Category Archives: Europe

Analysis related to USEUCOM

Kiev Calling

“I saw the ravages of the famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine- hordes of families in rags begging at the railway stations, the women lifting up to the compartment windows their starving brats, which, with dumbstruck limbs, big cadaverous heads and puffed bellies, looked like embryos out of alcohol bottles.”- Arthur Koestler (The God that Failed)

Background and History

Ukraine has enjoyed true independence from Russia for only a short period of time in its history with the establishment of a republic after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991.  For its entire history prior, it has been a vassal of Russian imperialists.  Even the etymology of Ukraine translates roughly to Borderlands.[1]  Through Russian and Soviet history, Ukrainian plains and farmland have served as a strategic breadbasket, with wars for control of the territory being fought not only by the Russians/Soviets, but Cossacks, Ruthenians (ancestors of modern Ukrainians), Poles, Lithuanians, Turks, Tartars, Swedes, Austro-Hungarians, and Germans.

The boundaries of the region of Ukraine through history are exactly what can be expected for a borderland… they are fuzzy.  They have shifted east and west, north and south, with populations shifting over centuries, but with a center of gravity focused on a Ukrainian people.  It was in the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 that Ukraine got its first glimpse of independence.  Three powers emerged in the territory- the Organization for the Ukrainian Nation (OUN), the Cossack Hetmanate of Ukraine with the mandate of an imperial fiefdom, and the Bolshevik-associated Directorate of Ukraine.  Ultimately in the Russian Civil War it was the Directorate that won the fight in Ukraine, establishing the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1919, and was formally admitted to the USSR in 1922.[2]

 

It was under the rule of the USSR and Joseph Stalin from 1932-1933 that this breadbasket faced the extreme measures that Russians would go to in order to ensure political domination.  During the Holodomor (Death by Hunger), the Soviet government diverted food deemed “surplus” to other parts of the USSR, causing the deaths of somewhere between seven and twelve million Ukrainians.[3]  The official Soviet census in 1926 showed a population of 29,018,817, with an estimated growth rate of 2.65%.  By the time the next census was taken in 1939, there should have been a population of 40,770,506, however there was only a population of 30,946,218.  That is a loss of over nine million people.[4]

Photo Credit: Connecticut Holodomor Awareness Committee
Photo Credit: Connecticut Holodomor Awareness Committee

After the Holodomor the USSR pursued a policy of encouraging the migration of Russians into Ukraine.  In 1926, Russians accounted for 9.2% of the Ukrainian population, while in 1939 Russians accounted for 13.4% of the Ukrainian population.  After the transfer of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954, the 1959 census showed Russians accounting for 16.9% of the Ukrainian population.  By 1989, Russians accounted for 22.1% of Ukrainian population, and the Ukrainian census of 2001 showed Russians at 17.2% of the population, with political domination in the east of the country, and in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.[5]   Since the Holodomor, the Russian population in Ukraine has doubled through the effects of the famine and Soviet migration policies.

Ukrainians continued to vie for independence throughout the Soviet era.  Labeled as counter-revolutionaries and agents of the Bourgeoisie as a cover for continued domination,[6] the OUN in exile to Western Ukraine/Galicia (then part of Poland) continued to organize a fight for independence.  That fight came with World War II when Poland was invaded.  First, the USSR annexed Western Ukraine/Galicia into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (which remains part of Ukraine today), and then the German Wehrmacht Heer invaded the USSR.  First were the Germans and their puppet government, then there were Ukrainian Soviet partisans, and then there was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA)- militant wing of the OUN.[7]  These entities fought a three-sided war.  Later, with the formation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic were included as separate founding nations, but their policies were controlled by Moscow, giving the USSR three votes in the General Assembly.[8]

After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Ukraine declared its independence, but remained a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  The question since that time was if Ukrainians would remain vassals to the Russian Federation, or would they begin to look west?  Since independence, the Russian Federation has pursued a policy of ensuring Ukraine remains in their sphere.  Of the four Presidents to serve in office, two of them were elected from the regions of Ukraine dominated by ethnic Russians.  The first president, Dr. Leonid Kravchuk was a Western Ukrainian, and pursued policies that minimized Russian influence on newly independent Ukraine.[9]  Both Leonid Kuchma[10] and Viktor Yanukovych[11] pursued policies bringing Ukraine closer to Russia, while the majority of Ukraine’s population supported joining the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Orange Revolution, 2004. Photo Credit: Kyiv Post
Orange Revolution, 2004. Photo Credit: Kyiv Post

This clash reached critical mass for the first time during the 2004 Orange Revolution, which saw ethnic Ukrainian Viktor Yushchenko take the Presidency,[12] along with Yulia Tymoshenko as Prime Minister.[13]  It was the poisoning of Yushchenko in particular that helped rally Ukrainians to the Ukrainian opposition coalition focused on breaking from Russian influence.[14]  However, after years of administrative mismanagement and political infighting, Yanukovych and his Party of Regions regained power in 2010.[15]  Tymoshenko, who ran for President in 2010 and was considered Yanukovych’s strongest potential opponent for the Presidency, was imprisoned on corruption charges in 2011.[16]  This historical question of Russian influence on Ukraine and Ukrainian politics sets the stage for current events.

Euromaidan 2014

Photo Credit: Global Voices Online
Photo Credit: Global Voices Online

It was in 2013 that protests began when a widely supported political association and free trade agreement with the EU was not signed by President Yanukovych, after the Russian Federation offered Ukraine a 15 billion USD loan.[17]  Those protests reached critical mass and became full riots in February 2014 at State Regional Administrative centers across Ukraine.  The Kievan Maidan became a warzone, seeing Ukrainian Police Forces fighting an armed camp of protestors, with dozens of casualties and fatalities on both sides.[18]

On 22 February, the Yanukovych administration collapsed.  Parliament turned on the ruling Party of Regions, impeaching and issuing arrest warrants for the President and Parliamentary leadership, with former Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Oleksandr Turchynov taking over as Acting President, [19] and former Foreign Minister Aresniy Yatsenyuk taking over as Acting Prime Minister.[20]  Yanukovych has since fled to Rostov-on-Don, the administrative center of the Southern Federal District of the Russian Federation, with his security detail.[21]  The new government also purged officials from the Party of Regions, as well as dissolved the Berkut (Riot Police).[22]

Russian Flag is Raised in Kharkiv, Ukraine. Photo Credit: Doctrine Man
Russian Flag is Raised in Kharkiv, Ukraine. Photo Credit: Doctrine Man

As political power shifted in Kiev, Russian President Vladimir Putin began to take a firmer tone on the turmoil in Ukraine.  He ordered 150,000 Russian troops to begin exercises along Ukraine’s border.[23]  Furthermore, Russian Naval Infantry troops began taking up positions outside of the Cossack Bay Naval Base, and an armed militia calling itself the Crimean People’s Brigade occupied strategic points around the Crimean Peninsula, raising the Russian flag over the Crimean Parliament in Sifremepol and two airports.[24]

Crimean People’s Brigade paramilitary holding positions outside Simferapol Airport.  Photo Credit: CNN, http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/dam/assets/140228065721-02-ukraine-0228-horizontal-gallery.jpg

Crimean People’s Brigade paramilitary holding positions outside Simferapol Airport. Photo Credit: CNN
Crimean People’s Brigade paramilitary holding positions outside Simferapol Airport. Photo Credit: CNN

The Current Situation

As of today escalation of the conflict is distinctly possible.  The Ukrainian government announced that they had retaken airports and Parliament of Crimea with no casualties, and that the Armed Forces stands ready to defend Ukrainian territorial sovereignty.  The Ukrainian government has also accused the Russian Armed Forces of already placing approximately 6,000 troops in Ukrainian territory.  Later in the day, President Putin requested the Russian State Duma authorize the use of force in Ukraine for the purpose of restoring order and protecting Russian citizens, which is similar to the authorization for force in the Republic of Georgia in 2008.  The United States and NATO in turn have warned the Russian Federation that interference with Ukraine would have consequences- although it is unclear if those consequences are diplomatic, economic, or military.[25]

Photo Credit: Contemporary Issues & Geography
Photo Credit: Contemporary Issues & Geography

Mr. Putin Does Not See Alaska from His House

In Russia… President Assassinate You! Photo Credit: Funny or Die
In Russia… President Assassinate You! Photo Credit: Funny or Die

President Putin has been quoted as saying that Ukraine is not an independent state, and for all intents and purposes,[26] except for some brief periods of time (1991-1994, and 2005-2011), he has been correct.  Ukraine has had a voice, but that voice was controlled by Moscow.  In his viewpoint, Ukraine is no different from any autonomous republic that is a subject of the Russian Federation, and its “independence” is merely a formality, such as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic’s vote in the UN General Assembly.

Ukraine is in essence considered not only a satellite of the Russian Federation but part of its territorial integrity.  Any break with Moscow could therefore be seen as an existential threat to Russian sovereignty, let alone a break that sees Ukrainian membership in the EU and NATO.  The center of Vladimir Putin’s political power lies in his strength as an executive, and maintaining influence over Ukraine plays a critical role in maintaining that strength.

Furthermore, Ukraine plays a strategic role to the Russian Navy.  The Crimea hosts one of the Russian Navy’s few warmwater ports, and the Crimean Peninsula itself is a strategic pivot point for the entire Black Sea, and serves as the Russian Navy’s logistical hub for projecting power into the Mediterranean Sea.[27]

In this case, President Putin is not concerned with the ambitions of the Ukrainian people, or sanctions that can be imposed on his state.  The potential loss of Ukraine is an existential crisis both politically and militarily.  The Russian Federation could tolerate diplomatic and economic sanctions.  It has the largest territory of any independent state in the world, with 143 million people, and vast untapped natural resources.[28]  Just as the USSR was able to develop isolated from the rest of the world,[29] so too could Vladimir Putin’s Russian Federation if it had to.

Policy Options: Do You Want the Rock or the Hard Place?

The United States has two options for actions that it can take: leave the issue alone or stand and fight for Ukrainians’ right for self-determination.  Out of these two options there is a middle ground- mediating between the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

The first option is that the United States leaves Ukraine to fend for itself.  Under this option the Russian Federation would launch a full invasion of the Ukraine once it became clear the United States would not intervene, and the maintenance of territorial sovereignty would be up to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.  The Russian Armed Forces have 766 thousand personnel on active duty, and over two million in reserve; while the Ukrainians have 159 thousand personnel on active duty, and one million in reserve.  The Russian Federation spends 4.4% of its GDP with a budget of 90.7 billion USD (32,381.29 USD per service member), while Ukraine spends 1.1% of its GDP with a budget of 1.9 billion USD (1,639.34 USD per service member).[30]  In short, Russian troops will tend to have better quality training and equipment than their Ukrainian counterparts, and if Russian troops invade the Ukrainian Armed Forces may not be able to hold positions on the flat terrain that composes the majority of the country.  The exception is in the Carpathian Mountains in the west of the country.

Relief Map of Ukraine. Map Credit: Wikimedia Commons
Relief Map of Ukraine. Map Credit: Wikimedia Commons

The main reason why the United States would not intervene would be primarily due to a lack of political will- war weariness from Afghanistan and Iraq.  Such an action would have an effect on the American treasury and cost American lives if the Russian Federation does not decide to withdraw after American troops intervene.  There would also be concerns if American troops, having not fought a conventional war since the 1990s, and having a force that came to age learning counterinsurgency will not fight effectively against Russian troops.

The second option is that the United States and NATO intervene to defend Ukraine against Russian aggression.  In terms of ground forces, U.S. European Command  (EUCOM) has the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment, the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, and the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade at its immediate disposal, with the 3rd Infantry Division and 1st BCT, 1st Cavalry Division are Regionally Aligned Forces stationed in the Continental United States.  This adds up to a grand total of approximately 9,000 troops that can be used immediately, with an additional 21,000 that can be deployed shortly thereafter.[31]  The best deployment of these limited ground forces would be for the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment to be deployed to eastern Ukraine in order to serve as a deterrent for Russian ground forces.  The 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team could be used to assist in isolating Russian forces on the Crimean Peninsula.  A small force could hold the only land link to the rest of Ukraine, the Isthmus of Perekop, which is only 7 km wide at its widest, while a larger force could hold the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s Main Supply Route over land, the Kerch Strait Bridge, a chokepoint that connects the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian Federation.  Aside from the American forces, the full weight of NATO’s military landpower can be focused on Ukraine.

Map Credit: Wikimedia Commons
Map Credit: Wikimedia Commons

The crux of support that EUCOM could provide to the Ukraine would be in terms of air and seapower.  Allied Air Forces could establish expeditionary air bases both in Ukraine and in Romania that could be used to both support defense of Ukrainian airspace and transportation.[32]  Additionally, the U.S. Army has one Patriot Missile battalion stationed in Germany to assist Ukrainian Air Defense Forces.[33]  A NATO combined task force could then theoretically blockade the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Cossack Bay.  The prospect or reality of the Russian Black Sea Fleet being humiliated by NATO naval and air forces, along with the possibility of a land invasion resulting in further escalation with a distinct possibility of a Russian military embarrassment after meeting NATO conventional forces of similar size, could hold a much worse political impact to Putin than not holding the Ukraine.

The third option is that the United States could focus on mediating between the Ukraine and the Russian Federation.  This is the option where Ukraine might have to cede territory to the Russian Federation.  Ethnic Russians get to maintain their ties to the Motherland, ethnic Ukrainians get to look westward, the Russian Federation maintains its naval installations, and avoids warfare that would prove economically devastating.  In short everyone saves face.  Such an option would involve negotiating either the direct transfer of territory or the offer of a referendum by administrative region.  In the case of a direct transfer of territory, the low end of the offer could be the Crimean Peninsula, with the high end being the Russian regions of Ukraine.  Under a referendum, Ukrainian Security Forces could ensure security of polling stations, with OSCE Observers validating results.  The likely results would have Ukraine losing about a third to half of its territory to the Russian Federation, but in turn Ukraine would be free to determine its own fate, and the Russian Federation would save face.

Map Credit: Wikimedia Commons
Map Credit: Wikimedia Commons

Recommendation and Conclusion: Negotiate

Misguided pride in former glory is a poor reason to start a war, and it is important that as a matter of policy that allowing a war to be fought is the last option.  It is also important to prevent Ukrainians from losing the independence they had sought for.  The best option is the one where a solution is negotiated.  Ukrainians want to break from the Russia Federation, but Russian Ukrainians want to remain with them.  The best solution is to let the Russian Ukrainians go, and let the Russian Federation feel that their interests have been best served, while ensuring the Ukrainians are able to join with the EU and NATO.  Using full force will only serve to harm American interests, while doing nothing will only encourage other actors to make bolder moves in the face of American power.

Robert C. Rasmussen is a graduate of the MA International Relations program at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs, and the CAS Security Studies program with SU’s Institute for National Security & Counterterrorism.  He has served as a Fellow with the New York State Senate, and has interned with National Defense University’s Center for Complex Operations, and the U.S. Military Academy’s Network Science Center.  He also serves as a Sergeant with the New York State Guard.  The views in this article do not reflect those of the Department of Defense, the New York State Senate, or the NYS Division of Military & Naval Affairs.


[1] “Ukraine,” Online Etymological Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=Ukraine&allowed_in_frame=0.

[2] “Ukrainian History: Chronological Table,” Guide to Ukraine, http://ukraine.uazone.net/.

[3] Davies, R.W., and S.G. Wheatcroft, “The Soviet Famine of 1932-33 and the Crisis in Agriculture,” Challenging Traditional Views of Russian History, ed. S.G. Wheatcroft, New York: MacMillan, 2002, 69-91.

[4] Figures based on estimated normal population growth rate compared with Census data.

[6] Lenin, Vladimir I., “Hanging Order,” Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/ad2kulak.html, 11 August 1918.

[7] Brooke, James, “Don’t Underestimate Ukraine,” Voice of America, http://blogs.voanews.com/russia-watch/2014/01/29/dont-underestimate-ukraine/, 29 January 2014.

[8] “Member States,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml.

[9] “Leonid Kravchuk,” President of Ukraine, http://www.president.gov.ua/en/content/history_kravchuk.html.

[10] Eke, Steven, “Profile: Leonid Kuchma,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2283925.stm, 26 September 2002.

[11] “Profile: Ukraine’s Ousted President Viktor Yanukovych,” BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25182830, 28 February 2014

[12] “Profile: Viktor Yushchenko,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4035789.stm, 13 January 2010.

[13] Profile: Yulia Tymoshenko,” BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-15249184, 22 February 2014.

[14] Rosenthal, Elisabeth, “Liberal Leader from Ukraine was Poisoned,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/12/international/europe/12ukraine.html?_r=0, 12 December 2004.

[15] Harding, Luke, “Yanukovych set to become President as Observers say Ukraine Election was Fair,” The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/08/viktor-yanukovych-ukraine-president-election, 8 February 2010.

[16] Karimi, Faith, “Yulia Tymoshenko Walks out of Prison, and Back Into Ukrainian Politics,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/23/world/europe/ukraine-yulia-tymoshenko-profile/, 23 February 2014.

[17] Snyder, Timothy, “Don’t Let Putin Grab Ukraine,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/opinion/dont-let-putin-grab-ukraine.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0, 3 February 2014.

[18] “As It Happened: Ukrainian Police Storm Kiev Protest Camp,” BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26244542.

[19] Urquhart, Conal, “Ukraine MPs Appoint Interim President as Yanukovych Allies Dismissed- 23 February as it Happened,” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/ukraine-crisis-yanukovych-tymoshenko-live-updates, 23 February 2014.

[20] Grytsenko, Oksana, “Arseniy Yatsenyuk Nominated to Lead New Government as Ukrainian Prime Minister,” http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/on-kyivs-independence-square-tonight-arseniy-yatseniuk-nominated-as-prime-minister-to-lead-new-government-337700.html, 27 February 2014.

[21] “Ousted Ukraine President Viktor Yankovych Appears at Russian Press Conference,” Wall Street Journal, http://live.wsj.com/video/viktor-yanukovych-resurfaces-in-russia/7DAD2A1D-7E35-4338-A838-CC5BB008D636.html#!7DAD2A1D-7E35-4338-A838-CC5BB008D636, 28 February 2014.

[22] Urquhart, Conal, “Ukraine MPs Appoint Interim President as Yanukovych Allies Dismissed- 23 February as it Happened,” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/ukraine-crisis-yanukovych-tymoshenko-live-updates, 23 February 2014.

[23] Prentice, Alessandra, and Richard Balmforth, “New Ukrainian Ministers Proposed, Russian Troops on Alert,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/26/us-ukraine-idUSBREA1G0OU20140226, 26 February 2014.

[24] Gumuchian, Marie-Louise, Laura Smith-Park and Ingrid Formanek, “Gunmen Seize Government Buildings in Ukraine’s Crimea, Raise Russian Flag,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/27/world/europe/ukraine-politics/, 27 February 2014.

[25] Herszenhorn, David M., Mark Lander and Alison Smale, “With Military Moves Seen in Ukraine, Obama Warns Russia,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/01/world/europe/ukraine.html?hpw&rref=world, 28 February 2014.

[26] Marson, James, “Putin to the West: Hands Off Ukraine,” Time, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1900838,00.html, 25 May 2009.

[27] Lally, Kathy, “Russian Forces in Ukraine: What Does the Black Sea Fleet Look Like?”  Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-decides-to-send-troops-into-crimea-what-does-the-black-sea-fleet-look-like/2014/03/01/38cf005c-a160-11e3-b8d8-94577ff66b28_story.html, 1 March 2014.

[28] Central Intelligence Agency, “Russian Federation,” CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html.

[29] Zickel, Raymond E., “The Russian Revolution & the Soviet Union,” The Soviet Union- a Country Study,” Ed. Raymond E. Zickel, Washington: Library of Congress, 1989, http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/Soviet1.html.

[30] “IISS Military Balance 2013,” International Institute for Strategic Studies.

[31] “Units and Commands,” U.S. Army, Europe, http://www.eur.army.mil/organization/units.htm.

[32] U.S. European Command, www.eucom.mil.

[33] “Units and Commands,” U.S. Army, Europe, http://www.eur.army.mil/organization/units.htm.

Ukraine: Sink or Swim

Ще не вмерла України і слава, і воля

Ukraine has not yet perished, nor her glory, nor her freedom
Upon us, fellow Ukrainians, fate shall smile once again.

These words of the Ukrainian National Anthem are full of passion, but they are a key to understanding the dynamics of the events and determination in Kiev. What pushed thousands of people to remain in Majdan Square for 3 winter months in spite of more than 70 victims? Clausewitz’s trinity of passion, chance, and reason is in some way applicable to today’s situation in Ukraine. There is clearly passion, and chance was evident in that this was the second opportunity for revolution – the first being the Orange revolution of 2004-2005. Now reason must govern a way forward full of compromises. For those in the U.S. public who would like to be more informed about these events, a series of questions arises:

– What Happened and Why?
– What Comes Next?
– What is the Larger Meaning for U.S. Interests and Strategy?

The direct cause of the protest was President Yanukovich’s rejection of the European Union Association Agreement. Aleksander Kwasniewski, former president of Poland, said that protests were predictable as one half of Ukraine wants to join the EU and the other half was persuaded by Yanukovich for three years that the agreement should be signed. So nearly everyone was surprised when the agreement was discarded.

Commenters often talk about two parts of Ukraine that are very different. This is true, there is a difference in culture, religion, and business preferences, which comes from history. But both parts want to live in independent Ukraine, without neighbors interfering in domestic matters, and they want to have a chance to realize their ambitions. For many of us this sounds natural, sentimental, or simply trivial. This is a very old nation but very young state. Ukraine gained independence for a brief period between 1918 and 1920 and most recently again in 1991. Not surprisingly they are very sensitive to problems of national independence. Nationalism is strong and could be equally constructive or destructive. The fact that Ukraine was and continues to be very important to Russia, doesn’t help. And it makes a difference. We speak about the vital interests of a former hegemon and a country that has the ambition to regain its status as a world-class power.

So what comes next? We should start with the simple statement that the situation is unpredictable and volatile. There are at least two reasons for that. One is the pace of change and dynamic course of action, full of unexpected turns. Using an analogy to Boyd’s OODA Loop, Majdan acts inside the decision loop of any potential opponent. The second reason is that given the history of the country and the very short period of independence, Ukraine needs time to work on the many soft elements constituting a state: well-crafted law and respect for the rule of it, transparency, accountability, democratic traditions, mature political elites, and so on. This alone is challenging without speaking of external circumstances. The biggest and most immediate threat to Ukraine’s stability is the legitimization of the new President and the economic situation. Such arguments have already been raised by Russian Federation officials, according to Reuters:

“We do not understand what is going on there. There is a real threat to our interests and to the lives of our citizens,” Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev was quoted by Russian news agencies as saying.

“There are big doubts about the legitimacy of a whole series of organs of power that are now functioning there.”

Russian naval vessels in Sevastopol, Ukraine.
Russian naval vessels in Sevastopol, Ukraine.

Strong rhetoric is not a mere ghost from the past. It is a sign that other tools from the Soviet epoch could also find their way into the hands of state leaders. We could witness subtle diplomacy interweaving with hard politics. The references to Russian citizens are especially worrisome. It seems natural, but we shouldn’t forget that there is a strong ethnic Russian minority in Crimea [who reportedly “elected” a Russian citizen as mayor this week] and that Sevastopol is a major naval base for Black Sea Fleet. The situation seems to be serious enough to cause a series of public statements by officials from both the United States and Poland.

Bronisław Komorowski, President of Poland considers honest and transparent presidential elections, producing an undeniable outcome, as a top priority. This was quickly countered by Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, who stated, “We consider it premature to hold presidential elections in Ukraine in May, as it contradicts the agreement dated February 21.”

On Feb 23rd, the U.S. State Department on Twitter said “US expects Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic freedom of choice to be respected by all states”.

Prof. Stanislaw Koziej, Chief of BBN (Poland’s National Security Counsel) expressed his concern more directly: “Intervention in Ukraine by foreign power would have significant consequences for international security”.

In order to facilitate strategy shaping for dealing with Ukraine, Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski offers his long-term vision in an article titled “Ukraine Should Join EU, but No Military Alliance” and says “In brief, the Finnish model is the ideal example for Ukraine, and the EU, and Russia.”

From the geo-strategic point of view, the big problem is that any formal or institutional link of Ukraine with the EU drastically limits Russia’s options and potential to influence this country.

What does this mean for the United States? Even if it doesn’t seem to be a priority, Ukraine’s future could have many indirect and strategic consequences. If the United States really believes in its values, it needs to respect the sovereign decision of Ukrainians. However, any chance of a scenario in which a weak Ukraine becomes a satellite state to Russia, would certainly resonate in all of Central Europe. That means adapting strategy, military modernization programs, and priorities at the NATO Summit in Wales, UK. A Strong or stronger Russia in this region is also an argument in favor of the “Three-Hub Navy” proposed by Brian McGrath.

But even then the hub in the Mediterranean still wouldn’t be among the top strategic priorities until we will assume that a powerful Russian Federation is a link between Europe and Asia. Russia is absent from most discussions about the Rebalance to the Pacific or events in China’s Near Seas, perhaps because the focus is on South China Sea. The way the Russian Federation is going to protect their interests in the Far East and Arctic, and interact with major players there, is likely to impact perceptions of security at least in Central Europe if not in the whole of Europe.

Any discussion about the future of Ukraine is impossible without considering the broader context in which Russia plays a key role. It has been this way for centuries. Poland is ready to offer its own experiences with the transformation process, which was long and painful, but the U.S. is probably the only power capable to persuade an assertive Russia.

Przemek Krajewski alias Viribus Unitis is a blogger In Poland. His area of interest is the context, purpose, and structure of navies – and promoting discussion on these subjects in his country.

Escape from Sochi: Montreux Convention Considerations and the Moneyball Fleet

Snake Plissken: A good solution for a 1 person rescue, not a 10,000 person NEO.
Snake Plissken: A good solution for a 1 person rescue, not a 10,000 person NEO.

The Russians are not ready to host the Olympic Games.  Everything from the hotel roofs to the perimeter security leaks like a sieve.  10,000 American Citizens are going to be in town for the games and will need to get out quickly in the event of a terrorist attack or public health emergency.

We are one day from the Opening Ceremonies of the 22nd  Winter Olympics and the early reporting from Sochi is damning: active kinetic security operations against Chechen forces are underway, wanted posters of known terrorists litter public places and the tap water has been deemed unsafe to bathe with, let alone drink.  In response to the potential threat against Americans visiting Sochi for the games—and recognizing the constraints of warship tonnage permitted to cross the Turkish Straits by the Montreux Convention—the United States’ European Command (EUCOM) has deployed the 6th Fleet Flag Ship, USS Mt. Whitney (LCC-20) and the guided missile frigate, USS Taylor (FFG-50) to the Black Sea. While bolstering the regional command and control (C2) / multi-agency liaison capability, the deployment of these two ships does little to provide additional sources of emergency egress to American citizens in Sochi due to their limited passenger capacity, small flight decks and absence of well-decks.  There is, however, a way to meet both operational requirements and the requirements set forth in the Montreux Convention: THINK MONEYBALL

Montreux Convention Primer

montreux

“The Montreux [Switzerland] Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits” was a 1936 agreement (subsequently amended) giving Turkey sovereign control of the Bosporus Straits and Dardanelles—the waterway passages from the Mediterranean Sea (Aegean Sea) to the Black Sea.  The agreement was negotiated by Australia, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Japan, the USSR, the UK, Turkey, and Yugoslavia as a strictly enforced body of regulations for vessel transits of the straits replacing the previously unrestricted navigation protocol under the 1923 League of Nations Treaty of Lausanne.  The convention places limitations on the number, types and tonnage of warships, overall tonnage of merchants / warships permitted to cross into the Black Sea by non-Black Sea bordering countries both individually and as a whole at any one time.

The Sabermetrics of Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

Distilled to its essence, NEO is concerned with the removal of civilians from an at-risk location and transporting them somewhere more secure as expeditiously and safely as possible.  In order to achieve the speed and safety requirements, naval task forces engaged in NEO should have the following capabilities:

2006 Lebanon NEO during Israel – Hezbollah War, USS Nashville (LPD-13)
2006 Lebanon NEO during Israel – Hezbollah War, USS Nashville (LPD-13)

– Surge-ready command and control spaces sufficient to plan and execute a joint, multi-agency (potentially multi-lateral), multi-axis NEO

– A flight deck capable of landing CH-53s, MV-22s, CH-47s, MH-60s – a variety of versatile helos

– A well deck capable of embarking Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) / Landing Craft Utility (LCU)

– A fleet surgical team with operating rooms, triage, and isolation

– Overflow berthing / open spaces to erect large numbers of cots

– Messing and sanitary capacity for hundreds of evacuees

– The ability to embark Naval Expeditionary Combat Command / special warfare personnel for the conduct of security operations and / or special operations

Moneyball: Deploying the Right Ships for Sochi (and Building Smarter Task Forces for the Future)

Turkey has been an extremely unreliable partner over the past eleven years.  As demonstrated by their reneging on a commitment to allow the US Army’s 4th Infantry Division to attack Iraq in 2003 as well as their preventing the USNS Comfort from entering the Straits to deliver Georgia humanitarian aid during the South Ossetia War with Russia in 2008, the United States should not count on Turkey to waive Montreux Convention limitations on tonnage and numbers of warships in the event of an evacuation contingency.  The 6th Fleet Commander (COMSIXTHFLT) needs to plan with forces on station in the Black Sea without an expectation of reinforcements.

ships
Moneyball: Major surface combatants that are Montreux Compliant look sexy and deliver “Credible Presence,” but lack the sabermetrics necessary to conduct a large scale NEO.

Whereas “Moneyball” is usually tied to limitations of budget, in this case it is tied to limitations of tonnage and numbers of ships.  COMSIXTHFLT needs to squeeze the maximum NEO sabermetrics into his Sochi Task Force.  To that end, I have highlighted the LCS-1, LPD-17, JHSV-1 and MLP-1 as ideal candidates for a Sochi NEO.  While the LCC-19 is an ideal C2 platform for coordinating a multi-lateral, multi-agency, Joint NEO—it lacks a sufficient flight deck / well deck to make a large contribution to the transport of evacuees.  Single mission ships went out of vogue generations ago, and make even less sense for a Sochi NEO—especially when you consider that command / liaison elements can embark an LPD-17, JHSV-1 or MLP-1 to exercise C2 while the respective ships are actively participating in LCAC / helicopter  transport of evacuees.

Beaches and piers provide prime egress points for a Sochi NEO
Beaches and piers provide prime egress points for a Sochi NEO

A good NEO plan is all about options of egress (i.e. fleeing in an orderly fashion).  Sochi International Airport features only two runways and is highly susceptible to uncooperative wind patterns that routinely halt flight operations.  In the event that the 2014 Winter Olympics turns into “Escape from Sochi,” the 6th Fleet ships on station in the Black Sea will need to exercise an organic NEO capability beyond C2 and liaison.  Going forward, NEO Task Forces should organize and plan around a sabermetric list of requirements that is agnostic to hull types and otherwise irrelevant traditional warfighting mission sets.

 

Nicolas di Leonardo is a member of the Expeditionary Warfare Division on the Chief of Naval Operations Staff, as well as a graduate student of the Naval War College.  The opinions expressed here within are solely his, and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the Expeditionary Warfare Division or the Naval War College.

The Albanian Navy in Action

The Republic of Albania, which joined NATO together with Croatia in 2009, has had an interesting relationship with its own maritime forces over the past two decades. Until the onset of economic crisis in 1996, the Albanian Naval Force consisted of approximately 145 vessels, many of which were obtained from China or the Soviet Union for the sole purpose of coastal defence. Illustrative of this focus on countering outside aggression, 45 of the Albanian Naval Force’s vessels were Huchuan-class torpedo boats manufactured in China.

With the onset of economic crisis in 1996, much of Albania’s maritime forces were decommissioned. Even prior to the collapse of the country’s communist regime in 1990-1991, the navy had entered a state of decline. The pride of the fleet – four Whiskey-class submarines obtained from Soviet benefactors – had essentially been mothballed by the end of the 1980s. Albania, despite its commanding position at the point where the Ionian Sea meets the Adriatic, had become a non-factor in naval affairs.

But the Albanian Naval Force has begun to experience a profound resurgence in recent years. Even prior to the country’s NATO accession, Albania committed in 2007 to participate in Operation Active Endeavour. This maritime operation is responsible for monitoring traffic in the Mediterranean Sea, intercepting illicit arms or narcotics shipments and enhancing the security of legitimate shipping in general. Since joining NATO, Albania has ramped up the modernization and expansion of its maritime forces as well. Whereas the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania once deployed sleek torpedo boats and predatory Soviet submarines in its defence, the Republic of Albania is actively acquiring patrol vessels to police Albanian waters and combat organized crime groups.

The mainstay of the new Albanian Naval Force is the Damen Stan 4207 patrol vessel, designed in the Netherlands but built for the most part in Albania. As of 2013, four vessels of this class are now in service on Albania’s coasts. It is worth noting that this design was the inspiration for the Canadian Coast Guard’s own Hero-class mid-shore patrol vessel, and that 35 vessels of the Damen Stan 4207 design are currently operated by 13 countries. The Albanian Naval Force backs up these four quality patrol vessels with an additional 27 vessels of various classes, most of which are patrol boats obtained from either the United States or the Italian Coast Guard.

But why is Albania dedicating so much of its resources toward the development of its maritime forces? The total cost of procuring the four Damen Stan 4207 patrol vessels is estimated to have been $45 million alone. The reason for this significant investment may be South Eastern Europe’s growing role as both a source of, and a transit point in, the trade of illicit narcotics. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Albania has emerged as the fourth most common country of provenance for heroin, behind only Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. Lazarat, located in the far south of Albania, has emerged as one of Europe’s most significant centres for cannabis cultivation and the production of such cannabis-related products as hashish. Another UNODC report estimates that Albania itself is home to only 3,000 to 5,000 injection drug users, indicating that heroin entering Albania is hardly meant to remain there. Rather, the 2012-2015 UNODC Regional Programme for South Eastern Europe pegs the market value of heroin trafficked from this region to Western Europe at approximately $13 billion a year.

While some quantity of cocaine, heroin, and cannabis may take a circuitous route by land through Albania, Montenegro, and other South Eastern European countries until it reaches the territory of European Union member states, Albania’s geographic position opens up other options. The Albanian city of Vlorë is less than 100 kilometres from the Italian port of Otranto, separated only by the narrow strait that lies between the Ionian and the Adriatic proper. There are likely other sea routes which can be employed by organized crime. The Albanian Naval Force of the past would have not been well-disposed toward the interception of criminal elements transporting narcotics between these ports and others. But new patrol vessels have enhanced Albania’s capacity to address this security challenge and, with the enhanced cooperation NATO membership brings, Albania is better able to coordinate patrols and interdictions with its Italian partners.

The substantial increase in drug seizures along Albania’s coasts since 2006 is a positive sign. There is still some room for improvement in the area of inter-agency cooperation, however. On the eve of its NATO accession, Albania established an Inter-institutional Maritime Operations Centre (IMOC), intended to foster close cooperation between the Defence and Interior Ministries (as well as military and law enforcement personnel by extension). As noted in a recent review of Albania’s National Security Strategy though, IMOC has thus far been constrained by overlapping legislation and bureaucratic friction. Reforming the Albanian Maritime Code and other relevant aspects of the country’s legal framework may be necessary to ensure the efficiency and efficacy of Albania’s maritime operations.

Fortunately, the momentum is with the Albanian Naval Force in the struggle against regional narcotics trafficking. Continued support from NATO and its member states will further discourage organized crime, ending the exploitation of this proud country as a transit point for harmful drugs.

This article was originally published by the NATO Council of Canada.

Paul Pryce is a Junior Research Fellow at the Atlantic Council of Canada. With degrees in political science from universities in both Canada and Estonia, he has previously worked in conflict resolution as a Research Fellow with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. His research interests include African security issues and NATO-Russia relations.