Human Factors Week

By Ryan C. Walker

On June 14, 1952, President Harry S. Truman visited the small town of Groton, CT, to commission the USS Nautilus (SSN-571), the first nuclear submarine. Truman, noting the pride present in the community gathered before him, began his speech with a joking comparison to his hometown of Independence, Missouri:

“I am very glad to be here today in Groton, Connecticut. You see, I got the right town this time. Somebody told me last week that this ceremony was going to be held in New London, over on the other side of the river. I referred to it in the speech I made Saturday out in Missouri. Very shortly thereafter I was set right in no uncertain terms. I am glad to see the people of Groton are proud of their hometown. I know how they feel. I sometimes get pretty tired of Kansas City taking all the credit for things that happen in Independence, Missouri. I can understand why the people of Groton should be proud of what is happening here today.”¹

The residents of Groton were proud not just from the Nautilus, but for supporting both the Naval Submarine Base New London (SUBASE NLON) and General Dynamics Electric Boat Shipyard (EB). The people living within and commuting to Groton were responsible for building and maintaining a sizeable portion of the American submarine fleet, both past and present. Groton evolved from a sleepy community of 5,600 persons with few businesses, a defunct naval base, and underutilized shipbuilding infrastructure at the beginning of the twentieth century into the self-proclaimed “Submarine Capital of the World.”² In 2020, at least 64.8 percent of the total workforce is directly associated with the submarine community, 10,350 persons worked at SUBASE NLON, and 8,092 work at GDEB, lending credence to this continued claim.³ Groton is, as described by local historians, “first and foremost, a maritime community.”⁴

Despite these impressive numbers, significant maritime workforce challenges have emerged. EB President Kevin Graney has embarked upon an aggressive hiring campaign both to fight attrition and support the boom in submarine construction, including by planning on hiring 3,000 more workers after already hiring 2,500 in 2021.⁵ Why so many? The issues stem primarily from a slowdown in naval activity in the region from 1989-2017 as submarines were decommissioned or moved away from the East Coast and submarine construction slowed. While 8,092 workers seem an impressive figure, 15,000 were employed previously at the EB shipyard in Groton in 1990.⁶ It is unlikely those local or stationed in the area saw EB or SUBASE NLON’s future as promising in the near or distant future. EB retained the workforce it had, while many of the younger, more junior employees were laid off or sought greener pastures.

There are two sets of issues, short-term and long-term, that EB and many other shipyards ramping up production face. The long-term issues are evolutionary in nature since it takes generations of investment and multiple avenues of funding to develop naval capital towns (NCTs) from scratch. These NCTs provide a critical foundation for naval industry to grow and flourish, making their development a naval priority. An upcoming edited chapter by the author describes this process and offers insights into developing NCTs, which can ensure the United States retains the naval industrial base it currently has and effectively support these communities.⁷ Groton’s development deserves closer consideration and sets the stage for two potential issues and recommendations for improving NCTs: finding recently separated or retired veterans by revamping rating-to job-conversions and changing perceptions of shipyard work environments and labor forces.

Groton from 1868-1940

The foundations of Groton becoming an NCT lay in EB and SUBASE NLON’s concurrent development through 1868-1940. While SUBASE NLON finds its origins in the predecessor Thames Naval Yard, alternatively known at the New London Navy Yard, it remained stagnant and underutilized throughout much of its life. Questions of purpose and cost would define the New London Navy Yard’s existence, and reasonably so. It was not being used for its incipient recommended purposes— the construction of naval vessels.⁸ Some ships were put “in ordinary,” but few active ships were in the region.⁹ One proposition for greater use came from a committee in 1883, who suggested the site was only suitable for building a “naval asylum.” This was met with immediate resistance, with the local newspaper The Day proclaiming in a front-page headline, “Thames Yard Must Go!”¹⁰ As can be seen in these early interactions, the federal government was only one interested party among many in the nineteenth century, and was often overridden by state and local interests.¹¹

The Naval Yard was employed for two purposes in the first decade of the twentieth century – as a coal facility in 1900 and Marine Corps officer training station in 1907.¹² The Marine Corps school moved to League Island in 1910 and the coaling station appeared to be underutilized, leaving an almost completely abandoned naval base.¹³ This did not change until EB determined that the current construction facilities in Quincy were insufficient in 1910. The company sent engineer Frank Cable to scout new locations to produce diesel engines. Upon his recommendation, the company selected Groton as the site for future expansion of the New London Ship and Engine Company (NELSECO), purchasing (initially leasing) the abandoned infrastructure from the Electric Shipbuilding Company. His rationale seems to be primarily business driven, since much of the initial infrastructure was already there, waiting for purpose.¹⁴ Furthermore, Groton was a shipbuilding town lacking a major employer, the harbor was dredged, the state paid for much of the new roads, railways accessing major cities such as New York and Boston were available, water and transportation costs were low, and it was likely cheaper than using developed facilities in New Jersey or New York.¹⁵ 

The forgotten Thames Naval Yard was likely not a consideration initially, but a promising 1915 visit by President Wilson’s Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, signaled the beginning of change. Daniels’ administration found an issue with how the U.S. Navy had managed its submarines and submarine sailors at the beginning of his tenure and his vision transformed the Thames Navy Yard into the naval base that it is known as today. At the time Sailors were housed in motherships that were manning intensive and expensive, so land bases were explored. Proximity to NELSECO and Lake Torpedo Boat were cited as reasons for the expansion, as both would create a feedback loop of feeding off the other’s success.¹⁶ The 1920s were a difficult decade for private yards. But by 1930, critical practices and interconnections had become firmly embedded between government and the local community, which typically characterizes stable defense industry sectors.¹⁷ Groton became a NCT in this period, one of the few that has been preserved relatively intact.

Naval Labor Transitions to Maritime Shipyard Labor

The bonds between the two major employers have become a major part of the identity of Groton as evidenced by the Submarine Force Library and Museum (which also houses the permanently moored USS Nautilus), SUBVETS WWII National Memorial East, and numerous streets and neighborhoods named after submarines. For many submariners, Groton became a home at some point of their careers, and many continue to offer their service in employment developing technology, building submarines or working on base, often drawing from competencies developed from submarine service. This community is the product of a century of commitment and cultivation, developing naval infrastructure, and promoting cross-state migration drawn by the allure of well-paying jobs in the region. Eastern Connecticut has proven uniquely suited to submarine construction because of the long-term investment in the region by all layers of private, public, labor, and military interests and its connection to other NCTs.

Efforts to attract sailors who are recently separated or retired, particularly from the submarine community, should be actively pursued and redoubled. The major hurdles are convincing sailors to not return to their hometown or state and rating-to-job skill training. The former issue is a difficult sell, there are many who are dead set on leaving Connecticut. Yet a qualified enlisted submariner who has completed more than five years of experience is an incredibly versatile person worth pursuing. Their daily duties included not only their rate, but also armed security watchstanding, quality assurance, damage control, supervisory roles, voluntary positions, and more. The skillsets are extensive. These individuals are among the most precious resource to maritime workforces in Groton, yet many leave the areas they served in for a variety of reasons. Finding a place for them, ideally that utilizes their acumen, is key to unlocking the full potential of the bonds between the shipyard, the naval base, and the local community. A submariner has learned quite a bit in their time, learning a trade in the right environment is not out of the question.

Issues with Perception: Who wants to work in a yard?

Part of the reason junior sailors are so important is the relatively insular nature of maritime industry. It is a relatively unknown niche industry that only directly or indirectly employs 393,390 people in the United States, of which 83.1 percent of the directly employed are concentrated in ten states.¹⁸ Of these ten states, the highest per capita of ship construction and repair workers belongs to Maine, at only 1.6 percent of the total employment, with Connecticut at 1.2 percent, meaning even in these states there is a high likelihood some may have never considered employment in shipyards.¹⁹ Further complicating this are some stigmas associated with shipyard work and workers, the so-called “shipyard bubbas.”

Part of these negative perceptions stems from some societal attitudes that do not effectively value “blue-collar” work or more accurately, “skilled tradesworkers.”²⁰ Dispelling the negative perception of the bubba is necessary moving forward to attract labor. Asking why this perception problem exists, and identifying the root cause, will be paramount to resolving this issue. The answer may come down to management and administration practices. Are leaders willing to adapt and rebrand to attract a younger workforce?

Conclusion

The process to build an NCT is incredibly difficult and requires decades of patience. The main issue for Groton has been funding. The end of the Cold War made a downturn in defense spending inevitable, with significant impacts on the submarine shipbuilding industry and the communities that support the industry. Reversing declining trends in labor over the past three decades will be an uphill battle for naval capital towns like Groton. Rebuilding the feedback loop of success between the EB and SUBASE NLON is necessary to translate retiring naval labor into local maritime labor, all while fighting negative perceptions associated with shipyard work. Expanding work outside of current NCTs may not be feasible in the short term and may be difficult to maintain in the long term. It is much better to focus on the established NCTs, rebuild connections between industry and the Navy, and improve labor management and administration practices.

Ryan C. Walker served in the USN from 2014-2019, as an enlisted Fire Control Technician aboard the USS Springfield(SSN-761). Honorably discharged in December of 2019; he graduated Summa Cum Laude from Southern New Hampshire University with a BA in History. He is currently a MA Candidate at the University of Portsmouth, where he studies Naval History and hopes to pursue further studies after graduation. His current research focus is on early submarine culture (1900-1940), Naval-Capital Towns in the U.S., and British private men-of-war in the North Atlantic. The research for this article came from his upcoming chapter in Seapower By Other Means, (ed. J. Overton), where he explores the process of building Groton CT as a Naval Capital town from 1868-1940. He currently resides in lovely Groton, CT.

Endnotes

1. Harry S. Truman, Address in Groton, Conn., at the Keel Laying of the first Atomic Energy Submarine. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/230973

2. Mary E. Denison. “Historic Heights, or the Borough of Groton.” In Historic Groton: Comprising Historic and Descriptive Sketches Pertaining to Groton Heights, Center Groton, Poquonnoc Bridge, Noank, Mystic and Old Mystic, Connecticut, ed. Charles Burgess. (Moosup, CT: Charles F. Burgess), 1909. 18; State of Connecticut. “Population of Connecticut Towns 1900-1960.” Accessed December 27, 2021. https://portal.ct.gov/SOTS/Register-Manual/Section-VII/Population-1900-1960

3. Town of Groton Finance Department. Comprehensive Annual Financial Report of the Town of Groton: Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2020. (Town of Groton: Finance Department, 2020). 140. This is a minimum and does not include other significant defense employers in the Groton and the surrounding areas such as Progeny, SEACORP LLC, and Sonalysts to name a few.

4. Carol W. Kimball, James L. Streeter, & Marilyn J. Comrie, Images of America: Groton Revisited, (Portsmouth: Arcadia, 2007). 7

5. Brian Hallenbeck, “Electric Boat president can’t stress it enough: ‘We’re hiring!’” The Day,  

6. Robert Weisman, “Layoffs at EB Were Expected, but Still Painful,” Hartford Courant, April 14, 1992, Hartford, CT, https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-xpm-1992-04-14-0000203265-story.html

7. Ryan C. Walker, “The Development of Groton as a Naval Capital Town: 1868-1940,” in Seapower by Other Means: Naval Contributions to National Objectives Beyond Sea Control and Power Projection, ed. J Overton, ISPK Seapower Series: Kiel, 2023). Upcoming publication.

8. New London Navy Yard Committee. Review of the Minority Report on the Navy Yard Question. (New London: Starr and Farnham Printers, 1864). 35-36

9. Brian Hallenbeck, “Electric Boat president can’t stress it enough: ‘We’re hiring!’” The Day, January 20, 2022, accessed October 3, 2022, https://www.theday.com/local-news/20220121/electric-boat-president-cant-stress-it-enough-were-hiring/.

10. “Thames Yard Must Go!” The Day, No. 772, New London, CT, December 31, 1883. In Google News Archive: The Day, Alphabet Inc. Accessed January 1, 2022. https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=SrsqWtBqNIQC

11. Often forgotten was how weak Federal power was until the Great Depression, while the State preoccupied itself creating a welcoming environment for business. Local political power played a major role, alongside private and business interests in much of the United States.

12. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives: On Estimates Submitted by the Secretary of the Navy 1906-1907. (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 1907). 215

13. David J. Bishop Images of America: Naval Submarine Base New London. (Portsmouth: Arcadia, 2006), 5-18. Bishop has picture of ships at the pier but gives the decline of coal as a maritime fuel as the reason. Coal was still a major part of the USN, so this reason does not capture the full scope of possibilities.

14. Frank Cable. “The Story of Our Plant,” 3-4 The Association Mirror, (May 1935). Submarine Archives, Electric Boat Collection, Submarine Force Library and Museum, Groton, CT. 2-3

15. Benjamin Tinkham Marshall, ed. A Modern History of New London County, Connecticut: Vol. 1, (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1922), 227, 237.

16. Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations United States Senate, HR 5949, day two, Sixty-Fifth Congress, 1^sr sess, September 20, 1917. 88

17. Gary E. Weir, Forged in War: The Naval- Industrial Complex and American Submarine Construction, (Washington D.C.: Naval Historical Center Department of the Navy, 1993).

18. Maritime Administration (MARAD), The Economic Importance of the U.S. Private Shipbuilding and Repairing Industry, Report, March 30, 2021. https://www.maritime.dot.gov/sites/marad.dot.gov/files/2021-06/Economic%20Contributions%20of%20U.S.%20Shipbuilding%20and%20Repairing%20Industry.pdf 1, 8

19. MARAD, U.S. Private Shipbuilding and Repairing Industry, 20

20. Dana Wilkie, “The Blue-Collar Drought: Why jobs that were once the backbone of the U.S. economy have grown increasingly hard to fill.” SHRM, February 2, 2019, https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/all-things-work/pages/the-blue-collar-drought.aspx

Featured Image: Snow covers the hull of the fast attack submarine USS Virginia (SSN 774) as it sits moored to the pier at Naval Submarine Base New London in Groton, Conn., on Feb. 2, 2007. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Human Factors Week

By Captain John Cordle, (ret.), and LCDR Reuben Keith Green, (ret.)

Human Capital; Humane Capitulation

“Most Americans associate the strength of the Navy with grey-hulled ships at sea, but the true sources of our naval power are the people and the loved ones who support them.” These are the words of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Gilday, speaking to lawmakers on Capitol Hill at his nomination hearing. As today’s military looks toward possible future conflicts with peer competitors, one thing we will need more than anything else is the best people. With recruiting challenges driving unprecedented measures such as significant signing bonuses, the Department of Defense needs to look to existing policies and practices that act as barriers to recruiting and retaining the right mix of servicemembers – irrespective of race or gender.

There is a major battle underway between those who support Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives and those who see them as divisive. The irony is that true DEI does not mean “more minorities,” but a diverse force that creates a culture where everyone has an equal chance of success. It is a fantasy to believe that a meritocracy is purely objective and devoid of bias, both explicit and subconscious. After attending a series of DEI symposia over the past year, we have built a series of recommendations, some of which would cost little to nothing, but each of which would very likely attract and keep more of the critical human capital needed to keep our nation safe.

People Issues, Policy Issues

Following the shocking murder of George Floyd and the lynching of Ahmaud Arbery, there were world-wide condemnations, soul-searching, introspection, and acknowledgement of shortcomings, as well as commitments to change. Those reactions occurred within the Department of Defense as well. Military personnel shared their experiences with discrimination and racism, including the current Chief of Staff of the Air Force, a retired four-star Navy admiral, and numerous mid-level active duty and retired officers from multiple services. Military personnel involved in focus group discussions yelled at each other from different sides of the racial divides, and the Air Force received 27,000 single-spaced pages of data after requesting stories of discrimination from their members. Symposiums were held, reports were commissioned and completed, programs were put in place, and accountability was fixed for progress.

But as with each period of progress toward true equity and inclusion, there was resistance, denial, and indecision as to how far to go. For the average servicemember, the most visible change was the banishment of offensive symbology from military bases, and name changes for nine Army bases named for Confederate figures (but oddly, no similar changes for two ships – more on this later). These changes were not without pushback and resistance, including from the then-Commander-in-Chief, but they are happening now. While the demise of Camp Nathan Bedford Forrest and USS Josephus Daniels occurred organically, the other more recent changes did not. Forrest fought for the Confederacy and was a feared slave trader and breaker, and is credited with founding the Ku Klux Klan, a terrorist group. Daniels was a newspaperman who masterminded the infamous 1898 Wilmington North Carolina Insurrection, and also served as Secretary of the Navy 20 years later.

These entities are long gone, passed to history, but other problematic names adorn two aircraft carriers – the USS John S. Stennis, a segregationist (read: racist) who led the Southern “Dixiecrats” as a Mississippi senator, and who called his senate office conference table “The Flagship of the Confederacy.” The USS Carl Vinson is named after another representative cut from a similar cloth. While many have forgotten the behavior and policies that made these men soldiers of segregation, the minority Sailors serving on these ships must feel a bit uneasy as they walk across the quarterdeck, if they know the history. Those individuals may have been helpful to the Navy in certain respects, but they are relics of a past that we can address, not erase – and send a clear and powerful message of inclusion.

Two years hence, it is time to look at what low-hanging fruit remains, based upon the reported experiences of servicemembers currently serving our nation. According to a DOD survey, fully one third of our minority servicemembers have reported racist, extremist, and harassing behavior having been directed at them, and no specific new guidance has been provided to them or increase in accountability for the offenders announced or codified. Numerous reports have been published about the ongoing issues of racism and discrimination in the military, as reported in stories by the Associated Press, Reuters, and other organizations. Congressional studies and research from the Center for Naval Analyses have shown increases in violent extremism, even while some call for the DOD to cease talking about it. Those reports have largely gone unanswered by cognizant authorities. Conversely, the Department of Defense removed the statistics regarding formal discrimination complaints from the historical Annual Defense Reports, and that data is now difficult to obtain and assess. Despite having been outlawed in 1948 by executive order, racist actions and behavior do not have a separate offense category under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, resulting in (according to a 2021 Center for Naval Analyses study on the topic), a quandary in that “the data quality is too poor to make a true assessment.” But that does not mean there is nothing to assess.

Some discriminatory polices remain, if nuanced and unintended. Male servicemembers suffering from Pseudofolliculitis Barbae (PFB) in all branches of the service have repeatedly faced harassment, disrespect, delayed promotions, and other adverse impact because of a permanent, genetic condition beyond their control. PFB is a skin condition that results in inflammation caused by ingrown hairs, typically around the face and beard areas, making it challenging and painful for individuals with PFB to consistently maintain a close shave. It afflicts 50 to 75 percent of blacks and 3 to 5 percent of whites who shave. Studies have shown individuals with PFB suffer a negative impact on promotion and advancement opportunities that negatively impact their careers, not to mention the psychological impact on individuals being singled out and disrespected on account of an approved treatment for a medical condition which can easily be rectified by growing a short beard, something that has occurred in the Navy and in the Army in the past.

Other than “tradition,” there is little justifiable reason to allow this situation and its discriminatory impact on a significant portion of the military to continue. The recruiting woes facing all the services can be addressed in a positive manner by making it less painful and difficult to serve. Would the policy change if a majority of white men were affected by this painful condition?

A recurring complaint expressed by many servicemembers is the lack of respect shown them in their daily lives while serving in uniform. A recent Joint Women’s Leadership Symposium featured discussions of sexual harassment; a female servicemember has a one in three change of being sexually harassed within the next year, and an 85 percent chance in her career. Sexual assaults at the service academies are up again for the past year.

Many of the problems mentioned here are reflections of a society that still struggles with concepts like racism, sexism, prejudice, or their opposites. To many, the implication of institutional bias, even when supported by data and facts, is seen as a personal affront. The institution is a reflection of its members – unlike larger society, which is stuck with some portion of biased or criminal members, the military can impact its own composition by seeking out and separating them. We cannot easily change minds – but we can change behavior. A good parallel can be drawn between the culture change that has resulted in better definition and understanding of the spectrum of harm associated with sexual harassment to sexual assault, and that of racism or discrimination to violent extremism. The former has outpaced the latter, but also laid a solid foundation upon which to build.

Recommendations 

What specific actions do we recommend? Stop addressing the issues one service at a time and create a coherent DOD strategy to include multiple steps that address challenges in a multi-faceted way.

1. The department should review and synthesize the plethora of past studies and reports and assess what has changed and what has not. The USFF Comprehensive Review of Surface Collisions provided an excellent template for this process, looking back over two decades of reports and studies as part of its assessment.

2. Reinstate the requirement to report and release the formal military discrimination complaint statistics on an annual basis and provide the historical reports that have been hidden thus far from public view. Include the number of reports, and how many were found to be substantiated and unsubstantiated, to facilitate trend analysis and eliminate poor data quality which has existed for decades.

3. Publish diversity studies and research in a readable, data-based format for public and servicemember understanding, rather than bury studies in a limited academic forum or format with no context.

4. Continue to provide education and review policies that present barriers to reporting sexual and racial discrimination, such as SECNAV’s recent policy to not prosecute minor infractions (such as underage drinking or UA) on the part of victims that report an assault, and assigning investigators outside the chain of command. Make these DOD policy.

5. Add “Respect” to the core values of each service, and to the Department of Defense. Accompany this with education on what it means to respect your peers, subordinates, and your service with concrete behavior. Start the conversation, spread best practices, and send a signal.

6. Rename the USS John C. Stennis and USS Carl Vinson, so that not one more generation of Black sailors has to face the prospect of serving on a ship named for individuals who focused on ensuring they were held to second class status as citizens and servicemembers. There are plenty of deserving heroes of all races that could serve as more fitting names for the U.S. Navy’s warships.

7. Revise the policies regarding facial hair to reflect a more equitable treatment of servicemembers afflicted with PFB. Allow short, well-trimmed beards for all servicemembers.

8. Create a DOD Women’s Policy Board, comprised of officer, enlisted, and civilian members, to provide DOD leadership with recommendations regarding issues relating to females serving within the department, and as a clearing house for problems to be addressed once identified.

9. Add a Uniform Code of Military Justice offense of “racist actions and behavior” so that each individual understands that they can be held accountable for such behavior. A database can be developed on recorded offenses and inform desired change. Publish the results to show accountability at work.

10. Establish a permanent DOD and GAO review process similar to Task Force One Navy, not as a one-time reaction with a singular focus, but as an enduring process that provides an annual report on diversity, equity, and inclusion policies and action items. It should note progress, or lack thereof.

Conclusion

The most frequent DOD response to most of these items in the past has been “no comment.” This must change. These 10 actions would require education, learning, and – most importantly – empathy, on the part of both junior and senior leaders. But they can all be completed in short order, with little relative cost, and will pay huge dividends. If taken, each of them will improve not just diversity, equity, and inclusion, but will have a lasting impact on retention, morale, unit cohesion, and advancement of all servicemembers. Just as importantly, by investing in our human capital – our people – the long term impacts will be seen where it really counts – a tangible boost in operational readiness and national security.

Captain John Cordle retired from the Navy in 2013 after 30 years of service. He commanded the USS Oscar Austin (DDG-79) and USS San Jacinto (CG-56), retiring as Chief of Staff for Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic. He received the U.S. Navy League’s Captain John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership in 2010, the Surface Navy Literary Award, and Naval Institute Proceedings Author of the Year Award in 2019. Recently, he has teamed with his co-author, LCDR Green, in an effort to promote diversity and inclusion in the military, authoring several articles and featured as speakers on the topic at various Navy and affinity group DEI symposia over the past two years. 

Lieutenant Commander Keith Green retired in 1997  after serving 22 years in the Navy. He served four department head tours, including as Executive Officer in USS Gemini (PHM-6). He is a former Legal Yeoman, Equal Opportunity Program Specialist, and leadership Instructor, and was commissioned in 1984 via Officer Candidate School. He has an MS degree in Human Resources Development. His memoir Black Officer,White Navy was acquired by a University Press and a revised edition will be republished in 2023.

Featured Image: Rear Adm. Alvin Holsey (left) speaks with Ensign Dimitri Foster in the pilothouse aboard guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Champlain in 2018. (Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Craig Rodarte/U.S. Navy)

By Nicholas Romanow

Cyber. Missiles. Satellites. Drones. Most of the trending topics in current military affairs fixate on technology and material factors of warfare. These topics are certainly pivotal parts of the security landscape, but they are far from the full story. Even the most advanced autonomous systems are designed for the purpose of providing the human warfighter with a capability they would not otherwise have. The study of military affairs is incomplete without a thorough examination of how military personnel are recruited, trained, and retained.

While militaries often boast of their technical prowess, they are fundamentally human organizations. Wars are fought by and for people. Military technology will only ever be a tool used to advance the objectives and missions executed by the people who compromise militaries. We need look no further than recent events in Ukraine to see how a much larger and supposedly more capable Russian military was rendered subpar by deteriorating morale, manning shortfalls and gimmicks, and is now forced to conscript citizens of questionable military suitability to sustain its war of aggression. The human factor is difficult to quantify and measure, but this does not obscure its centrality to military and maritime operations. The human element of war is ignored at great peril.

“Taking care of our people” is more than just a slogan. It is a core mission. How well leaders cultivate the talents of their people is a direct reflection of their competence as a leader. Many officers seek their commission out of a desire to lead and serve, but junior officers must first be led and served by their seniors who can set the right example and show them the way. Discussing best practices in core leadership functions is vital not only for the workforce writ large, but for empowering emerging leaders with the knowledge and skills to lead others into an uncertain era of strategic competition.

This week, CIMSEC will publish a series of articles on this subject. As this challenge is relevant to members of all services at every career stage, we are fortunate to publish a wide range of perspectives. Below are the articles and authors being featured in this series, which may be updated with further submissions as Human Factors Week unfolds.

“The Defense Department’s Unfinished DEI Business: A 10-Point Plan,”  by Captain John Cordle, (ret.), and LCDR Reuben Keith Green, (ret.)
“Groton as a Case Study for Building Naval Capital Towns,” by Ryan C. Walker
“Shifting the Role of Leader and Led: Using Year Group Cohorts to Accelerate Marine Corps Force Design,” by Travis Reese
“Weaponize PME to Improve the Force,” by Bobby Holmes
“Educating Maritime Geostrategists for the Naval Services,” by Drake Long

Ensign Nicholas Romanow, U.S. Navy, is a graduate of the University of Texas at Austin. He is currently assigned to Fort Meade, Maryland, and working toward his qualification as a cryptologic warfare officer. He was previously an undergraduate fellow at the Clements Center for National Security. He is CIMSEC’s Social Media Coordinator.

The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, or any other military or government agency.

Featured Image: EAST CHINA SEA (Aug. 24, 2022) Sailors in the pilot house of the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) conduct force protection training in the East China Sea, Aug. 24, 2022. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Justin Stack)