Category Archives: Strategic Outlook

Predictions and forecasting.

MFP 1: Reducing and Protecting Maritime Budgets

January 9, 2013 Guest Author 3 Comments

If your Navy/Coast Guard is facing fiscal hard times, what areas of the budget should be targeted first? What should be targeted last? Why?

This is the first in our series of posts from our Maritime Futures Project. The project is designed to illustrate possible developments in naval affairs and maritime security in the near-, medium-, and long-term tomorrows. As such, our brave contributors are making predictions about the future challenges, opportunities, and technologies for maritime professionals – as well as things we’d like to see come to pass. They are also hazarding recommendations, based on those predictions, for the tough choices faced by many of our sea services.

Note: The opinions and views expressed in these posts are those of the authors alone and are presented in their personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of their parent institution U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, any other agency, or any other foreign government.

While we were fortunate to receive some responses from international contributors, most of the submissions came from contributors in the U.S. As such, the majority focus on the effects of the multiple complications and ‘threats’ to the U.S. Navy’s budget and how cuts could best be absorbed (much more seriously than I did here). Major acquisition programs such as the DDG-1000, F-35B, and LCS were singled-out for the first cuts, but so were things like the number of government civilians and ships’ steaming hours. On the flip-side, the F-35C and the large-deck amphibs to support them – to potentially lessen the pressures on carrier presence, were highlighted by some as items in the budget to protect, along with areas such training, readiness, and R&D. As expected from a group of people with maritime interests, there is a general belief that cutting can be dangerous if not done right. See also the results of our internal informal poll at the bottom, based on the suggestions of these contributors.

CDR Chris Rawley, USNR:

First: The U.S. Navy has too many programs currently on the books that are simply unaffordable and threaten overall shipbuilding numbers. The F-35C (the carrier-version of the Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter) is probably first among these. The F-35B (The short take-off/vertical launch version) is still a viable program because it allows LHA/LHD ships to become small aircraft carriers for strike. Especially for its cost, the DDG-1000 doesn’t bring significant war-fighting capabilities not present in other ship types. Some of the more superficial personnel programs should be examined with a critical eye for budget cuts, starting with the disastrous Task Force Uniform.

Last: Training pipelines, maintenance, and logistics infrastructure (including Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships) should not be cut any further. The U.S. Navy has paid a price in readiness for the cuts these areas took last decade. The foundations of readiness cannot be reconstituted rapidly in a crisis.

LT Drew Hamblen, USN:

Efficiencies: Fiscal and man-hour efficiencies could be gained by following a naval aviation squadron model similar to the Air Force’s division of labor. They have been successful in managing their units without overloading pilots by reducing the number of pilots and instead using more admin and maintenance professionals that do not fly to focus on those tasks.

First: We could cut our overall manning and increase the proficiency/flight hours per pilot by focusing their efforts on their primary jobs instead of splitting their time with collateral duties that require significant training and frequent turnover. An admin/maintenance professional would not have to relearn his non-flying duties every 5 months. Pilots could spend more time improving their skills. An additional possible configuration would see some of the admin duties performed by personnel in a non-deployable status, with their workload shifted to augmented admin departments on surface ships’ to cover the squadrons’ needs – but that would require additional training and personnel for surface ships.

Last: Flight hour funding should not be cut unless the number of pilots is reduced. Reducing pilot numbers requires a reduction in collateral duties.

Felix Seidler, seidlers-sicherheitspolitik.net, Germany:

For my country of Germany, what we should not target for cuts are our submarine and counter-mine capabilities. Here, Germany has unique capabilities, should be preserved for joint missions with our allies. Moreover, there’s not much left that can be targeted. Thus, to achieve any savings while still preserving maritime capabilities, all future projects should proceed under cooperative agreements with allied countries to pool or share naval assets. The proposed Joint Support Ships for the German Navy could be purchased as a common project with countries like France, the Netherlands, Denmark, or Poland.

Sebastian Bruns, Fellow, Institute for Security, University of Kiel, Germany:

The German Navy has just over 15,000 people and is the smallest branch of the German military. With the end of conscription in 2011, it has been increasingly difficult to recruit qualified personnel. At the same time, the whole Bundeswehr is undergoing another, very ambitious reform.

Germany's most important maritime asset? — Germany’s most important maritime asset?

The German Navy will give up all eight of their old work-horses, the F-122 frigates of the Bremen-class (built in the 1980s) which are to be replaced by the planned four frigates of the Baden-Württemberg-F125-class (to join the fleet between 2016 and 2018). Moreover, the fast-attack craft component of the Navy will be withdrawn from service. Diesel submarines of the 206A-class have already been decommissioned, cutting the German Navy’s number of submarines in half by the stroke of a pen (only a handful of new state-of-the-art submarines of the 212A-class remain). The four new corvettes of the Braunschweig-class have been plagued by design challenges and mechanical failures, but have seen their first operational deployments in late 2012. The future plan of the German Navy calls for up to two Joint Support Ships (JSS), but it remains to be seen if that can be arranged, what design will be chosen, and whether the funds for these vessels can be made available. It should also be interesting to watch whether – as this pundit hopes – such an ambitious project will go hand-in-hand with a very desirable political debate about the role and value of seapower for German foreign and security policy.

The most sought-after investments for the German Navy, in this analyst’s opinion, are (1) the replacement of the aging Sea King (SAR) heavy helicopters and the mid-term replacement of the P3-Orion maritime patrol aircraft. (2) A capable JSS must be on time, on budget, and meet the real operational needs (this would mandate an even larger investment in something akin to a naval or maritime security strategy). (3) German participation in a sea-based BMD is also very desirable. (4) More generally speaking, the attractiveness of the naval force as an employer must be enhanced to recruit personnel in sufficient strength and quality.

Dr. Robert Farley, Professor, University of Kentucky:

This is a very difficult question. I think that, given the missions they’ve been tasked with, both the USN and USCG are at the limits of their capabilities. If absolutely necessary, force cuts should be balanced in order to prevent creating holes in the force; the services should maintain a balance of surface, air, and subsurface capabilities. While I don’t relish the idea of cutting the nuclear deterrent, I think that the United States could probably manage with 6-8 SSBNs instead of the current 10.

Bryan McGrath, Director, Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis:

If the U.S. Navy is facing fiscal hard times, it is only because senior U.S. decision makers do not have the courage to think strategically, preferring as they do to issue equal or nearly equal cuts to the Armed Services so as not to upset the “Joint” applecart, nor to unduly gore the oxen of particularly powerful constituencies on Capitol Hill. Were the courage to exist, the Navy would likely receive higher appropriations, in proportion to its strategic importance to the national security of the United States. Given the unlikelihood that such courage exists, I then move to answer the questions posed.

Assuming that the Navy must be cut, I would privilege readiness, capability, and R&D over capacity. This means, I would cut ship and airwing strength through early retirements, dramatically if need be, in order to retain, sustain, and obtain high-end warfighting capability. As for what should be targeted last, I believe any cuts to the procurement of precision-guided munitions should be avoided. Stocks of such weapons must be increased. Please remember—these suggestions are made given a requirement to decrease Navy Total Obligation Authority (TOA). I consider such a requirement to be strategically inane.

CDR Chuck Hill, USCG (Ret.):

The funding structure of the Coast Guard needs an overhaul. It has never been a good fit in any of the Departments it has been assigned to. A multi-purpose agency does not seem to integrate well in a government that seems able to deal with only one objective at a time. The Coast Guard is overseen by too many Congressional committees with divergent interest, most of whom see only small parts of the Coast Guard. Most significantly, as an armed force, it is part of the nation’s maritime security apparatus, but because it is not funded under DOD, relatively little attention is given to either its wartime role or funding for that role.

The Coast Guard has already fallen on hard times. Congress is attempting to cut spending at a time when, because of the cyclical nature of its shipbuilding, Coast Guard funding needs to be increased rather than cut. Many ships will be over 50 years old before they are replaced. Unfortunately it appears the Coast Guard needs to cut current operations to fund investment in future capabilities.

Bret Perry, Student, Georgetown University:

As a younger member of Generation Y, the idea of making serious cuts because of fiscal pressures is still quite foreign. Nevertheless, a procurement that requires further scrutiny is the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), specifically the Independence-class ships. It’s not that I disagree with purpose of the LCS class, but building both designs during fiscally challenging times is unreasonable. Although the Freedom and Independence classes each have their own pros and cons, I believe that the Freedom-class is more likely to reach the requirements originally envisioned for the LCS.

Despite being just as controversial as the LCS, the F-35B should be one of the programs last targeted for cuts because of its strategic importance. With the U.S. attempting to undertake its “pivot” to Asia and continuing to maintain two carriers in the Persian Gulf, America’s carrier capabilities will remain stressed. Although the USMC’s LHDs do not completely replace the power projected by an aircraft carrier, they do help relieve some of this stress by serving as a sea-based platform for a 5th generation aircraft, the F-35B.

Chris Putko, JIATF South:

Across the board, the question is no longer “if” the services/combatant commands/task forces are experiencing fiscal tightening, but how. We at JIATF South are getting our MPA (Maritime Patrol Aircraft) hours and ship deployments (USN FFGs, various USCG vessels) slashed. Since our JOA (Joint Operational Area) is so big – the CARIB (Caribbean) and EASTPAC (Eastern Pacific), intel plays a huge part in getting what few assets we have under our TACON (tactical control) where they need to be, and thankfully, our intel support has been great. Finding additional methods and technologies to enhance the targeting of illicit traffickers would be a great area to allocate additional monies, especially in an asset-constrained environment.

On the flip side, I think if cuts have to be introduced (and they do), I think it should be on personnel, specifically government civilians. Having served in multiple “good deal” duty stations, the revolving door of people getting out of the service only to take a pay increase and accept a position as a civilian in the same command is all too common. Everyone likes a good deal, but profligate hiring/promoting has become the norm, especially in duty stations in which there is a relatively higher local standards of living.

YN2(SW) Michael George, USN:

If the Navy were facing fiscal difficulties (which it may already be), I would first curtail the number of times ships are required to get underway. Certainly there are a number of reasons to police our waterways and there are a number of reasons to get underway, but when it costs so much each time for this undertaking, I believe that there could be much more activity consolidated into fewer underways.

The last thing I would cut back on is difficult, but one thing that comes to mind is medical care. Serving in any military branch is a potentially dangerous undertaking, and what Tricare offers is one of the major aspects of Service that keeps the Navy (and other branches) so appealing.

LT Jake Bebber, USN:

I’ll take a contrarian view on this for a moment. While I have no doubt that one can easily find waste in the Department of Defense or Department of the Navy (or any public or private organization with more than two people), is this the right question to ask? I think not. The better question is … what is our national security policy, what is our strategy to achieve those policy objectives, and how does the U.S. Navy fit into that strategy? From there, we ask: based on that strategy, what force structure will permit the Navy to fulfill its mission, and how much will that cost? The emphasis must be on matching funding to strategic objectives, not “cutting waste” for its own sake. Cutting top-line budget numbers achieves no strategic objective and does not put the Navy in position to fulfill its primary mission of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. My message to policy makers is this: you tell me what you want to accomplish, and I’ll tell you what force structure you need to do that mission. From there, we can discuss costs.

Alan Tweedie, Colorado:

The Navy seems to be in a perpetual budget crisis. If you ask the leadership they always seem to be running at a profound shortage. The best way to improve the fiscal situation for our Navy is to build ships with longer planned service lives rather than investing in new platforms. Take Oliver Hazard Perry FFG’s, the U.S. Navy is almost done with the class and is moving on with LCS, yet most of the OHP’s are still in service… in other navies. If we had elected to improve and modernize the class rather than sell them off we could be providing adequate combat capability with much less investment. This meme runs through the whole Defense Department, we just love shiny new toys.

LCDR Joe Baggett, USN:

Efficiencies: Streamline (reduce) future acquisition programs/projects.
We must always have an eye towards the future to constantly evolve and develop our force of tomorrow. However, we must also recognize our fiscally constrained times. It is increasingly difficult to sustain today’s force while also building for tomorrow. Since it is getting tougher to do both, our priority must be sustaining and advancing today’s proven capabilities while selectively developing programs that offer the greatest impact for the future at the earliest window.

Results of informal poll in CIMSEC’s Internal Discussion Facebook Group

What Should Be Cut First?

F-35C: 4    50%
Government Civilians: 3  38%
DDG-1000: 3   38%
Superficial personnel programs: 2 20%
Number of SSBNs: 2  20%
Independence-class LCS: 1  13%
Ship underway time: 0  0%
Early airwing and ship retiremnt: 0 0%

Total # of voters: 8

What Should Be Cut Last?

Training: 5    45%
Maintenance: 4   36%
Logistics infrastructure: 3  27%
F-35B: 1     9%
Readiness: 1   9%
R&D: 0    0%
Procurement of precision-guided munitions:0 0%
Targeting intel for counter-drug ops: 0 0%
Tricare (healthcare) funding: 0 0%

Total # of voters: 11

Strategic Outlook

A Three-Way In The East China Sea?

January 7, 2013 Guest Author 1 Comment

Senkaku-Diaoyu-Tiaoyu-Islan — Or are there only two ways of looking at this map?

The conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea illustrates a number of issues in the Asia-Pacific region. The People’s Republic of China’s expansive maritime claims is the granddaddy, but there are a number of contributing elements – from the challenges of deep-sea resource exploration to the region’s political relationships. The week before Christmas the Center for National Policy hosted a discussion at their headquarters about a recent Scholars Delegation that took “next generation policy experts and decision makers” to Taipei to meet with officials from the Republic of China, known to most of us as Taiwan. The delegation met with officials who were generally aligned with the current ruling party in Taiwan, the Kuomintang (or KMT). The panel discussion in Washington illuminated the fact that the political relationships in Asia aren’t a simple challenge defined by “alliances” and treaties. Instead, there are cultural and ethnic seams that cut through these relationships based in centuries of history, and encompassing domestic and international politics alike.

The President of Taiwan has put forward a peace proposal for the conflict in the East China Sea, setting aside the question of sovereignty and instead focusing on how to share the economic benefits of resource exploitation in and around the islands. Many analysts have indicated that the plan is more of an effort to kick the can than anything else. CIMSEC friend Dr. James Holmes instead has written that “It amounts to hoping that rational calculations of economic self-interest will overrule equally elemental imperatives such as fear of future aggression or the thirst for honor and prestige.” The proposal raises a question: Why is the leadership of Taiwan trying to avoid the question sovereignty? The discussion at CNP helped shed some light on the answer, and it is likely because of those cultural and ethnic seams and centuries of history.

In their comments during the panel discussion, both Dr. Jacqueline Deal and Michael Breen noted that the KMT embodies a strategic paradox that is driving a confused policy for the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The KMT, the party once led by Chiang Kai-shek, believes that the Republic of China (ROC) is the rightful government of all of China, both Taiwan and the mainland. According to their political platform reunification is a given once the People’s Republic of China (PRC) becomes democratic. Because the KMT sees themselves and the ROC as Chinese, not Taiwanese, the foundation of their policy toward the Senkaku/Diauyo is exactly the same as the PRC: the Diaoyu belong to “China.”

This belief creates a strategy/policy disconnect for the KMT. Strategic-level decision making becomes difficult because the party’s fundamental political belief can be at odds with the things that will help ensure the economic, political, and military security of the island of Taiwan. Japan is likely the ROC’s strongest ally in the region, yet on the Senkaku/Diauyo the ROC rhetoric makes it appear that they are siding with the PRC. Their fishing fleets have engaged in some unconventional tactics with the Japanese Coast Guard, similar to the work of the PRC’s maritime assets. This likely strengthens the fact that the PRC prefers the “anti-PRC” KMT over the “liberal” Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which believes in Taiwanese independence. Is it any wonder that President Ma Ying-jeou wants to try and avoid the sovereignty issue? Japan has elected a new conservative government with military expansion on their agenda. The PRC has initiated maritime aviation patrols of the islands. Neither side appears willing to set aside the fundamental sovereignty question in the conflict.

There is a large Chinese diaspora all over the world, from the islands of Southeast Asia to the streets of Panama City to Chinatowns of most major U.S. cities. An audience member at the CNP panel reminded the gathering that there is a strong belief in all these places that the Diaoyu are “Chinese” – the political system that controls them is irrelevant. The history of the Pacific and the military and political conflicts between the Chinese, Japanese, and the states of Southeast Asia go back centuries. These cultural realities make the Pacific a complex place. If the U.S. military thinks that trading the tribal cultures of Southwest Asia for the centuries of history in East Asia will make things simpler, it needs to rethink things. Will hoping for modern ideals and economics to overwhelm centuries of culture and history work any better in Pacific waters than it did in Middle Eastern sands?

The Firm of Maynard, Cushing, & Ellis does not represent the opinions of anyone that matters. Formed by Lieutenant Robert Maynard RN, Lieutenant William Cushing USN, and Captain Pete Ellis USMC, the firm doesn’t speak for the US Government, the Department of Defense, The Foreign Office, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, or the Department of Silly Walks.

Strategic Outlook

Carriers of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Great Game

January 4, 2013 Guest Author 8 Comments

By Felix Seidler, Institute for Security Policy, University of Kiel, Germany / German blogger.

Less Liaoning

Setting the stage for the Indo-Pacific Maritime Great Game

Nothing has been as over-hyped since August 2011 as China’s aircraft carrier program. After the former Soviet carrier Varyag, fully refurbished by the Chinese and renamed Liaoning, took its first “test drive”, thousands of blog posts, press pieces, and scholarly articles argued about possible regional and global implications. Is this single ship a regional or even global threat? What about the balance in the East and South China Seas?

Stay calm, people. After a few tests, China’s Navy – the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) – has shown it is in fact still years away from having an operational aircraft carrier, let alone integrated carrier strike group.

Moreover, if a navy wants to have a single operationally available aircraft carrier at any one time, it needs at least two, and better still three carriers in rotation: the one in operational status, one in the shipyard, and one in training and work-ups. According to these numbers, it is unlikely that the PLAN will be able to sustain a “blue water” carrier presence before 2020 based on projected shipbuilding schedules.

Even the first flights of a J-15 Shark from Liaoning’s deck were more PR event than step towards a credible carrier force. It’s one thing to launch a single fighter under controlled and planned conditions. Conducting dozens of flight movements per hour in wartime requires a significant increase in capabilities and training. To reach this, China must still walk a long road.

Eye on India

However, while most observers were busy with Liaoning, Asia’s only operational aircraft carrier, India’s INS Viraat, has largely been left out of the discussion (sorry, Thailand, but your never-operating carrier is not a serious asset). The first reason why India’s carrier must be taken more seriously than China: operational experience. India has been operating its current carrier since 1987 (the now-decommissioned INS Vikrant began service in 1961), and already has in place the necessary supply chains and logistics that the PLAN lacks. China’s maritime “Long March” could take longer than Mao’s to gain all the experience India already has. And while both China and India could turn to Russia for potential assistance, only the latter would likely receive carrier support – whether logistics or training – from the U.S., France, or the U.K.

Unlike their Chinese counterparts, Indian commanders already conduct serious exercises with their helicopter and fighter pilots integrated with their carrier crews. China, due to the lack of capacity (i.e. a carrier at sea) has not yet started the most crucial parts of its carrier training. Russian experts warn it may take the Chinese another decade to learn how to “efficiently” run carrier operations. Meanwhile, India’s next carrier INS Vikramaditya (former Soviet Admiral Gorshkov), due the benefits of Russian support, is already training in Arctic waters and is expected despite delays to enter service in late 2013 or 2014. The indigenously built INS Vikrant is slated to be commissioned in 2015. In consequence, whenever the PLAN’s first carrier is operational, India will have at least two well-trained counterparts (Viraat is set to decommission in 2020). Furthermore, India will generally be able to maintain one operational carrier off-shore while China, at least initially, will not.

New Delhi and The Three Carrier Big Boys

Beside Russian support – generous, but not free – India participates in joint exercises with the navies of the other two “Carrier Big Boys,” the U.S. and France. The PLAN is far from such trials and, beyond search and rescue (SAR), these navies by policy will not conduct full-scale combat training with a Chinese carrier, their possible future foe.

For instance, in April 2012, the U.S. and India conducted the 15th joint naval Exercise Malabar; which also included warships from Australia, Japan, and Singapore. Training with the U.S. means that India has the opportunity to look at and, thereby, learn from the skills of the world’s best carrier-operating navy. However, Indians pilots have not yet been reported taking off from U.S. carriers. Also unprecedented but not improbable, India’s carrier officers, pilots, and crews could hone their skills training side-by-side with the world’s best counterparts. This is something Chinese sailors are probably never going to experience. China’s fighter pilots had to travel to Brazil for portions of their carrier flight training.

Moreover, the U.S. is joined by France in using their carriers as political means of improving strategic ties with India. In 2011 the French Navy sent its carrier Charles de Gaulle, accompanied by surface vessels and a nuclear sub, to India for a joint exercise. Of course, this was also an advertisement for the French carrier-capable Rafale fighter, which India has since purchased. Operating combat-proven (Libya), NATO-interoperable fighters from carriers is surely a positive. Meanwhile, the competition is mostly working with slight improvements on copied Soviet and Russian designs. While China is developing a flat-top capable stealth fighter (the J-31), it will take years before it reaches full operational capabilities and production. In response to the threat of a Chinese carrier with J-31s, India could opt for the F-35C or a carrier-capable version of the Russian T-50 PAK FA. The U.S. and Russia would probably sell everything to New Delhi to keep a resurgent India in their camp.

Given all these advantages there can be no doubt that India’s already operating carriers deserve much higher esteem than China’s refurbished test-object in Dalian shipyard. However, it’s time to put the carriers into the geo-strategic context.

India’s Lasting Geo-strategic Advantage

For all its current carrier edge over China, India will not become a U.S.-like carrier superpower; but nor does it need to. Look at the Indian Ocean on the map and you’ll see the world’s most important sea-lanes running in front of the Indian military’s ports and air bases. Some of the most critical geostrategic hotspots and maritime chokepoints, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Malacca Strait, and the Gulf of Aden are nearby. For example, from its Andaman and Nikobar bases, India could easily block the northern entry of the Malacca Strait in the event of conflict.

By comparison, the PLAN has natural access only to the Malacca Strait, and to reach it must traverse the South China Sea, which can easily be filled with the subs and vessels of neighboring nations’ and the U.S. Navy. Thus, due to geography, the PLAN would have a far more difficult time exerting control on, or re-opening, access to the chokepoint than the Indian Navy. The Indian Navy would have a good deal easier job of accessing the South China Sea than the PLAN the Indian Ocean. Additionally, India has no “island chains” from which opposing forces can launch strikes, and therefore does not need to concentrate on Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) and instead can focus on freedom of action.

The Indo-Pacific Maritime Great Game

Finally, in the Indo-Pacific Maritime Great Game – how I like to describe what is going to happen in the map at top over the next 50 years – the better cards are in India’s hand.

As mentioned, India has the geographic edge. New Delhi’s maritime lifelines cannot easily be blocked. And, if someone tried, India’s carriers, surface vessels, subs, and air bases are within striking distance of the chokepoints. Furthermore, India has the better demography, with a younger (average) population base than China’s, which is “getting older before it gets rich.” This is important, because the Achilles Heel of the PLAN’s carrier program is the development of the Chinese population. Changes in society and government could reverse Beijing’s decisions in the carrier case. In 2060, India is expected to be the third or second largest economy in the world. Hence, it will have the money and the technology to sustain its number of carriers at an even higher rate than present.

With this in mind, whoever worries in the U.S. or Europe about these Chinese carriers, which could patrol the Indian Ocean’s SLOCs, should remember that India will be there too. So will other countries, like Australia. It’s time to recognize that of the two Indo-Pacific neighbors only one can as yet legitimately claim to be a global maritime power.

Besides, it won’t all come down to naval power in the Indo-Pacific Maritime Great Game. Of course, as the U.S. military recognizes, it must incorporate Air-Sea, but Space and Cyber must play integral roles too. Remember, all ships and fighters are worth nothing without satellite communications and a working cyber infrastructure. Therefore, wordy though it is, an Air-Sea-Space-Cyber-Battle is the way ahead (or perhaps Air-Sea+?); perhaps not only for the U.S., but for those developing their influence in the Indo-Pacific too.

Strategic Outlook

Maritime Janus

January 3, 2013 Guest Author 2 Comments

January is named for the Roman God Janus, the two-faced deity of the doorway or the threshold. With one face looking toward the future, and the other contemplating the past, Janus inspires the annual reviews of naval affairs as well as the predictions for the future that we see in the naval blogosphere. New Years 2013 in the maritime world is no different than in years past.

Over at Information Dissemination our favorite China shipyard-watcher Feng has a great post summarizing where the People’s Liberation Army Navy has been in the past year. Two things caught our eye in reading through Feng’s summary. First, seeing it all laid out in one place really emphasizes the capacity that is being developed by Chinese shipyards. For all the discussion of a dwindling industrial base in the United States, it is interesting to watch the pace of work in the Chinese shipbuilding industry. Second, we shouldn’t miss the massive construction underway for the maritime policing and Coast Guard equivalents in the People’s Republic. USCG cutters routinely deploy globally, sailing with USN ships in the Arabian Gulf and Pacific as well as the regular patrol of our backyard in the Caribbean. As China continues to build cutters and grows the size of their maritime security forces, we should expect them to develop interoperability with the PLAN in the same way the USCG and USN have developed their concept of The National Fleet. This melding of law enforcement patrol with military operations (based on a model provided by the Americans) in the South and East China Seas will continue to complicate the issues there.

Also at ID, CDR Bryan McGrath gives us a quick look at some highlights for I&W to watch for in 2013. We were glad to see him place the Blue/Green Team as his top item to keep an eye on. The Marines need to get over their fears of another Guadalcanal and return to their historic roots as an integrated part of naval forces. The Navy needs to overcome their self-consciousness about their comparative lack of recent combat experience and learn to look to the Marines for ideas and help in developing new concepts. It is time that both forces genuinely came together as an integrated, hybrid force rather than a pair of brothers constantly arm wrestling over who side is “supported” and who is “supporting.” We also note that discussions about the future of the Air Wing are on CDR McGrath’s list. That’s easy for a former SWO to say, but he’s right. The Naval Aviators amongst us are going to have to realize that there need to be some serious changes. Hard thinking, innovative ideas, and practical experimentation and testing will be required…humming “Highway to the Danger Zone” and quoting Goose and Slider will only give our adversaries more time to realize our weaknesses and take advantage of them. Maverick told us that you don’t have time to think up there…unfortunately today’s challenges require us to have people who are practiced and capable thinkers.

Elsewhere online the sometimes genial, sometimes grumpy, CDR Salamander takes a broader view toward the future at his blog. Strategy is the matching of ends, ways, and means. Sal points out that the United States must figure out the last part, with an honest and genuine assessment of the national financial status. Without it, developing “the ends” of national policy, and “the ways” of a sound Naval policy and shipbuilding plan, is impossible. That honest assessment…it isn’t going to be pretty. It has some very serious ramifications for the Department of the Navy, but also for every single part of American society.

We encourage you to follow the links and read the posts. There is some serious thinking here, some deep analysis, and some quick ideas that can help us frame the coming year – all worth your time. Janus is the namesake of the first month of the year and serves as a symbol of our New Year’s passion for self-assessment. He also serves as a fantastic symbol for naval analysts in general as we attempt to clarify the lessons of the past to illuminate our way into the future. If you’re still feeling a need for speed though, check this out to get your 2013 off to the right start.

Center for International Maritime Security

Category Archives: Strategic Outlook

MFP 1: Reducing and Protecting Maritime Budgets

A Three-Way In The East China Sea?

Carriers of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Great Game

Maritime Janus

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.