Category Archives: Strategic Outlook

Predictions and forecasting.

Europe, Strategic Outlook, Territorial and Law of the Sea Disputes

Maritime Security: Fact or Fallacy? The View from Gibraltar

November 19, 2015 Guest Author 1 Comment

By Michael Sanchez

The recent global maritime security scenario has been deeply affected by several factors that have by necessity, changed the way of approaching and dealing with individual problems at sea. Piracy, drugs smuggling, weapon trafficking and the repugnant trade in human lives have reemerged with particular virulence but of paramount concern and indeed priority is the ominous threat of seaborne terrorism. Most of us witnessed to our horror the murder of innocent tourists in a beach at Tunisia. The execution of this attack came from what appears to be a well coordinated plan that took everyone by surprise. The proliferation of fast RHIBs (Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats) and jet ski type vessels have given terrorists flexibility of speed and the ability of evasion that gives them a distinct advantage as they are able to mix and mingle with other craft and raise less suspicion when choosing their targets Not only are these fast vessels in the inventory of terrorists but they are the preferred method of transport by drug smuggling gangs

In the case of Gibraltar it can be said with concern that by the nature of our geographical position we are exposed to the threats of terrorism. It’s no use hiding behind the fact that North Africa lies 14 miles across the Strait of Gibraltar (STROG) and pretending it will not affect us sooner or later, directly or indirectly. Morocco has been subjected to attacks within its territory but has been successful in thwarting seaborne assaults against shipping in the strait including warships but they cannot do it all on their own. The Spanish enclave of Ceuta has been the recruiting ground for potential jihadist recruits that consequently find their way to Syria and/or Iraq. The North African coastline opposite Gibraltar can be considered a launch pad for vessels that trade in drugs, humans and other illicit activities. All stakeholders in the vicinity, Gibraltar, Morocco, and Spain have a duty to ensure that the malignant barbarity of present day terrorism does not cross the Strait of Gibraltar into Europe via this vulnerable route. To repulse any sort of seaborne attacks everyone must be prepared and not fall into one of mankind’s many weakness Complacency

As far as Gibraltar is concerned the responsibility for the maritime security of Gibraltar Territorial Waters falls under very awkward operational procedures and tasking. The MOD through the Royal Navy Gibraltar Squadron is tasked with, according to its mission statement “To contribute to the maritime defence and security of Gibraltar and when necessary, the prosecution of offensive maritime operations in order to allow BFG to support military ops as directed by HMG.” Quite a mouthful and perhaps ambiguous but it’s not the intention to assess the political ramifications of such a broad statement. Bearing all this in mind, the security of HM Naval Base Gibraltar falls into question. Every time a naval vessel is berthed alongside South Mole or “The Tower” a boom is placed across the harbour from South Mole to the old Gun wharf site. It consists of small orange buoys held in position by floaters and strung across with rope. This is to prevent unauthorised craft from entering the security cordon. The security boom is totally inadequate and useless. Any determine driver of a jet ski or RHIB can “jump” this boom and instantly find itself within a restricted area.

The MOD should invest in purpose built security booms that protect warships, particularly submarines in naval bases around the world. It has not gone unnoticed that since 2013 there has been an increase of RN nuclear power submarines visiting the naval base. Various operational tasks have been carried out including transfer of weaponry that demand the highest levels of security. This cannot be guaranteed with a weak protective boom that can be easily penetrated. On the fifth of July a drug smuggling jet ski entered the harbour through the southern entrance whilst HMS Ambush was alongside South Mole. Luckily, the intruder turned left and not right. The inadequacy of this security boom is a glaring capability gap that can be exploited by the enemy. Within this boom the task of protecting these warships is carried out efficiently by the GDP (Gibraltar Defence Police). Despite being equipped with 2 slow and aging ex Range Safety craft that are not fit for purpose they stick to their duty of affording port force protection but their response time to a fast intruder is minimal. GDP were to be equipped with modern patrol craft some time ago but it was decided otherwise to renege on it, another UK base benefitting from these new craft. For years there has been a succession of UK politicians and high ranking military officers trumpeting and touting the importance of Gibraltar as a base for UK ops. It’s time they put their money where their mouths are and transmit their thoughts into deeds.

Leaving aside the MOD estates we come to the protection of the civilian population which is by and large entrusted to the marine section of the Royal Gibraltar Police. This service boasts the most modern and fast craft to carry out their duties. There is a certain overlapping of responsibilities with the RN that due to constitutional obligations muddies the waters as to who is responsible for what when and how. This is rather unhelpful when it comes to tackling a potential terrorist threat. We are led to believe that there is coordination when it comes to security matters at sea but to a plain simple observer it does not appear to be so. A more robust communication environment should be encouraged to interchange ideas thoughts and indeed intelligence on a regular basis, not on ad hoc terms. To use a well worn phase everyone should be “singing from the same hymn sheet” instead of tearing out pages so that the other sings out of tune.

Gibraltar’s important maritime security infrastructure requires overhauling and redesigning. Our hugely important cruise liner industry can sometimes walk a tight rope when it comes to passenger and owner satisfaction. Cruise liners are vulnerable and a tempting target. On very few occasions are cruise ships escorted to and from the liner terminal by law enforcement craft and there is no seaward protection whilst alongside North Mole. This would prevent any unwanted or inquisitive boats from getting too close for comfort. We must bear in mind that although Cruise liners companies might be satisfied with ashore security arrangements any incident no matter how small or insignificant at sea could cause them to leave and this would destroy an important pillar of our economy. Why not go the extra mile and provide seaside security to such an important gem in our crown? It will enhance our reputation amongst cruise line companies as a serious port of call in which to do business with.

What cannot be allowed to happen again is a situation similar to that of the theft of one our reef blocks from under our noses. This was a highly embarrassing event that exposed a certain lack of supervision of Gibraltar Territorial Waters. It highlighted the absence of coordination in patrolling our waters. Each to their own without knowing who was doing what and where. Naturally there were local law enforcement craft swarming over the area next day but the horse had bolted and the stable was empty

These are but a few of the more noticeable flaws in the protection of our little country. I accept the fact that security cannot be 100% guaranteed but it can be made extremely difficult for anyone attempting to threaten our peace and stability. It serves no purpose to find faults and criticize without offering suggestions and ideas in which to improve the protection of our waters from dynamic situations that confront our day to day lives. With the expansion of yachting facilities at Ocean Village and the proposed reclamation at the Eastside there will be an increase in the load factor for law enforcement agencies in maintaining a safe maritime picture. A maritime surveillance system similar to the Spanish SIVE (Systema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior) should be considered as an aid to combating illegal activities close to our shores This system comprises of radars, infrared cameras and other surveillance equipment placed at strategic sites and controlled by an operations room. Any information gathered by this system can be transmitted to civilian law enforcement vessels (RGP HM Customs Port Authority) in real time via video link. It will make the task of intercepting suspect vessels easier and with ample time. The introduction of a joint maritime control centre is of vital importance. It is of huge value that all incidents be controlled “under one roof” thereby improving response times and rapid interventions. Everyone working together instead of pulling away from each should be encouraged. Pooling of resource can be an effective method of dealing with certain events/actions whilst each law enforcement agency maintaining their independence and freedom of movement in their particular field of responsibilities. Joint training exercises whether live or in tabletop format can be useful in honing particular skills and at the same time exchanging operational experiences. Of course the major stumbling block is finance as all these suggestions do not come cheaply, but in the long term it is an investment that will pay dividends by ensuring the adequate protection of life and property.

I am by no means advocating a “Fortress Gibraltar” bristling with guns missiles and military hardware. Life must go on as normal. In the present climate of economic prosperity and physical expansion it has to be top priority that to accommodate a thriving yacht industry, the protection of bunkering facilities, the secure operations of cruise liners and importantly the safety of local seafarers fishermen and pleasure boat owners the necessary infrastructure to enable Gibraltar to maintain its reputation as a competitive serious and reliable player in the maritime industry must be in place so that we hopefully never become an easy target for our foes whoever they may be

Michael Sanchez is a naval observer and commentator for Gibraltar & STROG. He is the founder of OpWest and the promoter of Gibraltar Coast Watchers, and explained the former’s operation in an interview with CIMSEC. Born in the Rock, he served as a police officer for 33 years before retiring. He tweets at @key2med

Global Analysis, Online Schedule, Strategic Outlook

Call for Articles – Russia Resurgent Week

November 3, 2015 Guest Author Leave a comment

Week Dates: Nov 23-29 2015
Articles Due: Nov 20 2015
Article Length: 500-1500 Words
Submit to: nextwar(at)cimsec(dot)org

Amidst headline-grabbing activities on land in Ukraine and Syria, Russia is steadily pursuing new strategies at sea. From assuring Black Sea access with the annexation of Crimea to joint Pacific exercises with China, recent Russian activities represent a level of commitment to sea power unseen since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

During the first week of November, CIMSEC will host a series exploring the maritime implications of Russia’s strategic goals, Russia’s capacity to execute its strategy at sea, and the implications of Russian strategy and policy for its neighbors, partners and adversaries. Potential topics, in order of broadest to most focused, could include: Is Russia a natural sea power, land power, or somehow both? What ends does Russia hope to achieve through sea power? What relationships is Russia looking to enhance or destabilize through stepped-up maritime activity? What asymmetries with the maritime strategies of NATO, the U.S., China, and others does Russian strategy hope to exploit? What policies should Russia pursue in the Arctic, and why? Does Russia have the economic and industrial strength to recapitalize its seagoing fleet? How much does the Russian economy depend on seaborne trade, legal and illicit? Does Russia possess an expeditionary capability? How does the concept of hybrid war, as practiced in Ukraine, extend to the maritime sphere? What role, if any, does or should Russia have in the humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean? And, to all of these questions, how should other countries adjust their strategies to react?

Contributions should be between 500 and 1500 words in length and submitted no later than 20 November 2015. Publication reviews will also be accepted. CIMSEC will re-post selected older entries about Russian maritime activity, as well.

Matt McLaughlin is a U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer. His opinions do not represent the Department of the Navy.

Africa, Europe, Global Analysis, Strategic Outlook

Tuning into Tunisia: An Assessment of Tunisia’s Naval Forces

September 29, 2015 Guest Author Leave a comment

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While much international attention is directed toward the flow of refugees from Syria and Iraq to Europe, which has prompted the partial suspension of the European Union’s Dublin Regulation by the German and Czech governments and even sent shockwaves through Canada’s ongoing federal election, hundreds of Libyans continue to make the perilous journey across the Mediterranean Sea. Kos Island has become famous around the world as the front line of the migrant crisis,

Migrants wait at a Lampedusa holding center. (Click image for source)

yet Italy’s Lampedusa continues to face an overwhelming number of both political refugees and economic migrants fleeing Libya in the wake of that country’s civil war and resulting unrest.

The Libyan Navy is in no position to be of assistance in managing the crisis. While it has a single Soviet-built Natya-class minesweeper still in operation, the remaining vessels of the Libyan Navy, comprised of a Soviet-built Koni-class anti-submarine warfare frigate and two Polish-built Polnocy-C-class landing ships, are reportedly undergoing refits in Malta and France. Though the Libyans doubtless possess some collection of small patrol craft, the force has thus far been unable to effectively police Libyan waters. In March 2014, an oil tanker from the rebel-held port of Sidra successfully evaded a Libyan Navy blockade, leaving a team of United States Navy SEALs to intervene and seize the tanker.

Fortunately, the Tunisian National Navy has proved itself to be a reliable partner in securing the Mediterranean and averting humanitarian disaster. In August 2015, Tunisia commissioned its first locally built patrol boat, Al Istiklal (Independence). This development made Tunisia the first country in the Arab world to develop a shipbuilding industry of its own and only the second in Africa, following South Africa’s lead. Reportedly, Al Istiklal is an 80-ton patrol boat that measures 26.5 meters in length and is 5.8 meters wide, enjoys a top speed of 25 knots and a range of 600 nautical miles, all while equipped with a 20mm cannon, two machine guns, and a thermal imaging camera. This expansion of Tunisian maritime capabilities was bolstered by four patrol boats of unidentified classification from the United States Navy (USN) earlier in 2015, with a further three boats expected for delivery by the end of 2016.

It is difficult to accurately assess the size of the Tunisian National Navy, but best estimates place the total number of vessels operated by Tunisia at 40 gunboats or patrol

One of Tunisia's Combattante IIIM Class Fast Patrol Boats with MM-40 Exocet missiles. (La Galite 501 pictured) — One of Tunisia’s Combattante IIIM Class Fast Patrol Boats with MM-40 Exocet missiles. (La Galite 501 pictured). (Source: World Military Intel)

boats, one landing craft, and six other non-combat vessels. The largest vessel operated by Tunisia’s maritime forces, President Bourgiba, was a decommissioned Edsall-class destroyer escort, USS Thomas J. Gary, which was transferred to Tunisia in 1973 and rendered no longer operational by a severe fire in 1992, having served at sea for almost 50 years in total. Since then, the largest vessels operated by the Tunisian National Navy are its six Albatross-class fast attack craft manufactured in Germany by Lurssen, with a displacement of almost 400 tons each. In short, Tunisia’s maritime forces are non-expeditionary and have been focused entirely on coastal defense for more than two decades.

It is unclear whether the US sees the transfer of defense equipment like the aforementioned patrol boats as part of a broader effort to counter al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or other militant Islamist groups. But it certainly has paid dividends in rescue efforts. As recently as June 2015, Tunisian patrol boats saved some 650 migrants and refugees bound for Lampedusa on unsafe rafts. A June 2015 attack on a Tunisian beach resort by Libya-based terrorists, in which 38 people were killed, demonstrated how closely connected Tunisia’s security is with that of its neighbors, Libya and Algeria. As such, Tunisia is bound to continue to play a significant role in securing the North African coast. Nonetheless, it would be prudent for European members of NATO to press for a formalization of this relationship, similar in many respects to the Tactical Memorandum of Understanding struck with the Kingdom of Morocco in 2009 to secure Moroccan participation in Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, NATO’s ongoing maritime mission to monitor traffic and combat terrorism in the Mediterranean. With or without European recognition, Tunisia appears set to be a maritime leader in its own right.

Paul Pryce is the Research Analyst for the Atlantic Council of Canada’s Maritime Nation Program and a long-time member of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC).

Arctic, Global Analysis, Strategic Outlook

An Arctic Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone: Can there be Cooperation Under the Counterforce Dilemma?

September 23, 2015 Guest Author 1 Comment

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The following piece is by Conference of Defense Associations Institute guest contributor Nancy Jane Teeple and can be found in its original form here. It is republished with their permission.

The promise of stability-enhancing and confidence-building measures under the New START agreement is waning. Obama’s Prague Agenda and New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) signed between the United States and Russian Federation in Prague on 8 April 2010, hoped to see reductions in nuclear stockpiles and delivery systems by 2018 – an agreement made at a time of significantly reduced tensions between the former nuclear competitors. The renewal of tensions between the West and a revanchist Russia under President Putin, particularly apparent in the Ukraine crisis, threatens the longevity of arms control.

The possible results of this trend are worrisome. We could see the deterioration of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty and any prospects for global disarmament enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and promoted by groups like Ploughshares and the Nuclear Security Project. These conditions have implications for proposals for an Arctic nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) promoted by notable individuals from foundations such as the Canadian Pugwash Group, Gordon Foundation, and Science for Peace.

The fear of nuclear weapon use for the most part declined since the end of the Cold War. The reduction of tensions between the East and West encouraged bilateral arms control negotiations not seen since détente in the 1970s. The emergence of movements promoting a world without nuclear weapons reinforced notions that the nuclear era was over, and that remaining stockpiles had to be destroyed to prevent potential accidents. Not surprisingly, nuclear weapons are considered by many to be a relic of the Cold War.

However, following the rise of Putin, the emergence of asymmetric threats, and new near-peer competitors such as China, the Bush administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and pursued rapid modernization of the US nuclear triad in order to counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from rogue nations and terrorists. These actions reinvigorated the security dilemma between the US, on one side, and China and Russia, on the other, with the latter two viewing the development of offensive nuclear weapons systems as threatening – in so far as the development of counterforce capabilities geared towards targeting another state’s nuclear arsenal can be seen as both a challenge to their second-strike capabilities and a repudiation of mutually assured deterrence. A new arms race ensued. Both China and Russia are modernizing their own nuclear arsenals, and Russia has ignited a new Cold War over the North with the renewal of long-range

A Russian Tu-45 bomber seen during an interception in 2011. (Source: Crown Copyright, via IHS Jane's 360) — A Russian Tu-45 bomber seen during an interception in 2011. (Source: Crown Copyright, via IHS Jane’s 360)

bomber patrols near the airspace of NATO member Arctic states.

Geopolitically, the Arctic may become a region of military confrontation, particularly with the rapid militarization by the Arctic-5 states (Canada, Norway, Denmark, Russia, and the United States), especially Russia, in enhancing their Arctic capabilities to defend economic interests in the region. In addition, although the United States, Russian, and NATO articulate an interest in reducing their nuclear arsenals and missions, they also reaffirm reliance on a credible deterrent capability so long as nuclear weapons are in the world.

This is the context within which global players must consider the feasibility of an Arctic NWFZ. Is such an initiative in the national interests of the United States and Russia? Would such a régime provide the stability needed for further cooperation on arms control and disarmament? What sort of role could smaller but influential states, such as Canada, play in encouraging bilateral negotiations to consider reducing nuclear forces in the Arctic? These are the questions that must guide any Arctic NWFZ initiative. Options must also be considered that involve compromises and concessions in order to minimize possible defections. What sort of agreement could find receptivity in both the United States and Russia?

An Arctic NWFZ must be tailored to the unique geographical and geopolitical character of the region and boundary options may not start out as comprehensive zones. Inclusion and exclusion zones involving the seabed, subsea, surface, and airspace must be considered. It might be prudent to explore provisions from existing NWFZs and other regional treaties banning nuclear weapons, such as the Antarctic Treaty, Seabed Treaty, and Outer Space Treaty. Limited geographical zones have been proposed, such as the Northwest Passage, which would open up opportunities either for resolution of the disputed status of the strait, or provide options for joint Canada-US monitoring and enforcement.

Another option involves establishing an exclusion zone in

the Canadian Basin, located north of the Beaufort Sea. If Canada’s claim to the seabed that extends into the Basin is recognized by the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Ottawa may be able to promote a NWFZ through administering its sovereign rights to protect the sea life by prohibiting nuclear-carrying vessels that pose a threat to the environment.

In establishing an Arctic NWFZ régime that would be receptive to the US and Russia, a potential option has been proposed by experts at Pugwash. This would be a treaty to prevent nuclear weapons in the entire region above the Arctic Circle. In order to be strategically feasible, this option would have to be adapted to the counterforce postures of the US and Russia by allowing the continuation of nuclear deterrence operations, as well as the replacement of nuclear warheads with conventional alternatives.

The modernization of the US nuclear triad is already being adapted for conventional counterforce options on both ballistic missile and air delivery systems. Russia is also developing a hypersonic conventional delivery system – an answer to the US Conventional Prompt Global Strike program. Like the United States, Russia’s air and sea-based deterrents can be outfitted with conventional warheads. This option acknowledges the reality that Russia’s Northern Fleet, which includes its ballistic missile submarines, is based mainly above the Arctic Circle. Russia would not likely be receptive to any arrangement that would restrict its sea-based deterrent, placing it at a strategic disadvantage to the United States.

These options may have been possible before the spring of 2014. However, under current conditions getting the US and Russia to the negotiating table to consider new arms control agreements does not seem feasible. Relations between the US/NATO and Russia can be characterized by Russia’s mistrust of NATO in Eastern Europe, accusations on both sides of violating the INF Treaty, Russia’s perception of the threat posed by US offensive counterforce weapons, Russia’s growing declaratory reliance on nuclear weapons, and the growing military and economic competition in the Arctic pitting Russia against the other Arctic states. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in early 2014, followed by military interventions in Ukraine’s eastern provinces of Donesk and Lukhansk, has intensified conditions of mutual mistrust, threat, and uncertainty.

Such conditions tend to militate against the potential for an Arctic NWFZ and must be mitigated before the nuclear powers are likely to consider cooperation. Unfortunately, a new détente is very unlikely in the foreseeable future.

This article originally featured at the CDA Institute and can be found in its original form here.

Nancy Jane Teeple is a Doctoral Candidate in Political Science at Simon Fraser University. Her areas of study include nuclear strategy, arms control, Arctic security, and intelligence. (Featured image courtesy of Russian Defence Policy blog.)

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