Category Archives: Capability Analysis

Analyzing Specific Naval and Maritime Platforms

Capability Analysis, Current Operations, Europe

Naval Logistics, The “Mediterranean Corridor,” and the Pivot to the Pacific

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By Alex Calvo and Pol Molas

The logistical side to the US Pivot to the Pacific. One of the aspects not often discussed of the US “Pivot to the Pacific” is that it is not just combat forces (US Army, US Air Force, US Navy and US Marine Corps) moving, but also the Military Sealift Command, which constitutes the cornerstone of logistical support for US operations all over the world. Just to get an idea of its size, if this command’s ships belonged to another nation they would be the fourth-largest navy in the world. As a consequence, NATO European members must reinforce their logistical capabilities.

The best-prepared naval forces to achieve this are the Royal Navy (the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, to be more precise) and France’s Marine Nationale. Germany is beginning to boost her global-scale force projection capabilities, limited to date due to well-known historical reasons. Now, the economic crisis and ensuing budget cuts are providing added impetus to the development of shared capabilities. While there is a growing pressing to achieve this, it is nothing new. For example, we can mention the United Kingdom and the Netherlands as a model of force integration, with their UK/NL Landing Force. By the way, there is a Catalan angle to this. Anglo-Dutch cooperation in amphibious operations dates back to the 1704 landing in Gibraltar, where a 350-strong Catalan battalion under General Bassett also took part. Therefore, should a future Catalan contingent join the UK/NL Landing Force, they would just be coming back home. Another significant example are the three Baltic Republics, which combine their naval forces in the BALTRON (Baltic Naval Squadron).

Barcelona and Tarragona Harbours: two key dual-use infrastructurs in the Western Mediterranean. When we talk logistics, one of its key elements are ports. It is precisely when countries are pondering how to cut costs that the concept of dual-use infrastructures comes to the fore. In this area, the ports of Barcelona and Tarragona can make a much greater contribution that they do at present. Right now, other than the occasional port visit by the US and other Allied navies, they are not the permanent home of any Spanish Navy unit. Furthermore, despite healthy growth in terms of tonnage, much of their necessary connecting infrastructure remains incomplete. In particular, a European gauge connection to the French railway network. However, in addition to featuring in plans for a future Catalan Navy, they could also become an strategic asset for NATO, being home to a portion of the Atlantic Alliance’s logistical units in the Mediterranean Theatre.

It is not just a matter of size. Both infrastructures are located in areas sporting a concentration of industry and transportation links. These links must certainly be improved, in line with the EU’s 2013 decision to confirm the “Mediterranean Corridor” as a key element of the Old Continent’s transportation networks. This label refers to a railroad transportation axis connecting cities and ports along the Spanish southern and eastern seaboards to France. Since most EU member states also belong to NATO, there is no reason to expect any discrepancy between the two organizations when it comes to the logistical map of Europe.

The benefits on the civilian economic front of completing this infrastructure have already been explained at length by myriad economists, such as for example Ramon Tremosa, currently serving as member of the European Parliament, who has written extensively on the project and worked hard as a lawmaker to see it come to fruition. This explains the support of the French Government and the European Commission, which have rejected alternative proposals to drill a tunnel in the Central Pyrenees, connecting Spain and France through the Aragon region. From a naval logistics perspective, this alternative plan would not have benefited NATO and allied navies to the same extent, since it would have meant bypassing Tarragona and Barcelona. The benefits of the “Mediterranean Corridor”, on the other hand, also extend to the field of defense. For example, should NATO’s Response Force (NRF) need to project one of its battle groups in a crisis scenario, we may ask ourselves whether Toulon, Marseilles, and Naples harbors would suffice. While it would not be impossible, it may make it harder to label it a rapid-reaction force.

Tarragona Harbor

The Pivot to the Pacific rests on a strong NATO and a secure Mediterranean. The US Pivot to the Pacific, and more widely the growing coordination among the maritime democracies in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region, are based on the assumption that the Mediterranean will be secured by NATO. Thus, any move reinforcing security in this body of water has a direct, positive, impact on the struggle for the rule of law at sea in the Indian-Pacific Region. A struggle, let us be realistic about it, that is surely to be bitterly tested in the future ahead. As a historical reminder of the connection between the two regions, we may mention the failed British strategy to defend Singapore. Built at a time of scarce resources, the naval base was supposed to provide the necessary facilities for a strong naval and air force to be moved in the event of a crisis, without the expense involved in a permanent presence. However, the need to protect home waters, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean, meant that all that London could send were HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, sunk by Japanese land-based naval aircraft in the South China Sea in the opening days of the Second World War in the Pacific.

Conclusions. Barcelona and Tarragona are key dual-use facilities in the Western Mediterranean, whose naval logistical potential to date has not been fully exploited. Their worth will multiply once the “Mediterranean Corridor”, backed by Paris and Brussels, is completed. Their potential contribution to NATO is growing as pressure on defense budgets forces countries to get as much bang for the buck as possible, and as moves to reinforce the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region make it imperative to fully secure the Mediterranean.

Alex Calvo is a guest professor at Nagoya University (Japan) and member of CIMSEC, Pol Molas is a naval analyst and regular contributor to the Blau Naval blog

Asia-Pacific, Capability Analysis, History

China’s Military Modernization: The Legacy of Admiral Wu Shengli

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This article originally featured on the Jamestown Foundation’s China Watch. You can view it in its original format here.

By Jeffrey Becker

Earlier this month, Caixin reported on another round of Chinese military promotions, highlighting the youth and operational experience of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) newly minted generals (Caixin, August 12). Moreover, in roughly two years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will hold its 19th Party Congress, a critical time to enact important military and civilian leadership changes. One change that is all but certain to occur as the PLA continues to promote a new generation of leaders is the appointment of a new PLA Navy (PLAN) commander. While rumors swirled in the Hong Kong press before the 18th Party Congress in 2012 that long-tenured PLAN Commander Admiral Wu Shengli might retire or be appointed Defense Minister, neither of those scenarios occurred (China Leadership Monitor [CLM], January 14, 2013). Instead, Admiral Wu remained PLAN Commander, becoming the oldest member of the Central Military Commission and one of the longest tenured commanders in China’s naval history. [1]

With no more than two years left before his likely retirement, it seems appropriate to begin looking back on the career of one of the PLAN’s most influential and successful commanders. This article attempts to begin that process. The challenges Wu faced and overcame in his early career provide insights into his leadership as PLAN commander. Additionally, Wu’s career has spanned the largest and fastest buildup in the PLAN’s history. Examining the Chinese Navy’s greatest accomplishments under his tenure may therefore help point toward future directions the PLAN could take under the possible candidates to succeed him in the post-Wu era.

A Product of China’s Revolutions

Admiral Wu’s early life and military career reflects some of the most tumultuous periods in modern Chinese history–the war of resistance against the Japanese, the Chinese civil war and establishment of the People’s Republic, and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Born in August 1945, Wu was raised in Zhejiang Province as a well-known “princeling” (太子)–the son of the famous Wu Xian, a Red Army political commissar during the Anti-Japanese war and the Chinese Civil War. Indeed, Wu is purported to have been given the name shengli (“victory” 胜利) in commemoration of the victory over Japan (Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015). After the wars, the elder Wu held important political positions, to include mayor of Hangzhou and vice governor of Zhejiang. Although Wu was raised by his father in Zhejiang, his family’s ancestral home is in Wuqiao County, Hebei Province, about 200 miles south of Beijing. [2]

Wu joined the PLA in August 1964, and began studying at the PLA Surveying and Mapping College in Xi’an, earning a degree in oceanography in 1968 (Guoqing, February 1, 2012). His timing was fortuitous, as his affiliation with the PLA likely helped shield him as the Cultural Revolution decimated Chinese social, government and Party institutions in what amounted to a low-intensity civil war. Over 12 million of Wu’s generation, including current senior PLAN officers, were forced to work on rural communes as part of China’s “sent down youth” movement. [3] As a member of one of the only institutions left standing, however, Wu was saved from this fate by joining the PLA. However, given what we know about the Cultural Revolution’s impact on the nation’s academic institutions, the quality of training he received in Xi’an was highly questionable, and Wu would not receive formal training again until 1972, when he attended the captain’s course at the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy. [4]

After Xi’an, Wu’s early career was spent gaining experience as a surface warfare officer in the East and South Sea Fleets in the 1970s and 1980s, serving as both commander of the East Sea Fleet’s (ESF) 6th Destroyer Flotilla and as deputy chief of staff for the Shanghai Naval Base. The fact that future President Jiang Zemin was serving as Shanghai Party secretary at this time has led some PLA-watchers to speculate that Wu may have cultivated ties with Jiang. [5]

Yet Wu and his colleagues lacked combat experience. The closest that Wu is known to have come to combat was as the commander of the ESF’s 6th Destroyer Flotilla, when he had authority over the FrigateYingtan (CNS 531), one of the vessels which took part in the 1988 Johnson South Reef skirmish with Vietnam. [6]

In 1992, Wu became chief of staff of the ESF’s Fujian Support Base. This was soon followed by an appointment as commandant of the Dalian Naval Vessel Academy, a highly influential post, which allowed him to affect the direction of training for future PLAN officers. Wu returned to the ESF as a deputy commander in 1998. He was appointed South Sea Fleet (SSF) commander in 2002, and promoted to vice admiral in 2003. In 2004, he became one of the few naval officers to serve as a deputy chief of the PLA General Staff, a position equivalent to a commander of one of China’s seven Military Regions and the second-highest-ranking operational officer in the PLA Navy (Center for China Studies [Taiwan], June 5).

Shepherding the PLAN’s Transition

Wu’s background, family connections and professional experiences made him a strong candidate for top leadership roles. Thus, when cancer forced Admiral Zhang Dingfa into retirement in 2006, Wu was promoted to PLAN Commander just as the navy was on the cusp of an organizational transformation. In 2004, Hu Jintao gave his landmark address on the PLA’s “New Historic Missions,” which declared that China’s interests abroad were expanding, and that the PLA had an important role to play in defending those interests (Xinhua, June 19, 2006).

This new direction provided the PLAN with a substantially increased role in the implementation of China’s national security and military engagement policy. For Admiral Wu and his contemporaries, this challenge was exacerbated by years of isolation from the international naval community, which, along with the domestic effects of the Cultural Revolution, led to a dramatic erosion of professional and technical skills, as well as a severe decline in human capital and basic quality of life within China’s navy. [7] Indeed, Admiral Wu seems to have personally taken an interest in improving the quality of life of China’s sailors. Wu’s writings include details about the difficult and backwards conditions onboard PLAN ships earlier in his career, noting how PLAN sailors routinely “would go into port but not go ashore, eat while squatting on deck, hold meetings on folding stools and sleep on metal siding.” [8]

This makes Admiral Wu’s success in overseeing the PLAN’s transformation all the more compelling. While he and members of his cohort were responsible for overseeing a rapidly transforming navy, complete with formally trained officer candidates, they themselves had only limited formal training. Though tasked with preparing the PLAN to conduct blue water operations, the navy Wu Shengli had joined was still overwhelmingly a coastal defense force. Despite these challenges, within a few years of assuming command, the PLAN would be conducting anti-piracy escort operations in the Gulf of Aden, evacuating Chinese citizens far from China’s borders, (first in Libya in 2011 and later in Yeman in 2015), and participating in progressively more complex multinational maritime exercises, including the U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific exercise in 2014 (RIMPAC-14) (China Brief, April 3; China Brief, May 1; Also see “Six Years at Sea… And Counting”).

Viewed in this context, what Wu and his contemporaries have accomplished in transforming the PLAN has been even more remarkable. The PLAN Commander and his staff must have truly been followed Deng Xiaoping’s aphorism to “cross the river by feeling the stones,” in part learning as they went about modernizing the PLAN and partly relying on younger, more technically trained PLAN officers–individuals who constitute the next generation of PLAN leadership. The history of China’s naval transformation in the 2000s has yet to be written, but understanding how Admiral Wu and his advisors managed this will be fascinating reading when the details come to light.

Improving USN-PLAN Relations

Navies often play the lead role in a country’s foreign military relations, and after having spent almost a decade developing the personnel relationships and diplomatic acumen that facilitates international engagement, Admiral Wu has in many ways become the face of the PLA abroad. Nowhere is this influence more apparent than in the PLAN’s growing engagement with the United States Navy (USN). Throughout this time, Admiral Wu has been a constant presence, meeting with each of the past three U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). In 2014 alone, CNO Greenert met with Wu on four separate occasions, the most of any foreign navy leader (USN, September 8, 2014).

Like any PLA officer with whom the U.S. Navy interacts, Admiral Wu’s talking points have been carefully selected and vetted by the Party. His statements in official settings reflect what the Party views as primary objectives for the military-to-military exchange. However, Wu’s long years of experience appears to have helped create a degree of stability in the U.S.-China navy-to-navy relationship not seen in the past. The two navies have worked together in multiple settings, including in the Gulf of Aden and in Hawaii at RIMPAC-14. They have conducted reciprocal port visits in Zhanjiang, San Diego and Hawaii, established the Code of Conduct for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) through cooperation in the Western Pacific Navy Symposium (WPNS) and continue to move forward on additional confidence building measures (Xinhuanet, April 23, 2014; Xinhuanet, December 14, 2014).

At the same time that the PLAN appears to have pushed its relationship with the U.S. Navy to new heights, the PLAN continues to play a vital role asserting China’s interests closer to home. For Admiral Wu, this ability to do both simultaneously reflects an adept and skillful use of maritime diplomacy. As China continues this assertive behavior however, this skillful balancing act may become increasingly difficult to maintain. Moreover, as Wu Shengli moves closer to retirement, his experience in helping manage this tension will surely be missed.

The Chinese Navy in the Post-Wu Era

While PLA decision making has become more transparent, opaque factors, including personal connections, family relationships and ever present corruption, make predicting who Wu’s successor will be impossible. That however, has never stopped China analysts from putting forth possible candidates for future promotion. With that in mind, the following three officers have been discussed at length as possible candidates to replace Admiral Wu:

Admiral Sun Jianguo: As the PLA’s deputy chief of staff in charge of intelligence, Admiral Sun is the second highest-ranking operational officer in the PLA, a position that Admiral Wu once held before becoming PLAN Commander. [9] Unlike Wu, Admiral Sun’s experience has largely been as a submariner, and he has captained both conventional and nuclear submarines, including those involved in espionage missions in the Taiwan Strait. [10] However, as a contemporary of Wu’s (Sun was born in 1952 and joined the PLA in 1968), he would be 65 by the 19th Party Congress, and thus would likely serve only an abbreviated tenure as PLAN commander.

Vice-Admiral Tian Zhong: A less likely but interesting alternative choice is Tian Zhong, who earlier this year was transferred from his former position as North Sea Fleet commander to deputy PLAN Commander, a position that provides him a seat on the PLAN Party Standing Committee. Relatively young at 59, Tian’s has moved through the ranks at a rapid pace. In 2007, he was promoted to NSF Commander after serving only a year as NSF chief of staff (Center for China Studies, August 3). Perhaps more tellingly, Tian was the youngest and lowest-ranking PLAN officer to serve on the CCP Party Central Committee. While still a fleet commander, Tian served on this elite organization alongside PLAN Commander Wu Shengli, PLAN Political Commissar Liu Xiaojiang and Admiral Sun Jianguo (Xinhua, November 14, 2012).

Vice-Admiral Jiang Weilie: Like Tian Zhong, former SSF commander, Jiang Weilie also became a PLAN commander in 2015. Jiang appears to be something of a technocrat, having served in the PLAN Equipment Department in 2010. [11] This is a highly unusual career move–few operational officers spend time in technical departments, a separate career track. [12] While in this department, Jiang was tasked with overhauling the PLAN’s equipment acquisition systems, after which he was rewarded with a fleet command. As the PLAN seeks to replace Wu’s international engagement experience, it should be noted that Jiang has also had multiple engagements with his U.S. Navy counterparts, most recently traveling to Hawaii in 2014 to serve as China’s VIP during its first-ever participation in RIMPAC-14 (Phoenix Online, July 22, 2014).

Conclusion

Whoever is selected as Admiral Wu’s replacement will be taking charge of a dramatically different force than the one Wu Shengli took command of in 2006. Thanks in part to his leadership, China’s navy today is far more capable, active and engaged with the rest of the world. It is staffed by more professional and formally trained personnel than at any time in China’s recent history, and enjoys a stable and robust working relationship with the USN and other international navies in large part due to his years of experience in maritime diplomacy and careful cultivation of relationships.

Notes

1. Although former PLAN Commander Xiao Jingguan nominally served as PLAN Commander for almost 30 years from 1950 to 1979, he was effectively sidelined during much of this time as a result of factual political infighting during the Cultural Revolution.

2. Jeffrey Becker et al., Behind the Periscope: Leadership in China’s Navy (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, 2013), p. 136

3. This includes for example current North Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Yuan Yubai. Before joining the PLAN in 1976, Admiral Yuan spent two years as a full-time member of his “Basic Line Education Work Team,” in Gongan County, Hubei Province. “Work Teams” were ad-hoc organizations invested with local authority during the Cultural Revolution. Jeffrey Becker et al., Behind the Periscope: Leadership in China’s Navy, p.183.

4. Cheng Li, “Wu Shengli – China’s Top Future Leaders to Watch,” Brookings, accessed March 18, 2015.

5. Ibid.

6. Yang Zhongmei, China’s Coming War: The Rise of China’s New Militarism (中國即將開戰: 中國新軍國主義崛起) (Taipei: Time Culture Press, 2013), p. 210–211

7. Admiral Liu Huaqing’s biography provides some exceptionally painful examples of just how far the PLAN had fallen immediately following the Cultural Revolution. See Liu Huaqing, Memoirs of Liu Huaqing, (刘华请回忆录), (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004), pp. 417-432.

8. Wu Shengli, “Beginning to Bid Farewell to Sleeping and Eating Aboard the Ship in Port: The Lifestyle Revolution for Chinese Sailors,” PLA Life (Jiefangjun Shenghuo; 解放军生活), no. 9 (2010).

9. Jeffrey Becker et al., Behind the Periscope: Leadership in China’s Navy, p. 173.

10. Shih Min, “Hu Jintao Actively Props up ’Princeling Army,” Chien Shao, April 1, 2006, no. 182.

11. Ma Haoliang, “High-Ranking Officer Adjustments in the Navy with a Focus on Having a Technologically Strong Military (海軍將領調整 凸顯科技強軍),” Ta Kung Pao, February 9, 2011

12. Kenneth Allen and Morgan Clemens, The Recruitment, Education, and Training of PLA Navy Personnel(China Maritime Studies Institute, 2014).

Asia-Pacific, Capability Analysis, History, New Initiatives, North America

‘Indo-Asia Pacific’ Explained: An Assessment of US Maritime Strategy 2015

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In March 2015, the United States published a new maritime strategy document titled ‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’ (Strategy-2015). It supersedes the one of the same title published eight years ago in October 2007 (Strategy-2007). It is the first maritime strategy to be released after the US announced its ‘Rebalance to Asia’ in 2011, and comes amidst seminal developments with far-reaching geopolitical and security ramifications. This view-point attempts to analyze Strategy-2015, including in comparison to Strategy-2007.

Jointness and Political Interface

Strategy-07 was the first-ever combined strategy of the three US Sea Services (Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard). Strategy-2015 maintains this feature, with is appropriate since the maritime environment is essentially ‘joint’’, and therefore, any strategy relating to the maritime realm cannot be a single-service articulation. Besides, due to fiscal uncertainties the US is facing today, an inter-service synergy is necessary to avoid duplication of resources and optimise investments for capability development.

Notably, unlike the 2007 document, the new strategy contains a ‘Preface’ by the Secretary of the Navy, which indicates an enhanced political interface with the Sea Services, possibly in terms of both oversight and support of the higher national leadership.

Indo-Asia-Pacific

The new strategy contains an explicit focus on the region that it calls the “Indo-Asia-Pacific.” While US officials have been increasingly using this phrase, the 2015 Strategy document is the first official articulation. The inference is two-fold:

• First, it denotes the realisation of the ‘inadequacy’ of ‘Asia-Pacific’ to address the emerging geopolitical, economic and security dynamics of the rising Asia.

• Second, while the phrase ‘Indo-Pacific’ has become more prevalent in Asia since 2007, the US preference to use “Indo-Asia-Pacific” indicates that it wishes to be part of Asia’s ‘rise’ and derive the attendant gains.

Ends, Ways and Means

The term ‘strategy’ is defined as an articulation of ‘ways’ and ‘means’ to achieve the ‘ends’. In this context, Strategy-07 was merely a ‘primer’ to strategy. It referred to ‘ends’ in very broad terms, without going into specifics of security challenges. It avoided naming countries, either as adversaries, or allies and partners. While it mentioned maritime threats like piracy, it did not contextualize these with specific areas. It was also frugal in expounding on the ‘ways’ and ‘means.’

In comparison, Strategy-15 is a detailed articulation. It echoes the spirit of the US ‘Rebalance’ policy in terms of China’s naval ascendency as both an opportunity and a challenge. It seeks to temper Beijing’s revisionist stance and dissuade its politico-military assertiveness through multifaceted engagement. It is also more forthright in defining the “military challenges”, such as the “Russian military modernization (and) aggression” and the (Chinese) “anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities that challenge our global maritime access….” Furthermore, it is more explicit on the ‘geography’ of piracy, the effects of religious radicalism and the fundamentalist groups. In terms of the ‘ways’ and ‘means’ too, Strategy-2015 reveals as much as a document in the public domain possibly can. It provides much detail on the US plans to allocate forces for the ‘Rebalance.’

Strategic and Operational Access

Since the middle of 20th century when the US rose to superpower status with the ability to influence events worldwide, unimpeded strategic access to the global commons and freedom of operational manoeuvre have been the cornerstones of its military strategy.

While Strategy-2007 did acknowledge the operational salience of dominating the realms of space, cyber and the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum – as integral to sea control, for instance – it conceived strategic access largely in the geospatial context: sea, land and air. Strategy-2015 goes beyond this to seek access and freedom of action in any domain—the sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace, as well as in the EM spectrum. In all likelihood, this is a declaration meant to counter China’s declaratory policy of A2/AD in the western Pacific, including the asymmetric challenges in the space, cyber and EM domains that Chinese military forces may impose upon their US counterparts.

Forward Presence and Partnership

Strategy-2007 had laid much emphasis on forward presence of the US Sea Services as essential for a major power like the US that seeks inter alia to shape developments in its areas of interest, be better prepared to respond to adverse contingencies, deter and dissuade potential adversaries, reassure allies and friends.

While maintaining the emphasis on forward presence, Strategy-2015 also explains how the US intends to achieve this more effectively, both operationally and fiscally. It adds that the forward naval presence would enable a quick and seamless access to the US joint military forces, if and when the occasion demands.

Given that resource limitations envisaged by the US Sea Services, ‘forward naval presence’ is closely enmeshed with the need to develop partnerships with local maritime forces. The Thousand Ship Navy (TSN) concept propounded by the US Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Mike Mullen in 2005 was rephrased as the ‘Global Maritime Partnership’ (GMP) initiative in Strategy-2007. As a set of informal arrangements, the GMP was also intended to “send powerful messages to would-be aggressors that we will act with others to ensure collective security….”

Strategy-2015 furthers the appeal for the partnership, now rephrased as a “global network of navies.” The document effectively communicates to the potential partners the rationale for such “plug and play” cooperation with the US forces sans “commitment.”

Force Design and Employment

Strategy-2015 describes “a force that balances warfighting readiness with our Nation’s current and future fiscal challenges.” This statement seems to be the mainstay of the force design and employment strategy of US Sea Services.

Strategy-2007 had laid down the intent to “tailor” maritime forces “to meet the unique and evolving requirements particular to each geographic region.” Strategy-2015, possibly driven by fiscal prudence, seems to have adopted a less ‘ambitious’ approach. It aims only to “align (existing) capability, capacity, and platforms to regional mission demands…by ensuring that our most modern and technologically advanced forces are located where their combat power is needed most.” It also seeks to enhance the effectiveness of naval forces by employing “new warfighting concepts… and…. innovation.” The innovations stipulated by the document include increasing forward-basing of forces “to reduce costly rotations…” and developing modular platforms like Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) to enable swapping mission modules in lieu of costly ship rotations.

In sum, Strategy-2015 is not only a quantum improvement over the preceding strategy document of 2007, but also sets a model for the other existing and emerging major powers to emulate in the interest of transparency in military concepts and capability development. Such transparency is essential among maritime-military forces that operate in the international medium, and particularly those belonging to the “Indo-Asia-Pacific” region that is becoming increasingly volatile, as recent developments indicate.

Captain Gurpreet S Khurana, PhD is the Executive Director, National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Indian Navy, the NMF or the Government of India. He can be reached at [email protected].

Capability Analysis

OK, Explain Again Just Why the American Taxpayer Should Pay For All This (Series Finale)

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OK, Explain Again Just Why the American Taxpayer Should Pay For All This

This article, the sixth of the series, presents reasons why Congress and the American taxpayer should pay for all the drones, buoys, railguns and the additional necessary ships to deploy them at sea introduced earlier in the series. Some of the justifications briefly discussed below are sure to be familiar to the reader, some less so. In either event, please feel free to mentally rearrange them according to your own priorities. Read Part One, Part Two, Part Three, Part Four, Part Five. 

Expensive Assets

These are not inexpensive assets that can be squeezed into the Navy’s spending plans somehow. With a likely cost of $3 billion plus for the CVLN and CARN classes, less the cost of at least one, possibly two DDGs that a CARN replaces in a carrier task force and $2 billion plus cost for an AORH, Congress and the American taxpayer are going to have to be persuaded to purchase these as additional assets for the Navy. So why should they do so?

Deterrence

Adding large quantities of ISR and ASW drones along with a dozen, or more, railguns as a matter of routine will provide a credible defense against the increasing A2AD threat the Navy faces. Presenting a potential adversary with overwhelming force in a potential area of conflict is a time proven technique for preventing conflict and promoting dialogue. It should also be noted that while these additional assets are expensive, combined they are still less than half the construction cost of just the CVN being protected, much less the air wing embarked aboard.

Protection

For CVNs

Much of the surface warfare assets the Navy possesses are routinely dedicated to protecting other critical ship classes and their embarked sailors. The CVNs operating in their dedicated task forces normally find themselves free to go where they please given the protection against air, submarine and surface threats the surrounding ships provide. Adding a CVLN and a CARN to this operating procedure is simply adding to a proven recipe by countering the increasingly formidable A2AD assets other nations are steadily acquiring.

For amphibious assaults

The Marine Corp routinely catches a ride on an ARG provided by the Navy. Most of the time there is no need to provide the extra protection provided by the suggested new ship classes. Come the big moment though, both during the few days leading up to and then during an amphibious assault placing a CARN, an AORH and a Zumwalt class destroyer between the opposing forces ashore and the ARG can very substantially improve the chances of success and measurably lower the anticipated casualty rates amongst the Marines making the landing. By providing substantial ASW assets in the coastal waters involved, numerous ISR and target spotting assets from the AORH, formidable fire support abilities from the CARN and Zumwalt and substantial anti-missile, rocket or artillery shell protection courtesy of the twelve railguns the new ship classes will significantly improve the Navy’s ability to support an amphibious invasion. Plus the Marines making the ride ashore will be able to start from just over the horizon thanks to the presence of multiple targeting drones and railguns instead of the much discussed fifty mile seasick inducing slog currently anticipated.

Ally reassurance

Protecting the carrier strike groups also means reassuring our allies that we will be able to fulfill the defense commitments we have made, particularly in the Western Pacific. However, building and deploying the means to allow the fleet to go where it wants is a globally useful capability, allowing the U.S. to confidently assert it will be there in time of need.

Multi-polar world

We live in a multi-polar geopolitical structure. China, Russia, India, Europe, the Gulf States, Brazil and others already are jostling with the U.S. for influence and trade. Including a China who already is in some respects, and will remain our economic equal in world affairs. This economic equivalence is something the U.S. has not had to deal with since our enormous industrial expansion in the last three decades of the 19th Century. We need to refresh our thinking with some of the concepts that worked well for us as we dealt with Great Britain, the existing economic power back then.

That said being a rival is not the same as being an enemy. There certainly are many areas where the U.S. and China will find ways to cooperate to our mutual benefit. We are certain to jostle each other though, especially in China’s immediate area as that proud civilization looks to ‘put things right’ after their many difficulties of the last two centuries. As mentioned above, we want to deter everyone in the area from using violence to bring about change, instead encouraging patience while the various nations involved discover mutually acceptable adjustments via discussion.

Playing defense to maintain the world as it is

There are other issues that come with being in a multi-polar world. In the new global circumstances the U.S., and the Navy in particular, need to execute defense, and first things first, keep our ships afloat. Something we have not had to overly concern ourselves with since the demise of the Soviet Union or the destruction of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the 1940s. Increasingly we will no longer be able to exercise the freedom of the seas and engage in whatever activity we want, whenever we want to. Russia is already building a submarine and long-range bomber force to potentially contest our passage. Others, China in particular, will be able to invest steadily increasing resources in military assets that make sense for their geo-political situation. Investments that mean the U.S Navy may have to fight our way across the North Pacific or North Atlantic before we commence operations at the location of our choice.

Hawaii has to eat

Our geography as a nation includes Hawaii, control of which easily translates into the control of the bulk of the Pacific Ocean. Yet Hawaii is a series of islands, thousands of miles from the mainland with a population of 1.4 million. Again, the change to a multi-polar world means we have to give thought to just how we can ensure the population on the islands can eat when trouble arrives. Russia already has the submarine assets needed to threaten mining or torpedoing ships crossing the North Pacific. Obviously the naval assets based at Pearl Harbor and the West Coast should be able to prevent that. However, we can no longer just take it for granted. The Navy needs to consciously add this to its long list of missions to accomplish.

The same issues apply to Guam, though the much smaller population can be fed by air if necessary, which means the mission is more one of being able to get our needed fuel and ammunition supplies delivered. Once more, the local air and naval forces should be able to ensure it happens. This is an area where the rise in China’s capabilities means we cannot take free passage for granted there either.

Maritime Commons

Protecting the global commons to ensure free passage of American trade was one of the primary reasons the U.S navy was originally built in the 18th Century. The need, a global need in the 21st Century, continues unabated.

Blockade

Occasionally over the years the U.S. has chosen to impose a blockade during a dispute. This is a capability, or more importantly for our relationship with China, a potential capability that we need to maintain. And the world needs to be reminded of on occasion.

Protection

As many others have noted over the last few years, a British citizen in the 19th Century could travel the world secure in the realization that the local government, regardless of whether it got along well with London or not, was not going to antagonize Britain by harming, or allowing to be harmed, the traveling Brit. A benefit that transferred to American citizens as a result of our overwhelming victory in 1945.

Unfortunately, in growing numbers of places in the world this benefit no longer exists due to the inability of many local governments to provide law and order within their borders for anyone, much less wandering Americans. This means that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corp have to face the reality that just as in the ‘olden days’ of the 18th and 19th Centuries, they are on call to provide basic protection to Americans all across the globe.

Rescue

The need for the Navy and Marine Corp to provide rescue service as needed has never gone away. And given the monotonous regularity of severe weather events, civil disturbances and the endless list of troubles that arise, this is certainly not going to change.

AORH uses

The AORH class suggested earlier in this series of articles was quite consciously designed to be capable of taking on some of the responsibilities, new and old, mentioned above. First among these was to be flagship capable, coupled with the resupply abilities and the substantial ASW and special forces capabilities built into the design.

These abilities are capable of being useful undertaking missions beyond the obvious applications in the Gulf, South China Sea and Northeast Asia. In addition, an ice-strengthened version of an AORH is very well suited to leading a small task force of frigates on ASW duty in the Arctic. It can also be used as the centerpiece for an old-fashioned hunter killer group prosecuting submarines or to provide transoceanic convoy protection in either the North Pacific or North Atlantic.

Current Political Impasse

As for the likelihood of persuading the current Congress to pay for this the Navy needs to be frank. The additional spending being asked for here are additional dollars for additional capabilities. Beyond some small incremental steps, most of the needed dollars will not fit inside the spending limits in place over the next few years. It is intended as a long term plan, to be funded as a recovering economy allows, with the big ticket items being built starting in the 202os and extending into the late 2030s.

For the economy is slowly growing and just as importantly the deficit is in notable decline. There are multiple reasons for this and there is good reason to believe they will continue to positively impact the deficit. A growing economy, the impact fracking is having on energy production, the beginning of the return of some manufacturing to North America from China due to higher wages there, the fact that Medicare costs are much less onerous than forecast five years ago, Obamacare is not costing nearly as much as feared when it was passed, and ending the Bush-era tax cuts are having a real impact on the actual deficit as well as on the, far larger, feared one.

So the enormous fear factor that was driving the deficit reduction hawks back in 2010/11 is in the process of dissipating, being replaced with some truly old-fashioned value driven politics. It is important to note that the Republic has been down this road before. After both the Revolutionary War and the Civil War Congress chose to slowly bring down an enormous deficit by running small annual surpluses. In essence, some variation of this strategy, regardless of how fiercely you espouse the ‘value’ part of balanced budgets, is what we are going to have to do as we deal with the left over Cold War debt and the enormous additional debt load piled on post 9/11 and due to the Great Recession.

Die Hard Yankee Frugality

Or depending on one’s viewpoint, good old-fashioned small town frugality, skinflints, True Blue small town values defending America from corrupt Big City mentalities, etc. The reader should feel free at this point to insert the variation(s) he hears most often where he lives. This cultural attribute came to the New World with the Pilgrims and remains a vigorous part of American culture. It has not, and will not be, departing from our political discussions. Or budgeting decisions.

So, how should we address those who hold this belief? In my experience, when trying to influence or alter decisions made by those operating from this position, argument and persuasion can work. If. Actually two ifs. Big ones. First a resolution to the revenue versus budget issue forcing hard choices has to be visible to the individual you are working with. And it is they that have to see it; regardless of how obvious it is to you, they are the ones that have to see, understand and agree. Then you need a plan dealing with anticipated results and consequences that you can clearly articulate, including how you will execute the plan, deal with the known potential problems and be convincing about being able to complete the task on time and most importantly, within the agreed upon budget.

Mid-America Teary-Eyed Balanced Budget Goodness

Across much of interior America another strong cultural value, the Intrinsic Goodness of Balancing Your Budget also accompanied some of the earliest English settlers of North America. Over the centuries this value has also been passed on to succeeding generations over family dinner tables, political discussions at the local diner or at the town’s barbershop. The at times teary-eyed value some of it’s current believers place in it can be almost moving to observe by someone who considers it merely another number. Plus, minus or zero each have meaning, yet no particular cultural Goodness.

To the True Believers amongst us it constitutes one of life’s bedrock values though. And it is not departing the American political scene either. Which means it will strongly impact budgeting issues far into the future as well.

However, unlike those professing Yankee Frugality, True Believers are virtually impervious to discussion and argument. Sometimes they will patiently listen to you and your points, still no matter how cogent and persuasive one might be, True Believers, once they start their decision making process, will cycle back and check your argument against various values and beliefs they hold. And if they find your argument in conflict with one of their values, for the purposes of this article, the Intrinsic Goodness of Balancing Your Budget, your suggested plan will be rejected.

Any additional information you might provide tends to ultimately provoke something along the line of this real life quote. “You are just trying to confuse me with facts,” responded one individual a few years ago. Global warming was the topic that day rather than the budget and the end result was, “I have my faith (in the rightness of their belief – not really a conclusion, a belief) and I will not change my position.”

This attribute is very much in play when discussing the current budget situation. Unfortunately it is, in my experience anyway, impervious to analysis and discussion. All those carefully honed arguments and points of persuasion potentially useful when speaking with those convinced of the value of frugality will only be considered by True Believers after the budget is balanced. Maybe.

Their faith in the correctness of the uttermost value of balanced budgets can be trumped by another value however. Not by many though, as it ranks high in their pantheon. Historically of course the value to use was the need for defense. Whether national defense from other nations, personal defense against crime or terrorism or preserving orderly and lawful procedures when discussing social issues, over the decades this has proven an effective approach.

Unfortunately the current spending debate has been embroiled in the revolt of a significant number of voters, primarily though not entirely, conservative Republicans, over the blatant abuse of this trump value during the second Bush administration. Vice President Cheney was incorrect when he claimed there were no electoral consequences to running vast deficits. There are, both economic and political, a truth that is not going away.

A significant portion of their political base could, and did for a while, accept the national defense against terrorism argument after 9/11. However subsequent failures to control Federal spending, under a Republican President, Senate and House no less infuriated them. Fury then became something close to horror after the Salomon Brothers debacle unleashed a need for massive federal deficits to restore the economy.

So after years of serious abuse of the national defense trump value, its use with those who fervently believe in the Intrinsic Goodness of Balancing Your Budget has been heavily invalidated. For a significant portion of the American electorate the call for a return to this basic value remains a hot button issue. It is five years on from the revolt that took place in 2010 and the fury and horror seem to have been replaced with a grim resolve to never allow spending to run out of control again. And balance the budget.

This implies, barring a serious political change in the House in a future election year, we may well have to wait for the sanctified day when the Federal government takes in more revenue than it spends before any substantive increases in spending, or allocations for substantial new abilities for the U.S. Navy can be expected.

In all likelihood this means it will not be until sometime in the 2020s before much of what has been suggested in terms of shipbuilding, i.e. the new AORH, CVLN and CARN class ships and large quantities of the associated drones and buoys, can obtain the political support needed for the substantial sums needed.

Count Our Blessings

It is always useful to Count Your Blessings though. The bulk of the resistance in Congress is to additional spending, with no more than the usual amount of Congressional meddling in the details of departmental, including DOD, spending. Just figure out a way to get things done within the dollar amount allotted is a frequently expressed desire by many in the House.

Nor is there any value based or carefully analyzed opposition to new equipment programs from any of the services. So while the suggested ship classes and drones will provoke a fierce defense of spending limits, there is no reason to anticipate Congressional opposition to the new equipment if the Navy develops a coherent plan including them. As suggested above in all probability the big items will not be affordable until sometime in the 2020s, nonetheless if the items are part of a long term acquisition plan it will merely be a question of waiting for funds to become available rather than overcoming fierce opposition to the plans and equipment.

So have a long-term plan in place

This means the U.S. Navy needs to have that forward looking plan in hand, constantly being updated as various improvements in doctrine, sensors and drones are developed. And be ready when additional funds become available, rice bowl pointed upwards as the saying goes. Whether the motivation to Congress is a perceived problem somewhere across the globe, the occasional Congressional compromise over something or other that includes extra funds for some department, a call for ‘shovel ready’ projects when recessions hit, or the slippery processes of logrolling; having a plan in place will allow the extra funds to be applied far more beneficially to the Navy’s, and the countries, benefit than a haphazard purchase of a few more of this and that.

Honor the Premise

In the end though, funding for the U.S. Navy, and all other Federal government departments, is only going to grow as fast as the economy. Which will happen, meaning any plan including the suggestions made in this series of articles will have to be implemented over a period of many years. Into the late 2030s or mid-2040s before the last of nine ship CARN build for instance. The early 2030s for eleven AORHs and the same for a six ship CVLN build are also reasonable build out expectations at this point.

Clearly the time to start to work on such a plan is now.

Jan Musil is a Vietnam era Navy veteran, disenchanted ex-corporate middle manager and long time entrepreneur currently working as an author of science fiction novels. He is also a long-standing student of navies in general, post-1930 ship construction thinking, design hopes versus actual results and fleet composition debates of the twentieth century.