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Norway Faces a New Era of Russian Realpolitik in the Arctic

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By Daniel Thomassen

Germany’s assault on neutral Norway in April 1940 was swift and surprising. A great power was contemplating a smaller state with strategic importance, but without any significant defense capability and no credible allies. Fortress Norway ensured all-year access to the Atlantic for the Kriegsmarine, as well as iron ore transport for the German war industry. Extending the frontline to a secondary northern front put pressure on the crumbling British and French resistance on the European continent. The invasion of Norway was an act of brutal realism, where the comparative power of states and alliances within an anarchic international system is decisive for strategic decision making.

This writing discusses the deteriorating strategic environment that will challenge Norwegian security again in the coming decades, and the necessary responses to them. The Norwegian National Security Strategy must address these challenges by refocusing NATO, enhancing bilateral partnerships, and strengthening the Norwegian Armed Forces.

A New Dawn on the Arctic

Four reverberant strategic trends are converging to increase pressure on Russian neighbor Norway and NATO’s Arctic flank. First, climate change will gradually melt Arctic ice, opening a new ocean for shipping and competition for natural resources. Secondly, Russia will continue its confrontational line with the West, while strengthening its global power status through commercial and military activities in the High North and strategic cooperation with new Asian partners. The Russian loss of confidence in diplomacy and international law is a dangerous trajectory converging with increased Arctic competition. Third, the balancing power of the U.S. is gradually shifting its effort to the Asia-Pacific, while fiscal challenges necessitate a reduced footprint elsewhere. Finally, NATO is becoming relatively weaker because of decreasing European defense spending, American reluctance to cover the expenses, as well as divergent national interests and conflicting views on Article 5 collective response scenarios.

The world’s attention is now increasingly on the Arctic, where melting polar ice ensures access to new areas faster than previously expected. Global commercial shipping will gradually utilize new shipping lanes in the Arctic, which also holds an abundance of petroleum, gas, minerals, and important fish stocks. The leading nations of the world will increase their presence in the region and emphasize its access and security as a global maritime commons. The Northern Sea Route on the Russian coast is already open through July to December and normally ice-free in September and October. 71 vessels from 11 different nations used the passage in 2013. The travel between Western Europe and East-Asia can be reduced by two weeks when choosing this route. The Northwest-passage as well as the transpolar route will also become seasonally accessible in the 2020-2030 period.[2]

northernsearoute
The Northern Sea Route, shown above, is increasingly accessible thanks to receding sea ice. (Institute of the North)

Studies suggest that a third of the world’s undiscovered natural gas is in the Arctic – mostly in the Russian sector.[3] Then, there are vast amounts of oil and minerals[4] with an estimated 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil resources and $2 trillion worth of important minerals like iron ore, zinc, nickel, gold, and uranium in the Russian sector. Even if the accessibility and technology have been unavailable to extract these resources safely and economically, such constraints are gradually overcome. Russia started oil production from the first Arctic field of Prirazlomnaya in December 2013[5] and recently increased its output. Exxon and Russian state-owned oil-company Rosneft only saw their cooperative effort to start production in the Kara-Sea interrupted because of sanctions on the Russian energy industry.

The Arctic nations are now racing for ownership of the valuable Arctic seabed. Russia and Denmark have already submitted overlapping claims to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and Canada is preparing to do the same. However, the Commission does not hold authority to decide ownership. Its statements will be the basis of bilateral negotiations, like the 2010 Barents Sea Treaty, which settled the delimitation between Russia and Norway. Significant Asian nations are also focusing their attention to the polar region. China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore were all accepted as observer-nations in the Arctic Council in 2013. China is actively negotiating extensive commercial relations with the Arctic nations – with favorable export deals in return for Chinese investment and technology.

The interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty from 1920 and international law in adjacent maritime zones will become increasingly disputed as multinational activity in the Arctic increases. The most pressing concern will be threefold: whether Norway enjoys sovereign rights to resources buried in the continental shelf, whether it can claim taxes from other nations’ commercial activity, and finally whether the signatories have equal rights to extract these seabed resources.[6] Furthermore, Norwegian regulation on fishing as well as restrictions on drilling, extraction, and shipping for environmental protection will be challenged. Even if the other Arctic nations and the EU share Norway’s concern for responsible and sustainable activity, they will each weigh conflicting commercial and environmental interests separately.

Russia’s Rise and Requital

According to its strategies and doctrines, Russia is a major global power that must regain its temporarily lost historic and natural place as a counterbalance to the U.S. and the West in the international system. The Russian Federation regards the unipolar system with the U.S. solitary superpower as a serious threat to itself and other states with divergent forms of government and values. Russia has lost confidence in international law and cooperation in the international environment because of what they conceive as independent actions of U.S.-led coalitions without United Nations assent. So even if Russia presumably prefers agreements based on common interests with its competitors and claims to adhere to treaties and international bodies[8] – the official documents clearly express that they do not believe that western countries will respect these standards and make fair concessions.

The Russians have experienced that realism is the decisive international model over the last 30 years, where the relative power of the states is what matters. They believe weak states run the risk of forced regime change if they stand up to American pressure. Russian strategic documents state that Western subversion has corrupted the former Soviet republics during Russia’s period of weakness after the Cold War. Some of these have been adopted into NATO and the EU, while the Russian demand for friendly buffer states has been disregarded. Thus, Russian leadership believes it is under attack by the West and wants to look strong to its domestic audience. Their biggest fear is western influence on the younger Russian population, which could potentially spark opposition to the central government. This results in the portrayal of NATO – with its eastwards expansion and global mission sets – as the main threat to Russia and its regional allies. Russia must consequently reestablish a position of strength in order to uphold stability in its proclaimed sphere of exclusive interest.

Recent updates to Russian military and maritime doctrine were published in December 2014 and July 2015. They describe how the use of force in conflicts and international competition is intensified, while international relations are becoming more complicated and unfair.[10] Russia makes it clear that they will protect their vital national interests with all means necessary. The new doctrines reflect the growing global ambition of Russia and particularly in the Arctic – which is its most important region for military purposes and for strengthening its long term economy by exploiting natural resources. The strategic priorities towards 2020 are transforming Russia to a world power, raising the living standards of its people, ensuring economic growth, achieving a balanced multipolar international system through strategic partnerships, and retaining  strategic deterrence by modernizing its armed forces.[11]

Russian national identity is complex, but remains more of a European than an Asian one. Ties to Europe have been bolstered by growing economic interdependence in energy trade. Russia made recent investments in renewed and diversified infrastructure to continue exporting energy to the EU into the future. However, conflicts with the West over Syria, Kosovo, NATO-expansion, Ukraine, and the dismissal of former president Medvedev’s proposal to replace NATO with Russian-European security cooperation[12] have led the Russians to look towards other partnerships. The worsening relationship between Russia and western countries coincides with a shifting of the world’s economic center of gravity and future vital markets to Asia. Therefore, Russia is presently engaged in forming strategic partnerships with China, India, and Iran where their shared interests are the suspicion of the West. Such interests include energy supply, mutual understanding of security challenges, and diminishing the role of the U.S. in global order.

The Union State with Belarus is Russia’s most formal alliance. This country is strategically located as a buffer zone to NATO and only 150 miles from the encircled province of Kaliningrad. Then, there is the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which was formed in 1992 in response to NATO. The members are Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while Afghanistan and Serbia are observers and Iran is touted as a possible candidate. But the most important in the future, is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This political, economic and military cooperation was formed in 1996 and has seen substantial developments since then. Russia and China have been the most important members since the beginning, with India and Pakistan included in July 2015. Increasing military cooperation on exercises, arms trade, and intelligence has developed over the last years as well as continuing negotiations of a free-trade agreement within the SCO and the Eurasian Economic Union.[14]   

The Russian economy is struggling and has been in decline since 2013. Governmental spending was recently slashed by 10% and most sectors had to be reduced, except the defense budget. Reports are suggesting that 60 out of Russia’s 83 different regions are in a state of crisis. The lingering effects of the 2008-09 financial crisis, plummeting oil prices and Western sanctions have been devastating. As a result, the reinstating of the superpower has slowed down and internal unrest is increasing. This is a worrisome development which causes Russia to become less predictable and more aggressive in its foreign relations, especially with its neighbors. Still, Putin’s popularity is at record levels,[16] nationalism is growing stronger, and the people accept the narrative that Russia is the victim of a Western conspiracy. Eventually though, the Russian economy needs to be adequately healthy in order to uphold this loyalty.

Russian energy company Gazprom has a lucrative thirty year contract with the PRC. (Sergey Porter / Vedomosti)
Russian energy company Gazprom has a lucrative thirty year contract with the PRC. (Sergey Porter / Vedomosti)

Russia and its allies are the world’s leading energy producers, exporting oil, natural gas and uranium on a grand scale. The EU estimates a 27% worldwide increase in energy consumption by 2030,[17] while the U.S. expects a 56% increase by 2040.[18] The export of oil and gas amounted to 70% of Russian foreign sales in 2012 and more than half of total state income.[19] The Russian economy is dependent on energy exports for the foreseeable future and the competition for ownership of natural resources is emphasized in its National Security Strategy. The Russian economy is bound to profit from increasing sales of energy to meet rising Asian need. Oil and gas exports from the Arctic region, Siberia, the Caspian Sea, and Eastern Russia are now targeting this new market. China is itself a world-class energy producer, but has seen substantially growing consumption due to demographics and industrialization. 2007 saw China become a net importer of natural gas and the demand is strong for gas to replace polluting coal power plants. The infrastructure for large gas imports from Russia is now under construction. Sizable gas deals between state owned companies Gazprom and CNBC were completed in November 2014 and May 2015 for at least 68 billion cubic meters per annum. These deals will make China the largest customer of Russian gas for a thirty-year period from 2018 and are valued at $900 billion.[21]

The importance of European trade will eventually become less significant to Russia – even if new infrastructure is still being built for Europe.[22] Eighty percent of Russian energy sales went to the EU as late as 2012, but the EU is diversifying its energy sources and no longer wishes to depend on Russia as the dominant provider.[23] The current dependency denies the EU any significant soft power leverage, and the economic sanctions towards Russia have been painful for the EU as well. The Russians have also shut down the gas flow for political purpose on several occasions.[24] Thus, the EU is looking for other partners to bolster their energy security and Russia responds by looking to alternatives and potentially larger rewards in emerging markets.

Russia will effectively remain the single great power in the Arctic for the near future. Until now, the Russians have been alone in considering the High North as vitally important, but there is growing interest and competitiveness from other major powers and the Arctic nations. Russia is leading the line in an inevitable militarization of the Arctic region while protesting military presence of any other nation in general, and NATO in particular. The establishment of the Russian Arctic Military Command and the Armed Forces modernization program[25] included renewing their strategic submarine fleet, strengthening homeland defense, and building military infrastructure in the Arctic. Their new doctrine emphasize the importance of both nuclear and conventional deterrence, as well as an increased presence of the Northern Fleet in the Arctic and the Atlantic Ocean. An expert group, advising the Norwegian Secretary of Defense, recently published a report describing how these measures are providing better protection for nuclear-armed submarines, as well as the ability to conduct sea-denial and sea-control operations off the coast of Norway.[26]

The Russians would like to retain the upper hand in the High North to avoid interference with their vital military and commercial activity, and to solidify their claims in potential negotiations over international or disputed areas. Also, Russia wants to be in a predisposed position, aimed at calling out a provocative act for an increased Western military presence. Neighboring Norway will remain a representative of the collective western protagonist and will be challenged by Russian activity and its competitive approach in the Arctic region. The geopolitical focus will take priority over regional bilateral relations and cooperation in the Arctic Council.

Norway and the Western Allies

The Norwegian Security Strategy is founded upon the NATO collective defense concept and the national ambition of protecting sovereign rights, dealing with incidents and crises, as well as enabling allied military action on national territory.[27] The absence of any serious threats since the Cold War, combined with the expectancy of proper warning time of an emerging conflict, along with the military supremacy of the NATO alliance, have reduced the national requirements for a significant war prevention capability. The requirements for higher readiness for counterterrorism and contributions to international operations have resulted in more professional forces with quicker reaction time. For this purpose and because of cuts in defense spending the Armed Forces have been transformed from a relatively large and robust mobilization force into a small, balanced and capable readiness force. However, the deteriorating strategic security environment recently led the Norwegian Chief of Defense to advise the Government to increase budgets by $5 billion for the next planning cycle running through 2020. There is a need to bolster territorial defense capability since there are no permanent allied forces stationed in Norway.[28] Failing to do so, he warns, would endanger the ability to sustain a first line of defense long enough to receive allied reinforcements. If Norway has already fallen, NATO would face a tougher task and decision to retake the territory instead of reinforcing it.

The problem, however, is that NATO is not the sustainable and unwavering organization it aims to be. It is becoming increasingly difficult to reach unanimous decisions among member states, which have substantially different security concerns. For example, there is speculation about whether allies are willing to risk a major conflict in the case of any Russian intrusion in the Baltics.[29] Even if Russia’s illegitimate actions in Ukraine sparked a renewed political commitment at the Wales summit to the unity, capability, and relevance of the alliance, the allied nations continue to be unwilling to fund the stated ambitions. The NATO nations committed to invest 2% of their GDP on defense in 2006, but the general will to actually respect the agreement is frail and the alliance is weakening as a consequence. Collective defense spending in NATO has dropped by $76 billion since 2013.[30] Only five out of the 28 nations are spending the required 2% or more in 2015: the U.S., Great Britain, Poland, Greece, and Estonia. Six nations are now shouldering 90% of NATO’s expenses. The American share has grown from about half during the Cold War to 75% currently.[31]

There is a growing frustration in the U.S. with the lack of European will to take responsibility for its own security.[32] The American defense budget is also in decline[33] and the U.S. considers Asia to be its most important future theater.[34] Repeatedly over the years, Washington warned that NATO must avoid becoming irrelevant if the U.S. is going to continue its commitment on the same level.[35] The high-end response capabilities of NATO were gradually reduced over the last 20 years, due to reduced budgets and transformation towards lighter, professional forces of smaller numbers. The military capabilities of the most significant European NATO powers (UK, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy) are now reduced to levels which provide inadequate means to address all the strategic concerns of the alliance.[36] The Norwegian northern flank is thus given a low priority, compared to the eastern and southern regions of NATO. And of course, Russia is more than happy to put pressure on the cohesion of NATO and test its willingness to stand its ground in the periphery towards the Russian borders. Frequent warnings are coming from the Kremlin for NATO to avoid “provocations” in the shape of exercises, shared Ballistic Missile Defense, and allied presence in Eastern-Europe and the Arctic. As a result, Norway must increasingly rely on its National Armed Forces to stand up to Russian aggression before the alliance can mobilize the political will and military strength to respond.

The new American maritime strategy gives guidance for its Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to increase their presence in the Asia-Pacific region to 60% of deployed ships within 2020, as well as strengthening their numbers in the Middle-East from 30 to 40 ships.[37] Consequently, other regions will be less prioritized even if this depends somewhat on the situation. The White House recently announced an increased budget for the European Reassurance Initiative in 2017,[38] but it is still not enough to reverse the long term trend of reduced U.S. commitment to Europe. The backbone of the maritime commitment to the European theater will be the four BMD-capable destroyers[39] operating from Rota in Spain, rotational deployments of the USMC ARG/MEU, and participation in NATO’s Standing Naval Forces. There is growing attention on the Arctic, but the U.S. is unable to commit necessary resources to increase its activity in the region and finds itself way behind Russia.[41] The American Arctic strategy is thus far reluctant and its presidency of the Arctic Council until 2017 is aimed at promoting peaceful cooperation in the High North. Simultaneously, the Russian military posture in the northern region is now being described as the second Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) challenge, next to the Chinese island disputes. But for the foreseeable future, the U.S. Navy’s activity in the Arctic will primarily revolve around occasional submarine patrols, Coast Guard cutters, and one to two ice-breaking vessels.[42]

Going Forward

Norway is a small state which must adapt to a changing global security environment. It will experience growing political and military pressure from a surge in international activity in the increasingly more important Arctic region. This new attention on the Arctic will result in competition and a more cynical relationship between states, partners, and alliances based on political realism. This changed behavior will challenge regional cooperation and commitment to demilitarization. Russia’s prioritization of the Arctic is currently unprecedented because of the importance of the region for an improved Russian economy and nuclear deterrence. The only superpower in the High North is Russia. The other Arctic NATO-nations are starting to contemplate the increased importance of this region. But there is little effort to converge security strategies apart from agreed adherence to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, cooperative environmental protection, and shared climate research.

European NATO nations must increase burden sharing with the U.S. or face diminishing relevance of the transatlantic alliance. Norway will be less reassured by its traditional alliances as the U.S. reduces it European footprint and European unity and prioritization on defense-spending spirals downwards. Even if Norway will always have an asymmetrical relationship to its Russian neighbor, its national defense must be bolstered to uphold a substantial war-preventing threshold and to enable allied reinforcement before it would be too late. Norway must also have a capable military in order to be conceived as a responsible strategic supplier of energy to Europe. The Norwegian Government is obliged to mitigate the weakening of the NATO northern flank by increasing its investment in defense to the agreed 2% level of the GDP. Since 1990, the defense budget dropped from 2.5% of GDP to its current 1.4%, and the armed forces were severely reduced in numbers.[43] The Army shrank from six operational brigades to one in this period, and the reserves were cut by 90%. The Air Force and Navy likewise took big cuts, and there is now debate on the number of new fighter jets, as well as whether to uphold aging capabilities such as maritime patrol aircraft and submarines. Defense experts have been warning about the defense structures balancing on the edge of “critical mass” for the last decade. If Norway remains unwilling to increase its effort to maintain a capable and balanced national defense, it should devote itself increasingly to shared Smart Defense initiatives in order to achieve value for money. This is, however, an increasingly risky strategy when considering the negative trends in the alliance.

Norwegian security policy remains committed to NATO, but contingencies must be developed. In order to uphold commitment from its allies and mitigate the waning focus on the Arctic within NATO, Norway must be a committed member of NATO itself and be seen as willing to take its share of responsibilities and investment. Hosting major NATO events, like the upcoming high visibility exercise in 2018, are wise initiatives that seek to draw attention and resources towards the High North. Further, strengthening bilateral and multilateral partnerships based on long-term shared interests and security concerns within the North Sea region, the European Union, and the United States is of great importance. The U.S. is Norway’s primary ally, and continuing the shared sponsorship of the U.S. Marine Corps Prepositioning Program in Norway is vital. Nordic Defense Cooperation[44] must be developed into full spectrum defense cooperation and Norway should continue to commit forces to the Nordic Battle Group, [45] which is a rotational EU readiness force element. Norway must continue the balanced policy – adopted since long ago – towards Russia. Firm sovereign authority and deterrence through active alliances go hand in hand with acting predictably and avoiding unnecessary provocations on the border. Dialogue and mutual understanding should be nurtured when possible by maintaining active diplomatic relations, seeking cooperation in shared regional interests, and respecting Russian rights to commercial and military activity. However, Russia has chosen to upset the balance by its aggressive behavior and military pressure. Unless Norway and its allies respond by increasing its deterrent capabilities and presence, they signal weakness which invites Russia to adopt an even more dominant posture in the High North.

Conclusion

The Russian-Norwegian relationship is affected by geopolitical developments and crises in other regions, where currently the conflict in Ukraine is reverberating into the Arctic. Norway must consequently respond in a predictable manner in order to regain its balanced approach towards Russia and avoid being a weak link in a strategically vital region. A proper response includes strengthening the Armed Forces, inviting more allied presence on Norwegian territory, and increasing Arctic presence and capabilities. Norway’s best contribution to NATO is to emphasize national defense over foreign deployments, and to raise awareness among its allies of the increasing challenges on the northern flank. Hesitant and overloaded allies and partners must see a committed national effort by Norway before they can be expected to contribute to an increased deterrent posture in Norway and the Arctic.

Commander Daniel Thomassen is a Surface Warfare Officer in the Royal Norwegian Navy.  He served as the Commanding Officer of a Fast Patrol Boat from 2005 to 2007. His last assignment was as the Executive Officer of HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen (FFGH) 2012-14. He participated in operations UNIFIL in 2006 and 2007 and RECSYR (Removal of Chemical Weapons from Syria) in 2014. He is currently an International Fellow at the United States Naval War College.

[1] “Northern Sea Route Information Office,” http://www.arctic-lio.com/nsr_ice.

[2] John Greenert, ”The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 to 2030,” Chief of Naval Operations, February 2014, 11.

[3] Donald L. Gautier, ”Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic,” Science Vol 324 (2009).

[4] Steve Hargreaves, ”Oil: Only part of the Arctic’s massive resources” , CNN, 19 July 2012.

[5] Martin Katusa, ”The Colder War,” Wiley & Casey Research (2015): 96.

[6] Sarah Wolf, “Svalbard’s Maritime Zones, their Status under International Law and Current and Future Disputes Scenarios, ”Working Paper FG 2, 2013/Nr. 02, January 2013, 37.

[7] See Vladimir Putin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” March 18, 2014,  http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. (NATO’s intervention in Kosovo 1999 and the second Iraq-war 2003 are considered illegitimate by the Russians and were used by Putin as examples of western double standards when annexing Crimea.)

[8] President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” December 2014.

[9] U.S. House Armed Services Committee: “Understanding and Deterring Russia: U.S. Policies and Strategies,” February 2016, https://youtu.be/Th9vNtNReMw.

[10] President of the Russian Federation, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” December 2014.

[11] President of the Russian Federation, ”National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020,” May 2009.

[12] Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, ”Russia Unveils Proposal For European Security Treaty,” November 2009.

[13] See “China hosts largest ever military drill with Russia, other SCO nations,” August 2014, https://www.rt.com/news/182400-sco-military-drills-china.

[14] Daria Chernyshova, “India must speed up talks on free trade zone with Eurasian Economic Union,” Sputnik International: (2015).

[15] Stratfor Global Intelligence, “Conversation: Russia’s Perfect Economic Storm,” August 2015, https://www.stratfor.com/.

[16] Alberto Nardelli, Jennifer Rankin and George Arnett, “Vladimir Putin’s approval rating at record levels,” The Guardian, July 2015.

[17] European Commission, “European Energy Security Strategy,” May 2015.

[18] Ray Maybus, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” Department of the Navy, March 2015, 60.

[19] Alan Neuhauser, and Paul D. Shinkman, “Europe, Russia Ensnared in ‘Energy Cold War,’ Experts Say,” U.S. News, April 2014.

[20] U.S. Energy Information, “International Energy Statistics” http://www.eia.gov/.

[21] Kenneth Rapoza, Russian Government Ratifies Huge China Gas Pipeline Deal”, Forbes, May 2015.

[22] See Stephen F. Szabo, “Germany, Russia, and the rise of Geo-Economics,” Bloomsbury, 2015. The oil terminal Ust-Luga in the Baltics, as well as gas pipelines North-Stream (Baltic Sea) and South Stream (Black Sea).

[23] See European Commission, “European Energy Security Strategy,” May 2015. (The Russian market share of EU gas was 39% in 2013. The Norwegian was 20%.)

[24] Adam Withnall, “Putin’s gas threat: What happens if Russia cuts the gas to Europe?,” The Independent, February 2015.

[25] See Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defense Policy, ”Unified Effort,” Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 2015, 18-19. (The ”GPV-2020” program is spending $3500 billion to modernize the Russian Armed Forces and strengthen the Military-Industrial Complex.)

[26] Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defense Policy, ”Unified Effort,” Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 2015, 20.

[27] Defense Long Term Proposition (2013-2016) ver 13.0, “Et Forsvar for Vår Tid,” Norwegian Ministry of Defense, December 2014, 25-27.

[28] Haakon Bruun-Hansen, “Norwegian Armed Forces in Transition: Strategic Defence Review by the Norwegian Chief of Defence,” Norwegian Armed Forces, 2015.

[29] Jarno Limnell, ”Will NATO Protect All Members Equally?,” Breaking Defense, September 2014.

[30] Kedar Pavgi, ”NATO Members’ Defense Spending, in Two Charts,” Defense One, June 2015.

[31] Jorge Benitez, ”Will the U.S.‘Rebalance’ Its Contribution to NATO?” Defense One, October 2013.

[32] BBC, “US diplomat warns Europe of dangerous defence spending cuts,” March 2015.

[33] Andrew Tilghman, “Lawmakers: Sequestration is here to stay,” Military Times, March 2015.

[34] Robert Burns, “Ash Carter says U.S. is opening new phase of Asia pivot,” Associated Press, April, 2015.

[35] Ted G. Carpenter, “NATO, European Spending and US Grievances,” CATO Institute, May 2015.

[36] Gary J. Schmitt, “A Hard Look At Hard Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of Key U.S. Allies and Security Partners,” Strategic Studies Institute and Army War College Press, July 2015, ch. 4, 10, 15.

[37] Ray Maybus, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” Secretary of the Navy, March 2015, 11.

[38] White House Press Release, “FACT SHEET: The FY2017 European Reassurance Initiative Budget Request,” Office of the Press Secretary, February 2016.

[39] Arleigh Burke-class destroyers deployed for Ballistic Missile Defense.

[40] US Marine Corps Amphibious Readiness Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit: See http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Amphibious%20Ready%20Group%20And%20Marine%20Expeditionary%20Unit%20Overview.pdf.

[41] Steven L. Myers, “U.S. Is Playing Catch-Up With Russia in Scramble for the Arctic,” New York Times, August 2015.

[42] Joseph R. Fonseca, ”Seawolf Completes Arctic Deployment,” Marinelink.com: (2015).

[43] Diesen og Narum, “Norsk forsvarsevne – en varslet avvikling,” Aftenposten, May 2015.

[44] NORDEFCO, http://www.nordefco.org/the-basics-about-nordefco.

[45] Elizabeth Braw, “The Nordic Battlegroup, Ready and Willing,” World Affairs: (2015).

Europe

Repositioning NATO after the Warsaw Summit

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This article originally featured at the Conference for Defence Associations Institute and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here. 

CDA Institute guest contributor Andrew Rasiulis, a Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, examines the challenge posed by ISIL and a revanchist Russia in advance of the NATO Warsaw Summit.

The NATO Summit in Warsaw this July offers the Alliance the opportunity to reposition itself to address the security challenges on both its Eastern and Southern flanks. In the east, the war within Ukraine, while stagnant, remains politically unresolved. In the south, the scourge of terrorism, most notably manifest through the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), has wrecked violence within NATO itself as witnessed by the various terror attacks in Belgium, Canada, France, and Turkey. The impact of ISIL generated violence, and that of its allies in Africa and Asia, has been the creation of waves of refugee migration. This migration, in turn, is having a powerful impact on the politics of NATO member states.

The Alliance will therefore seek ways to reposition itself to enhance the defence of its member states along its borders with Russia, while at the same time examining ways and means of bringing forth a political resolution to the situation in Ukraine. To the south, the ongoing violence of terrorism will challenge NATO to take a long-term view of the reasons for the phenomenon of ISIL and its corresponding reaction.

Russia has emerged once again as a key player on the international stage. NATO must therefore reassess its relationship with Russia, which at times has both divergent and convergent interests. In Ukraine we find the divergence of interests being predominant, as NATO expansion after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union is being rebuffed by a resurgent Russia not only in Ukraine, but in Georgia and Moldova as well. However, the ongoing terrorist actions of Muslim extremists threatens both Russia and NATO. In this latter threat context, NATO and Russia are both seen as the enemy by ISIL and its allies.

These security challenges are pushing NATO to strengthen its defence and deterrence posture along its Eastern flank with Russia. The NATO Wales Summit in 2014 also grappled with the resurgence of Russian military power and set out to craft a NATO response – a reassurance package, as it became known – for its more vulnerable members along the eastern and southeastern flanks. Essentially, this was characterized by a significant increase in NATO multinational exercises and a limited pre-positioning of armaments, such as one U.S. brigade’s worth of tanks.

The Warsaw Summit will need to take stock of the varied confluence of interests since 2014, such as the establishment of the Minsk 2 process in February of 2015 which put in place a precarious ceasefire in eastern Ukraine and, and as of yet, an unfulfilled roadmap for a political settlement. In the Middle East, developments such as the nuclear deal with Iran and the limited ceasefire in Syria were achieved with active diplomatic co-operation between the United States and Russia. The picture reflects both the divergence and convergence of NATO and Russian interests.

In tracking Summit preparations currently underway in Brussels and NATO capitals, one is able to discern that the outcome will lead to a further strengthening of the Wales reassurance package, with something akin to a deterrence/defence package. Speculation is that NATO will deploy “on a permanent rotational basis” approximately four multinational battalions within Poland and the Baltic states. The nuance on “permanent” and “rotational” is to conform to what is perceived to be the letter, if not the spirit, of the 1997 NATO-Russian Founding Act that prohibits the permanent stationing of non-indigenous NATO troops in NATO countries east of Germany. Some observers argue that the NATO pledge not to station permanent forces was, in fact, conditional on the security situation faced by the Alliance, and that under the current circumstances there is no valid prohibition.

The Russians recently reacted to this by stating that three new Russian divisions will be deployed in its Western and Southern Flanks by the end of 2016. The Russians are indicating they will respond to any NATO build-up with whatever means are deemed necessary to protect their perceived national interests. Add to this the issue of the level and type of military assistance for Ukraine in its stalemate with the Russian-supported rebel enclaves in the Donbass.

Within NATO, and particularly among its eastern member states, there is concern that should the Russians decide to use limited, non-nuclear, military force against NATO in an effort to undermine the cohesion of the Alliance, the Baltic states – vulnerable to a Russian incursion – would require reinforcement. This scenario in turn begs the question raised by Alain Enthoven in his 1971 Rand study “How Much is Enough?”

A 2016 RAND Corporation study by David A. Shlapak and Micheal W. Johnson postulates an answer to that question in the context of a limited conventional Russian attack. The answer is seven brigades, three of which would need to be heavy. The Summit is unlikely to agree to such numbers for its deterrence/defence track, ergo the four battalion option.

While the threat of a limited attack against the Baltic states is a challenge that will be addressed by the Warsaw Summit, there is also the opportunity to seek a corroborating détente/dialogue ‘second track.’ There is a mutual political benefit in re-examining NATO’s 1967 Two-Track Approach, which was based on the Harmel Report. To avoid having NATO’s Eastern Flank turn into its “Eastern or Russian Front,” the second track of détente and dialogue must build on areas of political convergence between NATO and Russia.

This balance should also be reflected in the manner in which NATO continues to provide capacity-building training support to Ukraine in its standoff with the Russian backed rebel held Donbass. NATO will likely continue along the path of reform minded capacity-building with the aim of strengthening Ukrainian defence capabilities, while at the same time strongly encouraging badly required reforms along the entire spectrum of governance within Ukraine.

The goal of NATO in the context of its Eastern Flank should be to secure a stable order building on convergence of geo-political interests with Russia. The Southern Flank poses a more amorphous challenge for the respositioning of NATO. The nature of the threat from ISIL is multidimensional. It ranges from political to economic, social to military. Its geographic theatre of operations is virtually global. The Warsaw Summit should also recognize the opportunity for NATO and Russia to search for common ground in dealing with the ongoing threat of terrorism that seeks to undermine the political stability of both.

Andrew Rasiulis, retired from the public service, is now a freelance consultant with Andrew Rasiulis Associates Inc. He is also a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

(Image courtesy of AFP Petras Malukas.)

Asia-Pacific, Book Review

Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World

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By Sally DeBoer

Navarro, Peter. Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World. New York: Prometheus Books, 2015, 335pp. $19.95.

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Those focused on the realm of maritime security have watched China’s actions in the East and South China Seas with some combination of fascination and trepidation over the past several years. From land reclamation efforts on Johnson South Reef to “cabbage” strategy successes around Scarborough Shoal, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has repeatedly defied convention, their neighbors’ sovereignty, and yes, international law in their expansive effort to exercise control over the seas about the first and second island chains under the guise of historical righteousness. The impending arbitration ruling from the United Nations has tensions in the region at a fever pitch. Questions abound: Will China declare an ADIZ in the South China Sea, as they did in the East China Sea in November of 2013? Will a ruling in the Philippines’ favor spur China to double down on its expansion activity and militarism? Will there be war with China, and what might such a conflict look like? It is this last question, an overarching theme in any discussion of China’s militarization and the international community’s efforts to reckon with it, that author Peter Navarro seeks to address in his book Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World.

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Author Peter Navarro. Image courtesy of the author.

Navarro, a bestselling author and professor at the University of California Irvine’s Merge School of Business, takes a holistic and comprehensive approach to answering the question of whether or not a war with China will occur and, in the event of war, what form such a conflict might take. Perhaps most importantly, Navarro also details pathways to avoid conflict through means of diplomacy and deterrence. Navarro’s prose is engaging and moves at a rapid pace. Styled as a “geopolitical detective story,” Crouching Tiger’s text is widely accessible and consistently clear, making an issue that is opaque to most readers digestible. Each chapter begins with a multiple-choice question about the subject matter, which readers (detectives, as the book calls them) themselves are equipped to answer by its conclusion. The direct tone of the book should not be confused for simplicity, however. Navarro does not shy away from detail, addressing the complexity of great power politics head-on. Navarro’s argument is strengthened by the opinions and research of some of the world’s foremost scholars on geopolitics and China, with statements from the likes of the University of Chicago’s John Mearsheimer and the U.S. Naval War College’s Toshi Yoshihara woven throughout the text. Though short, Crouching Tiger is indeed quite dense, providing a truly sweeping account of the subject matter.

Crouching Tiger begins by setting the stage for the discussion, succinctly but completely outlining the schools of thought on great power politics, the history of China’s interactions with both the United States and the global system at large, and assessing the capabilities of the Chinese military. Navarro deftly characterizes China’s rapid military build-up in their quest for regional hegemony, covering topics from the DF-21 “carrier killer,” to China’s “Underground Great Wall” and truly staggering nuclear stockpile (this will come up again later.) Further, Crouching Tiger addresses China’s Anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities (demonstrated famously with the destruction of the PRC’s own FY1-C weather satellite in 2007), which leave the United States’ overhead constellations, on which it has become militarily, economically, and comprehensively dependent, at risk.

Moving quickly, Navarro then delves into possible “triggers, trip wires, and flash points” that could ignite a conflict between China, the U.S., and their various allies and defense treaty cosigners. Some of these triggers will be familiar to readers who keep an eye on the news in the South China Sea, while others, such as China’s territorial disputes with India and their possible implications for coming periods of water scarcity, are less well known. In the third section of the book, Surveying the Battlefield, Navarro provides a synopsis of U.S. vulnerabilities and strategies with regard to a notional conflict. Crouching Tiger’s final sections discuss possible “pathways to peace.” In a particularly effective section, Navarro gleefully dismantles the arguments for U.S. isolationism (which seem to grow louder by the day), peace through economic engagement (which provided no guarantee of peace in World War One), and traditional nuclear deterrence a-la USSR-U.S. Cold War relations. Crouching Tiger concludes with Navarro’s own strategies to avoid conflict and ensure peace.

If Navarro can be criticized for anything, it is that Crouching Tiger lands a little on the alarmist side. But perhaps in a nation that has tolerated the squeeze of sequestration, watched its military readiness decline as the U.S. Navy rides out the last of its Reagan-era investments, and where more than one politician on either side of the aisle has promoted isolationism (either directly or by reduced investment in defense) as a sound fiscal and geopolitical policy, a little alarmism may not be a bad thing. Indeed, if Navarro’s goal in publishing Crouching Tiger is to provide a wake up call to his readers about the stark realities and implications of U.S. policy, investment, and presence in the Asia-Pacific, he has done so with considerable aplomb. The text is not lengthy; some scholars of the Asia-Pacific may find that some of Navarro’s arguments lack some context. Despite this, a broad audience will find much to consider in the pages of Crouching Tiger. As such, this book comes highly recommended to readers from the most accomplished geopolitical scholars to high-level policymakers and diplomats. I will add my voice to this chorus.

Note: There is an accompanying film series for Crouching Tiger. Find more details at Crouching Tiger’s website.

Sally DeBoer is the Book Review Coordinator for CIMSEC. She can be reached at books@cimsec.org.

Europe

Trident: Hybrid Warfare Under a Nuclear umbrella, and UK-US and UK-EU Relations

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By Alex Calvo

Introduction. We begin the second installment in our four-part series with an examination of the relationship between nuclear weapons and a country’s hard and soft power, and then move to discuss “Hybrid warfare” under a nuclear umbrella. We next deal with the system’s opportunity cost and whether it may constitute an obstacle for conventional rearmament, and ponder its connection with the “special relationship” between London and Washington. In our final section, we examine Trident in light of the UK’s place within the European Union. Read Part One here.

The Bomb and a Country’s Image and Power, Hard and Soft

Concerning the second question posed earlier, whether a country needs to be a nuclear weapons state in order to be a top diplomatic power, right from the early days of the nuclear era possession of the bomb has been widely recognized as a major status symbol, marking a country as a big power and supporting its diplomatic stance. What matters most is to discuss whether we are just talking about national pride and image, or whether a country’s nuclear status is a significant contributor to its national power, that is the ability to constrain other countries’ options and shape their behavior in the pursuit of its own national interest. If the former is true, then it is to be expected that some people may come to see a nuclear deterrent as non-essential, given financial realities and more pressing needs, both within and without the realm of defense. Thus we may hear voices demanding that Trident be scrapped and its cost be allocated either to conventional defense or to non-defense spending or tax cuts. If, on the other hand, the latter is more accurate, then any discussion of the UK’s nuclear deterrent cannot be undertaken in isolation.

While no formal connection exists between UNSC membership and nuclear weapons, it is often considered to be no accident that all five permanent members are recognized nuclear powers. Despite the continued criticism of nuclear weapons, possessing them does indeed place a country in the top diplomatic league, and therefore if the UK renounced her own national deterrent, this may be seen as an anomaly, and evidence of decline into the minor league of diplomacy. At a time of renewed strife with the country facing possible aggression on at least three fronts (Russia, Gibraltar-Falklands, and Jihadism), the consequences may go beyond what may seem clear at first sight. It could be argued, on the other hand, that renouncing nuclear weapons may give a boost to the UK’s worldwide image, turning the country into a champion of disarmament and thereby bringing about a wave of goodwill resulting in additional soft power. Although it may sound logical, and may actually be in line with some of the motivations for the current policy of a minimal nuclear posture, history seems to indicate that such well meaning intentions would have the opposite result.

Furthermore, the UK’s policy of minimal deterrence has not been followed by other nuclear powers. Here we should stress that, although Western governments and observers have generally refrained from even mentioning it, Indian experts have had a field day stressing how the Ukraine accepted the removal of the nuclear weapons located on her territory and the country’s accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state, only to later see part of her territory grabbed and her very existence as an independent state questioned by those who chose to retain both nuclear assets and NPT weapons state status. This includes not only traditional nuclear hawks, but even observers who had always opposed nuclear weapons. For example, in April 2014 Swaminathan S Anklesaria Aiyar wrote “All my life I have opposed nuclear bombs. I have argued that such bombs are basically unusable; that, instead of ensuring security, they risk escalation of small conflicts into disasters; and that they lead to undesirable macho foreign policies. Most Indians exulted after India’s nuclear tests of 1998, claiming India was now a great power on par with the U.S. I cautioned that India was merely on par with Pakistan and North Korea. However, after seeing Ukraine bullied by Russia, I have to revise my views. Nukes are not useless, and may be essential deterrents” adding “Lesson for non-nuclear states: don’t depend for security on the big powers who will dump you when convenient. Disarmament is for wimps. Go get your own nukes if you can. More nuclearization will deter some invasions, but also increases chances of a nuclear clash or accident. It is not a panacea. But it is now inevitable.”

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U.S. President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and Ukranian President Leonid Kravchuk in the Kremlin on 14 January 1994, when Kiev agreed to give up its nuclear capability. Indian analysts have been having a field day since the outbreak of the Crimean Crisis, using the conflict as a reminder of the vulnerability prompted by lack of a nuclear deterrent. (Diana Walker/Time)

In the Ukraine herself some voices have regretted the 1994 Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances “’We gave up nuclear weapons because of this agreement,’ Pavlo Rizanenko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament, told USA Today. ‘Now there’s a strong sentiment in Ukraine that we made a big mistake.’ Nuclear weapons may make the world nervous, but foreign troops rarely pay unannounced visits to nuclear states.”

“Hybrid Warfare” under a Nuclear Umbrella: Conventional and Non-Conventional Defense

With regard to the third issue, the relationship between nuclear and non-nuclear defense, this is sometimes discussed purely in terms of opportunity costs. To be precise, whether by retaining Trident the UK may be forced to implement defense spending cuts endangering conventional capabilities. It is of course true that any weapons system must be examined in terms of opportunity costs, and that we must be aware of what we may be losing or failing to acquire by preserving existing assets or purchasing new ones. This is even more the case following the 2010 announcement by the chancellor that the cost of the nuclear deterrent would be funded through the defense budget, as opposed to separately by the Treasury. George Osborne said “I have made it very clear that Trident renewal costs must be taken as part of the defence budget.”

Where we have to be careful is in drawing too strict a line between conventional and non-conventional weapons. This is sometimes done by observers who stress threats to the UK from non-state actors and non-nuclear weapons states, saying that the former cannot be deterred (because they do not control a territory and population which can be threatened with destruction if they attack the UK with nuclear weapons) and the latter cannot be dealt with using nuclear weapons because the UK deterrent is aimed at fellow nuclear weapons states. The first argument has merit and cannot be dismissed out of hand, yet is not sufficient in and by itself to defend an end to the nuclear deterrent on at least two counts: first, that while non-state threats are indeed important, state to state conflict remains a very real possibility, as clear from recent developments in Eastern Europe, the South Atlantic, and the Strait of Gibraltar. Second, that a non-state actor may be supported by a state, in which case the latter may be deterred, or may gradually evolve into a de facto state which, although not internationally recognized, may also have actual control over a population or territory and thus be equally liable to classical deterrence. Concerning the second argument, although it is true that British nuclear doctrine is mainly targeted at other nuclear weapons states, it is nowhere stated that it is thus restricted. As noted when examining a possible role for nuclear weapons in the defense of the Falklands, “while the British nuclear deterrent was not originally designed to deal with conventional aggression, and the UK doctrine mainly refers to dealing with nuclear threats or attacks, its documents do not rule out a first strike and more to the point do not provide any explicit assurance to non-nuclear weapons states.”

We then have the not often openly discussed issue of the relationship between nuclear forces and conventional and asymmetric combat. More precisely, whether nuclear weapons are necessary to wage conventional or asymmetric war, and in the British context, whether losing Trident would put a dent on the country’s other military capabilities. Here we have to be careful not to follow the simplistic logic that presents conventional and non-conventional capabilities as separate. Both from a practical historical perspective, and from a more theoretical and doctrinal one, they are clearly not. A country is often able to wage conventional or sub-conventional war precisely because it has the nuclear forces necessary to constrain the reaction by other actors. The Korean War is a classical example, the 1949 Soviet maiden nuclear test paving the way to a conventional war of aggression to unify the Peninsula. More recently, Russian sources stress not only the “hybrid” nature of armed conflict but the inclusion of the nuclear component in that “hybrid warfare.”

01 Nov 1950, Wake Island --- 10/15/1950-Wake Island: President Harry Truman decorates General Douglas Mac Arthur with the Medal of Merit. --- Image by © Bettmann/CORBIS
US President Harry Truman decorating General Douglas MacArthur. The Korean War exposed the impact of nuclear weapons on conventional conflicts, ultimately leading to MacArthur’s dismissal. (Bettmann/CORBIS)

While many Western observers describe “hybrid warfare” or “hybrid war” as basically comprising a mixture of traditional armed force with special operations, information management and clandestine operations, the U.S. Army 2012 Unified Land Operations manual describing it as “The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorists forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects.” Russian observers emphasize that for it to be effective it must operate under a nuclear umbrella. The resulting deterrence enables Russia to engage in lower forms of conflict, while never losing sight of this connection. Thus, for an actor to be able to wage conventional and sub-conventional war, in particular where other nuclear powers may be directly or indirectly involved, it may be necessary to retain its nuclear deterrent. This means that the UK needs to preserve either Trident or a nuclear alternative to this system not only to directly deal with nuclear threats or the possibility of nuclear threats, but also to retain her freedom of maneuver when it comes to waging other kinds of war. Otherwise, the resulting loss would not only impact the nuclear domain, but the whole spectrum of military operations and diplomacy. Argentina’s recent dalliances with two nuclear-weapons states are a reminder that a national nuclear deterrent may be necessary to constrain the intervention of nuclear powers in a conventional or sub-conventional conflict with a non-nuclear weapons state.

Trident’s Opportunity Cost: A Bar to Conventional Rearmament?

An argument against Trident by some observers otherwise committed to national defense is that its high cost may have a disproportionate impact on conventional capabilities, thus indirectly damaging British national security and the country’s power and influence in the international stage. Official estimates put the cost of replacing the current submarines at between £15 and £20 billion, while some voices against extension argue that the real cost is higher, with Greenpeace for example putting it at more than £34 billion.

While Greenpeace’s figures may be suspect given its anti-Trident posture, work by such organizations may be useful in having a more realistic perspective of the likely costs involved, even more so in view of past cost overruns in the defense industry. Furthermore, it must be admitted that some of the official estimates do not include the whole spectrum of associated costs linked to the program. When Greenpeace’s report was published, a MOD (Ministry of Defence) spokesman said that “The 2006 white paper set out the costs [of Trident] at £15-20bn, not the £30-33bn that Greenpeace suggest. As stated in the 2006 white paper, the costs are at 2006 prices and VAT is not included. It is impossible to try and predict exchange rates and material costs over the course of replacing Trident.”

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Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon. The ruling SNP remains strongly opposed to Trident, and seeks to gain political capital from this policy. (Jeff J. Mitchell/Getty Images)

We have already made it clear that the opportunity cost of any weapons system is a major factor to be considered, and thus this argument cannot be easily dismissed. However, given the also explained link between nuclear and non-nuclear defense, should Trident come to be seen as too expensive, the best solution would be to replace it with another nuclear delivery system, rather than renouncing an independent national deterrent.

Last year was witness to an intense public debate on British defense spending, given the danger of falling below the NATO guideline of two percent. The debate went on into the run up to the general election, which saw the Conservatives gain an absolute majority and thus dispense with the need to share power with the Liberal Democrats. The new administration formally announced that London would keep spending two percent of British GDP on defense, although doubts remain as to whether some creative accounting may be employed to secure this goal. To some extent, the debate overlapped with that on Trident. However, as noted by some commentators, Trident is currently funded separately from the defense budget and “any savings which could be made by cancelling or changing the programme would not be realised until the next Parliament and beyond, up until the 2040s, which is when the vast majority of spending on the renewal programme will occur.” Both points should be taken into account when defending the view that Trident may be scrapped in order to fund conventional rearmament, since it is perfectly possible, from a political perspective, that no such impact would come to be realized. Furthermore, from a tactical perspective, voices soft on defense may conclude a tactical alliance with proponents of higher conventional defense spending with a view towards downgrading or terminating the national deterrent, only to turn against the latter once that objective had been secured. The end result would be a UK deprived of nuclear forces and with conventional capabilities even smaller than at present.

Trident and the “Special Relationship”

British nuclear policy has an influence on relations with Washington at different levels. First of all, the UK’s nuclear deterrent is a major contributor to the country’s power and thus its worth as an ally for Washington. Second, the existence of the deterrent may complicate calculations for any would-be aggressor in the Euro-Atlantic Area, and while this is a complex issue defying simplistic analysis, it may result in a greater combined deterrence capability since that aggressor would need to ponder not just the American but also the British (and French) reaction. However, while recent U.S. defense policy seems to be putting more reliance on key regional allies, this basically refers to the conventional arena, with voices in favor of letting additional allies develop an independent deterrent being in the minority. Among the exceptions we can cite a National Interest article arguing that “America’s policy of opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons needs to be more nuanced. What works for the United States in the Middle East may not in Asia. We do not want Iran or Saudi Arabia to get the bomb, but why not Australia, Japan, and South Korea? We are opposed to nuclear weapons because they are the great military equalizer, because some countries may let them slip into the hands of terrorists, and because we have significant advantage in precision conventional weapons. But our opposition to nuclear weapons in Asia means we are committed to a costly and risky conventional arms race with China over our ability to protect allies and partners lying nearer to China than to us and spread over a vast maritime theater.”

Trident relies to a considerable extent on U.S. technology, the UK nuclear weapons program being heavily dependent on America ever since Washington resumed nuclear cooperation in 1958. As noted by think-tank BASIC, “The United Kingdom’s Trident missiles are purchased directly from the United States under the terms of the 1963 UK-U.S. Polaris Sales Agreement, amended in 1980 and 1982 to govern cooperation over the Trident I (C4) and Trident II (D5) generations of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), respectively. Cooperation between the two states’ nuclear weapons complexes operate under the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement, renewed every decade and up again for renewal next year (2014). The UK does not actually own any individual missiles, but purchased the rights to 58 missiles from a common pool held at the US Strategic Weapons facility at the Kings Bay Submarine Base, Georgia.” Thus, the U.S. defense industry has a clear stake in the program’s continuity, and this may bring a degree of pressure from Washington, irrespective of the two previous factors discussed earlier.

In more than one way, Trident reflects the complex nature of the British nuclear deterrent and of nuclear cross-Atlantic relations. As already mentioned, after spearheading Allied work in this area, the UK left matters in American hands, only to find access restricted after the war and having to engage in a major effort to ensure a place at the nuclear table. Being under national command, yet reliant on American technology, Trident reflects some of the ambiguities and contradictions in the UK’s post-war status and foreign policy: a major power yet one closely associated and dependent on one of its allied superpowers. Like its predecessor, Polaris, Trident is based on “American missiles, British submarines and warheads.” The missiles are the same employed by the U.S. Navy. One of the traditional arguments against Trident is that it is not fully “independent,” with, for example, the missiles being serviced in the United States.

Keeping Tident in place, if accompanied by a retention of non-nuclear capabilities, may facilitate preserving British influence in Washington. Scrapping it, in particular if accompanied by a further deterioration in conventional capabilities, is likely to have the opposite effect. Replacing it with a system less reliant on US technology, or even purely British, would likely prompt both industrial and financial concerns on the other side of the Atlantic, and political ones as well. It is beyond the scope of our series to examine them in depth, but they should be noted.

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Faslane, in Scotland, is the home base of the UK’s strategic nuclear submarines.

In addition, we should also remember that working with the United States also poses some technical challenges given the different development and procurement plans on the two sides of the Atlantic. For example, as noted by the Guardian, “The U.S. has decided to extend the life of its existing D5 missiles to 2042, a decade before the new British submarines would retire. The UK would therefore have to put new U.S. missiles in then-old submarines.” On the other hand, in addition to the political considerations already mentioned, working with U.S. technology means the UK does not have to face the full cost of developing and servicing a whole delivery system on her own.

Trident, the UK, and the European Union

The debate over Trident is also linked to another perennial discussion in British politics, namely that concerning the country’s relation with and place in Europe. This debate is becoming more and more intense as we approach the 23 June referendum, and one of its aspects is security and defense. Some years ago a certain consensus emerged, centered on the notion of a EU restricted to little more than a free-trade area, but this has now been effectively dismissed in the minds of many, thus simplifying the terms of the debate while at the same time making it even more intense. For a significant number of Britons, the UK faces a choice between recovering her full independence or becoming a European province ruled by Brussels, with national defense gradually giving way to supranational arrangements.

The relationship between European policy and nuclear policy is complex and defies simplistic linkages. However, those favoring the gradual dilution of British sovereignty into a European federal state logically tend to lean against the renewal of Trident, since the whole concept of an independent nuclear deterrent is based on the assumption that there is indeed a national sovereignty to protect and project. It is no coincidence to see some of the most ardently pro-EU voices in British political life engaged in an equally intense, parallel, campaign against Trident. For those, on the other hand, favoring British sovereignty and the preservation of traditional British liberties under a constitutional monarch, nuclear weapons policy remains an important aspect of the defense policy debate, although this does not mean that they necessarily support Trident or a nuclear alternative.

Some European observers have noted how Trident’s continuity is not only good for British national security but for that of other European nations. A German security and defense blogger has argued that “For legal, political and financial reasons, there will never be any kind of multinational European sea-based nuclear force. However, European countries still need a nuclear umbrella for their security. If you do not believe that, please consult our Baltic and Polish friends,” adding that despite U.S. commitment to nuclear modernization “it is yet unclear, if the US Navy’s future sea-based deterrent will be large enough to span up a worldwide nuclear deterrent as we have it today” meaning that “Europe and the UK cannot afford to rely on that America provides nuclear free-rides forever.” While conceding that London may not retaliate against aggressors employing nuclear weapons on another European country, the text emphasizes how the possibility that she might make their “life much harder, if they at least have to take the risk of retaliation into account.”

It should also be noted how, although the European Union’s narrative is to a great extent reliant on the notion that it has brought peace to the old continent, making war unthinkable, this pretense does not stand to any serious scrutiny. British citizens remain under threat at the hands of a fellow EU member state which does not recognize their right to self-determination, while enjoying the continued support of British taxpayers. This is only one of many contradictions that cast a doubt on the proposition that the UK may renounce her own defense policy, to be taken over by the EU. In connection to this, it should also be remembered that the UK retains the responsibility to defend different British Overseas Territories, including the Falklands and South Georgia, also under threat. Since not only do these territories not belong to the EU, but in the 1982 Falklands War it was clear that the degree of support to be expected from fellow member states was rather limited, any move toward deeper European integration may well be incompatible with their continued security.

Alex Calvo, a guest professor at Nagoya University, Japan, focuses on security and defense policy, international law, and military history in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region. He tweets at Alex__Calvo and his papers can be found here. Previous work on British nuclear policy includes A. Calvo and O. Olsen, “Defending the Falklands: A role for nuclear weapons?” Strife Blog, 29 July 2014, available here.

Featured Image: HMS Vengeance returning to HMNB Clyde, after completing Operational Sea Training. The trials were conducted in Scottish exercise areas. (Tam McDonald/MOD)