mobile Base ships.

The mission sets of LOCE/EABO require distributed forces over long distances and the need to minimize the effects of ship losses. The Navy needs to acquire at least 30 ESB ships in order to accomplish this. The ESB class can provide lift capacity for 250 Marines and four CH-53/MV-22 aircraft at a cost of $135 million per ship. For the $2 billion cost of a San Antonio (LPD-17) class ship that can lift 699 Marines, two CH-53/MV-22 aircraft, and provides a surface connector capability the Navy could field approximately 15 ESB-class ships, offering a lift capacity of 3,750 Marines and 60 MV-22/CH-53 aircraft. Having a plethora of ESB ships allows the Navy to minimize the degradation of lift capacity due to maintenance or combat loss. It also gives the MEU/ARG command team added flexibility in their force composition and their ability to distribute forces across the area of operations necessary to execute LOCE and EABOs.

While not as stealthy or as small as the developing McClung (LSM-1) class, a deep bench of ESB ships would enable the amphibious lift of Marines and equipment to the WEZ and intermediate transition points, or close enough to the WEZ to utilize the MV-22 or CH-53K to complete the journey while minimizing risk to the ESB. Having a deeper inventory of affordable transport ships will be fundamental toward enabling Navy and Marine warfighting concepts inside the WEZ of a rival great power.

Major Christopher “Pink Sheets” Lowe is a Maritime Space Officer (1706) serving as the Information Warfare Operations Officer at the I Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group Information Coordination Center, Camp Pendleton, CA. He has served as a Low Altitude Air Defense Officer (7204) with the Tactical Air Commander Center 38, 2d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion, and deployed on the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. He also previously served in the Navy as a Surface Warfare Officer on USS Cowpens (CG-63) and USS Antietam (CG-54).

The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Marine Corps and the Department of Defense.

Featured Image: SAN DIEGO (Feb. 9, 2024) The expeditionary sea base Pre-Commissioning Unit (PCU) John L. Canley (ESB 6) enters San Diego Harbor. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Mark D. Faram)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Benjamin Van Horrick

A dire shortage of Asian operation linguists in the First Island Chain hinders the United States’ capability to deter Chinese aggression. The joint force’s campaigns depend on strengthening regional partners and fighting as coalitions. Operational linguists act as interpreters and translators, forge trust, assist with planning, and enable the execution of coalition operations. Since language is culture, linguists also inform and educate the commands about the host nation’s cultural and social nuances, such as those that can affect operational integration. However, the present number of operational linguists in the Pacific is already insufficient for regular peacetime campaigning, let alone for crisis or war. The new administration can fix the problem and add more operational linguists in the Pacific before the operational need becomes a damaging shortfall.

The difficulty of Northeast Asian languages, coupled with the steep learning curve associated with translating for and working with military units, makes recruiting cleared, contracted linguists an urgent operational requirement. As America expanded operations in southern Afghanistan, the shortage of Dari and Pashtun linguists hindered operations. Coupled with the rapid advancement of PRC capabilities and the joint force’s increasing operational tempo in the Pacific, now is ideal for building a deep bench of Asian language linguists. The exercises in Korea, Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines are growing more complex and ambitious. These operations increasingly depend on accurate translations to meet exercise objectives, mitigate risk, and strengthen alliances.

Servicemembers with language skills often do not serve as operational linguists. Most uniformed linguists are crypto-linguists, specialized in listening to conversations and pulling relevant information. Uniformed Regional Area Officers (RAO) and Foreign Area Officers (FAO) possess language skills, but focus on planning with partners. These talented officers and SNCOs can and will support transition and transcription, but the investment the services make in RAOs and FAOs goes far beyond their linguist acumen. Many operational linguists, ones who interpret conversations and translate documents and correspondence between US forces and their partners, are contracted support.

Linguists will serve as an invaluable link in the killchain during wartime. All available assets from across the coalition must be brought to bear to make sense of the environment, prosecute targets, and support maneuver in all forms. Linguists will minimize friction and the fog of war as coalition members shorten the time between sensing and striking a target – no matter what country the capabilities originate from.

During conflict, command centers and coordination cells will link partners in the Pacific as they respond and counter PRC aggression. Unlike the Global War on Terror, the joint force will integrate and accentuate partner capabilities rather than advise and assist. These centers and cells’ detailed coordination and synchronization will rely on linguists to build and maintain shared awareness of the operational environment. Information sharing will allow coalition forces to generate tempo and exploit fleeting opportunities in the battlespace. Commanding and coordinating the fight in the Pacific will require proficiency in multiple difficult languages such as Japanese, Korean, Thai, Tagalog, and Mandarin.

Coalition warfighting is central to the modern U.S. way of war, placing a premium on linguists. During a crisis or war the demand for these critical personnel will only increase. If the joint force leaves the operational need unaddressed, it risks losing mission success in translation.

Major Benjamin Van Horrick is the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade current logistics operations officer. 

The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official views or positions of the U.S. Marine Corps and the Department of Defense.

Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps Col. Robert Brodie, commanding officer of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Col. Kouki Watanabe, commanding officer of the JGSDF 12th Infantry Regiment, salute the formations of U.S. Marines with Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 31st MEU, and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Service Members with the 12th Infantry Regiment, 8th Division, Western Army, during the opening ceremony for Exercise Forest Light Western Army at Camp Oyanohara, Kyushu, Japan, Jan. 18, 2020. (Official Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Ethan M. LeBlanc)

Notes to the New Administration Week

By William Martin

The Yellow Sea is a vital maritime lane for trade and security in Northeast Asia. A 2012 CNA study found that “nearly 57 percent of China’s total trade volume and over 70 percent of South Korea’s total trade volume emanates from the Yellow Sea.”¹ It is also home to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Northern Theater Command (NTC).

Despite the strategic significance of these waters, for too long the United States has ceded maneuver space in the Yellow Sea to the PLA Navy. In recent years, China has increased its aggressive activity in this vital maritime lane, to the detriment of U.S. interests, the security of allies, and the maintenance of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The United States and its allies must increase force presence along this key maritime terrain to disrupt PLA confidence in freely maneuvering through these waters as they conduct operations counter to U.S. interests.

China has begun installing physical structures in international waters that represent overlapping claims with South Korea, a major U.S. ally.² This is reminiscent of actions in the South China Sea that allowed China to increase control of sea lanes there in violation of international law. Tensions between China and South Korea have been on the rise for years, including Chinese incursions across the 124th meridian, which has been a maritime control line between the two for decades.³ The PLA NTC routinely exercises with its carrier in the Yellow Sea, and has conducted joint exercises with Russia in the Sea of Japan, further raising tensions in the region.⁴

Although the U.S. Navy has conducted some recent exercises in the area, they have been restricted to the Korean coast and directed against the DPRK, without reference to PLA aggression.⁵ The U.S. Navy has long been absent from the broader areas where the PLA NTC is based, including international waters that are critical to U.S. allies and fundamental to regional stability.

Not only does the PLA NTC pose a significant and unaccounted-for threat in any contingency on the Korean Peninsula, those forces are also essential to the PLA’s Taiwan plans.⁶ The PLA NTC has already been seen performing vital missions during Taiwan scenario exercises, such as securing the Tsushima Strait.⁷ Moreover, the NTC controls one of the PLA’s two active carriers, several cruisers, scores of 5th generation fighter aircraft, and China’s most powerful destroyer variants.⁸ All of these assets could easily be sent to reinforce a Taiwan invasion, and the sea lanes they transit would remain largely uncontested. Increasing U.S. and allied presence in these international waters will strongly affect the PRC decision calculus regarding offensive operations against Taiwan.

It is critical for the United States to increase its naval presence in the Yellow Sea to disrupt the PLA’s belief in a near absolute freedom of maneuver through these critical waters. This requirement is not unlike ongoing actions to maintain allied freedom of action in the South China Sea and elsewhere.⁹ Such presence is fundamental to maintaining “peace through strength” in Northeast Asia.

William Martin is a pseudonym for a senior joint information planner and policy advisor for the Department of Defense. He holds a master of arts degree in history with a focus on East Asia.

The views presented here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the United States Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

References

1. Michael A. McDevitt, Catherine K. Lea, Abraham M. Denmark, Ken E. Gause, Bonnie S. Glaser, Richard C. Bush III, and Daniel M. Hartnett, The Long Littoral Project: East China and Yellow Seas, A Maritime Perspective on Indo-Pacific Security (CNA, September 2012).

2. Lee Min-seok, Kim Dong-hyun, and Park Su-hyeon, “Exclusive: Beijing Resumes Disputed Installations in West Sea amid S. Korea’s Turmoil,” The Chosun Ilbo, January 10, 2025, https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/01/10/2VZWCDVB2JEOBKDIM5TOW5S634/.

3. Lee Chul-jae and Park Yong-han, “Beijing Ships Cross the Line Again,” Korea JoongAng Daily, January 26, 2021, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/01/26/national/defense/China-124th-meridian-Yellow-Sea/20210126183100580.html.

4. Choi Hyun-june and Gil Yun-hyung, “As Theater for Shows of Force, Korea’s East Sea Becomes a New Powder Keg,” The Hankyoreh, November 30, 2024, https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1101036.html.

5. David Choi, “US, South Korean, Canadian Warships Train in Yellow Sea Ahead of Incheon Anniversary,” Stars and Stripes, September 15, 2023, https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2023-09-15/trilateral-naval-drill-yellow-sea-incheon-11383145.html.

6. Ashton H.S. Cho and Yuan-Chou Jing, “Tipping the Balance? China’s PLA Northern Theater Command and the Korean Peninsula,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 36, no.2 (2024), https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART003084667

7. Ki-Yong Kim, “China’s Shandong Performs 5-Day Blitz Exercise Against Taiwan,” Donga Daily, September 18, 2023, https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20230918/4434721/1.

8. Marielle Descalsota, “Take a Look at China’s Biggest Destroyer, a $920 Million Cruiser That’s Said to Be the 2nd Most Powerful in the World After the USS Zumwalt,” Yahoo News, June 21, 2022, https://www.yahoo.com/news/look-chinas-biggest-destroyer-920-063256052.html.

9. Lt. j. g. Rebecca Moore, “Netherlands, US Naval Forces Conduct South China Sea Operations,” US Navy’s Pacific Fleet News, accessed January 21, 2025, https://www.cpf.navy.mil/Newsroom/News/Article/3784611/netherlands-us-naval-forces-conduct-south-china-sea-operations/.

Featured Image: SEA OF JAPAN (Oct 6, 2022) The Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), front, the Republic of Korea navy destroyer ROKS Sejong the Great (DDG 991) and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JS Chokai (DDG 176) transit the Sea of Japan during a trilateral ballistic missile defense exercise. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Gray Gibson)