Category Archives: Notes to New CNO Week

Create a New Doctrine for Applying Learning Strategies to Warfighting Challenges

Notes to the New CNO Series

By CDR Paul Nickell

The Get Real Get Better initiative has been a near-term effort to increase the effectiveness of how Sailors do things, to include problem-solving – which could be described as the science of warfighting. To holistically improve Sailors, the “Navy-wide culture renovation” must also inculcate learning strategies – the art of warfighting. A supplement or revision to NDP-1, tentatively entitled Naval Warfighting, would accomplish this by integrating the art and science of warfighting into an enduring doctrine on learning strategies.

China and Russia both view the focus of modern warfare as being cognitive dominant, which is described as a positive outcome from the friction between intuition and expertise, or art and science. A revised NDP-1, modeled on the Marine Corps FMFM-1 Warfighting, would offer structured ways to think and learn about naval warfare. It would codify the values and skills of continuous learning, and provide guidance on cognitive development for all echelons. In this way, a revised NDP-1 will go beyond teaching warfare principles as an instrument of national power. Indeed, it would provide a timeless model for how to approach complex warfighting challenges with specific learning strategies and campaigns.

Currently, NDP-1, Naval Warfare, is insufficient to generate an understanding of the central premise of naval forces’ existence – warfighting. It also lacks foundational organizational concepts and individual behavioral strategies such as feedback loops. These strategies and concepts are needed to help individuals and organizations navigate the learning challenges that are at the core of strengthening warfighting skill.

A revised NDP-1 would be the doctrine that guides Sailors’ learning efforts in three essential ways. First, cultivate self-awareness and knowledge about how cognitive biases affect information processing and meaning-making in a warfighting environment. Second, practice broad, holistic decision-making skills that are willing to challenge prevailing assumptions and established practices. Lastly, employ decision frameworks and learning models when developing guidance and policies. All of these efforts would be grounded in warfighting, with an eye toward how to apply these principles to tactical and operational challenges.

Regardless of their quality, doctrinal publications may fall far short due to a lack of concrete incentives and directives that make sure personnel engage with the material. For a revised NDP-1 to have real impact, it can be made mandatory reading for warfare tactics instructors, war college faculty and students, fleet staffs, and other target audiences.

Some within the fleet have readily embraced Get Real Get Better’s call to action. But more can be done, especially to ground this campaign in warfighting. A revised NDP-1, focused on developing learning strategies for warfighting challenges, will help the Navy and its Sailors achieve a campaign of continuous learning. It will help strengthen the professional incentives that reward warfighting skill, and cultivate a more robust intellectual environment in the Navy, one that values diversity of thought, the questioning of ideas, and rapidly developing winning solutions.

Commander Paul Nickell is a PMBA student at the Naval Postgraduate School and a Senior Course student at the Naval War College. He is part of the naval aviation community having commanded a P-8A squadron, facilitated learning at the Navy’s Leadership and Ethics Command for future Major Commanders, Commanding Officers, Executive Officers, and Command Master Chiefs. His academic focus has been on organizational learning, vertical development, and executive coaching as foundational aspects for learning organizations.

Featured Image: NAVAL AIR STATION WHIDBEY ISLAND, Wash. (Aug. 1, 2023) – A P-8A Poseidon assigned to Patrol Squadron (VP) 46, the ‘Grey Knights,’ taxis into the combat aircraft loading area at Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island, Washington. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jacquelin Frost.)

The United States Navy Needs an Operational Level of War Strategy to Inform Fleet Design

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Steve Wills

The United States Navy has been without an operational level of war strategy to guide its force size, design, and employment since June 1990. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) nominee Admiral Frank Kelso put the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s “on the shelf,” stating, “military strategy needs a specific enemy, and the issues before us today seem ones of naval policy rather than strategy.” Since Admiral Kelso’s CNO tenure, the Navy has created a series of white papers and policy documents. These ranged from Kelso’s “From the Sea” document of 1992, to the most recent Advantage at Sea, Tri-Service Maritime Strategy” signed by CNO Admiral Mike Gilday in 2020. CNOs have also issued guidance to the force, with recent examples including CNO Admiral Richardson’s “Designs for Maritime Superiority,” and Admiral Gilday’s “Navigation Plans.” But these documents have not sought to provide a concrete operational strategy for how the Navy would be employed in war.

The same period highlighted how the lack of an operational strategy contributed to the Navy’s declining force structure and readiness. From 1990 to 2020, the Navy decreased from over 520 ships to less than 300. Yet the service continued to forward deploy an average of 100 ships while at the same time maintaining a potential “surge” capacity for short-notice deployment of six carrier strike groups, such as were surged for Operations Desert Storm, and later Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. These requirements became a heavy burden on fleet readiness over the 2000s and 2010s. Successive reports from the Board of Inspection and Survey, the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office and Congressional Research Services, and others have been critical of Navy readiness. The 2010 Balisle report and Center for Naval Analyses “Tipping Point” studies both sounded significant alarms on Navy readiness challenges.

Successive service plans to address readiness problems in the form of the Fleet Response Plan, Optimized Fleet Response Plan, and now the 75 Ready Ships initiative have all failed to address the root causes of declining Navy readiness. Multiple classes of ships are reaching block obsolescence, including the CG-47 class cruiser, the LSD-41 class amphibious warfare ship, the SSN-688 class submarine, and the first units of the DDG-51 class destroyer. Attempts in the past two decades to create a new generation of surface ships such as the Zumwalt-class destroyer and littoral combat ship (LCS) failed to provide the desired capability. It seems clear that without an operational strategy to anchor its focus, the U.S. Navy has been unable to develop and sustain a force design with specific numbers of ships that meet its global mission set.

Some may argue that an operational level of war strategy is not the purview of the Navy as a service, but rather that of the combatant commands. The recent Marine Corps reforms highlight what is possible. The development of operational warfighting concepts such as stand-in forces and expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) set the stage for changes to force design and how to measure readiness. By changing the forces that the service provides, the Marine Corps was able to subsequently evolve the warfighting options and strategies of the combatant commanders.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act instituted a bifurcation between the military entities that generate forces and those that employ them, which seemingly put a service-developed operational strategy like the Navy’s 1980s Maritime Strategy out of reach. But this bifurcation does not absolve the services of the fundamental need to develop warfighting strategies. The services must develop their own separate visions of future warfighting given how their force design and readiness mandates go well beyond the typical time horizon of combatant commander responsibilities.

The U.S. Navy is now at a force design and readiness crisis point not seen since Admiral Elmo Zumwalt took the helm in 1970. Admiral Lisa Franchetti should take the initiative to develop a comprehensive, operational level of war maritime strategy that will determine fleet missions, which will subsequently inform a specific fleet size and force design. Forging a stronger connection between warfighting strategy and force design will remain among the most pressing matters for the leadership of the United States Navy.

Dr. Steven Wills is a navalist for the Center for Maritime Strategy at the Navy League of the United States. He is an expert in U.S. Navy strategy and policy and U.S. Navy surface warfare programs and platforms. His research interests include the history of U.S. Navy strategy development over the Cold War and immediate, post-Cold War era, and the history of the post-World War II U.S. Navy surface fleet.

Featured Image: APIA, Samoa (Sept. 13, 2023) – Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Jackson (LCS 6) arrives in Apia, Samoa, for Pacific Partnership 2023. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Deirdre Marsac)

Notes to the New CNO Series Kicks Off on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

For the next two weeks, CIMSEC will be featuring short articles submitted in response to our Call for Notes to the New CNO. In this special series, authors will convey their thoughts on what they believe are the most pressing issues for the U.S. Navy’s new top leader, Acting Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti. From calls for new naval strategies and approaches to force design, to competing with a rising China and personnel retention issues, the Navy’s new leadership is confronting myriad challenging issues.

The featured authors are listed below, and will be updated with more names as the series unfolds.

The United States Navy Needs an Operational Level of War Strategy to Inform Fleet Design,” by Steve Wills

Create a New Doctrine for Applying Learning Strategies to Warfighting Challenges,” by CDR Paul Nickell

Focus on Culture for Success in the AI Era,” by Harrison Schramm

Dusting Off the Z-Gram: Getting Real with Recruiting and Retention,” by Lt. Sam Strauss

Counter China’s Goal of Displacing American Command of the Sea,” by Robert C. Rubel

Empowering Division Officers and Enhancing Sailor Stability,” by Lt. Upton Wallace

Revamp Force Design for Sea Control and Joint Integration,” by Commanders Andrew “Kramer” Tenbusch and Trevor “Mrs.” Phillips-Levine

The Navy Must Rediscover its Roots and Recommit to Small Combatants,” by Victor Sussman

Capitalize on Allied Capabilities to Succeed at Sea – A View from Spain,” by Gonzalo Vazquez

Rebalance the Fleet Toward Being a Truly Expeditionary Navy,” by Anthony Cowden

Organize Campaigns of Learning and Reshape the Defense Analysis Paradigm,” by John Hanley

Empowering Enlisted Sailors: The Imperative for Expanded Educational Opportunities in the U.S. Navy,” by Petty Officer 2nd Class Richard Rodgers

Get Real Get Better about Digital HR for Sailors,” by Artem Sherbinin and Daniel Stefanus

Down Select and Commit To Uncrewed Surface Systems,” by LCDR U.H. (Jack) Rowley (ret.)

Man The Fleet and Reduce Sailor Exhaustion,” by Capt. John Cordle (ret.)

Sailors Matter Most: Incentivize Education and Cultivate Learning Leaders,” by Sean F. X. Barrett, Mie Augier, and William F. Mullen, III

Lead the Fight Against Climate Change and Transnational Crime in the Indian Ocean,” by Commander Amila Prasanga, Sri Lankan Navy

Prototype the Bi-Modal Naval Force,” by Shelley Gallup

Improve the Culture and Mechanisms of Naval Learning,” by Commander Art Valeri

Ask the Public for Material Sacrifice to Narrow the Civ-Mil Divide,” by Michael D. Purzycki

Be Mindful of JADC2’s Emission Risks,” by Richard Mosier

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org

Featured Image: Washington DC (September 14, 2023) Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti answers questions from members of the Senate Armed Services Committee during her confirmation hearing. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communications Specialist Amanda R. Gray)

Notes to the New CNO Week Concludes on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

Last week CIMSEC featured articles submitted in response to our Call for Articles requesting short submissions where contributors offered their suggestions to the U.S. Navy’s new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday. From future warfighting considerations to the management of the force, authors provided a variety of hard-hitting insights.

Below are the articles and authors that featured during the topic week. We thank the authors for their excellent contributions. 

Two Unaddressed Problems in the Surface Navy” by Matthew Harper, CDR, USN (ret.) 

“A lot has been written about the troubles of the U.S. Navy’s surface force, but two underlying institutional problems have not been fully addressed. The failure to address these flaws promises that the U.S. Navy’s surface force will continue to risk generating less capable Sailors who are more risk averse and less tactically astute.”

Prepare for Autonomous Undersea Conflict” by David Strachan

“Undersea warfare is entering an era of profound transformation due to the increasing sophistication and proliferation of unmanned systems. But while their roles, missions, and concepts of operation have been thoroughly analyzed, the ultimate deployment of autonomous, expendable vehicles in a shadowy, hostile environment could unfold in ways that have yet to be fully imagined.”

Make Crew Endurance an Operational Warfighting Imperative” by Captain John Cordle, USN (ret.)

“The Navy owes Sailors a culture that maintains its people with the same rigorous mindset and planning as the maintenance of its ships and aircraft. Proper crew rest and sleep hygiene not only improve the daily performance and long-term endurance of our personnel in stressful environments, but best practices will lead to better long-term health outcomes when our Sailors leave the service.”

Reestablish the Strategic Studies Group” by Commander Chris O’Connor, USN, and Lieutenant Commander Ryan Hilger, USN

“The SSG’s original mandate, to develop and propose innovative warfighting concepts against peer competitors (initially the Soviet Union), is quite relevant today. The new CNO should reestablish the SSG along these lines to develop a new generation of strategists and operational concepts for Navy and Marine Corps warfighting.”

Recapitalize Sealift or Forfeit the Next Great Power War” by Stephen M. Carmel

“In the U.S., at least in terms of sealift, incrementalism is our watchword and even then we don’t execute on that minimal vision. The focus is always on doubling down on failed programs and policies that brought about the current state of affairs when bold, innovative thinking that does not repeat the mistakes of the past is required.”

Every Sailor a Cyber Warrior” by Lieutenant Douglas Kettler, USN

“The next level of fleet-wide cyber education should show the Sailor how the domain impacts their lethality and arms them with the education to recognize, respond, and overcome adverse cyber effects. Through the new creed of ‘every Sailor a cyber warrior,’ the CNO will be able to leverage his experience at Tenth Fleet to arm the Navy with the foundational skills necessary to fight and prevail in twenty-first century network-centric warfare.”

Defend and Advance Core Undersea and Network Capabilities” by John T. Kuehn, Ph.D., Commander, USN (ret.)

“The Navy must emphasize fielding proven technology. Do not bank on emergent technology that only currently exists on paper and in formulas, and is not something that can be fully operationalized into the fleet we have by 2030.”

To Win Great Power War, Treat Information As a Strategic Resource” by Lieutenant Commander Robert “Jake” Bebber, USN

“The Navy and Joint Force should be part of a national strategy that harvests information resources and controls critical information industries while denying that leverage to our adversaries. This requires new operational concepts, deeper relations with partners, allies, and industry, and a re-thinking of current personnel recruitment, training and retention.”

Restore Authority and Accountability” by Commander Rob Brodie, USN

“The cause of the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions was the administrative chain of command’s decisions to send untrained officers to the fleet while also replacing intuitive with non-intuitive ship control consoles without training support. But instead, only the operational chain of command was held accountable for the loss of life.”

Tackle Force Dynamism and Administrative Structure For a Stronger Navy” by Petty Officer Second Class Jacob Wiencek, USN

“The CNO should focus on his role of training, developing, and administratively overseeing the U.S Navy, specifically in two key areas that are adversely affecting the fleet: administrative and personnel structure, and force dynamism.”

The Navy Reserve is Broken” by Lieutenant Blake Herzinger, USN

“Navy reservists are ready and eager to serve, but what message do they receive when they arrive on deployment and are told the duties they have arrived to execute are unimportant or nonexistent? Administrative problems have administrative solutions, but without attention from above, they will languish and Sailors will suffer the consequences.”

Junior Personnel: The X-Factor in Great Power Competition” by Lieutenant Adam Johnson, USN, and Lieutenant Junior Grade John Maslin, USN

“Incorporating a non-discriminatory dataset from the junior ranks into senior-level decision-making could be an ‘X-factor’ for several reasons. First, it would provide senior leaders with crowdsourced, deckplate-level data that, in many cases, they are currently not receiving. Harnessing these collective insights from a generation that has grown up in a technology-fueled world that is entirely dissimilar from the early experiences of our senior leaders could pave the way for new strategies for how the Navy conducts business.”

Kill the Darlings and Pet Programs” by Lieutenant Commander Ryan Hilger, USN

“It is time to kill our darlings. We cannot deploy the Navy the nation needs with the many pet programs we have. Underperforming programs must go. Follow Secretary Esper’s lead and hold ‘Night Court’ for the Navy…”

Don’t Forget Seapower’s Dry Foundation” by J. Overton

“Important as that role is, bases’ size, location, and presence means they are continuously carrying out effective naval strategy. Some of that is direct and traditional – overhauling ships, fueling aircraft, training submariners. But much of that is better described as ‘collateral strategy’ – using the means available through local presence to establish global ends. “

Improve Mutual Cooperation with Small and Medium-Sized Navies” by VADM. (Ret) Omar Eduardo Andujar-Zaiter, DRN

“The CNO should include in his working plan a desire to better understand and collaborate with small and medium-sized Navies of nearby democratic countries with the aim of earning bilateral cooperation for USN objectives. For this the CNO may connect through person-to-person visits and calls to the leaders of these navies to earn a better understanding of how other international naval forces operate and contribute to regional security.”

Please Stop Making Sailor-Soldiers” by Lieutenant Zachary George, USN

“It is time again to get the reserves back to sea. The CNO must direct the Chief of the Navy Reserve and the Chief of Naval Personnel to quickly make both the Reserve Surface Force and the greater global force management process a system that mobilizes Sailors into Sailors, and not Sailors into soldiers.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org

Featured Image: NORFOLK (Aug. 27, 2019) Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Mike Gilday visits with Sailors aboard USS Kearsarge (LHD-3). (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Nick Brown)