By Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill and Alexandru Filip

Introduction

With tension level ever increasing in the Pacific, Canada must prepare for future naval threats from revisionist states, which threaten international order and the peace of fellow democracies. In August, Ottawa deployed three frigates of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) to the Pacific to demonstrate freedom of navigation against encroachments by the Chinese Coast Guard. This posturing, coupled with a willingness to act along side allies, sends a strong signal of determination to maintain international norms, while also preparing for a fight against aggravating Chinese and Russian hostilities which will no doubt pull Canada into a wider conflict if deterrence fails. But Canada’s current naval capabilities fall short of meeting great power threats, which may diminish its usefulness in supporting allies in a Pacific conflict.

Canadian Mission Sets in Pacific Conflict

In the event of war in the Pacific, most likely confronting China over Taiwan, Ottawa will adopt postures and mission sets in support of allies. Canadian military missions could consist of a wide range of missions to include convoy protection across the Pacific (possibly up to the East coast ports of Taiwan, Philippines and Okinawa) with an emphasis on anti-submarine warfare (ASW), air defense against long-range and submarine-launched and island-based missiles, and littoral duties to include defense against small attack craft hidden in estuaries.

Beyond warfare mission sets, Canadian military forces could be used for blockade enforcement in the open seas, along the Ryukyu Islands, at the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Makassar straits of Indonesia, the Straits of Hormuz, and in the Indian Ocean against Chinese allies like Iran, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. If the Kremlin provides material support to Beijing, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) could assist or reinforce U.S. arctic inspections for war contraband at the Bering Strait and the Northwest Passage. Canadian military forces could also help escort U.S., Japanese, or British aircraft/helicopter carrier groups operating in the Philippine Sea or the Indian Ocean. Canadian military forces could also provide support to other allied platforms capable of conducting long-range deep strike missions against bases and sensors within mainland China. However, supporting such a kinetic mission sets during wartime may escalate Chinese Communist Party (CCP) retaliation to Canadian soil attacks from conventional hypersonic weapons against economic targets such as at Fort McMurray in Alberta, or the Great Whale hydroelectric projects in Quebec.

Canadian military forces could also conduct surveillance of key transhipment points against states Beijing-aligned states, such as the Republic of South Africa and the Cape of Good Hope, and Cuba and the Panama Canal. In the unlikely contingency of an attempted breakout from the first island chain of the Chinese PLAN (People’s Liberation Army – Navy), Canada’s Harpoon-equipped Halifax class frigates may be employed as part of a surface action group (SAG). Canadian ASW helicopters operating from the deck of the Halifax frigates, and Aurora maritime surveillance aircraft, could also could also support high-risk contingency mission such as assisting allied submarines to hunt the PLAN’s six Jin class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in the South China Sea, the Central Pacific, or even Russia’s SSBN bastion in the Sea of Okhotsk.

The Canadian military could also provide at-sea-replenishment, a key enabling mission to overcome vast distances involved in a Pacific campaign. This mission could be will be fulfilled by Protecteur class vessels, currently being built. All of these contingencies will involve the RCN, in conjunction with Canada’s maritime surveillance capabilities, to operate from allied Pacific bases, such as in Japan, the Philippines, or Taiwan, protected by elements of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and Army.

Canada’s Naval Capabilities

Canada’s current naval capabilities are inadequate for a determined operation in the Pacific theater. Canada currently has 12 multi-role Halifax class frigates, four Victoria class submarines, and 14 CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. These platforms, and Ottawa’s future Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC), must be assessed as seriously deficient compared to their most likely combat missions. Modern vessels are judged by the numbers of vertical launch system (VLS) tubes, of which the U.S. has 9,044, China has at least 2,000, and Canada will have zero built-in VLS for at least the next half-decade. Canada’s 288 obsolete above-deck VLS on its Halifax frigates, are far more vulnerable to shrapnel.

The current Halifax class frigates that are the mainstay of the Canadian surface fleet are outclassed and limited in combat against opposing navy’s ships or even as deterrents. Their older Sea Giraffe 180 HC and SMART-S MK2 radars only provide surface and air radar coverage to a maximum of 100 and 135 nautical miles, respectively.

For comparison, PLAN’s most common frigate, the Type 054A Jiangkai II (of which they have around 30 vessels) has a Type 366 radar. This variant is a reworked Chinese version of the Russian MR-331 Mineral-ME radar, covers surface targets to 135 nautical miles. It also possesses a Type 382 radar, an adaptation of the Soviet MR-710 Fregat M2EM present on Russian Sovremennyy class destroyers, which provides coverage to 161 nautical miles for air and surface searches. In terms of weaponry, the PLAN Type 054 outperforms the Halifax class in the form of its YJ-83 anti-surface ship missile (100 nautical mile range) outfitted with 32 VLS cells, which exceeds the Halifax’s compliment of RGM-84L Harpoon II (75 nautical mile range). While it may seem that the disadvantages posed to Jiangkai II are peripheral, these seemingly marginal issues will be further compounded because the RCN will be operating in an environment in which it is outnumbered. It will also be deployed against a seemingly pervasive littoral air threat in the form of PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army – Air Force) H-6 bombers and other sea denial anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles.

Despite the present surface capability gap, the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) project of fifteen warships by the early-2030s, offers enhanced capabilities for many of the Royal Canadian Navy’s future operational requirements. Each CSC will feature multi-load-out capable 32 VLS, AN/SPY-7 radar, and RIM-66M-6 (maximum range of 90 nautical miles) missiles that will enable a far greater surface to air capability. The BridgeMaster E radar provides a surface search capability of around 96 nautical miles, which is a slight reduction from the Halifax class, but compensates with a complement of RGM-184A Naval Strike Missiles (NSMs) with a 100 mile range.

This puts the CSC a step above the Halifax-class with radar and weapon arrangements that are closer to China’s Type 052 Luyang III, China’s most common destroyer class. While the Luyang class fields YJ-18 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM), which boasts a range of around 300 nautical miles, the CSC fields Block IV Tomahawk cruise missiles (Raytheon has been looking at turning into antiship missiles for naval combat). Their retrofit could offer a solution to longer range targeting and act as a deterrent against Chinese and even Russian surface vessels, allowing these ships to engage in blockade operations along strategic sea lines of communication from a significant distance. This would allow the RCN to carry out escort missions supporting convoys through the Indonesian Archipelago to Australia, Japan, and Taiwan, while also providing surface, air, and anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) against Chinese long-range bombers and attack aircraft.

The PLAAF H-6’s principal anti-ship missiles (ASM) ordnance outranges the CSC’s anti-air capability. However, the H-6’s Type 245 radar only has a range of 150km, and the CSC’s Electronic Warfare (EW) countermeasures could jam the bomber’s sensors, and even the Airborne Early Warning (AEW) radar of Chinese aircraft patrolling nearby, from exactly pinpointing its location, forcing the enemy to get closer and possibly within range of the CSC’s surface-to-air missiles (SAM). The CSC’s AN/SPY-7 multi-mission radar is capable of tracking missiles headed towards other ships in its flotilla.

The CSC also provides an enhanced underwater sensing capability. The CSC’s Modular Multistatic Variable Depth Sonar System and S2150-C Hull-Mounted Sonar System allow the ship to navigate through mined sea lanes. The CSC’s can embark the CH-148 Cyclone helicopter, which hosts a suite of sensing equipment to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) beyond the ship’s horizon. The CSC’s sonar capability, in conjunction with the ASW capable CH-148 Cyclone helicopter, will serve instrumental against PLAN and Beijing-allied submarines, such as North Korea, which can launch long-distance torpedoes and stand-off anti-ship missiles. The RCAF’s anticipated procurement of the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol reconnaissance aircraft (MPRA), equipped with an outfit of sensing and attack equipment to include magnetic anomaly detectors (MAD), sonobuoys, surface-search radars, and Mark 54 Torpedoes, operating with the CSC will critically enhance ASW capabilities.

These ships also will fulfill the Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) mission set that involves targeting enemy ships and aircraft, which would conduct similar adversarial mission sets. The CSC could fulfill the role of a picket, technically the supporting role of being used as a “forward radar observer,” because of its radar and electronic warfare (EW) systems that could mask friendly ships and aircraft by jamming. Through an integrated or combined effort, Canadian or allied P-8As could launch long range anti ship missiles (LRASM) or Rapid-Dragon anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), while receiving over-the-horizon (OTH) and midcourse guidance towards their targets from Canadian CSCs. This would allow aircraft and ships in the area to utilize emissions control (EMCON) procedures to remain hidden from Chinese passive electronic intelligence (ELINT) sensors.

Canada is overdue for an upgrade to its submarine fleet. This new fleet should be composed of nuclear submarines capable of deterrence patrols, surveillance, and action across both the great distances and extended deployments required of the Pacific or Canada’s Arctic archipelagic theatre. Theses subs should conduct patrols to avoid a repeat of the lacunae of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union operated submarines through the Northwest Passage undetected. In peacetime and in the lead up to conflict or war, these submarines should conduct intelligence gathering operations including signals intelligence (SIGINT), in conjunction with organizations such as the Canadian Communication Security Establishment (similar to the U.S. National Security Agency), responsible for foreign SIGINT operations.

Operation Ivy Bells is similar example of peacetime SIGINT conducted by the United States during the Cold War. From the beginning of the 1970s until 1981, submarines would transport divers into the Sea of Okhotsk where they then tapped into Soviet undersea communications cables. Despite advances in technology, there is still a distinct operational necessity in regards to using submarines for intelligence collection or observation operations, which would require them to penetrate deep into unfriendly territorial waters, or even sabotage operations in the event of hostilities.

Conclusion

Any military action will have significant implications for Canada’s domestic politics and Ottawa may choose to opt out of certain taskings, especially regarding sentiments of the substantial recently immigrated Chinese-Canadian population. However, aside from the difficulty of politically micro-managing the daily mission of Canadian vessels in a rapidly changing operational theatre, this type of participation avoidance may provoke a critical response from Washington. Worse still, not having sufficient fleet capability to confront the contingencies faced by Pacific allies will leave Canada severely marginalized, with implications for its interests in the Arctic, commerce, and even Canada’s strategic autonomy.

Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill is associate professor of international relations at Concordia University. He authored Militarization and War (2007) and of Strategic Nuclear Sharing (2014). He published extensively on Pakistan security issues and arms control and researched contracts at the Office of Treaty Verification at the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and then for Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO). He is a consultant that conducted fieldwork in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Egypt. He is a former Operations Officer, 3 Field Engineer Regiment, from the end of the Cold War to shortly after 9/11. Follow him on X (formerly Twitter) @Ju_Sp_Churchill as well as other following links: Publishing 7, Muckrack, Concordia, Canada, Youtube, and the Canadian Centre for Strategic Studies.

Alexandru Filip is an International Relations student at Concordia University, Montreal. He is also an analyst and editor at the Canadian Center for Strategic Studies research institute. His research focuses on strategic and security studies, with a particular interest in naval, air, and nuclear capabilities. He has previously published in RealClearDefense.

Featured Image: The Royal Canadian Navy Halifax-class frigate HMCS Calgary (FFH-335) departs Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (USA), to begin the at-sea phase of Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2014. (U.S. Navy photo)

By Capt. Anthony Cowden, USN (ret.)

A recent article published by the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) – the first in a series – does an outstanding job of describing and explaining the Navy’s “core operating concept” of Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO). In short, DMO calls for “…the massing and convergence of fires from distributed forces, complicating adversary targeting and decision-making, and networking effects across platforms and domains.”¹

The strike effectiveness of the DMO operating concept requires further investigation. In pursuing this, it is important to recall that a fleet does four things – it Scouts, it Screens, it Strikes, and it Bases.² As currently envisioned, at least in open source definitions, DMO is not yet well-developed in the Scouting, Screening, and Basing functions of a fleet. Rather, DMO seems mostly focused on the offensive functions of a fleet, the Strike function.

The first step in this analysis will be to analyze a traditional concentrated force versus another concentrated force using the salvo equations. The second step will be to look at a distributed force that is able to mass fires against a concentrated force. The final step will be to look at a concentrated force that engages part of a distributed force. We will also look at what “firing effectively first” means in practice, and what happens if the enemy force distributes.

The Salvo Equations

The salvo equations were developed by the late Captain Wayne Hughes and are discussed in detail in Chapter 1 and Appendix A of Fighting the Fleet: Operational Art and Modern Fleet Combat. With the salvo equations, Captain Hughes showed:

“how modern naval combat follows a salvo model: opponents apply a pulse of combat power to each other in an instantaneous salvo exchange. A salvo exchange is an interaction of offensive combat power (e.g., mines, torpedoes, bombs, or missiles) and defensive combat power (e.g., surface-to-air missiles [SAMs], jamming, chaff, decoys). Combat power remaining from these interactions is applied against a target’s staying power (the number of hits of a particular weapon that a target can withstand and still be useful for combat purposes).”³

The salvo equations are presented here for reference:

Concentrated versus Concentrated

The first step in our analysis will be to look at two concentrated forces engaging one another. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that each force is exactly equal, where each force consists entirely of the same number of missile-equipped surface ships, with the same offensive and defensive capabilities. These include:

• Each force consists of six surface ships (A = B = 6).
• Each surface ship has a displacement of 8,000 tons. Using the “cube root rule,” this means that it takes two “thousand-pound bomb equivalents” (TPBEs) to put a ship out of action. Given the destructive force of modern explosives, that equates to 2 x 660 lbs, or 1,320 lbs of modern warhead explosives. Assuming a warhead size of 500 lbs, it would take 2.64 warheads to put an 8,000 ton ship out of action. (a₁ = b₁ = 2.64).⁴
• Each surface ship is equipped as follows:
  • Eight anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) equipped with a 500 lb warhead. All ASCMs are considered to be “well-aimed” (i.e., unless otherwise destroyed, decoyed, or defeated, the ASCM would hit its intended target; this is not always true, as discussed in Chapter 1 of Fighting the Fleet.⁵ b = ).
  • A surface-to-air missile (SAM) system capable of destroying two incoming ASCMs in a general engagement involving multiple incoming missiles.
  • A close in weapons system (CIWS) capable of destroying two incoming ASCMs.
  • An electronic countermeasure system (ECM) capable of defeating one ASCM.
  • A decoy system capable of defeating one ASCM.
  • Therefore, given the combined capabilities of the SAM, CIWS, ECM, and decoy systems to destroy or defeat incoming ASCMs, a₃ = b₃ = 6.
• Each force has equivalent organic and inorganic scouting capabilities, and is able to detect and localize the opposing force at the maximum range of their ASCMs.

Based on these assumptions, the salvo equations for an engagement between two concentrated forces are featured in Figure 1:

Predicting damage to warships in combat is always difficult, but a change in the number of units in force A and B () of 4.55 indicates enough hits to put 4.55 ships out of action in each force.⁶ Of course, this is highly dependent on hit distribution, which, if evenly distributed across the force, would mean that each ship in each force received some damage, but was not put out of action. In addition, this scenario assumes that each force was able to launch an attack “simultaneously,” where simultaneity is defined as each force being able to launch its ASCMs against the other force before it is hit by the other force’s ASCMs.

The essence of Captain Wayne Hughes’s admonition to “fire effectively first” then is to launch an attack and have missiles hit the opposing force before that force can launch its missiles.¹⁷ Assume that if force B was able to “fire effectively first,” then proceeding from the salvo equations above, force A would be reduced by a total of 4.55 ships, so force A’s subsequent attack on force B would result in the following:

A negative number for DB indicates that the B force is likely to be able to defeat all of force A’s incoming missiles; and the bigger the number, the more likely it will defeat the incoming strike. Such is the advantage of being able to “fire effectively first.”

This highlights two other aspects of offensive and defensive fires. First, close-range defensive fires such as point-defense missiles can often be replenished prior to another salvo attack. While they may be limited in their ability to defeat an incoming salvo, they can generally be reloaded and prepared to defend against a future salvo, without any reduction in capability. Second, this is not always true of ASCMs, many of which are housed in dedicated launchers and are limited in number and cannot be reloaded quickly or at sea. As the reader will see in this example, there is arguably little incentive to retain offensive fires for possible future engagements, as it often takes all the offensive firepower available to overcome the opponent’s defensive capability.

Distributed versus Concentrated

The second step in this analysis is to look at a distributed force that is able to mass its fires against a concentrated force. However, at this point the reader should be able to see that the results are likely to be similar as in the scenario presented above, assuming that the concentrated force is able to launch against all elements of the distributed force. An issue associated with the distributed force is the coordination required for a distributed force to mass its fires against a common target. Scouting information about target location, course, and speed would need to be communicated to all elements of the distributed force, and some sort of coordination and communication would need to occur for the distributed elements to mass their fires against the target. This is inherently more complex than attacking with a concentrated force, and more subject to communication and coordination failure.

The third step in this analysis is to look at a concentrated force that engages part of a distributed force. The danger in distributing one’s own force in the face of a competent – or lucky – opponent is that the opposing force will defeat one part of own force “in detail”; that is, the entire opposing force will engage just part of own force and be able to destroy it. Assuming that force A divides itself into two equal parts, A(1) and A(2), and assuming that force B engages A(1) before A(2) can become involved in the fight, such an engagement is characterized in the salvo equations as depicted in Figure 3:

Here we see that force B has a preponderance of offensive firepower that overwhelms A(1)’s defensive capability, and force B’s defensive capability is able to defeat force A(1)’s inadequate offensive punch. Should A(2) get off a shot against force B, its results would look exactly like those of force A(1), as shown in Figure 4:

The net result of the damage to force A in the distributed case would be the likely destruction of all three A(1) ships, with no damage to the opposing A(2) ships. Recall that in the concentrated case, the damage to force A ships (i.e., 4.55 put out of action) would be distributed over the six ships of the force. Here, however, enough offensive power from force B to put 11.36 ships out of action would only be distributed over the three ships of force A(1), virtually ensuring that all three ships would be put entirely out of action. Force B would not suffer any damage at all. Compare this to the concentrated case or the case where a distributed force A had been able to mass its fires (Figure 1), where force B would have suffered an equal amount of damage.

What happens if force B only detects one of the distributed parts of force A (force A(1)), but distributed force A is able to mass its fires against force B?

The result is depicted in Figure 5. All three ships of force A(1) would likely be put out of action, no damage would be incurred by force A(2), and force B would incur the same damage as if force A were concentrated. It turns out this is the one case where a distributed force has a strike advantage over a concentrated force. However, it should be noted that this is not an advantage conferred by distribution, it is an advantage conferred by effective Screening and Scouting. One part of the distributed force drew the attention and the fire of the concentrated force, but was able to combine its fires with the undetected portion of the distributed force.⁸

Next, what would happen if force B knew that force A had distributed itself, it had detected force A(1), and it assumed that force A(2) was nearby? If it retained half of its ASCMs for a possible future engagement with force A(2), the engagement with A(1) might look like the results contained in Figure 6:

Of course, a future engagement with force A(2) would look much the same, and note that force B does not suffer any damage. Given the uncertainty of combat, it makes much more sense for force B to launch all of its ASCMs against force A(1), likely destroying all of force A(1), and use screening to scuttle back into port before any other force can attack it – a classic case of Corbett’s “arrested offense.”

“Fire Effectively First!”

In Figure 2, the value of firing effectively first was illustrated for the base case of two concentrated forces engaging one another. This also applies to a concentrated force and a distributed force that engage each other simultaneously. The following looks at the value of “firing effectively first” for two of the other cases discussed previously:

• A concentrated force that engages part of a distributed force (Figure 7). It should be self-evident that if the concentrated force, B, fires effectively first, the engaged part of the distributed force will be put out of action. But what happens if the part of the distributed force A(1) fires effectively first against the concentrated force B, and then B launches an attack on A(1)? As we can see in the following equations, B is able to defeat A(1)’s incoming salvo, and since it is undamaged, if it is able to launch an attack against A(1), it will overwhelm A(1)’s defenses.

• A concentrated force only detects one of the distributed parts of force A (Figure 8). In this case, force B fires effectively first against force A(1), which is put out of action, and force A(2) launches a retaliatory strike against force B. A(1) is destroyed, and force B is able to defeat A(2)’s inadequate attack.

Whether a force distributes or not, what is essential to victory – and survival – is the ability to “fire effectively first,” and firing effectively first is a function of scouting, not distribution or concentration of platforms. That being said, even if the distributed force fires first, it will be unable to defeat or even damage the concentrated force unless it can effectively coordinate its attack.

What if the Enemy Distributes?

If distribution is a good idea, then we must expect the other side to distribute as well. The combinations of possible engagements begin to escalate quickly, depending on how each side distributes its forces. We can, however, look at some of the more interesting cases, based on the assumption that each side distributes evenly into two equally-sized groups of three ships:

• Both forces are able to launch coordinated attacks on each other near-simultaneously. The results will be the same as those depicted in Figure 1. Both sides being distributed provides no advantage to either side in terms of strike.
• One force is able to attack one part of the other force, but the entire other force is able to attack both parts of the first force. The results will be the same as those depicted in Figure 5. Both sides being distributed provides no advantage to either side in terms of strike.

These dynamics yield a set of recommendations, including:

• No matter how forces are deployed – concentrated, distributed, or some other way – win the scouting contest and “fire effectively first.”
• If forces are distributed but the communications capability is not able to coordinate their fires, then force posture must be rearranged to respect the limits of communication. If this cannot be done in time, then better to disengage to fight another day.
• Improve screening. Decoys, for example, can be very useful in diluting the effect of the enemy’s salvo. The effect of each ship in force A being able to decoy just one more missile each is shown in Figure 9: it effectively halves the amount of damage force A could expect to receive.

Conclusion

The salvo equations are analytical tools, not predictive ones. They do not result in “the answer” as to exactly how any single engagement will turn out. Combat entropy and instability, discussed at length in Fighting the Fleet, is a factor worth appreciating, such as how six bombs sunk four carriers at Midway, but five kamikazes did not sink one destroyer, USS Laffey, at Okinawa.⁹ That being said, the salvo equations can be used as an analytical tool to provide insight into probable outcomes. As they say, the race does not always go to the fastest, or the contest to the strongest, but that is the way to bet.

It should be noted that the single point of failure for a distributed force is the ability to coordinate a strike on another force. This coordination becomes even more complex with greater distribution of one’s own force, and even more so when the other force is distributed.¹⁰ If the distributed force cannot coordinate their fires then they lose in every scenario. This may be caused by jamming or some other interruption of communications, but it could also be from any failure to efficiently coordinate a strike, which could be as simple as poor distribution of weapons, training shortcomings, and other shortfalls.

The one case where a distributed force comes out ahead of a concentrated force is the case where only one part of the distributed force is detected by the enemy and absorbs the enemy’s attack, but is able to combine its strike with the other part of the distributed force before it dies. But that is not a “concept of operation,” it is more of a scouting tactic, and in prior generations this was better implemented with a LAMPS Mk III, Hawklink, and the naval tactical data system (NTDS).

DMO might be able to “complicate adversary targeting and decision-making” and it should be noted it would apply to one’s own force if the enemy distributes as well. But when it comes to the Strike function of a fleet, a distributed force had better be able to efficiently mass its offensive fires, or it runs the risk of being defeated in detail, resulting in, at best, a disappointing exchange in the number of destroyed and damaged ships.

Anthony Cowden is the Managing Director of Stari Consulting Services, co-author of Fighting the Fleet: Operational Art and Modern Fleet Combat, author of The Naval Institute Almanac of the U.S. Navy, has published numerous articles on a range of topics, and was a commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy for 37 years.

References

[1] Filipoff, Dmitry, Fighting DMO, Pt. 1: Defining Distributed Maritime Operations and the Future of Naval Warfare, Center for International Maritime Security, February 20, 2023, https://cimsec.org/fighting-dmo-pt-1-defining-distributed-maritime-operations-and-the-future-of-naval-warfare.

[2] Cares, Jeffrey R. and Anthony Cowden, Fighting the Fleet: Operational Art and Modern Fleet Combat (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2022), pp. 71-73

[3] Cares and Cowden, p. 16

[4] Cares and Cowden, p. 23. Estimating the number of hits to put a ship out of action is probably the most controversial aspect of using the Salvo Equations. The reader is invited to substitute whatever value they desire and conduct the analysis themselves. One useful approach is to use a parametric range of values and discover the sensitivity of the force to the number of hits required.

[5] Cares and Cowden, pp. 19-22

[6] How to interpret the Salvo Equations, as well as the concept of “Combat Entropy”, is discussed extensively in Chapter 1 of Fighting the Fleet.

[7] Hughes, Captain Wayne P., USN (Ret.) and Rear Admiral Robert P. Girrier, USN (Ret.), Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, Third Edition (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018), Chapter 13.

[8] Quick show of hands: who wants to serve in force A(1)?

[9] Cares and Cowden, pp. 19-22

[10] Distributed networked operations can become amazingly complex. Those interested in the theory and application of distributed network operations are invited to read Cares, Jeff. Distributed Network Operations: The Foundations of Network Centric Warfare. Newport, RI: Alidade Press, 2005.

Featured Image: Amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) fires a NATO Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missile to intercept a remote-controlled drone as part of Valiant Shield 2016 (VS16). (U.S. Navy photo)

This article is part of the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s Project Maritime, a series exploring the intersection of irregular warfare and the maritime domain. It is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here.

By Walker Mills

The Dnipro River runs more than 1,300 miles, beginning near Smolensk in Russia and emptying into the Black Sea. It is the third-largest river in Europe and is nearly two miles across at its widest points. It cuts across Ukraine for over six hundred miles, from north to south, and bisects several of Ukraine’s largest cities, including the capital, Kyiv.

The Dnipro and its reservoirs power no less than six major hydroelectric stations that together comprise one of the “largest hydropower systems in the word.” It provided water for the reservoirs at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant on the banks of the river and one of its tributaries, the Pripyat River, provided water for the cooling at Chernobyl. It is difficult to understate the importance of the river in Ukraine’s history, where it was a key part of the trade networks for luxury goods like walrus ivory and amber, linking the Baltic and Black Seas as far back as the Vikings and the ancient Greeks. The Dnipro River is a defining geopolitical and historical feature of Ukraine.

Given its centrality to Ukraine’s commercial and trade development, it is not surprising that the river has again become a focal point for the ongoing war in Ukraine. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have used Ukrainian waterways as space to maneuver troops and move supplies. Ukrainian forces have become especially proficient in using small boats to carry out raids on Russian forces. Today, in certain areas, the Dnipro River is a de facto demarcation of the front line, and in other places is the de jure demarcation for regions claimed by Russia. The Russian withdrawal from Kherson and the west bank of the Dnipro leaves the river marking hundreds of miles of front line as the conflict passes into the winter.

In many places, rivers and adjacent infrastructure have become key terrain in the conflict. The New York Times reported that the battles in southern Ukraine have “revolved around rivers and bridges” since the opening days of the conflict. In May, a Russian unit attempting a river crossing on a pontoon bridge in eastern Ukraine took “significant” losses, an embarrassing setback for the Russian military. In October, Ukrainian forces surrounded as many as twenty-five thousand Russian troops in Kherson, where they were pushed up against the western bank of the Dnipro River and the crossing points could be targeted by artillery. More recently, Ukraine accused Russia of planning a “false flag” attack on the dam over the Dnipro at the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, which would flood dozens of Ukrainian towns and villages downstream. A canal from the Dnipro in Kherson also provides some of the only freshwater supplies to Russian-occupied Crimea, making it a critical objective of the invasion. And in November, Ukrainian forces launched an amphibious assault on the Kinburn Peninsula in Crimea, which dominates the mouth of the Dnipro River, showing the interplay between riverine and coastal operations. In the Dnipro estuary, Ukrainian and Russian special operations forces are still struggling for control of key islands.

The importance of river systems in Ukraine highlights the disappointing reality that the United States is neglecting its own riverine capability and, by extension, its ability to control key terrain in future conflicts, even as the US government helps support Ukrainian riverine forces. Competency in riverine warfare will continue to be important in Ukraine whether the conflict continues with high intensity or dampens to a low boil because it can enable high-end combat operations, resistance, or local security operations. Despite clear lessons from Ukraine on the importance of riverine capability, the United States military does not have adequate forces that specialize in riverine or fluvial operations and security. In many military operations, rivers are seen only as obstacles to be crossed, despite the opportunities they present for maneuver and sustainment. However, properly trained and equipped units can use river systems to penetrate behind enemy lines and carry out targeted raids, sustain forces, or secure population centers. Riverine capability is especially important in irregular warfare and asymmetric conflicts because rivers are often key terrain for the military but also support critical infrastructure for civilian populations.

While the US military is equipped to conduct “wet gap” crossings and cross rivers (despite the Marine Corps’s divestment of its bridging companies), it is not adequately prepared to use rivers as a maneuver space—or prevent adversaries from doing the same—and it has not been for years. The US military should maintain a dedicated riverine capability in its conventional forces that can be employed in irregular warfare and beyond, and that can be exported to allies and partners in need. The Army and the Marine Corps have largely abandoned their own riverine capability, and the Navy has precious little left. The Navy’s special boat teams are capable, but only one of the three teams, Special Boat Team 22, is focused on riverine operations and operates a riverine-specific platform, the Special Operations Craft–Riverine (SOC-R). On the conventional side, the Navy’s Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces are chronically underresourced and focused on coastal rather than riverine environments. In a rare bit of good news for riverine capability, Marine Forces Reserve has been moving toward reestablishing a small craft capability for the Marine Corps, though it remains to be seen if the effort will be successful.

Ignoring Our History

Historically, the US military has assembled riverine units in an ad hoc manner when they were needed—usually for counterinsurgency operations. The US Navy, in particular, has a “long and varied but episodic history of riverine operations,” according to a Center for Naval Analyses report. The Army and Navy both have experience in riverine warfare dating back to the American Revolution and inherited experience from even earlier colonial conflicts along North American inland waterways. In the years before and after World War II, the US Navy had a dedicated “Yangtze Patrol” of riverine gunboats conducting security operations in China. Vietnam saw large numbers of soldiers and sailors working to provide security on the Mekong River and elsewhere in the country as part of the Mobile Riverine Force, which was inactivated in 1969. After the invasion of Iraq, Marines in a special riverine company were tasked with providing security for critical infrastructure along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, responsibilities that were later taken up by the Navy’s new (at the time) Coastal Riverine Force, which executed thousands of missions and helped train Iraqi police when the Marine unit was disbanded in order to free up personnel for other units. Around the same time an Army unit found the need for riverine capability so critical that it used local fishing boats to patrol Iraqi waterways. But today, there is almost nothing. The Navy has recently rebranded the Coastal Riverine Force as Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces because “riverine warfare is no longer an assigned mission area for the United States Navy, and the legacy name no longer captures the roles and missions of our force.” The change was also part of a shift from irregular warfare to great power competition.

Paradoxically, some of the best American riverine expertise is at the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS), under United States Special Operations Command, but the school only instructs international students from allied and partner nations. NAVSCIATTS is a critical organization that helps the United States export riverine expertise to partners around the world where coastal and riverine forces are not only key to defense, but also to internal security and stability. The Pentagon recognizes that riverine expertise is important enough that we pay to bring hundreds of foreign students per year to the United States to learn it and related skills, but the US military doesn’t maintain adequate riverine capability itself. Worse, NAVSCIATTS is at risk of closure, a move that would also rob many US allies and partners of a key riverine training resource and further gut the US military of resident expertise in riverine operations.

Rivers Aren’t Going Away: The Joint Force Needs More Riverine Capability

The Pentagon needs dedicated riverine warfare capability focused on irregular warfare, but also valuable in other types of operations and in other contexts. Recent US wars have shown the enduring value of brown-water navies in irregular warfare in Iraq and Vietnam and Ukraine is continuing to demonstrate the value of riverine capability in high-intensity conflict. And exporting riverine expertise to allies and partners through training exercises with conventional US riverine forces and schools like NAVSCIATTS is valuable for all of the above.

Exporting US riverine expertise to allies and partners improves American relationships and interoperability. Colombia is one of the best examples of a country that has benefitted from US expertise in riverine warfare, and from US investments in Colombian equipment and training, to the level where Colombia is now a world leader in such operations. Rivers are critical in Colombia because the country relies on over 7,000 miles of navigable rivers for everything from transportation to border security and hydroelectric power. The Colombian military has sent dozens, if not hundreds, of sailors, soldiers, and marines to NAVSCIATTS as students, which has helped transform the Colombian Marine Corps into one of the most capable riverine warfare organizations in the world. Today, the Colombian Marine Corps boasts thirteen riverine battalions supported by indigenously designed and built riverine gunboats and naval aviation—units that were critical in beating back the FARC insurgency and forcing the group to the negotiating table in 2016. Much of Colombia is only accessible by river, and the Colombian Navy and Marine Corps are not just guarantors of security, but the only presence of the state in remote communities where they also help provide basic services like health care. Today, Colombia actually exports riverine expertise from its Centro Internacional de Excelencia Avanzada Fluvial (International Center of Advanced Riverine Excellence) to other countries from inside and outside the region, including Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mozambique, and has designed a family of purpose-built riverine patrol vessels built by COTECMAR, a domestic shipbuilder.

Riverine environments present a dichotomy. On the one hand, recent research from Stanford University shows that navigable rivers historically played a large role in the foundations of economic and political development and are linked with prosperity and democracy. However, riverine environments are also more likely to suffer from insecurity than other environments as they “are susceptible to the greatest shock in security terms.” They are often adjacent to population centers and supply irrigation systems, drinking water, and power generation. Compounding the risk of insecurity, they are also vulnerable to severe weather events, including flooding and drought—both of which are projected to increase due to climate change.

From the Seminole Wars to Vietnam and Iraq, American riverine capability has been critical for irregular warfare and beyond, but assembling the brown-water navy has always been an ad hoc process. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated how important rivers and the riverine environment are to larger, more conventional conflicts in today’s era, characterized by strategic competition as well as irregular conflict. Recognizing this, the US government has announced multiple transfers of dozens of riverine patrol boats, including some likely from its own stocks—a move that ironically emphasizes both the importance of riverine capability and simultaneously, the US military’s disinterest in it. Unlike DoD’s donations of HIMARS, Javelins, and other weaponry, the patrol boats will not be replaced. The US military cannot again wait until riverine capability is in high demand before bringing it back; it needs to establish an enduring conventional riverine capability that can support irregular operations or a large-scale conventional conflict, and everything in between.

Walker D. Mills is a Marine Corps infantry officer and nonresident fellow at Marine Corps University’s Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Future War and a nonresident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Featured Image: JOHN C. STENNIS SPACE CENTER, Mississippi (April 29, 2019) Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS) students participate in a Patrol Craft Officer Riverine (PCOR) training exercise on John C. Stennis Space Center, Mississippi, April 29, 2019. (U.S. Navy photos by Michael Williams/RELEASED)