Category Archives: Global Analysis

A Geographical Breakdown of What’s Going on in the World

Asia-Pacific, Tactical Concepts

Developing an Assessment for the IO Environment in Afghanistan

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You may be wondering what an article about Afghanistan is doing on a site about maritime security. Well, I found myself asking a very similar questions when, within six months of joining the U.S. Navy and graduating from Officer Candidate School (OCS) in Pensacola, FL, I found myself in a land-locked country serving on a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) conducting counterinsurgency operations. The irony was not lost on me since I had joined very late in life (I was 35 when I went to OCS). The recruiter had said, “Join the Navy and see the world!” Little did I know we’d be starting in alphabetical order …

Meeting the requirements of an “individual augmentee” – (Fog a mirror? Check!) – and having just enough training to know how to spell “IO,” I arrived in Khost province in early 2008. I was fortunate to relieve a brilliant officer, Chris Weis, who had established a successful media and public diplomacy program and laid the groundwork for a number of future programs.

I decided that before setting out to win the “hearts and minds” of the local population, we needed to take stock of where we were and whether our efforts were achieving the effects we desired.

The goal of Information Operations (or “IO”) is to “influence, corrupt, disrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”[i] But how does one know whether the decision process, either human or automated, has actually been influenced in some way? We can assume or surmise that, based on the actions of the target of the IO campaign, some desired effect was achieved or not achieved. But how much of that was based on our IO campaign and how much on other factors, perhaps unknown even to us? We can also attempt to ask the target after the fact whether campaign activities influenced their decision making. But such opportunities might rarely arise in the midst of on-going operations. 

Commanders conducting counterinsurgency operations should have two primary IO targets: the insurgents and the local population. Retired U.S. Army officer John Nagl notes that “persuading the masses of people that the government is capable of providing essential services—and defeating the insurgents—is just as important” as enticing the insurgents to surrender and provide information on their comrades.[ii] A PRT is not charged with directly targeting insurgents. Instead, its mission is to build the capacity of the host government to provide governance, development, and these “essential services” for the local population.[iii]

Information Operations traditionally suffer from a lack of available metrics by which planners can assess their environment and measure the effectiveness of their programs. It may be impossible to show direct causation, or even correlation, between Information Operations and actual effects (i.e., did my influence program actually have its desired effect?). This often places IO practitioners at a distinct disadvantage when attempting to gain the confidence of unit commanders, who are tasked with allocating scarce battlefield resources and who are often skeptical of Information Operations as a whole.

Given these constraints it was clear that the PRT in Khost province, Afghanistan, needed a tool by which the leadership could benchmark current conditions and evaluate the information environment under which the population lived. We hoped that such a tool could help provide clues as to whether our IO (and the overall PRT) efforts were having the intended effects. As a result, we developed the Information Operations Environmental Assessment tool, which can be used and replicated at the unit level (battalion or less) by planners in order to establish an initial benchmark (where am I?) and measure progress toward achieving the IO program goals and objectives (where do I want to go?). 

Since my crude attempt was first published in 2009, the U.S. Institute of Peace (yes, there is such a thing) developed the metrics framework under the name “Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments” or “MPICE.” This project seeks to:

provide a comprehensive capability for measuring progress during stabilization and reconstruction operations for subsequent integrated interagency and intergovernmental use. MPICE enables policymakers to establish a baseline before intervention and track progress toward stability and, ultimately, self-sustaining peace. The intention is to contribute to establishing realistic goals, focusing government efforts strategically, integrating interagency activities, and enhancing the prospects for attaining an enduring peace. This metrics framework supports strategic and operational planning cycles.

No doubt the MPICE framework is far more useful today than my rudimentary attempt to capture measures of effect in 2008, but I hope in some small way others have found a useful starting point. As I learned firsthand, and as practitioners of naval and maritime professions know, what happens on land often draws in those focused on the sea. 

The author would like to thank Dr. Thomas H. Johnson and Barry Scott Zellen, both of the Naval Postgraduate School, for their professional mentorship and constructive advice, and for including my work in their book.

LT Robert “Jake” Bebber is an information warfare officer assigned to the staff of Commander, U.S. Cyber Command. He holds a Ph.D. in public policy from the University of Central Florida and lives with his wife, Dana and son, Vincent in Millersville, Maryland. The views expressed here are not those of the Department of Defense, the Navy or those of U.S. Cyber Command. He welcomes your comments at jbebber@gmail.com.

 

[i] Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations, p. ix

[ii] Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 93.

[iii] Ibid.

Arctic, History, Podcast

Sea Control 22 – Behind the Curtain

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seacontrolemblem(Download: Sea Control 22 – Behind the Curtain, the First.)

A. Denis Clift, former Naval Officer, president emeritus of the National Intelligence University, and Vice President for Operations of USNI, joins us to talk about his reflections on his time in the Antarctic, Cold War intelligence, life, and the United States Naval Institute. This is the first of a bi-monthly series that will be investigating his career during the Cold War.

We are available on Itunes, Stitcher Stream Radio, etc… Remeber to subscribe, leave a comment and a 5-star rating.

Asia-Pacific

What if the U.S. Gave an “Air-Sea Battle” and No One Came to Fight?

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There has been much discussion in the past year on the relative merits and disadvantages of Air-Sea battle as a potential strategy or operational concept. Much of the debate has been a comparison between the warfighting options embodied in the Navy/Air Force concept verses those less kinetic choices incorporated in an “offshore control”, blockade situation. The usual opponent for these measures is the People’s Republic of China. Those in favor of these competing concepts rarely “give the potential enemy a vote” and talk more of what their idea could do vice what the opponent’s response might be. China’s own strategic choices ought to play a greater role in the discussion of these competing plans. One of the most surprising outcomes might be a failure on the part of the Chinese to engage with either vision. A review of a historical similarity, and recent Chinese strategic actions might very well suggest that if the United States attempted to have an Air-Sea battle, the People’s Republic could easily choose to not attend the event and still win the war.

This is not the first time that carefully laid plans for war at sea have come to naught. The naval situation in the North Sea throughout the First World War is an excellent example of one side not really needing to do battle in order to gain an advantage. On the outbreak of war in August 1914, many observers assumed there would be a titanic naval battle in the North Sea between the British Royal Navy (RN)’s Grand Fleet and Imperial Germany’s High Seas Fleet for the domination of the Atlantic. Noted American naval theorist Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan had predicted such an event as the logical result of the conflict of great naval powers. Both navies had planned for a confrontation for many years. They held a ten year naval race in the construction of battleships. German officers spoke of “der tag” (the day) that they would meet and defeat the Royal Navy in battle and the German Kaiser Wilhelm II complained that British Navy charts he observed on a visit to British battleship listed the German fleet as the principal British opponent. When war did come however, the seas were largely silent and no great battle immediately took place. German naval officers may have spoken of an immediate engagement with the RN, but their leadership had a much more nuanced strategy for success.

The Germans wanted to defeat the Royal Navy, but they knew they did not have the numbers to immediately force a decision. Instead they conducted numerous raids in hope of drawing out a portion of the RN they could defeat, and thereby even the odds in a follow-up fleet engagement. They were persistently unsuccessful in doing this, and although there was a brief opportunity at the May 1916 Battle of Jutland to accomplish this goal and destroy the RN’s battle cruiser squadron, the prompt arrival of the bulk of Grand Fleet frustrated these efforts and the German’s beat a sharp retreat for home. Many experts, including such luminaries as Winston Churchill and Admiral Sir John Fisher castigated Grand Fleet Commander Admiral Sir John Jellicoe after the battle for failure to repeat the efforts of the famous Admiral Nelson, who destroyed the combined French and Spanish fleets at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805.

In reality, Jellicoe had little chance of repeating Trafalgar as the Germans’ strategy did not support the likelihood of a fleet engagement of that magnitude. The German fleet had little reason to come to sea and face annihilation by the British. Its merchant fleets had already been rounded up, and submarines would increasingly become the principle tool for threatening the lines of communication and supply to the British Home islands. All of its vital resources came through protected waters like the Baltic Sea or through overland routes. Although the German surface fleet eventually became demoralized and rebellious after four years of inactivity, hunger, and fanatical disciplinary measures, its basic strategy of “doing nothing” was fully supportable. Admiral Jellicoe could truly have “lost the war in an afternoon” had a significant part of the British fleet been destroyed in battle, but the Germans on the other hand could afford to wait.

China could also afford to wait out any attempts to apply Air-Sea battle just as the Germans did in World War 1. China’s strategic calculations remain open to debate. The Chinese Navy’s leadership may talk boldly about their fleet and its capabilities, but it remains questionable what that fleet might do in wartime. It could be employed in a sudden rush to conquer Taiwan, and then retreat behind the formidable Chinese Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) system. Such a move would leave U.S. naval and air units without a seagoing opponent, but facing potentially high casualties in breaking through shore-based Chinese defenses to aid an occupied Taiwan. Unlike the British in World War 1 whose principle bases were a day’s sail from the potential battleground, a U.S. fleet would need to remain far at sea on station expending fuel, time, and energy waiting for a Chinese naval sorties that might never occur.

A blockade might be equally fruitless. The Chinese have worked to develop alternative shore-based routes for vital supplies like petroleum products and other basic resources for war. The Chinese govt. has invested large sums of money in the Pakistani port of Gwadar on the Indian Ocean. It signed an agreement with the Pakistani govt. in 2013  to build a 2000 km. long road and rail route from Gwadar to the Chinese city of Kashgar. This route would largely circumvent any U.S. attempts to blockade Chinese fuel imports. The Chinese govt. has also developed friendly relations with Iran and Iranian oil shipped overland to Gwadar would entirely avoid naval blockade efforts. Further Chinese movement of resources and goods for commerce could be conducted through the vast Asian steppes of the Russian republic, another nation with whom China has cultivated an improved relationship. In the early 20th century, British geopolitical theorist Sir Halford Mackinder described this Asian interior as the “heartland” of a future Eurasian economic system. It remains, as it was in Mackinder’s time as largely immune to Western and U.S. military efforts aside from a dwindling U.S. strategic Air Force.

The British Royal Navy desperately desired to engage the German High Seas fleet, and in doing so somehow force an end to the First World War. German strategic thinking made this an unattainable goal. Chinese strategic efforts may equally make both Air-Sea battle and “offshore control” blockades fruitless endeavors. Some commentators have complained that the services’ effort to define these concepts has been slow. This is actually beneficial in that China’s strategic calculus remains nebulous. The usual U.S. methods of creating “strategy” through defense budgets and weapon programs are likely to fail if geography and history are not taken into consideration in planning a U.S. response. The U.S. might plan to conduct Air-Sea battle or an offshore control blockade, but neither would be useful if the Chinese chose not to accept the invitation. The U.S. can no longer deny the opponent their vote in the planning to counter their next move.

Global Analysis

The Evolution of Air-Sea Battle

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Just as history and past experiences have guided the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on a path towards the deployment of a robust anti-access/area-denial capability (A2/AD), Washington’s own historical narrative will guide its own counter response. Such a response, known as Air-Sea Battle (ASB), has gone through an important evolution–thanks mainly to an important and often times heated debate–over the last four years that many scholars and followers of this operational concept are quick to gloss over or are unaware of. Understanding such an evolution and tracking its progress is key not only for understanding ASB itself but also in monitoring how nations and non-state actors dependent on A2/AD might attempt to adapt or counter such efforts.

ASB: Core Foundations

American planners over the last several years have sought techniques to continue to deploy a superior conventional military capability in spite of growing A2/AD capabilities, retain the ability to mass forces and enter a combat zone decisively while controlling the global commons across all domains (land, air, sea, space, and cyber). Despite carefully worded statements, Washington is clearly trying to negate PRC and in some respects Iran’s A2/AD capabilities along with non-state actors.  The most widely discussed option when it comes to defeating A2/AD strategies is the highly controversial operational concept known as AirSea Battle. Many times confused as a war fighting strategy, in its simplest form, ASB is an effort by America’s military to ensure access to the global commons from any adversary that would contest such access across any and all domains.

The initial phrase ASB is a most likely a borrowed one. It derives its likeness from the Cold War concept of AirLand Battle (ALB). ALB was its own joint warfighting concept; however, that is largely where the similarities stop. As Robert Farley has noted, ALB succeeded Active Defense as U.S. Army doctrine in the early 1980’s. The doctrine primed NATO forces for  combat in Central Europe against the Warsaw Pact, although many of its basic precepts could also apply to other scenarios (like the 1991 Gulf War, for example). Farley explains that “ALB represented an accommodation between the Army and the USAF, providing a respite to the decades of intra and inter-service strife…” The Air Force essentially set aside its own strategic concept in order to provide operational and tactical support for army forces in a protracted struggle with a much larger conventional adversary.

CSBA Version of Air-Sea Battle: ASB 1.0?

The first comprehensive study of ASB and what it could offer U.S. war planners is a widely cited 2010 report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) entitled: AirSea Battle – A Point of Departure Operational Concept. To this day, the report is one of the most authoritative documents concerning ASB, even though the concept has evolved dramatically since publication. While the document was developed without Department of Defense support, it provides important detailed operational and strategic guidance of how ASB could be moved from an operational concept into a war-fighting strategy to defeat A2/AD battle networks.

While the CSBA version addresses ASB capabilities at the tactical and strategic levels, it is the operational level that is most important, as ASB is an operational concept—which many scholars confuse. As the CSBA report notes:

Air-Sea Battle must address the critical emerging challenges and opportunities that projected Chinese A2/AD capabilities will present, and to which currently envisioned US forces do not appear to offer a suitable response. In general, since A2/AD capabilities seek to impose ever-greater constraints on US operational freedom of action, an AirSea Battle concept must address how the challenge can be offset or, failing that, how freedom of action can be regained in at least selected temporal/positional aspects for purposes of power projection.

The CSBA version of ASB would see combat take place in two stages. The first stage is detailed as an initial stage, comprised of several distinct lines of operation.  U.S. forces would first withstand an initial attack and limit possible damage. Next, a “blinding campaign” would commence against PLA battle networks. Next, a “suppression campaign” would then commence, focusing on PLA long-range ISR and strike systems. Focus would also be placed to ensure “Seizing and sustaining the initiative in the air, sea, space and cyber domains.” Emphasis would also be placed on “distant blockade operations,” and increased procurement and production of precision guided munitions—among other goals.

ASB would rapidly find acceptance and quickly be adopted by official U.S. war planners as part of an overall strategy to shift U.S. thinking away from COIN based operations to future military challenges—specifically operating in A2/AD environments. During late fall of 2011, it was announced that an Air-Sea Battle office was in the process of being formed to “oversee the integration of air and naval combat capabilities in an age of smaller budgets and leaner forces.”

ASB and the JOAC

ASB continued its evolution as part of a much wider Joint Operational Access Concept, or commonly known as JOAC, in early 2012. Signed by U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey, the goal of this document is to show how U.S. “joint forces will operate in response to emerging anti-access and area-denial security challenges.” The JOAC places the first official U.S. definition of ASB into the public domain:

The intent of Air-Sea Battle is to improve integration of air, land, naval, space, and cyberspace forces to provide combatant commanders the capabilities needed to deter and, if necessary, defeat an adversary employing sophisticated A2/AD capabilities. It focuses on ensuring that joint forces will possess the ability to project force as required to preserve and defend U.S. interests well into the future.

Enter The ASB Office

ASB would again be refined and further sculpted once more in U.S. government documents for public disclosure, this time by the newly formed AirSea Battle office itself. On May 12, 2013, the ASB office released an unclassified version of what was dubbed a “summary” of the ASB operational concept:

A limited objective concept that describes what is necessary for the joint force to sufficiently shape A2/AD environments to enable concurrent or follow-on power projection operations. The ASB Concept seeks to ensure freedom of action in the global commons and is intended to assure allies and deter potential adversaries. ASB is a supporting concept to the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), and provides a detailed view of specific technological and operational aspects of the overall A2/AD challenge in the global commons. The Concept is not an operational plan or strategy for a specific region or adversary. Instead, it is an analysis of the threat and a set of classified concepts of operations (CONOPS) describing how to counter and shape A2/AD environments, both symmetrically and asymmetrically, and develop an integrated force with the necessary characteristics and capabilities to succeed in those environments.

Confusion, Evolution and Revolution?

Even after the ASB offices authoritative documentation, many still confused ASB for a war-fighting strategy against China. Many mistakenly continue to this day cite and attack the CSBA version of ASB. The area of the document that draws the most attention is where it calls for controversial kinetic strikes on mainland China to disrupt important A2/AD C2 and C4ISR that would control PLA A2/AD combat capabilities. Because of this confusion, members of the House Armed Services Committee held a special session on October 10, 2013 in an attempt to remove any ambiguity (I was able to attend). The meeting was described as “for the first time ever, senior leaders from the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Army and Joint Staff discussed the Air-Sea Battle Concept in an open hearing.” As U.S. Navy Rear Admiral James Foggo testified, ASB is:

Designed to assure access to parts of the “global commons” – those areas of the air, sea, cyberspace and space that no one “owns,” but which we all depend on – such as the sea lines of communication.  Our adversaries’ anti-access/area denial strategies employ a range of military capabilities that impede the free use of these ungoverned spaces. These military capabilities include new generations of cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles with improved range, accuracy, and lethality are being produced and proliferated. Quiet modern submarines and stealthy fighter aircraft are being procured by many nations, while naval mines are being equipped with mobility, discrimination and autonomy. Both space and cyberspace are becoming increasingly important and contested. Accordingly the Air-Sea Battle Concept is intended to defeat such threats to access, and provide options to national leaders and military commanders, to enable follow-on operations, which could include military activities, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster response. In short, it is a new approach to warfare.

In many respects the debate and confusion around ASB has played a critical role in its evolution and definition in publicly available sources of information. While scholars will surely battle over the abilities of ASB to provide effective solutions to confront the challenge of proliferating A2/AD technologies and strategies, having a correctly understood definition of ASB are crucial to such a debate. As ASB has been misinterpreted, misunderstood, or mistaken for something it is not, those who look to the benefits of ASB have been forced to refine and develop the motivations and aspirations of this operational concept. While issues of national strategy, budgetary politics and public opinion may ultimately cause ASB to become nothing more than an historical curiosity (for the record, I sure hope not) its evolution continues on for those who wish to see it.

Harry J. Kazianis is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the China Policy Institute (University of Nottingham) as well as WSD Handa Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: PACNET. Mr. Kazianis also serves as Managing Editor for the National Interest. He previously served as Editor of The Diplomat. The views expressed are his alone.