Join CIMSEC’s DC chapter for an evening happy hour discussion on PLA reform and Asia-Pacific security from a regional perspective.
Featured Discussant: CHANG, Ching, a retired career officer of over 30 years from the Republic of China Navy and a maritime strategist as well as a leading PLA expert in Taiwan. Dr. Chang is also a frequent contributor to CIMSEC, and will offer a presentation on PLA military reform and regional security in the Asia-Pacific region. Dr. Chang attends various functions on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to understand security matters and can provide a uniquely informed perspective.
Time: Wednesday, 12 September, 6:00-8:00pm
Place: Fuel Pizza Farragut Square, 1606 K St NW, Washington, DC 20006 (via Farragut North or West Metro Station).
Nobody’s arguing that inspections aren’t important. Heaven only knows what the beam of a flashlight might find under the bunk of a warship during a zone inspection. But there must be some way to reduce the 80 or so inspections a combat unit is subjected to every 18 months and use some of that time for the study of tactics.
Why have we let our concern for tactics slip away? How can we continue to call ourselves naval officers when our attention is being constantly drawn away from what should be our main interest—besting potential adversaries in war? As a naval officer, I am by definition a person who is capable of waging and winning a war on the high seas. I have trained and studied diligently, but is it for the next conflict or the next helpful inspection? We must refocus our attention on tactics.
If the inspections themselves do not indicate a lack of faith in the system, they seem to be part of the diminishing importance of tactical thought at all levels of command. The junior officer does not perceive that his senior pays attention to tactics as a matter of routine. If a junior commanding officer is delayed from returning to home port for some tactically significant reason, he can normally still expect to have to meet all his visits, assist teams, and inspections despite the crew’s inconvenience. The commanding officer does not see a routine emphasis on tactics, and, therefore, he tends not to pass any concern down to the members of his wardroom. How often does one see the immediate superior in command stay after the most recent inspection and talk about his philosophy of the wartime employment of his units? During the last year, how much has the immediate superior, type commander, or fleet commander contributed to the fleet officers’ thought process of winning an engagement? And if progress is being made, as it is in the Sixth Fleet, it rarely starts with or is emphasized at the unit level. Of all the reports and inspections conducted, how many can a junior officer reasonably link to combat thinking?
Featured Image: U.S. 5TH FLEET AREA OF OPERATIONS (Aug. 10, 2018) Operations Specialist 2nd Class Alexandra Allen monitors air activity in the combat information center aboard the guided-missile destroyer USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109) during a general quarters drill. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jonathan Clay/Released)
One week before Christmas 2017 the USS Little Rock left Buffalo, New York on its maiden voyage to its future homeport in Florida. The crew of the newest Littoral Combat Ship in the Navy proudly entered the port of Montreal seven days later as part of a goodwill port visit between the United States and Canada. A frigid cold snap sank in while Little Rock sat pier-side and the St. Lawrence river froze over three weeks earlier than anticipated. Commercial icebreakers, frequently used to navigate the St. Lawrence river, were unable to operate after January 11th due to ice thickness, and the riverway was closed to traffic by the St. Lawrence River Authority. The Little Rock, the newest ship in the Navy, left Montreal nearly three months later once ice levels decreased sufficiently for the river authority to allow commercial icebreaker operation.
The story of the Little Rock unfolds across the Arctic, albeit on smaller scales, as climate change provides unprecedented access to the region. Fishermen push farther north, cruise lines dare to operate through the Northwest Passage, merchant shipping increasingly travels along Arctic routes, and native communities are forced to travel greater distances to maintain subsistence traditions. Within American waters the Coast Guard is solely responsible for providing mariners with safety from the elements, illicit activity, and man-made disasters. With limited resources they accomplish their mission in the areas they are able to access. With only two operable icebreakers the Coast Guard is unable to safely conduct their mission in regions which are increasingly accessible due to receding ice levels. This gap in capability exacerbates international and economic consequences of an increasingly accessible Arctic against American interests. To conduct sustained Arctic operations in the national interest new icebreakers are needed and soon.
Current Capability
The U.S. Coast Guard lists three active commissioned icebreakers; USCGC Polar Star, Polar Sea, and Healy. Of the three, only the Polar Star and Healy are capable of Arctic operations. The Polar Sea suffered major propulsion problems in 2010, relegating it to a spare part depot for the Polar Star, and where both ships are over 10 years past their designed service life of 30 years.1 Furthermore, Polar Star is reserved to ensure access to McMurdo station, rendering Healey the only commissioned vessel to access Arctic ice-covered regions.
The medium-class icebreaker Healy breaks ice around the Russian-flagged tanker Renda 250 miles south of Nome Jan. 6, 2012. (P.O. 1st Class Sara Francis/US Coast Guard)
The Coast Guard has 11 statutory missions, nine of which pertain to the Arctic and require icebreaking capability.2 The Healy solely executes these missions from the sea. In 2017 these missions included extensive research with 40 embarked scientists, ice breaking patrols miles north of the Alaskan coast, and search and rescue (SAR) training. These missions also include protection of marine living resources, drug interdiction, search and rescue, and migrant interdiction, which haven’t required persistent icebreaking capabilities in the recent past. Increasing levels of human activity in the Arctic indicate those missions are increasingly relevant and the recent dearth of those mission sets reflects a period of good fortune rather than trends to be continued. Finally, the Coast Guard allots 185 “Days Away from Homeport” (DAFH) per ship per year, including transit time and port visits to actual on-scene operations.3 Budgeting Healy’s DAFH reveals, optimistically, an icebreaker availability during only one-third of every year.4 The Coast Guard’s Arctic icebreaking forces are very capable but extremely limited. They are being are asked to do more now and will be asked to do even more in the future, but this will far outstrip existing resources.
Why Icebreakers Matter
Rapidly decreasing ice levels and increased human activity in the Arctic change the mission from seasonal operations to a year-round endeavor. Historically, Arctic patrols occur during warmer months when activity levels necessitate a Coast Guard presence. In 2012 a record low minimum sea ice extent was observed, followed closely by record low sea ice maximum extent in 2016.5 Those changes allow higher levels of human activity throughout the year, requiring a concomitant year-round icebreaking capability.
The lack of capability immediately threatens U.S. interests in the region including energy security, disaster response, and Maritime Domain Awareness. In the winter of 2011 Nome, Alaska nearly ran out of fuel used for heating and cooking. A Russian ice-hardened tanker managed to break through extensive inshore ice to provide refueling but no American assets were able to provide similar services. The refueling shows a fortunate coincidence of Russian capability and American need, however, an alternative scenario can be easily imagined.6 Privatized icebreakers such as the Aiviq, an ocean-going tug owned by Dutch Shell Oil company, provide extremely limited ability to assist offshore developments in production and disaster response.7
Russian nuclear Icebreaker Yamal during removal of manned drifting station North Pole-36. August 2009. (Wikimedia Commons)
In congressional testimony, following the 2010 British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill, USCG Admiral Thad Allen stated the Coast Guard doesn’t have enough icebreakers to respond to a major spill north of the Alaskan coast.8 The World Wildlife Foundation models spills in oil and gas producing regions, such as the Barents and Beaufort Seas, and claims the ecological damage of those potential spills is greatly exacerbated by a lack of access which is in turn worsened by a lack of icebreakers.9 Maritime Domain Awareness requires constant monitoring via multiple sensors and engagement from multiple platforms. Much of this can be accomplished by remote sensing but human knowledge and experience on how to operate in Arctic environments cannot be replaced.10 The crew of the Healey comprises the majority of American government maritime experience in Arctic ice-bound environments, revealing a major gap in Maritime Domain Awareness. These examples project the need for more icebreakers to operate in the Arctic, although many needs already go unmet.
A 2011 report by the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General found the Coast Guard delinquent in meeting four interagency icebreaking missions including persistent assured access for the Department of Defense, fisheries enforcement, search and rescue, and winter research for the National Science Foundation and National Aeronautics and Space Administration.11 In total, governmental agencies made 32 requests for icebreaking services from the Healy in 2017, only 25 of which went fulfilled.12 Central to each deficiency is icebreaker availability, and even more requests could have been filed. Using the aforementioned “Days away from Homeport” allotment provided by the Coast Guard, a minimum of three icebreakers is required to provide persistent access and capability in the Arctic.
Critics contend that procuring more icebreakers is optimal but untenable within current budget constraints. The Coast Guard High Latitude Mission Analysis Report in 2010 concluded six icebreakers (three medium and three heavy) are required to meet mission demands in the Arctic and Antarctic.13 That same report cites four core missions as the minimum requirements driving icebreaker acquisition: Arctic West Science, Arctic North Patrol, McMurdo Station resupply, and Polar Freedom of Navigation missions.14 The consensus of multiple sources is that specific Arctic missions are going unmet and the minimum procurement requirements to close that gap illuminate the desperate need for more icebreakers.
International Implications
Among Arctic nations the United States uniquely lacks robust icebreaking capabilities. Russia already boasts an icebreaking fleet 46 strong, including seven nuclear-powered vessels. Other nations, such as Finland, Canada, and Sweden all employ seven or more icebreakers, providing sufficient capability to operate routinely in Arctic waters.15 This disparity in capability opens the door for external intervention against American interests in the Arctic and challenges American leadership on Arctic issues.
The icebreaker gap exacerbates traditional maritime issues such as freedom of navigation and commerce by predetermining which nations can access waterways. Russia notably exploits this difference in the North Sea trade route where merchants may transit, aided by Russian icebreakers, for a hefty toll.16 Icebreakers further enable Arctic nations to conduct regular commerce in the Arctic during times the U.S. is unable to without their assistance. Additionally, as the Little Rock incident shows, ice heavily limits military mobility. The lack of domestic icebreakers makes freedom of navigation vulnerable to the whims and interests of countries with the capacity to outdo U.S. efforts. Ongoing international arbitration over Arctic economic claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea could become a moot point if nations able to access disputed areas do so unilaterally and lay de facto claim to the resource rich region.
Russian oil platform in the Arctic Ocean. (Photo by Krichevsky)
Freedom of access to Arctic areas has broader implications than the immediate effect of restricted access. International institutions are resource driven. Those who hold relevant resources in an international organization (such as NATO) are able to drive the agenda for how those resources are used. To date, the Arctic Council has passed three binding agreements. Two of those agreements, on search and rescue and maritime oil spill response, pave the way for icebreaker-laden states to take larger roles in the implementation of those agreements. If the United States is unable to match resource contributions for these efforts then the U.S. bargaining position for future Arctic Council resolutions will be significantly hampered.
It might seem that parity in the number of icebreakers is a worthwhile outcome. However, icebreaker parity with Russia is an undesirable and unachievable goal for American Arctic operations. The Arctic is central to the Russian way of life, demanding more and better ways to cope. An American icebreaking fleet simply needs the ability to access areas in pursuit of national interests and contribute to international efforts under existing agreements. Given the relative size of the American Arctic coastline and population compared to other Arctic countries a small but capable icebreaking fleet is sufficient to ensure American interests.
Funding and Procurement
The lack of action to date stems from a lack of funding and not recognition of the need. The Coast Guard traditionally lacks the independent funding to procure icebreakers or other large-scale expenditures. Consequently, large Coast Guard acquisitions frequently partner with the Navy Shipbuilding and Conversion Fund (SCF) to make the size of those acquisitions tenable within the context of the Coast Guard’s meager budget. The Coast Guard’s Procurement, Construction, and Improvement Fund is responsible for all new purchases and upgrades of the Coast Guard’s entire fleet with only a $1.54 billion budget.17 Conversely, the Navy was appropriated over $20 billion in 2017 explicitly for new ship construction.18 Icebreaker procurement considerations are included in the Navy’s new shipbuilding budget as part of a “block-buy” contract system. Under a block-buy system procurement costs over multiple years provide the total cost of a project as it is built. This process, combined with fixed cost contracts, helps decrease the total cost of the project and budget demands on a yearly basis. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 allots the Navy’s Shipbuilding and Conversion Fund $150 million for domestic construction of a heavy polar icebreaker to be built and transferred to the Coast Guard.19 This initial step is crucial, but insufficient, toward reestablishing an icebreaker fleet.
Detractors argue that foreign construction or leasing provide the best path to more icebreakers. The first option happens to be illegal, requiring a waiver from the president for foreign construction of military platforms.20 The political component of the equation removes the likelihood that foreign construction is viable considering domestic shipyards are capable of producing these ships. Additionally, domestic production provides domestic shipbuilding experience, a significant factor in reduced costs for purchases of multiple icebreakers. Because of those learned efficiencies projections for purchase drop nearly $200 million as additional platforms are purchased.21 Leasing is similarly constrained by the lack of available assets on the global market to provide medium to heavy icebreaking capability.22 To lease a heavy icebreaker it would have to be built, a process that takes a comparable amount of time to building them domestically. The only commercial icebreaker available for lease, the Aiviq, has a poor track record of performance, including responsibility for the grounding of a drilling rig in 2012 when it lost propulsion. For legal, political, and marketplace reasons leasing and foreign construction are untenable options for meeting American icebreaker needs.
Conclusion
Climate change provides unprecedented Arctic access but much of the region remains restricted by ice. The United States Coast Guard uses icebreakers to meet that challenge. Established icebreaker levels fail to meet current interagency demands and are projected to meet even fewer of those demands. International icebreaker competition has immediate economic first-mover consequences and institutional repercussions for nations with adequate Arctic resources. Building heavy icebreakers in the short-term to complement Healy proves the most tenable option while meeting the minimum requirements for Arctic capabilities and international obligations. In a resource-constrained budgetary environment prioritization of other interests prevented purchase of replacement icebreakers. Recent steps toward expansion of the icebreaker fleet are encouraging but remain insufficient to meet the minimum force level needed for persistent American Arctic presence.
Matt Hein is a Surface Warfare Officer currently studying for his Masters in Security Studies at Georgetown University. He can be found on twitter @Matt_TB_Hein. These views are presented in a personal capacity.
Works Cited
[1] O’ Rourke, Ronald. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2017, fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf. 9
[2] The two missions not explicitly linked to the Arctic are drug interdiction and human smuggling interdiction.
[3] O’ Rourke, Ronald. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2017, fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf. 48
[4] “One-Third” based on transit time from Seattle to Nome, and assumes three port visits of 5 days each while away from homeport subtracted from 185 days.
[5] Meador, Ron. “As Climate Change Reshapes the Arctic, Scientists Are Struggling to Keep Up.” MinnPost, 27 Apr. 2017, www.minnpost.com/earth-journal/2017/04/climate-change-reshapes-arctic-scientists-are-struggling-keep.
[6] Demarban, Alex. “Russian Icebreaker to Deliver Fuel to Nome, Highlighting Shortage of U.S. Icebreakers.” Anchorage Daily News, Anchorage Daily News, 5 Dec. 2011, www.adn.com/rural-alaska/article/russian-icebreaker-deliver-fuel-nome-highlighting-shortage-us-icebreakers/2011/12/05/.
[9] “Oil and Gas in the Arctic.” WWF, 17 Mar. 2018, wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/arctic/what_we_do/oil_gas/.
[10]United States, Congress, Chief of Naval Operations. Maritime Domain Awareness Concept, 30 May 2007. www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/Navy_Maritime_Domain_Awareness_Concept_FINAL_2007.pdf.
[11] The Coast Guard’s Polar Icebreaker Maintenance, Upgrade, and Acquisition Program. Department Of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, 2011, www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-31_Jan11.pdf.
[12] O’Rourke, Ronald. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2017, fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf 26
[13] United States Coast Guard High Latitude Region Mission Analysis Capstone Summary. ABS Consulting, 2010, assets.fiercemarkets.net/public/sites/govit/hlssummarycapstone.pdf. 10
[14] United States Coast Guard High Latitude Region Mission Analysis Capstone Summary. ABS Consulting, 2010, assets.fiercemarkets.net/public/sites/govit/hlssummarycapstone.pdf. 12
[15] O’ Rourke, Ronald. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2017, fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf. 13
[16] Lavelle, Marianne. “Arctic Shipping Soars, Led by Russia and Lured by Energy.” National Geographic, National Geographic Society, 1 Dec. 2013, news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2013/11/131129-arctic-shipping-soars-led-by-russia/.
[17] United States Coast Guard 2019 Budget Overview. United States Coast Guard 2019 Budget Overview, Coast Guard Office of Budget and Programs, 2018. http://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/documents/budget/2019%20BIB_FINALw.pdf
[18] Labs, Eric. “The 2018 Outlook for Navy Shipbuilding.” Congressional Budget Office, 15 Jan. 2018, www.cbo.gov/publication/53446. 7
[20] O’Rourke, Ronald. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2017, fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf. 37
[21] O’ Rourke, Ronald. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2017, fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf.19
[22] Judson, Jen. “The Icebreaker Gap.” The Agenda, 1 Sept. 2015, www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/09/the-icebreaker-gap-000213.
Featured Image: 16 May 2003, Antarctica — Coast guard icebreaker travels through ice floes which have broker off sea ice edge in late summer, McMurdo Sound, Antarctica (Image by Norbert Wu/Minden Pictures/Corbis)
What could and should the United States do if the Belt and Road Initiative collapses?
By Grant Newsham and Tuan Pham
Part one of this two-part series discussed the growing concerns of a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) bubble that may burst, and that China’s hurried and reckless BRI investments through the years are beginning to drag down its already slowing domestic economy.
So to advance the strategic dialogue, let’s assume that the BRI bubble has, or is close to bursting, and is exacerbated by a weakened Chinese economy and a destabilizing trade war. In part two, each author individually offers his perspective on what America could and should do (and conversely not do) as the result thereof.
Opportunities – What to Do
Pham: Make the most of the strategic opportunity and build more economic leverage on the issues of China’s unfair trade policies and practices, discriminatory trade barriers, unequal trade balances, forced technology transfers, and intellectual property rights theft. Leverage the recent U.S.-European Union agreement to ally against China which has nearly broken the world trading system. Then, convert the accumulated economic leverage into additional political leverage in the geographic spheres of North Korea, South China Sea (SCS), East China Sea, and Taiwan and contested domains of space and cyberspace – similar to how Beijing uses the BRI. When appropriate and expedient, rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership to complement the other U.S. instruments of national power; bind America to the other regional economies; blunt the other Chinese economic initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; and ultimately offer an enduring alternative to the BRI. From there, use the added influence to further encourage and challenge China to become a more responsible stakeholder that contributes positively to the international system and uphold the international rule of law and respect for global norms (human rights, freedom of navigation, etc.); and in the long-run, possibly consider a grand bargain to adopt mutual agreements and avoid another Cold War (no large-scale conflict directly between the two sides, but each may be supported by major regional “proxy” wars) and the Thucydides Trap (a rising power challenges a dominant power leading to a great power competition for preeminence).
Of note, the concept of the Thucydides Trap has detractors who understandably and fairly warn against the Chamberlain Trap (avoiding conflict through concessions) and cite the years of ill-advised U.S. acquiescence and accommodation (strategic patience and wishful thinking) in the SCS. Nevertheless, no matter which side one takes on this philosophical debate, the reality remains that China and America are interlocked in a strategic competition for regional and global pre-eminence. So, how best to contain and manage this competition and keep it from escalating into a “no-win” conflict?
Newsham: Recognize that China’s objectives with the BRI are ultimately political. BRI is one front in an existential, multi-front campaign to displace and overtake the United States – and America’s pernicious notions of individual liberty, rule of law, and equality among nations – that have served the world well for the last 70 years.
As such, the U.S. Government (USG) ought to do several things with the BRI in mind. First, develop and implement a political warfare effort that exposes the BRI as ultimately a combination of colonialism and loan-sharking. As often as not, BRI investments and projects are over-priced, poorly thought out, and shabbily constructed; and benefit China and Chinese companies more than the recipient countries.
Toward this end, the USG might also profitably direct its vast intelligence resources toward exposing the corruption and payoffs that are part and parcel of Chinese business and government efforts connected with the BRI. The USG bringing charges against Patrick Ho, a former top Hong Kong official, for bribing African officials on behalf of a Chinese company shows what is doable. Locals who resent Chinese heavy- and under-handedness will welcome exposure of such improprieties.
Second, keep trade pressure on China in response to longstanding unfair trade practices. This pressure – and attendant reductions in the foreign exchange needed to keep the Chinese economy chugging along – reduces funds available for BRI activities – to include investments, bribes, and bailouts. It’s ironic that U.S. and Western businesses have effectively funded the BRI efforts – not to mention China’s military development.
But it’s not enough to criticize China and the BRI – even if well founded. Indeed, one must admire China and Chinese companies’ willingness to get involved in countries where American companies refuse to go. The USG needs to work closely with the private sector and change the “risk profile” for American companies so they might show some initiative and go where Yankee Traders of old used to go. And since this is ultimately a political struggle, why not link the public-private partnership effort with that of allied countries such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and others?
In summary, recognize the BRI for what it is, expose its vulnerabilities and rapacious aspects, keep trade pressure on China and thus reduce the foreign exchange available for its BRI activities. And as importantly, the United States and like-minded countries need to offer a better alternative.
Challenges – What Not to Do
Pham: In light of the deepening economic stagnation, the present risk of domestic political instability may drive Beijing’s future foreign policy. Economic prosperity (purse) and nationalism (people) – buttressed by the People’s Liberation Army (gun) and propaganda (pen) – have long been the principal sources of legitimacy, credibility, and stability for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As the prosperity and nationalism wanes, President Xi Jinping (undisputed core leaderof CCP) may increasingly rely on propaganda and security – tempered to a certain extent by fiscal constraints – to maintain the party’s (and his own) power and influence over the masses. In other words, make people look outward at the forest and not inward at the trees.
But here lies the strategic quandary for U.S. policymakers. The tricky part is to avoid strategic overreach and to find the right balance of making the most of the strategic opportunity without triggering the CCP to a tipping point that elicits a strong nationalist response (including military confrontation).
Newsham: Don’t bail out Xi and China if they’ve been overextended on the BRI. They won’t appreciate the gesture. The more problems Beijing has with financially draining overseas ventures – and the inevitable local opposition they provoke over time – the less China can concentrate its efforts on military development and bringing its regional neighbors to heel while being able to take on its declared main enemy – the United States. It also dispels the image of inexorable Chinese domination.
Don’t try to calibrate just the right mix of pushback and engagement (to include on the BRI) that will make Beijing become a “responsible stakeholder.” Why should it? China has done well enough over the last 40 years without adjusting its behavior. Robert McNamara also tried “calibrated” pressure with North Vietnam. It didn’t work very well. Instead, stand up for America’s own interests and keep the pressure on.
Don’t consider the chance for a few American firms to make some money on BRI projects to outweigh the existential threat the CCP-led China poses to the free, liberal world order. And don’t forget that today’s China holds over one million people in internment camps and is trying to do the Uighurs what King Edward the First tried with the Scots. It is also a repressive security state along the lines George Orwell wrote about and where modern technology is creating new and unprecedented tools of oppression. At the end of the day, regardless of the highways, ports, and bridges it might build (for a considerable price and of questionable quality) in far-flung places, it should always be remembered that the BRI is an outgrowth of a staunchly authoritarian and repressive regime.
Conclusion
China risks big with the BRI, and accordingly, could lose big if indeed the declining trend lines are proven correct. If so, how does it impact Beijing’s strategic ambitions for national rejuvenation and ultimately global preeminence? But more importantly, how could and should Washington make the most of the strategic opportunity?
Grant Newsham is a retired U.S. Marine Officer and a Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies.
Tuan Pham is widely published in national security affairs and international relations. The personal views expressed therein are their own.
Featured Image: Officials attend the groundbreaking ceremony of the rail project linking Bangkok and Nakhon Ratchasima, on Dec. 21 in Nakhon Ratchasima, Thailand. (Photo by Yukako Ono).
