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The U.S. Realignment of the Persian Gulf Regional Security Complex

March 16, 2015 Guest Author 1 Comment

The Persian Gulf sits at the nexus of multiple regional security complexes overlaid one upon another, creating a delicately balanced yet dangerously volatile mosaic of cultural politics and armed forces. As a result, the calculated political positioning of states within the region have ramifications that produce a ripple effect across the entire globe: affecting energy markets, political stability, and military cooperation and procurement programs which define how several non-regional states engage.

At the core of this Gulf complex is a security rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran; a centuries old antagonism between Sunni and Shia’ Muslims manifest in global politics which now dictates defense alignment policies and military readiness. A second, and rising, security complex to examine is the establishment of the United States as a permanent military, economic, and diplomatic partner in the region – absent only in sovereign territory of its own. With the presence of the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, American interests in the region are clearly communicated, as are the passive-aggressive cavitation of our naval vessels plying the Straits of Hormuz at the dismay of Iran’s Supreme leader. Third, Gulf security politics exist within the broader global context of a contentious Muslim and Jewish relationship, most clearly exhibited by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To this point, it is argued that much of the anti-Israeli rhetoric coming from Iran, for example, can be explained by recognizing Iran’s need to appear as the sole, legitimate voice of Muslims in the Gulf as opposed to Saudi Arabia. Last, this piece will address the strategic importance of an American presence in the Persian Gulf to fulfill President Obama’s pivot towards Asia. Tangled in an economic complex with the Middle East, major Pacific actors have made attempts to use their geographic back door in South Asia to secure natural resources, thus sustaining the growing trend of urbanization in Asia. Because of this, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review calls for a continued American presence in the Gulf as a key stratagem to check expanding Chinese power.

Conceptual Framework:

Proposed by Barry Buzan in his 2003 publication Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, regional security complex theory tells us that a relationship between two countries is often dictated by contextual factors rather than a direct binary balance of power dynamic. This checkers to chess dynamic is found in Southeast Asia where ASEAN states coordinate diplomatic, economic, and security interests according to a broader context of Chinese encroachment into the South China Sea. Furthermore, Buzan suggests that a security complex applies not only to states that share a region, but also implicates states that have shared economic and security goals in absence of shared borders. An example of this would be the seemingly puzzlingly and provocative rhetoric of Israeli statesmen who are factually out numbered and surrounded by opposition in the Middle East. However, when considering the added influence of American military power that backs Israel, it becomes clear that one cannot simply understand Israeli foreign policy in the region without first considering its dependent relationship upon the raw capabilities of the United States in projecting power onto countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

The application of this theory in the Persian Gulf helps to explain the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Evident in the coordinated relations of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, a security complex emerges that explains the alignment of foreign and defense policies in opposition to Iran. Placating to the politics of identity and culture, the complex provokes an arms and ideological race between Saudi Arabia and Iran that is executed by proxy across the region. The concern regarding this ideological race is not that it is fought over religious differences, but rather that their cold war is fought within the context of suppressing unalienable freedoms according to ethnic fault lines. Quite possibly warming the conflict to a more traditional shooting engagement, ideological grievances often result in genocidal war crimes. As a pretext to the grim reality of a coming ideological conflict between the two nations, Iran’s limited offensive role against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seeks to avoid, in the interpretive eyes of Saudi Arabia, this very scenario—despite Saudi’s open disapproval of ISIL’s advancements. Ultimately, neither country wants to engage in combat with the other, but their regional posturing is motivated by both an effort to omnibalance and offset an internal threat to stability while professing a legitimate claim to the Muslim caliphate to external entities. Most interestingly, F. Gregory Gause III, author of The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, poses an important question in this discussion: Can we consider the United States as part of the Persian Gulf’s regional security complex even though the country is not physically part of the region?

In order to answer this question, and others regarding the Persian Gulf security complex, we must first explore how the Gulf security environment has changed since the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Second, we will explore how changes in U.S. foreign policy have affected the region, highlighting significant issues that exist today whose solutions are a requisite to ushering peace and security into the region.

A Changing Gulf Security Environment:

At the close of the Iran-Iraq War in 1989, the Gulf security environment changed drastically in three ways. First, the international community developed an altered understanding of Saddam Hussein, and his desire for regional control. After eight years of bloody stalemate, it was clear that Hussein was committed to making offensive gains along Iraq’s borders, particularly if it included a deep-water port or improved access to the Euphrates River south of Basra. Second, there was a paradigm shift in the Westphalian system marked by the fall of the Soviet Union. The unilateral dominance of the United States across the globe introduced the world’s sole super power—capable of projecting military might to the farthest reaches of the globe. Third, following the Iraq War from 2003-2011, the balance of power shifted from a tripolar political dynamic between Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, to a bipolar system where Saudi Arabia and Iran were left to their own devices.

Though the Iran-Iraq War ended with over 400,000 killed, along with an additional 700,000 injured, neither Iran nor Iraq was able to make substantive land gains on either side of the mine-infested fields along the Euphrates. What did change, however, were the attitudes of both Iraqi and Iranian citizens, which created a nationalist fervor in both countries thus, informing the nature of the regional security complex that was to follow. For Iran, the country had successfully defended itself at great personal sacrifice, which united the newly established government with its people. Iraq, on the other hand, experienced the feelings of embarrassment and loss despite the conflict best characterized as a draw. Paranoid of being overthrown by is own people and feeling the pressure to act, Saddam engaged the ebbing tide of Iraqi nationalism and internal reconciliation process to put his military back to work by invading Kuwait. In tandem with the incessant need to conquer something in the region proving his military prowess and invigorating the floundering sense of Iraqi nationalism, Saddam Hussein publically declared several justifications for invading Kuwait. The first of these justifications was that Kuwait was allegedly stealing Iraq’s petroleum reserves, in conjunction with manipulating the energy market with overproduction in order to damage the Iraqi economy. As a result, and through the use of violence, Iraq attacked Kuwait increasing their littoral access from 30-miles of marshland originally proctored by the British, to 300-miles of coastline, which included Kuwait’s Shuwaikh Port—providing deep-water access to Iraqi sea vessels. In addition, perhaps, Saddam may have wanted to highlight to the world the West’s hypocritical tolerance for Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory, but intolerance towards Iraq’s semi-legitimate legal claim to Kuwaiti soil. Saddam’s understanding of this legal right is grounded in an Ottoman land-use agreement demarcating parts of present day Kuwaiti under the control of Ottoman governors residing in the sub-regional capital of Basrah, Iraq.

Another significant shift occurring after the Iran-Iraq War was the world’s perception of Saddam, and a new international understanding that Iraq was an aggressor towards other Gulf States. This belief was perpetuated across the globe and reinforced by Saddam’s prompt invasion of a sovereign Kuwait. It was believed that Iraq’s move to invade Kuwait in the immediate shadow of their eight-year stalemate with Iran indicated that “Saddam’s quest to dominate the Gulf” would continue. As a result the United Nations passed a Security Council Resolution condemning Iraq’s invasion and in January of 1991, the U.S. Congress voted to authorize the use of force to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The results of this vote represented two momentous transformations in the region, the first being the introduction of what would become a permanent U.S. military force—the first such permanent foreign presence in the Gulf since the exit of the British after World War II, and second the United States massed forces in Saudi Arabia establishing an American interventionist precedent in the heart of Islam’s holiest location. The massing of forces in Saudi Arabia not only loaned the name of American military power and might to the Saudis, but it solidified a formal military alliance, which turned the tables against Iran. After the United States’ impressive 100-hour ground assault driving Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, the door was open to the United States to establish a foothold in the region, giving the Americans a strategic upper hand in military and economic matters. It should be noted that though Iran was having its long-time Iraqi enemy destroyed by American forces, leadership in the Islamic Republic was concerned with the growing U.S. influence in the region. At the end of the ground campaign, President George H. W. Bush stopped short of marching to Baghdad and signed a bilateral agreement with Iraq, sparing the remaining Iraqi military units and leaving Saddam in power—Iran, among others, was disconcerted with this outcome, but had few bargaining chips to use with the U.S. embassy hostage fiasco fresh in the minds of American policymakers.

Coinciding with the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the collapse of the Soviet Union emphasized American military dominance and the new world order underwritten by its power. These international phenomena empowered America, and encouraged U.S. diplomats and military leaders to explore their newfound role as the world’s sole superpower. Because of their new position of leadership in the world followed by the resounding victory in Kuwait, the United States gained both soft and hard power for dealing with security issues in the Middle East. The growing influence of the United States in the region was epitomized by the 1995 reactivation of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, subsequently assigned a homeport in Khawr al Qulay’ah, Bahrain. The United States’ move to establish a permanent naval base in the Persian Gulf was a direct result of the conditions created in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War. Unfortunately this presence, along with U.S. naval vessels in Yemen, and combat troops in Saudi Arabia, served as the central grievance of Osama bin Laden subsequently leading to his denunciation of the West and eventually the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001.

Until the Iraq War began in 2003, the Persian Gulf was ruled by a conflicting triad anchored by Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. The creation and provocation of the Gulf Cooperation Council among the broader regional contest with Iran, was tempered by the often-roguish behavior of the third party, Iraq. After Iraq’s initial Gulf War defeat in 1991, President George H. W. Bush’s son, President George W. Bush, was determined to remove Saddam Hussein from power and disband the Iraqi Army at the insistance of key players from within his administration. After the ground assault on Iraq, the United States was able to quickly take control of Basrah, Nasiriyah, Najaf, and Baghdad over the span of two weeks. With the capture of Saddam Hussein and the consequent announcement ending major combat operations in Iraq, the Gulf’s localized tripolar dynamic was effectively dismantled and the United States was forced to intervene more directly in the regional balance of power. Shortly after the destruction of Iraq and its army, the United States existed in Persian Gulf with naval dominance of the waterways and air superiority over Iraq marking an interesting turn in the nature of the Gulf regional security complex, an interesting development in light of Gause’s original question about whether the United States is truly a part of the power balance in the Gulf.

In the wake of the Iran-Iraq War, the U.S. backing of Saudi Arabia, the dismantling of Iraq and the presence of the Fifth Fleet’s 40 ships, 175 aircraft and 21,000 personnel in Bahrain, the United States has become a critical member of the Persian Gulf security complex. Gause sums it up best when he writes “Washington is a direct, day-to-day player in Gulf politics now. Iraq is no longer a player, but a playing field.”

The Influence of U.S. Policy on Security in the Region:

The most effective faucets of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf are manifest in military alliances with Saudi Arabia and other GCC monarchies.With a decreasing dependency on Middle Eastern oil, a continued U.S. military presence in the Gulf is required to maintain healthy relationships. In 1993 the Clinton Administration developed a strategy known as “Dual Containment,” which, in shadow of Nixon’s failed “twin pillar” strategy, formally endorsed Saudi Arabia as the premier Gulf state by limiting regional influences stemming from both Iraq and Iran. In congruence with limiting Iraq and Iran’s regional capabilities, the United States sought to reinforce GCC coalition building by selling member states, particularly Saudi Arabia, “advanced weapons” ensuring interoperability and shared training doctrine. More interestingly, the United States has been comparatively quiet with regard to voicing concern over Saudi Arabia’s efforts to obtain nuclear energy to run desalination plants. In an effort to undercut Saudi Arabia’s claim to Gulf superiority after the fall of Iraq, Iran has reached out to the smaller littoral Gulf states in an effort to establish bilateral defense agreements with the intent of siphoning off support for Saudi’s assumed increased regional responsibilities. In addition to the full backing of Saudi Arabia by American foreign policy advisors, the U.S. military has also sought a strategic foothold in the region for their own diplomatic and military missions.

The American military plays an important role in the Persian Gulf beyond influencing regional politics. Actively patrolling the Indian Ocean and the Gulf Aden, the U.S. Fifth Fleet has undertaken the world’s responsibility of maintaining the open and free passage of the Strait of Hormuz, often under threat of blockade by Iran, and for battling Somali pirates preying on civilian tankers. In fact, the U.S. protects 17 million barrels of oil in total passing through the Strait of Hormuz everyday. Furthermore, American domestic energy policy affects the security environment in the Persian Gulf by decreasing sales, and therefore American dependency, on foreign oil. Until the end of the Bush Administration in 2009, it was forecasted that U.S. dependency on petroleum from Middle East states was on the rise. Accounting for 42% of all American oil imports, a significant portion of the 59% total from member-states of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 2005, it was forecasted in 2009 that American dependency would rise to 65% by 2020.

Conclusion:

Future diplomatic successes in the Persian Gulf will be built upon the shoulders of unofficial civilian diplomats engaged in Track II talks. Saudi, Iranian, and American non-governmental organizations can, and should, work together in tackling shared soft security challenges by capitalizing on proliferating technologies and ideas that seek to address climate change issues.

Two issues that must be resolved to increase peace and stability in the Persian Gulf are nuclear security and climate change. The weaponized use of nuclear power is a hard security issue, while climate change, and in particular water scarcity, is best characterized as a soft security issue. The word soft does not mean, however, that these issues are less important. In fact, some of the soft security issues may in fact have far greater effects on the residents of the Gulf, thus informing regional affairs in ways unaccounted for in Buzan’s regional security complex theory. Put best by Mary Luomi climate change exists as a ‘“threat multiplier” that can create or worsen intra- and interstate tensions.” Climate change’s affect on water is not limited to potable sources, but it is also driving sea levels higher, which for a country like Bahrain that depends on flood barriers, poses a serious threat. With successful collaboration in the private sector, it may just be possible to pave the road to success.

In the wake of the Iran-Iraq War and America’s Wars against Iraq in 1991 and 2003, it is clear that the Persian Gulf has faced a rapidly changing security dynamic that, to answer Gause’s original question, is underpinned by the introduction of the U.S. to the Persian Gulf regional security complex. Exhibited in the undeniable American influence in the region stemming from a full military presence, the United States has established itself as a permanent player in the Persian Gulf; a fact that will have an immense amount of influence in the foreseeable future with regard to the U.S. pivot to Asia.

Captain William Allen is a US Marine currently serving as company commander of A Co. 4th Combat Engineer Battalion, 4th Marine Division. Graduating from Columbia University’s Middle East Institute with a masters in Islamic Studies, Captain Allen is a Fellow with the Truman National Security Project and is currently serving as the Joseph S. Nye National Security Intern at the Center for a New American Security with their Technology and National Security Program. Captain Allen’s writings can be found here at the Center for International Maritime Security, as well as, the Small Wars Journal, and the International Relations and Security Network at ETH Zurich. The views expressed in his writing are his alone.

Works Cited:

Barry Buzan. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

F. Gregory Gause, III. The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

J. E. Peterson. “Sovereignty and Boundaries in the Gulf States: Settling the Peripheries” International Politics of the Persian Gulf, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011).

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen,. Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era(London: Hurst, 2011).

Lawrence Potter. “Persian Gulf Security: Patterns and Prospects,” in Iran and the West: Regional Interests and Global Controversies, Special Report, ed. Rouzbeh Parsi and John Rydqvist (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, March 2011).

Lawrence Potter. “The Persian Gulf: Tradition and Transformation,” Headline Series. (March 19, 2013).

Lawrence Potter. “Tripolarity” (class lecture, Security and International Politics of the Persian Gulf, Columbia University, New York, New York September 24, 2014).

Mari Luomi. “Gulf of Interest: Why Oil Still Dominates Middle Eastern Climate Politics,” Journal of Arabian Studies 1 no. 2 (2011).

Mehran Kamrava. “The Changing International Relations of the Persian Gulf,” in International Politics of the Persian Gulf, ed. Mehran Kamrava (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press)

Quadrennial Defense Review 2014. (Published by the Secretary of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf, March 4, 2014).

Unofficial U.S. Navy Site. (Published by Thoralf Doehring, http://navysite.de/navy/fleet.htm 2013).

Global Analysis, Members' Roundup

Members’ Roundup Part 17

March 13, 2015 Guest Author Leave a comment

Welcome back to another edition of the Members’ Roundup, where we share with the rest of the CIMSEC readership the great work that our members have produced elsewhere. From the geopolitical situation in the Indian Ocean region to military science-fiction, there will definitely be an article for every interest.

Automation has long colonised jobs that were once performed through manual labour; changes to military operations will be no less profound. In an article for a joint War on the rocks – Center for a New American Security on military robotics and autonomous weapons, Paul Scharre reminds us that beneath all of the technological developments is the human element driving the military application. Nations and militaries that are able to better understand the policy, strategic and operational challenges will be better placed to succeed on the battlefield. You can access his article here.

Over at Real Clear Defense, Emil Maine presents a stark assessment of the state of the United States’ munition stockpile. According to Maine: ‘unless policy makers act to raise discretionary caps on defense in the upcoming fiscal year, the severity of weapon shortfalls will only intensify.’ Given that the preference by coalition partners is to avoid committing boots on the ground, there will be a future need for a consistent supply of munitions in order to sustain the current rate of operations.

193636993 — Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18 crews prepare for another mission against ISIS.

This week we have two contributions from Vijay Sakhuja. The first is an article for the National Maritime Foundation, based in India, and it analyses the bilateral relationship between India and the Seychelles. President James Michel’s Blue Economy project presents many opportunities for cooperation, but how this will be implemented is the challenge. The second article features in the Nikkei Asian Review; Vijay discusses the nature of Chinese infrastructure development in the Indian Ocean region and the ‘maritime silk road.’ In spite of growing tensions, many Asian countries continue to invite Chinese investment, leading to a win-win situation.

CIMSEC’s very own Scott Cheney-Peters features in this week’s edition of the Roundup with his short story “Red Light Challenge” published on the Atlantic Council’s Art of Future Warfare website. The story is about a start-up team’s journey, with undertones of a hacker counterculture amongst the members, as they begin designing a flight-capable exoskeleton for the military. Throughout the piece, however, we see the human side during the project development; each character has their own traits and reasons for participating in the challenge. You can read Scott’s story here, as well as a follow-up interview about it here.

The Indo-Pacific region is rapidly emerging as a key focus of maritime geopolitics. In June last year, the Stimson Center and the Observer Research Foundation co-hosted a three-day conference titled Sea Change: Evolving Maritime Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific Region. Two CIMSECians were invited to speak at the event; Scott Cheney Peters presented a paper on U.S. security relationships in the region and Nilanthi Samaranayake presented on the strategic importance of island states in a region of great powers. A copy of the publication can be accessed through the Stimson Center’s website.

In the latest Proceedings Magazine, John Morton explains that the Third Offset Strategy needs more Mahanian thinking than meets the eye. Mahanian doctrine holds that a properly conceived national interest reflects the foundational sinews and national establishment of the era and must inform implicit long-term grand strategy. Today, the information age and globalised economy are what is important for long-term prosperity. You can read more of John’s article here.

Over at The National Interest there are three CIMSECians whose work I wish to draw attention to for this week’s edition of the Roundup. Zachary Keck reports that most Chinese citizens believe the PLA could seize islands in the East and South China Seas, even if the U.S. military were to intervene in the conflict. Earlier in the week, Keck cited a Heritage Foundation report that assessed America only had ‘marginal’ capacity to defend vital interests in the current threat environment. You can access that post here. Harry Kazianis continues the theme with an assessment of sequestration’s affect on America’s military readiness. Across the board, munitions levels are considerably low and it risks putting lives in danger. It is not, however, all doom and gloom. You can read more of Harry’s article to find out why. Kyle Mizokami presents his own roundup of the Top 5 most deadly anti-ship missiles of all time.

Finally, a quick and shameless spruik for my own work over at Young Australians in International Affairs. Earlier this week I wrote a blog post posing the question of what Australia’s military would look like if there was an opportunity to start with a blank canvas. Many of us in the military understand that force structure and procurement are constrained by fiscal and structural realities, but sometimes it is important to break down the fundamental requirements of national defence to truly understand what is needed to achieve the task.

At CIMSEC we encourage members to continue writing, either here on the NextWar blog or through other means. You can assist us by emailing your works to dmp@cimsec.org.

Follow @NamKhoaNguyen

Global Analysis, North America

The New US Maritime Strategy

March 13, 2015 Guest Author 1 Comment

Editor’s Note: The U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Marine Corps today released the revised maritime strategy, unveiling it at an event at CSIS. You can download it here, and access a fact sheet on it here.

By Joshua Tallis

A Cooperative Strategy Reboot

A Cooperative Strategy for 21^st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready (CS21R) is different from its 2007 predecessor in both tone and content in a number of critical ways. Some of the changes are merely those of diction, others those of new threats and previously ignored regions. Yet, all of these changes suggest an important evolution in the scope and attitude of the United States’ maritime services: the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.

Parsing the Tone

The Tone of CS21R is set early on as the document’s authors seek to explain why an adapted strategy has become necessary. First and foremost on this list is the budget, a note that mirrors the tenor of more recent strategy documents (see the 2014 QDR, for example), but is absent from the original 2007 version. Before the end even of the preface, written by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, the document makes reference to fiscal constraints. And this theme remains an undercurrent throughout the white paper.

In addition to budget, the document is quick to remark on the increasing complexity of the world’s dynamic threat environment. This too is found in Secretary Mabus’ preface, and continues through the foreword (signed by all three maritime service chiefs) and onward into the strategy itself. And again in this way CS21R sets itself apart from its predecessor. As the Chief of Naval Operation noted at the launch event at CSIS, the 2007 document was the product of a vastly different environment. Multiple conventional carriers were still afloat, the United States was heavily engaged on the ground in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and cyber was not yet the buzzword it has become in policy circles. In many ways the original document was a product of a wartime environment, one broad in scope but nevertheless clear in direction and purpose. The revised strategy favors the term complex where the earlier document uses evolved, a small change in diction that perhaps suggests a greater uncertainty in the future responsibilities of the maritime services. Yet, tone only suggests so much. The document, which is slightly longer than the original, provides greater content and thus a more sophisticated representation of its purpose than its predecessor.

Analyzing the Strategy

There are myriad ways one could parse the new document with respect to the old. It is vastly more robust in its attention to the cyber domain (which garners only side mentions in the 2007 version). It also pays far greater attention to Africa than the 2007 paper, which only mentions the continent once by name. In fact the revised version goes into far greater depth on all geographic regions, with a section (II) detailing each specifically. One unique change here is in a shift from the term ‘Asia-Pacific’ to a vastly more expansive ‘Indo-Asia-Pacific,’ defined as “spanning from the West Coast of the United States to the eastern coast of Africa.” (CS21R 3) This of course widely expands a geography the Navy in particular has had a growing interest in, though how it influences the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is unclear. China still features heavily in the document, and the service chiefs all noted that the country weighed on their minds as the document evolved. It is likely in response to China, as well as threats posed by Russia and Iran, that induced one of the greatest changes to the document, the addition of “All Domain Access” as a pillar of seapower alongside the more traditional columns of deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security. All domain access is defined as the “ability to project military force in contested areas with sufficient freedom of action to operate effectively.” (CS21R 19) This of course brings to mind anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenges posed chiefly by China, though the document indicates that this principle extends even into the cyber domain and the electromagnetic spectrum. (CS21R 21)

None of these changes will go unnoticed. Greater geographic specificity, the expansion of interest in securing the cyber realm, and the inclusion of a fifth pillar in the sea services’ conception of what seapower means are all ‘above the fold’ revisions to the original strategy. What may go unnoticed to those focused on traditional geopolitics is the documents marked increase in interest in maritime security. Human trafficking makes its debut in the revised document, while greater significance is given to those non-state threats mentioned in the 2007 white paper. The first section of the strategy detailing geopolitical changes since the publication of the first document is peppered with references not only to extremism and terrorism but also to transnational organized crime (TOC), the growing significance of population expansion in the littorals, and the threats posed by under-governed zones ashore.

As to be expected, each of the service chiefs highlighted certain portions of the cooperative strategy over others. When asked against what greatest threats the updated strategy was intended to prioritize, the Chief of Naval Operations pointed towards North Korea, Iran, Russia, cyber, and a host of non-state actors (mostly terror organizations such as Isis and Boko Haram). The Commandant of the Marine Corps also noted violent extremism, but leaned heavily on conventional threats such as Russia, China, North Korea and nuclear proliferation. The Commandant of the Coast Guard, however, highlighted throughout the launch event the primacy of a range of maritime security threats emphasized in CS21R. Chief among them was transitional crime, which the admiral estimates is worth $750 billion annually. The commandant also repeated the Coast Guard’s unique placement as a law enforcement operator with dozens of mutual legal assistance treaties negotiated across the world enabling easier Coast Guard access to littorals where other maritime forces may have operational restrictions.

International partners, most of whose navies are closer in scope and composition to the U.S. Coast Guard than the U.S. Navy, are a related component to this energized perspective on maritime security. The document makes continued reference to the need for partnerships, and Admiral Greenert noted at the launch that the document was already in the process of being translated to allow for greater dialogue with international partners. In West Africa, the Caribbean, Central America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia in particular, many of these partners’ primary concerns are of matters of maritime security, terrorism, and organized crime. The Coast Guard’s partner programs in the South China Sea and its counter-narcotics mission in the Caribbean and Central America were highlighted in the event as examples of maritime security cooperation outside of the traditional navy-to-navy framework.

Finally, the document goes into greater detail than its predecessor with respect to implementation. Section IV on force design included components on force readiness and composition, personnel, strategic development, and capabilities. At the launch, Admiral Greenert noted that the strategy captures how the navy is organizing, equipping, and training its sailors in new ways. General Dunford made reference to personnel and training shifts to precipitate in the coming years, guided in part by CS21R, and Admiral Zukunft emphasized that the Coast Guard was on the threshold of the largest recapitalization effort in the service’s history.

Conclusion

In many of the most significant ways, A Cooperative Strategy for 21^st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready is not so much a revision but a replacement of its 2007 incarnation. Longer, more detailed, more expansive, and more inclusive, the revised document builds heartily on the framework established eight years ago, the result being a document distinctly different in both tone and content. While great attention will no doubt be paid to many of these differences, equally important if perhaps subtler changes were made regarding how the maritime services face non-state issues, including the illicit traffic in people, narcotics, and weapons. As CS21R continues the tropes increasingly familiar in strategy documents—budget uncertainty, evolving threat complexity, a shift towards the Asia-Pacific—it brings the maritime services into a more nuanced, if perhaps ambitious, vision of what seapower will mean in the future.

About the Author

Since 2011 Joshua has served as the manager for research and analysis at Security Management International (SMI), an intelligence services provider in Washington, DC. Josh has co-authored several articles in the Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International with SMI associates. Since 2013 Joshua has also been a frequent contributor to spaceflightinsider.com, a member of The Spaceflight Group’s community of aerospace news websites. He is a PhD candidate at the University of St. Andrews’ Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, where he researches maritime security. Joshua is a Summa Cum Laude graduate of The George Washington University where he received a BA in Middle East Studies from the Elliott School of International Affairs.

Global Analysis

Distributed Lethality: An Update

March 12, 2015 Guest Author Leave a comment

Ed. note: VADM Thomas S. Rowden, USN, provided this update from San Diego after his original article received the most votes in the run up to CIMSEC’s Forum for Authors and Readers (CFAR) of those pieces our readers wanted to see discussed in person.

Congratulations to everyone involved in CIMSEC, and thank you for all you have done to advance understanding and debate about Seapower, especially American Seapower. I am grateful to your readers for their interest in the piece I submitted earlier this year, “Surface Warfare: Taking the Offensive”, and I only wish my schedule had allowed me to join you for the “Forum for Authors and Readers” on February 26^th[Ed note: videos online now]. Hopefully, this update will keep me in good standing among CIMSEC boosters.

We in the Surface Force are embarking upon a serious intellectual deep dive into the very nature of what we do and what we CAN do, an inquiry that seeks to capitalize upon the two of the most important attributes surface forces possess—mobility and persistence. Part of this inquiry is concerned with a concept we are developing known as “Distributed Lethality”, an idea that we were still forming when I wrote the piece above and referred to it as “dispersed” lethality. You can learn more about Distributed Lethality by reading about it in the January issue of Proceedings, or by watching the second half of my Surface Navy Association 2015 speech beginning at the 25:45 mark. Properly understood, Distributed Lethality combines an opportunistic and steady increase in unit lethality over time with innovative methods of operating those units together, the goal of which is to create a new range of operational problems for potential adversaries and hold numerous and diverse targets he values at risk. As I have written, increasing unit lethality without new and innovative operating patterns sub-optimizes the investment, while new and innovative operating patterns without enhanced unit lethality assumes unacceptable risk. Both activities are required for Distributed Lethality to have impact.

Working across the Surface Force—the Fleet, OPNAV, the Systems Commands, the training organizations, and ONR—we are looking at ways of getting more combat punch out of the platforms and payloads we already field by asking simple questions and then aggressively seeking answers. We are applying elements of the thinking of talented navalists like Captain Wayne Hughes and Captain Jeff Klein at the Naval Postgraduate School, CDR Phil Pournelle at OSD, and Dr. Jerry Hendrix at the Center for a New American Security to the real problems of resource constraints and evolving threats.

We are taking the long view on Distributed Lethality, aiming at a horizon of 2030 for our planning purposes but with steady progress from year to year and POM to POM. I spoke at SNA of this being a “generational” effort, and I meant it. There will not be a lot of splashy, overnight successes along the way; rather, there will a series of opportunistic capability upgrades where they make the most sense at the right times. But first, we must lay the intellectual groundwork for moving in this direction, and that is what will comprise much of the work we do in 2015.

A team of surface warriors across the enterprise is working hard to put meat on the bones of the articles and speeches made thus far, fleshing out the concepts and supporting concepts of Distributed Lethality, not to mention identifying the overarching concepts into which it must fold. Eventually, a small team will begin traveling to the numbered fleets and COCOMS to engage in a two-way dialogue designed to expose planners to what our thinking is, and to vest our concept development team with an updated appreciation of the operational factors most at play in the various areas of responsibility (AOR).

Additionally, we are working with the Naval War College to frame appropriate war-games and analytical venues to allow us to identify near-term, high-impact lethality upgrades and to ensure that our thinking is not in violent conflict with established methods of doing business. I frame the previous sentence the way I do because I am not ignorant to the possibility that what we are suggesting with Distributed Lethality could be potentially disruptive to current thinking about large scale maritime campaigns and war-at-sea. I honestly don’t think we would be doing our jobs very well if we weren’t constantly evaluating the status quo in search of more effective and efficient methods of delivering Seapower from the Surface Force. I hope CIMSEC readers would agree.

In the meantime, little victories are accumulating, and the logic behind Distributed Lethality becomes clearer. Earlier this month, Naval Air Systems Command and Raytheon conducted a test demonstration of a Tomahawk Block IV missile that received off-board guidance to intercept a moving surface target. Getting back into the over-the-horizon ASuW game is a central thrust of Distributed Lethality, and this interesting re-purposing of the Tomahawk is exactly the kind of opportunistic, straightforward capability upgrade that we seek. Think about the utility and flexibility of a Tomahawk sitting in a VLS cell that can strike fixed land-targets, moving land targets, or moving maritime targets. One missile, three very different targets. Apply that thinking across other munitions and projectiles, and we really begin to provide gritty operational problems to adversaries grown used to our defense crouch.

Before I close, let me once again reinforce the centrality of high value unit defense and Strike Group operations to Surface Warfare. Nothing we do in Distributed Lethality should be seen as taking away from our historic and necessary role in enabling naval power projection by helping to protect CVN’s and ARG’s. We start from the proposition that HVU operations and defense is our main mission, and then work to create operational problems with more lethal and distributed surface forces from there. Our proposition is that the Surface Force can do more, and we’re going to take the time necessary to study and analyze that proposition in order to get it right.

Thanks again for the opportunity to provide this update, and keep up the great work. CIMSEC is establishing itself as an intellectual powerhouse in maritime matters, and I am proud to play a small part.

Vice Admiral Thomas S. Rowden is Commander, Naval Surface Forces. A native of Washington, D.C., and a 1982 graduate of the United States Naval Academy, VADM Rowden has served in a diverse range of sea and shore assignments.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.