So Yeon Kim joins the program to discuss “Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas,” their increasing politicization, and how states use them to protect sensitive ecosystems.
Sections of the following article are adapted from a forthcoming master’s degree thesis, titled The Hunt for Underwater Drones: Explaining the Proliferation of Uninhabited Underwater Vehicles.
By Andro Mathewson
In late May 2021, the Israeli armed forces destroyed an armed underwater uninhabited vehicle (UUV)1 operated by the terrorist group Hamas. This kamikaze-UUV was used in an attempt to attack Israeli offshore gas and oil installations, which Hamas had unsuccessfully targeted in the past using rockets and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs). This is possibly the first use of an armed UUV by a non-state actor, but UUVs have been in use since the 1950s, with the United States and Russia leading the charge. UUVs are now owned by over fifty nations across the world. Understanding why and how this technology proliferates is crucial to recognizing the role of such new technologies in international security and preparing effective responses. Based on this common understanding, the international community can counter further UUV proliferation by establishing a framework of norms and agreements, while security forces and military industries can focus on advancing effective counter-UUV technology.
Why Examine the Proliferation of UUVs?
UUVs are becoming an important tool within the realm of international security. Naval forces across the world are quickly developing and acquiring a variety of UUVs due to their furtive nature, dual-use capabilities, and multifaceted functionalities. While the technology is still in relatively early development stages and leaves much to be desired, UUVs have quickly become an integral element of modern navies but also appear in the arsenals of lesser developed armed forces and non-state actors due to their utility as an asymmetric tool for sea denial. With advancements in intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies, UUVs are becoming essential assets in the maritime forces of states across the world. Although still predominantly used in an unarmed and surveillance capacity, UUVs have recently also been both adapted and designed to carry explosive ordnance and act in an offensive capacity. While the United States and Russia are at the forefront of UUV development, over fifty other states have either developed or acquired UUVs, as the following map shows.
Countries in possession of UUVs as of May 2021.2
There is also considerable interest in underwater drones and their diverse applications from militaries, private corporations, civil society organizations, and journalists alike.3 Their broad applications explain why the global UUV market size is projected to grow from USD 2.0 billion in 2020 to USD 4.4 billion by 2025. Despite the increasing interest in UUVs, many commentaries about their proliferation and use are based on speculation rather than on empirical analysis. Finally, examining the early proliferation of UUVs offers opportunities to explore, in-depth, the initial stages of a technology’s adoption by actors in the international arena, make predictions for the future, and prepare effective responses. While several of the patterns identified in this article might not persist moving forwards, it is nonetheless an opportunity to attempt to understand the wider motivations of governments and decision-makers on a global scale, including the role of security alliances, conflict, geography, economics, and international law.
UUV Proliferation
While at least 30 states have the indigenous capacity to manufacture UUVs, at least 55 states own or have previously owned UUVs.4 This demonstrates that there has been significant technology transfer and diffusion between states. UUVs, and the majority of the technologies they incorporate, are fundamentally dual-use, and the export thereof is often restricted by states and allowed only in a very small set of circumstances. For example, in 2009, the Egyptian Navy signed a deal under the United States Foreign Military Sales program for the delivery of the U.S.-based Columbia Group’s Pluto Plus UUV system, intended primarily for mine identification and destruction. More recently, in 2016, the United States donated two Remus autonomous underwater vehicles to the Croatian Navy to upgrade their countermine capabilities. While the majority of UUV proliferation is based on such authorized transfers between nations and global corporations or domestic development, there have been numerous cases of unwanted UUV technology transfer through smuggling, intellectual theft, and capture.
There are at least four documented cases of UUVs being seized either by nations or non-state actors. Perhaps the most prominent example is that of China seizing a USN UUV in the South China Sea in late 2016. However, this is not how China first acquired UUV technology, yet it is a possibility that the Chinese Navy deconstructed the UUV to understand and reconstruct the technologies within. While China later returned this drone, it had previously been able to smuggle protected American UUV technology via middlemen out of the United States. Other examples include the capture of a US Remus UUV by Houthi forces off the coast of Yemen in 2018, the seizure of an American early-model mine reconnaissance UUV in 2005 by North Korea, and the capture of a Chinese underwater glider by Indonesian fishermen in 2020. While it remains unknown if these captured UUVs were later remodeled to be operational by their new owners, these incidents showcase both a lesser-known method of technology proliferation and an inherent vulnerability of UUVs.
The legal status of UUVs is a factor that has presently had little influence on their proliferation, partially due to their relative novelty in the international arena as well as due to the currently very unclear legal boundaries concerning unmanned underwater vessels. However, due to the ability of regulatory systems and international law to limit said proliferation or direct it solely to allied states, essentially weaponizing both limitation and regulation, this unclarity is unlikely to continue. Additionally, the distinctive ethical character of war at sea generates several novel ethical dilemmas regarding the design and use of UUVs, which have yet to be answered by international law but certainly require attentiveness.
Country
Likelihood of UUV Adoption
Romania
.886
Libya
.812
Chile
.780
Slovenia
.751
Argentina
.692
South Africa
.653
Algeria
.588
Cyprus
.559
Ukraine
.553
Iraq
.462
Keeping track of new government acquisitions of UUV technology is an important first step in developing adequate responses. Thus, looking to the future, the database created for this article and the subsequent analysis thereof can help identify possible future adopters of UUVs.5 While exact foretelling is nigh impossible, the following table lists the ten most likely future adopters of UUV technology based on the author’s model. The majority of the nations listed have extensive military requirements. As UUVs become less cost-prohibitive and countries become wealthier, their proliferation may reach a tipping point where they become a widespread and almost ubiquitous technology, possibly following the route of UAVs, which are now present in almost every military across the globe. One other possible explanation for the future acquisition of UUVs by these listed states is their involvement in ongoing maritime disputes as UUVs are useful tools for monitoring vessel movements in contested spaces.
Responses to UUV Proliferation
Due to their relative novelty, both responses to their use and mitigation strategies are presently scarce. Countering global UUV proliferation should be an imperative for the United States Navy, its allies, and international organizations alike. Despite the clear recent increase in proliferation over the past decade, there are currently no national or international agencies in charge of a response to military purpose UUVs, while their ambiguous legal status has led to a de-facto underwater arms race. Nevertheless, there are two possible answers to these challenges: risk mitigation and counter-UUV technology. However, a dual-pronged approach addressing both simultaneously will most likely have the most effective results.
The first option relies on a rules-based international system and the adherence of states to international agreements and regulations. Risk mitigation strategies attempt to minimize the risk of conflict through international cooperation. In the case of military technologies, this is primarily via arms control agreements, the effectiveness of which is hotly contested. While arms control has been somewhat effective for several weapons, such as cluster munitions, its ability to restrict the proliferation of other uninhabited vehicles, such as aerial drones, has been generally deemed unsuccessful. Similar to UAVS, the place of UUVs in the international legal framework is highly uncertain. Many issues remain unanswered: Is a UUV part of its state of origin and thus immune from legal seizure by other nations? Should they operate only on the surface in another nation’s territorial seas? Can it legally operate there at all? (This is only a snippet of the many questions on UUV legality).
Deciding upon the legal status of UUVs in both domestic and international law is crucial for the security of states and the reduction of risk in the international arena. For example, classifying UUVs as ships or extensions thereof would categorize them under the rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This would allow UUVs to act correspondingly in the regions of the sea as determined by UNCLOS, illuminating where they may be legally deployed and for what reasons. Within the different zones, states could apply the rules currently affecting maritime vessels to UUVs, restricting the available legal actions of the UUV-controlling state. However, UNCLOS is not inviolable. Amongst many others, the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, reducing its coercive power. Many other states, including Russia and China, often criticize and neglect its stipulations. International law enforcement is also often ineffectual. Thus, although enforcing UUV use under the clauses of UNCLOS could alleviate some tensions, it is far from a panacea. Consequently, states must also develop more reliable defensive strategies and technologies to thwart antagonistic UUV deployments.
The development of counter-UUV technology is in its infancy, primarily due to two factors: the novelty of UUVs and the fact that they are predominantly still unarmed and used mainly for surveillance and intelligence gathering. However, the sooner the United States and its allies invest in and develop effective counter-UUV technologies and strategies, the more prepared they’ll be more future encounters. Due to the dual-use nature of UUVs, the true intentions behind their deployment are almost indistinguishable. Thus, states must prepare an extensive response toolkit, which requires both economic and political investments. Countering a technologically advanced threat requires the development of new defense mechanisms. In the case of UUV’s this could be new countermeasure methods of detection, tracking, and tracking – for example – acoustic or magnetic tripwires, to determine underwater movements through sensitive passages like harbors or straights. Another option is a more aggressive approach, such as the development of new systems to capture or outright destroy UUVs operated by adversarial states, including more precise torpedoes or more advanced naval mines capable of targeting and destroying UUVs.
Conclusion
The current status of aerial drones and their widespread use across the world offers militaries, policymakers, and international organizations the opportunity to prevent a similar scenario from occurring with underwater drones. While UAV technologies come with certain benefits to state military forces, such as surgical precision airstrikes, their indiscriminate use by non-state actors and terrorist groups has wrought havoc across the Middle East. Preventing a similar outcome with the continued proliferation of UUVs is vital to the security of the global ocean and the ships upon it. This will require concerted efforts and significant international cooperation from governments, international organizations, and civil society groups alike. While the successful control of UUV proliferation is not impossible, states must also prepare for the adverse outcome and develop effective and efficient counter-UUV strategies and technologies.
Andro Mathewson is a Research Fellow at the Arctic Institute, a Capability Support Officer at the HALO Trust, and an International Relations MSc student at the University of Edinburgh. His dissertation explores the proliferation of uninhabited underwater vehicles (UUVs) on a global scale. He is interested in international security, military technologies, and naval warfare. Andro has previously contributed to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the Texas National Security Review, the Wavell Room, and the UK Defence Journal. Before his current studies, he was a research fellow at Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania, where he also received his Bachelor of Arts in PPE and German. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of The HALO Trust.
Endnotes
1. For the purposes of this article, the term uninhabited underwater vehicles (UUV) will be used throughout. There is no generally accepted nomenclature, thus “UUV” in this paper will encompass all types of uninhabited underwater vehicles, regardless if armed, unarmed, military, civilian, autonomous, or remotely operated. UUVs are also known as underwater drones or undermanned underwater vehicles and include autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROUVs), and underwater gliders. However, it is also important to note that this essay focusses exclusively on government owned UUVs.
2. The map illustrates states and their militaries that are in possession of UUVs, regardless if those are armed or not, or how they were acquired (developed, bought, co-owned, transferred, or captured).
3. Part of this is driven by their dual-use nature and multifaceted abilities, including, for example, wreck salvage and environmental survey, as well as by the growing number of deep-water offshore oil & gas production activities and increasing maritime security threats.
4. This data is based on an original cross-sectional database produced in May 2021, containing information on the UUV capabilities of 196 states and 2 non-state actors. I use the term “at-least” for two reasons: (1) Due to the military nature of UUVs, it is safe to assume that there is significant information pertaining to their proliferation that is publicly unavailable, and (2) despite extensive research, there is always the possibility that there are lapses in my data.
5. To analyse this data, I use a probit regression model, focusing on two dependant variables (government UUV ownership and domestic production capacity) and the following independent variables: Access to the global ocean; Ratification of the United Nationals Convention on the Laws of the Sea; Submarine ownership; UAV ownership; NATO membership; Ongoing Maritime Disputes; Military Expenditure; and GDP per capita. This model shows an estimated probability that a state with a set of particular characteristics (the independent variables) will either own UUVs or have the domestic capacity to produce them. Based on this model, the list shows states most likely to acquire UUVs next, compared to the overall characteristics of states already owning UUVs.
Featured Image: Unmanned underwater vehicles, assigned to Commander, Task Group 56.1, are pre-staged before UUV buoyancy testing. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Julian Olivari/Released)
In Fall 2021 CIMSEC will host the seventh annual CIMSEC Forum for Authors and Readers (CFAR), an event where our readers and the public get to select the top CIMSEC authors of the preceding year, and engage with them on their work and topics of interest. The evening will provide a chance to engage your favorite CIMSEC contributors, hear their thoughts on how their pieces have held up, and explore their predictions.
Thanks to the generous partnership of the Center for Naval Analyseswe are pleased to offer a professional conference on a range of maritime security issues. We will also hold CFAR virtually via Zoom, so you can join in the discussion no matter where in the world you are!
Event Details
August 25–September 1: Nominations open September 6-9: Voting on finalists September 15: Winners and speakers lineup announced
How will the speakers be chosen? All CIMSEC readers are welcome tosubmit nominations for articles with the only criteria that the article nominated must have published on CIMSEC on or after June 8th, 2020. After nominations close, CIMSEC members will vote on the selected pieces and the finalists will receive invites to speak at CFAR. Not yet a member? Consider joining CIMSEC for free!
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We hope you can join us for an exciting event where authors chosen by CIMSEC readers will present on their writing and research. See you in the fall!
The Advent of Laser Weapon Systems Presents a Highly Complex Decision Space
The Navy is advancing rapidly with the development and integration of high energy laser (HEL) weapon systems onto ships to support the ship self-defense mission. HEL systems offer novel hard-kill and soft-kill engagement options with targeting accuracy and narrowly focused speed-of-light lasing with a relatively low cost per shot. HEL hard-kill engagements provide a more traditional weapon function of burning through the target to cause enough damage to render the threat useless. HEL soft-kill engagements offer “softer” options of blinding threat sensors and optics, rather than complete destruction.
HEL systems differ significantly from traditional kinetic shipboard weapon systems. Laser weapons concentrate a very highly focused beam of coherent energy on targets at a distance. They must have line of sight with the threat target. Although the laser beam travels at the speed of light, the beam must “dwell” on the target for a period of time long enough to induce soft or hard kill effects. Environmental and atmospheric effects can greatly affect laser beams, diminishing the amount of irradiance that makes it to the threat. Laser weapons require significant amounts of power, and when facing threat situations that require longer dwell times or multiple engagements, operators may need to make sure that sufficient power is available.
Figure 1 – Laser Weapon Factors of Complexity. Click to expand.
Operating laser weapons is a complex endeavor. Figure 1 identifies the many characteristics of HEL operations that lead to complexity in this decision space. At the outset, tactical operations for defensive missions have inherent complexity: threats are often unexpected and offer a very limited reaction time, situational awareness is often incomplete and uncertain, the environment is dynamic and changing rapidly, human operators can become overwhelmed with information, uncertainty, and decision options, and the consequences can be dire.
Laser weapon systems contribute additional complexity to the operator’s decision space. The operator must weigh many factors within the dynamic threat situation to choose a soft-kill or hard-kill option, select an effective target aimpoint, calculate the required laser power-in-the-bucket (amount of actual laser irradiance per area that makes it to the target) and calculate the required dwell time. The operator must consider environmental effects and must determine if enough power is available to support the engagement. The operator may also decide to use an existing kinetic weapon system instead of a HEL system depending on a comparative prediction of kill success.
During combat operations, a ship’s warfare operators will make critical kill chain (weapon engagement) decisions under highly time-critical and uncertain conditions. Figure 2 illustrates an example of a ship’s tactical operations picture in a situation involving UAV threats. In this scenario, the operators must weigh what is known about the threat with what the ship’s defensive weapon systems are capable of. In this example, the operators must predict and compare how successful the Sea Sparrow, the laser weapon system (LaWS), and the Phalanx CIWS will be against the threat UAVs. The threat’s proximity and incoming speed will dictate how much time the operators have to make these comparative predictions. In many cases, the human operators may be well-served with an automated decision support system that can quickly calculate preferred weapon options based on the situation, such as doctrine statements. The emerging capabilities of artificial intelligence can be leveraged to enable automated decision aids for laser weapons—thus creating a cognitive laser approach for laser weapon systems.
Figure 2 – Complex Decisions for Naval Weapons Operator. Click to expand. (Source: Blickley et al, 2021)
Combining Emerging Technologies: Laser Weapons and Artificial Intelligence
Two emerging technologies lead to the cognitive laser concept: laser weapon technology and artificial intelligence. The Navy has been researching laser technologies for decades and lasers have recently matured to the point where they are being integrated and tested on ships for operational use. In parallel with this evolution, there have been significant advances in artificial intelligence (AI)—particularly in the development of intelligent computer systems that can support complex decision-making. The marriage of these two emerging technologies is the genesis of the proposed cognitive laser concept.
Laser weapon systems and their use in the defense of naval ships presents a complex decision space for human tactical warfare operators that requires the assistance of AI to process, fuse, and make sense of large amounts of data and information in short timeframes, and to develop and evaluate effective courses of action involving complex systems (including laser weapons). The laser weapon kill chain requires the intuitive, adaptive, and creative cognitive skills of humans as well as the abilities of automated systems to rapidly fuse large amounts of disparate data, construct and assess vast permutations of options, predict performance, and deal with uncertainty. Automation, artificial intelligence, and machine learning can provide a human-machine teaming cognitive solution.
November 26, 2014 — Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert gets a firsthand look at the directed energy Laser Weapon System (LaWS) operator’s console aboard the interim afloat forward staging base USS Ponce (AFSB(I) 15) (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Peter D. Lawlor/Released)
Cognitive Laser Concept
Graduate students at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) have been studying various aspects of the cognitive laser concept. A systems engineering capstone team developed Figures 3 and 4 as they developed a conceptual design of an automated decision aid to support laser weapon engagement decisions for a naval shipboard HEL system (Blickley et al, 2021). Figure 3 presents a context diagram illustrating how the decision aid might retrieve threat information and laser resource information from onboard sensors and weapons scheduling in order to develop engagement recommendations and provide these to HEL operators.
Figure 3 – Cognitive Laser Context Diagram. Click to expand. (Source: Blickley et al, 2021)
The capstone team performed a functional analysis of the conceptual cognitive laser decision aid. Figure 4 contains a functional flow diagram from this analysis. It highlights some of the decision factors involved in determining whether or not to fire an HEL system: if there is sufficient time, if atmospheric conditions are favorable, if there is sufficient power, if the threat’s material composition can be effectively lased, and if there are no deconfliction issues (if there is no risk of friendly fire in the path of the laser beam).
Figure 4 – Cognitive Laser – Flow Diagram. Click to expand. (Source: Blickley et al, 2021)
NPS SE thesis students are studying other aspects of the cognitive laser concept. One study is widening the scope of the problem beyond laser weapon system decisions (Carr 2021). This study is asking the broader question: how do warfare operators on ships make the determination of which weapon to select when they have kinetic weapons and laser weapons to choose from? For this higher-level kill chain function, the operator needs to be able to compare the predicted performance of the kinetic weapon with that of the laser weapon for a given threat scenario. The threat is not stationary—as it moves, the range between the weapon and target changes and therefore the amount of “atmosphere” that the laser beam must traverse changes. Real-time changes in the threat’s proximity and kinematics continuously affect the projected performance of the two types of weapon systems differently. Weapon operators will be more familiar with when and how to engage a dynamic threat with kinetic weapons. They may be less familiar with the intricacies of engaging a dynamic threat with a laser weapon. The required laser’s dwell time and power needs will change as the threat moves and maneuvers. The complexities of a projected performance prediction between the two different types of weapons warrants the use of AI and automated decision aids to support this complex decision space.
As threats advance in complexity, naval operators will need to use laser weapon systems in more sophisticated and complex operations. NPS is studying the use of laser weapons to defend against future swarms of drones (Taylor 2021). The study is first characterizing possible drone swarms—their configuration, the number of drones, and the types of drones. The study is exploring the capabilities of laser weapons to address the swarms—soft-kills, hard-kills, and engagement timelines to understand how many drones can be addressed in a given situation. The study is developing strategies to apply different engagement logic to different threat scenarios—a series of soft-kills, or strategic hard-kills, or combinations of lasing and using kinetic weapons, as examples. The rapid development of effective laser weapon engagement logic in such complex tactical situations will require a cognitive laser approach to aid laser operators.
May 16, 2020 — USS Portland (LPD-27) successfully disables an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with a Solid State Laser. (Video via USNI News)
Tactical energy management, as illustrated in Figure 5, is a cognitive laser concept for allowing laser weapon operators to understand and manage the dynamic energy resources during tactical operations. Laser weapons require significant amounts of energy when they are fired, and energy is a constrained resource on ships. This concept taps into the power sources on a ship to give laser operators insight into how much power is available and to determine how much power will be required to defeat specific threats as they are encountered.
Figure 5 – Tactical Energy Management. Click to expand. (Source: Armentrout et al, 2017)
Machine learning is an AI method that involves computers “learning” effective solutions or answers by training them using great amounts of data or scenarios. Recent research projects at NPS have been studying the use of machine learning approaches for determining the required dwell time based on the properties of the material composition of targets (Blickley et al 2021) and for target selection and engagement strategies against drone swarm threats (Edwards 2021). From the operator’s perspective, a machine learning algorithm would enhance a real-time decision aid by providing an expert-level laser weapon system knowledge base as shown in Figure 6. As real-time sensor data provides information about the threat—its location (or locations for a swarm threat), kinematics, and characteristics, the decision aid can assess and predict the target type, location of components (fuselage, sensors, seekers, etc.), material composition and thickness. This information is compared with the machine learning knowledge base which produces accurate recommendations for engagement strategy, aimpoint selection, and laser dwell time.
Figure 6 – Machine Learning for the Cognitive Laser (Source: Blickley et al, 2021)
Laser weapon operations pose a friendly fire risk. Lethal laser beams can unintentionally harm nearby friendly forces (aircraft, ships, etc.) or civilian entities in the vicinity. Deconfliction planning is a critical function in the laser weapon kill chain to ensure that the “coast is clear” so that the path of the laser beam is free of friendly and civilian assets. NPS studies are developing concepts for ensuring and managing deconfliction for different military laser weapon applications (Kee et al. 2020, Clayton et al. 2021). In time-critical tactical operations, laser weapon operations will require a cognitive laser approach to ensure for proper deconfliction.
The realization of a cognitive laser requires advances in human-machine teaming research to ensure the effective and safe employment of AI methods. Several studies at NPS are researching different aspects of applying AI to the tactical domain. Jones et al (2020) studied the air and missile defense kill chain to show that human-machine teaming arrangements can adapt in response to the threat situation timeline. The threat will dictate how much time the operator has to react, and this can be incorporated into the design of AI-enabled automated decision aids. Burns et al (2021) are embarking on a research project to map specific AI methods to the specific functions of the kill chain. Tactical kill chains (including laser weapon kill chains) require a variety of cognitive skills and decisions. These include data fusion, assessment, knowledge discovery, addressing uncertainty, developing course-of-action alternatives, predicting system performance, weighing risks, and gaming second- and third-order strategies.
A wide variety of AI methods will be needed to support these kill chain functions. Cruz et al (2021) are studying the potential safety risks and failure modes that may be introduced as AI and automation is adopted in the tactical domain. Safety risks may be inherent to the AI systems and their decision recommendations, or they may come in the form of cyber vulnerabilities as AI is introduced into tactical systems, or they may arise from the interactions of humans with intelligent machines. Peh (2021) is taking a deep dive into the complex dynamics of trust between humans and AI systems by researching methods to engineer AI systems for tactical operations. Peh’s research mission is to engineer AI systems as tactical decision aids that are trustworthy and achieve an effective trust balance to avoid both over-trust (humans blindly trusting AI) and under-reliance (humans disregarding AI).
Conclusion
Two emerging technologies are pairing up to provide new capabilities for the warfighter of the future: laser weapons and AI. Laser weapons are becoming an operational reality for defending ships and fleets, but they also pose an operational challenge in the form of decision complexity. AI is the necessary companion that can tackle this decision complexity and support effective human-machine teaming to operate laser weapons effectively and safely. A cognitive laser solution marries these two emerging technologies. The cognitive laser concept opens a diverse and challenging field of research for innovations in the application of AI methods to both laser weapon operations and the military tactical domain in general.
Dr. Bonnie Johnson is a senior lecturer of systems engineering at the Naval Postgraduate School. She was previously a senior systems engineer in the defense industry from 1995–2011 working on naval and joint air and missile defense systems. A graduate of Virginia Tech with a bachelor of science in physics and a graduate of Johns Hopkins with a master of science degree in systems engineering, Dr. Johnson received her PhD in systems engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School.
References
Armentrout, A., Behre, C., Ngo, T., Rowney, D., Schroder, E., and Stopper M., 2017. “Objective architecture for tactical energy management of directed energy weapons,” Naval Postgraduate School Capstone Report, March 2017.
Blickley, W., Carlson, J., Magana, M., Pacheco, A., and Roscher J., 2021. “Cognitive laser – automated decision aid for a system of laser weapon systems,” Naval Postgraduate School Capstone Report, March 2021.
Burns, G., Collier, T., Cornish, R., Curley, K., Freeman, A., and Spears, J., 2021. “Evaluating artificial intelligence methods for use in kill chain functions,” Naval Postgraduate School Capstone Proposal, April 2021.
Carr, A. 2020. “A proposed model for a shipboard high energy laser and kinetic weapons system automated decision aid,” Naval Postgraduate School Thesis Proposal, October 2020.
Clayton, B., Scott, M., Shelton, J., Williamson, J., and Vermillion, M., 2021. “Highway to HEL – USMC expeditionary employment of a high energy laser to counter drone threats,” Naval Postgraduate School Capstone Proposal, July 2021.
Cruz, L., Hoopes, A., Pappa, R., Shilt, S., and Wuornos, S., 2021. “Evaluation of the safety risks of developing and implementing automated battle management aids for air and missile defense,” Naval Postgraduate School Capstone proposal, May 2021.
Edwards, D. 2020. “Application of machine learning for a laser weapon system aimpoint selection decision aid in support of a cognitive laser.” Naval Postgraduate School Thesis Proposal, August 2020.
Jones, J., Kress, R., Newmeyer, W., and Rahman, A., 2020. “Leveraging artificial intelligence for air and missile defense: an outcome-oriented decision aid,” Naval Postgraduate School Capstone Report, September 2020.
Kee, R., Lutz, T., Schwitzing, M., Murray, E., 2020. “Impact on shipboard power generation and storage when utilizing high energy laser systems to counter anti-ship cruise missiles in fleet defense scenarios,” Naval Postgraduate School Capstone Report, September 2020.
Peh, M., 2021. “Developing a trust metric in engineering an artificial intelligence enabled air and mission defense system,” Naval Postgraduate School Thesis Proposal, November 2020.
Taylor, A. 2021. “Shipboard laser weapon system automated decision aid: countering unmanned aerial vehicle swarm threats,” Naval Postgraduate School Thesis Proposal, January 2021.
Featured Image: Dahlgren, VA – ARABIAN GULF (Nov. 16, 2014) The Afloat Forward Staging Base (Interim) USS Ponce (ASB(I) 15) conducts an operational demonstration of the Office of Naval Research (ONR)-sponsored Laser Weapon System (LaWS) while deployed to the Arabian Gulf. (U.S. Navy photo by John F. Williams/Released)
