This article originally featured on the Fletcher Forum of World Affairs and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here.
By Max Schreiber
America’s military vessels brave contested waters, hurricanes, tropical storms, and other chaos—so why is the presence of U.S. Navy ships in the Arctic so limited? The Arctic, after all, is no longer just vast icebergs floating around like sentinels of death, surrounded by silence more oppressive than its cold—it is now a major geopolitical prize in the Great Power Competition between the United States, China, and Russia.
The Arctic has relevance to every facet of this struggle. Energy? The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that one-eighth of the world’s untapped oil reserves and one-third of its natural gas reserves lie in the Arctic. Trade? The Arctic’s three trade routes—the Northwest Passage (above Canada), the Northern Sea Route (above Russia), and the Central Arctic Route (between Iceland and the Bering Strait, through the North Pole)—will soon subsume a substantial share of shipping, by some accounts five percent of global maritime traffic in 2030 and with no sign of slowing down. Political-military risk? The Russian Navy’s elite Northern Fleet recently expanded its area-of-responsibility specifically to secure the Northern Sea Route, and China proclaimed itself a “near Arctic” state as it begins to establish a “Polar Silk Road” of influence and commerce in the region (“near” does a lot of work there). In fact, China and Russia are cooperating in the Arctic, as evidenced by their joint naval patrol near the U.S. Aleutian Islands in 2023.
The Great Powers in the Arctic
The Great Power Competition in the Arctic will be won with icebreakers—highly specialized naval vessels capable of slicing directly through polar ice that would crush traditional ships and withstanding “storms that can ice over superstructures until ships become so top-heavy they capsize.” Currently, complete exploration, shipping, and patrol of the Arctic is impossible without them. Yet, there is a stark imbalance among the Great Powers in their icebreaking capabilities. China, located 800 miles away from the Arctic at its closest point, operates two existing icebreakers (with a third on the way) and is developing nuclear-powered technology for these vessels. Russia has a fleet of forty-sixicebreakers, including three nuclear-powered ships for extended Arctic patrols, and has recently launched a new “class of combat icebreakers with high-speed guns and launchers for anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles.” Both Russia and China have centralized their icebreaker programs under their navies, underscoring their view of these ships as military assets.
In contrast, America’s icebreaker program is in disarray. The U.S. government has only twooperational icebreakers—the decades-old Polar Star and the Healy—and neither of them are capable of year-round operations. Plans to build a new fleet of six to nine icebreakers, through the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program, are faltering. This joint venture between the Navy and Coast Guard is vastly over budget and behind schedule, already exceeding procurement cost by 39 percent, with the first delivery expected in 2029—four years late. Unlike Russia and China, the U.S. has no serious plan to equip its developing icebreakers with nuclear power. Moreover, while the Navy has some involvement in procurement and construction of the icebreakers, the Coast Guard alone is responsible for their operations. This is important because the Navy is the U.S. military’s forward-deployed, combat-oriented force, while the Coast Guard is structured primarily for homeland defense. This organizational divide means that the purpose, posture, and operational reach of America’s icebreakers are dangerously mismatched with those of its primary adversaries in the Arctic.
The Need for a U.S. Navy Icebreaker Program
Accordingly, the U.S. Congress and the President must enact legislation requiring the Navy to build and operate its own combat-orientedicebreaker program to secure our national interests in the Arctic. The Navy is unlikely to take on this role voluntarily. In 2023, the former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, underscored this reluctancewhen he deflected questions about icebreaker procurement to the Coast Guard, making it clear that he did not view the program as the Navy’s responsibility. Currently, the Coast Guard is the only branch of the U.S. military legally tasked with “develop[ing], establish[ing], maintain[ing], and operat[ing] icebreaking facilities.” Without a mandate, the Navy has shown no intention to expand its footprint into the icebreaking business. Notably, Gilday’s 2022 Navigation Plan, which outlines the Navy’s strategic goals through 2045, does not even acknowledge the Arctic as a major global maritime shipping route, nor does it identify potential geographic choke points in the region. In 2020, then-Secretary of the Navy, Kenneth Braithwaite, acknowledged the importance of icebreakers in front of Congress, but stated that “it is not a mission that is central to the United States Navy” and is one it “rel[ies] on the Coast Guard to provide.” However, leaving this critical program solely with the Coast Guard—a service with less than 10 percent the Navy’s size and budget—neglects U.S. strategic interests in the Arctic.
U.S. presence in the Arctic requires a robust naval combat capability which the Coast Guard cannot provide alone. In his 2001 commentary on the differences between the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, Professor Colin Gray of the Naval War College identified three unique characteristics of the Navy, all of which are implicated by the icebreaker program.
First, the Navy “takes its tune … from control (even command) of the high seas.” This means the first duty of “the premier navy, is to control sea lines of communication—to allow or deny access to the sea, thence across it, and finally to the land, where humankind lives.” However, without an active icebreaker presence in the Arctic, the Navy is voluntarily denying itself full access to the Arctic leaving gaps for its adversaries—namely Russia and China, to aggressively expand and militarize their icebreaker presence.
Second, the Navy’s commitmentto “boldly go … where great navies have feared to sail” is undermined by its repudiation of icebreaking operations. Failing to establish a surface presence in the Arctic with icebreakers could yield an “asymmetric [] equalizer” for adversaries, a risk that becomes more imminent as polar ice melts and access to the Arctic increases.
Third, and most importantly, “the navy of a superpower that aspires to protect commerce and international order globally has no responsible choice other than to pursue excellence virtually wherever military science takes it, however serendipitously.” Russia and China are actively moving the Great Power Competition to the Arctic: Russia is arming its icebreakers with anti-ship weapons and cruise missiles, both nations are regularly patrolling the Arctic seas with icebreakers, and heavily investing in nuclear technology for these vessels. While icebreakers are certainly necessary for the Coast Guard’s missions—including search and rescue, navigation, environmental protection, interdiction, and ice operations—Russia and China have embraced icebreakers as dual-use assets that squarely address the Navy’s purpose. Moreover, the Navy and Air Force’s existing submarine and aircraft presence in the Arctic is inadequate for the Great Power Competition. Submarines and aircraft alone cannot “clear a path for critical shipping, respond to oil spills, or conduct maritime safety and security boardings in the U.S. Arctic”—let alone accomplish more strategic goals of sea control and power projection in the region.
Separately from the mission, Congress and the President should also require an independent Navy icebreaker program due to the Coast Guard’s ongoing struggles in procuring and constructing the vessels. This summer, the United States recently signed the ICE Pact with Finland and Canada to build seventy to ninety new icebreakers over the next decade. While this agreement will help expand America’s icebreaker fleet, it relies on Finland—which can build a polar-class vessel in two years at just 25 percent of the cost of in America—to handle construction. This outsourcing is, frankly, an embarrassment. The poor outcomes in the PSC program may stem in part from its joint structure: since the Coast Guard operates the icebreakers, the PSC program lacks the Navy’s full commitment. The Navy hasn’t fully leveraged its size, money, expertise and influence to drive efficiency or accelerate progress of the program, while the Coast Guard remains constrained by the Navy’s budget authority. Furthermore, each service can deflect blame onto the other in congressional oversight hearings, complicating accountability for the program’s setbacks.
In some ways, the PSC Program inverts the issues between space operators and Air Force leadership that precipitated the United States Space Force. There, space operators’ lack of independence in the DAF—which is traditionally led by pilots—meant space operations and acquisition were deprioritized. With icebreakers however, the lack of substantial direct involvement by the Navy—especially in operations—may be depriving the military of considerable influence that could expedite and improve the development of these critical vessels.
Conclusion
The Arctic is poised to become a critical arena in the Great Power Competition. Thus, to ensure the U.S. is strategically postured in this region, incoming-President Donald J. Trump should work with Congress to enact legislation mandating that the Navy build its own combat-oriented icebreaker fleet—which, upon completion, can sustain a U.S. surface warfare presence in the Arctic.
Max Schreiber is an active-duty intelligence officer with the 76 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Squadron (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base) and public interest attorney with the Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute. His academic interests include executive power in foreign affairs and the use of diplomacy and pre-conflict military power to achieve national objectives; he has published on these topics in journals such as The Journal of Advanced Military Studies, Aether (the Air Force’s official strategy journal), and The Towson Journal of International Affairs. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School and Duke University (electronic and computer engineering).
Featured Image: The crew of the Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star operates near two seals off the shore of Antarctica, Jan. 16, 2017. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Chief Petty Officer David Mosley)
Chinese Coast Guard vessels are ramming Philippine Coast Guard ships at an alarming rate in the South China Sea. Chinese military planes are increasing dangerous intercepts with U.S., Allied and partner planes over the international waters of East Asia. While the high-profile use of military ships and planes is concerning, China is building and training a joint military force designed with one overarching objective in mind—to seize land areas from its neighbors.
U.S. naval and air forces have been contesting China’s maritime and air threats for years. But they alone cannot deny China the ends of its military strategy either through gray zone tactics or use of force. With significant U.S. Army investments in long range fires systems, and lessons of harsh ground combat in the war in Ukraine, the role of land forces in the Indo-Pacific is becoming more apparent. To deter China from seizing terrain as part of the long-term strategic competition, while assuring our regional allies, U.S. Army Pacific is complementing maritime and air forces by improving the ability to defend key terrain, including the sovereign territory of the United States and its Allies. This can be accomplished by increasing the scale and frequency of campaigning activities forward in the region involving long-range fires systems, pre-positioning equipment and supplies, and capitalizing on favorable policy developments.
U.S. Army Pacific is strengthening its multi-domain capabilities to support joint operations in the Indo-Pacific region. By increasing the scale and frequency of campaigning activities, namely regional exercises that involve long-range fires systems, the Army aims to bolster Allies’ and the joint force’s abilities to counter maritime and air threats. This approach, developed through the U.S. Army’s multi-domain operations doctrine and implemented by newly formed Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs), integrates land-based offensive and defensive capabilities with space, cyber, electronic warfare, and information operations.
Recently a Multi-Domain Task Force deployed its new Typhon Mid-Range Capability to Northern Luzon in the Philippines. Typhon is a mobile land-based anti-ship missile system capable of launching the Navy’s SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles. Typhon offers complementary capability to the Philippines’ BrahMos antiship missile batteries coming online. The deployment demonstrated U.S. commitment to a mutual defense treaty ally faced with escalating threats. This is particularly important as the Armed Forces of the Philippines shifts its focus from counterinsurgency operations in Mindanao to a new strategy of comprehensive archipelagic defense. MDTFs are also employing terrestrial sensors, high-altitude balloons, and deep-sensing platforms in the Indo-Pacific.
A Mid-Range Capability (MRC) Launcher from Charlie Battery, 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, Long Range Fires Battalion, 1st Multi-Domain Task Force arrives as part of the capability’s first deployment into theater on Northern Luzon, Philippines, April 7, 2024. (U.S. Army photo by Capt. Ryan DeBooy)
This new formation is applying lessons from recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East to drive experimentation with advanced technologies. This strategy enhances U.S. military effectiveness and empowers Allied nations with capacity to develop their own land-based long-range fires capabilities—critical for defending their sovereign areas—contributing to a more robust regional defense posture against potential adversaries like China.
U.S. Army Pacific is positioning critical sustainment equipment and supplies in Allied nations so that the U.S. is ready to meet its mutual defense treaty obligations and support U.S. joint forces. The tyranny of distance from the Continental United States to the “First Island Chain” of Japan – Taiwan – Philippines requires positioning essential equipment and supplies before any fast-moving crisis. For contingency purposes, the Army has pre-prepositioned stocks across the globe in locations such as the Middle East, Poland, Japan and Korea. These pre-positioned stocks provide a unique set of sustainment capabilities to the joint force to include Common User Land Transport (CULT), ship-to-shore fueling capability, bulk water purification and storage, vertical and horizontal engineering, field feeding, maintenance services, contracting and large-scale medical capabilities across a host of disciplines.
The Army also provides watercraft and causeways that the joint force relies upon for intra-theater sealift as well as ship-to-shore movements. U.S. Army Pacific is equipped with purpose-designed, theater-enabling commands to run these functions in support of the joint force, Allies and partners. For exercises and deployments, pre-positioned equipment and supplies in critical locations reduce commercial vessel movement costs and support the economies of vital U.S. Allies. Pre-positioning equipment and supply in the Philippines and Australia, for example, rather than on ships at sea, also enables the U.S. joint force to respond faster and more effectively to their international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief needs during natural events such as cyclones, typhoons, floods and landslides. Investment in pre-positioned equipment and supplies on our Allies’ soil allows the U.S. military to provide a range of options to protect and safeguard our friends in the region.
The U.S. Departments of Defense and State have matured existing policy agreements with many countries allowing the Army to tangibly improve the joint force’s ability to meet Mutual Defense Treaty obligations. The new reality of China’s land seizure capability combined with their increasing ties with Russia have informed our diplomatic and military support to allies and partners. Current agreements provide sufficient authority to increase exercise scope and duration as well as storage of military equipment and supplies, but often nations choose to support agreements based on their political will.
Persistent engagement, collaboration, and routine communication are critical to earning and maintaining our allied and partner militaries’ trust. From information sharing with the Philippines on maritime threats to their economic exclusion zones, to network development with the Japanese in command post exercises and missile defense, the U.S. Army is building trusting relationships. In stark contrast to China’s bullying tactics, the U.S. Army works with local populations and governments to gain and retain freedom of action in the competitive space, giving joint and combined forces an edge should they have to transition to crisis or conflict.
Members of the Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) conduct operations. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Philip Velez)
Critics will question why allies and partners would be willing to grant access and basing short of a crisis. Because they will seek support when we least expect it – and we must be strategically vigilant in positioning forces and equipment ahead of a crisis. In competition short of war, land forces translate political legitimacy into military advantage through campaigning: the logical and sequential arrangement of operations, activities, and investments. These recommendations position U.S. Army forces to support Allies in anticipation of their requests for assistance, and at the invitation of the host nation under existing agreements. These simple actions strengthen our critical alliances – a value that China fails to bring into any of its transactional relationships.
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General (retired) Mark Milley believed that “preparing for war is expensive,” but “there is nothing more expensive than fighting a war.” The forementioned costs would be far less than U.S. blood and treasure spilled in conflict with China. General Flynn, Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific, often reiterates that “our goal is no war.” To protect our allies and prevent another future conflict, U.S. land forces must complement maritime and air forces by increasing the scale and frequency of exercises involving long-range fires systems, pre-positioning equipment, and capitalizing on policy developments. U.S. air and sea power alone will not deter. Controlling physical land areas and nonphysical areas (e.g., human and information dimensions) directly supports freedom of the seas, in times of competition, or command of the sea in wartime. Alongside Marine Corps stand-in forces and U.S. special operations forces, Army forces can help secure key terrain in maritime Asia. Land force integration is essential to preventing war and winning the long-term strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.
Major General James B. Bartholomees III currently serves as the Chief of Staff of U.S. Army Pacific. He previously served as the Operations Officer of U.S. Army Pacific and his previous commands include the 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) and 2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. MG Bartholomees holds a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering from the United States Military Academy and a Masters in National Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.
References
ADM Samuel J. Paparo, USN, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Change of Command speech, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, (May 3, 2024).
Chris Panella, “The US Army put on a sudden show of force out on the far edge of Alaska to send the message it can as Russia and China partner in the Pacific,” Business Insider, (September 14, 2024).
Featured Image: Soldiers observe a live fire during Rim of the Pacific 2018 at Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands. (Sgt. 1st Class Claudio Tejada/Army)
Kazakhstan is the largest landlocked country, relying heavily on a resource-exporting economy, with the main route to international markets going through Russian territory.1 For many years, Kazakhstan did not experience any interruptions while exporting its resources, but the Russian invasion of Ukraine now challenges Kazakhstan’s economic and security stability. Russia has blocked Kazakhstan’s oil exports by shutting down a pumping station in the Black Sea port to draw Kazakhstan into its advantageous political stance vis-à-vis Ukraine. Kazakhstan is now exploring different routes for its resource exports. The Caspian Sea offers a promising option but will require sea lines of communication (SLOC). Kazakhstan should build a “Fleet in being” to protect its lines of communication, guaranteeing access to the Caspian Sea.2
80 percent of Kazakhstan’s GDP comes from oil and gas exports.3 90 percent of those oil exports go to European markets through Russian territory via pipelines.4 Kazakhstan’s reliance on energy exports places the country in a vulnerable position that is now being exploited by Russia. In 2022, Russia shut down oil transportation several times in response to Kazakhstan’s chosen foreign policy. On March 20, 2022, high seas in the Black Sea allegedly damaged the oil pumping station, but under nefarious circumstances. During the two-week disruption, Kazakhstan lost up to 300 million dollars in revenues.5 Before this event, reports surfaced that Kazakhstan chose not to send troops to Ukraine to fight alongside Russian forces.6 On June 20, 2022, Russia shut off its oil pumping station in the Black Sea a second time due to discovered malfunctions. The second disruption coincided with Kazakhstan’s Presidential announcement of non-recognition of Russian-occupied Ukraine territories on June 17, 2022.7 The third interruption occurred on July 6 when a Russian local court halted exports under the guise of an oil spill.8
In response to the oil export interruption, on July 7 Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev urged the development of alternative routes for oil export. He directed a study to examine the construction of an underwater pipeline and the use of an oil tanker fleet in the Caspian Sea.9 Similar proposals for an underwater pipeline took place in the 1990s but remained blueprints and mockups. In the 1990’s U.S. companies undertook the Transcaspian gas pipeline project, which was aimed to transport gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and later from Kazakhstan to European markets. The Clinton administration created a new position in the State Department for Caspian gas and oil projects. In turn, Russia appointed two high-level government representatives to address the Caspian issues. Moscow also agreed with Iran for strategic energy cooperation in the region, meant to block any efforts for a trans-Caspian pipeline not under Russia’s control or influence.10 Both countries used the unresolved status of the Caspian Sea to impede any further development of energy transfer options.
A map depicting energy infrastructure and deposits in the Caspian Sea. (Graphic via U.S. Energy Information Administration)
In 2018, the Caspian Convention regional countries signed a pact to exclude Russian and Iranian vetoes over a trans-Caspian gas pipeline.11 This new legal status for the Caspian Sea allows Kazakhstan to diversify its oil export transit options. This project’s completion remains uncertain due to Russia’s opposition. Another option for Kazakhstan is to build a tanker fleet and expand port capabilities. In the future, a Caspian oil tanker fleet could move up to 30 percent of oil exports through the Caspian Sea.12 However, oil tankers in the Caspian remain vulnerable to adversaries’ provocations without appropriate protection offered by the Corbettian concept of a “Fleet in Being,” providing security to a friendly fleet, and defending against unwarranted attacks.
The military balance of power in the Caspian Sea is shared between five countries: Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. Russia holds “local command” of the Caspian Sea with its relatively significant fleet for this isolated body of water. The Russian Caspian flotilla consists of 28 warships, including two guided missile frigates, eight corvettes, four patrol boats, seven minesweepers, six landing craft, and a gunboat.13 Iran’s fleet comprises one frigate, two corvettes, and ten patrol boats. Azerbaijan possesses one frigate, four submarines, and dozens of patrol boats. Kazakhstan’s fleet comprises two missile boats, two patrol boats, and one minesweeper. Turkmenistan’s fleet is even smaller.
Kazakhstan’s present naval fleet remains inferior compared to the top threat. Russian and Iranian cooperation further compromises Kazakhstan’s already precarious position. Kazakhstan’s fleet only patrols the littorals and provides security for offshore oil extraction.
In the face of new challenges, namely developing new export routes through the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan should build a “Fleet in Being” to ensure the denial of adversaries. The main task of Kazakhstan’s fleet should be focused on quick reaction to any provocation on its SLOCs, which are approximately 300 kilometers in length. This could be resolved by three to five corvettes and dozens of smaller high-speed boats with effective firepower, such as anti-ship cruise missiles. More significantly however, a naval buildup might stimulate further militarization and an arms race in the Caspian Sea. To mitigate these risks surface ships numbers should be enough to present a credible threat, but appear defensive.
The missile boat Mangystau of Kazakhstan’s Naval Forces arrives in Baku, Azerbaijan. (Photo by Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan)
To ensure that any adversary’s action in the sea would be defeated, Kazakhstan might acquire ISR systems and loitering munitions. This capability combination proved effective in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War.14 ISR systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) would be able to provide locations of ships and targeting information, while loitering munitions could deliver precision strikes, similar to current operations in Ukraine. The main requirements for such platforms can include UAVs that are able to operate beyond an adversary’s effective range while being able to relay the target’s location. Loitering munitions should feature enough explosives to cripple a corvette-sized vessel. For instance, the Harop drone could be used as a loitering munition designed to locate and strike with 23 kg of high explosive. It also can be safely landed and relaunched.15
The combination of UAVs and loitering munitions can avoid an unnecessary arms race in the Caspian Sea. It is also cheaper to acquire and maintain them. Another advantage of this combination is that they can be used in other tasks in different locations. Loitering munitions can be operated in low altitudes above the sea surface, making them highly survivable. They can an effective range of 1,000 km and 9 hours of flight endurance.16Units that operate this system could train in any location in the vast steppe of Kazakhstan. In concert with the abovementioned ship capabilities, they can also provide a credible deterrent.
Conclusion
In the face of geopolitical challenges, Kazakhstan is positioned to diversify its oil exports through the Caspian Sea. However, the country’s naval power might not be able to provide secure lines of communication since it was designed to patrol seashore and offshore oil production, more like the functions of a coast guard. To ensure SLOC security, Kazakhstan should build a “Fleet in being.” That capability could consist of additional corvettes armed with cruise missiles, as well as ISR systems and loitering munitions. This combination promises to be an effective deterrent while not provoking an arms race in the Caspian Sea.
Bakhtiyar Askaruly is a pseudonym for a military officer of a Central Asian nation.
2. Sir Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press Reprint, 1988), 165. This passage describes what is meant by this term, a force than can “dispute” command of the sea.
10. Fiona Hill, “Pipelines in the Caspian: Catalyst or Cure-all?” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Winter/Spring 2004): 17.
11. Robert M. Cutler, The Trans-Caspian Is a Pipeline for a Geopolitical Commission, Energy Security Program Policy Paper No. 1 (March 2020: NATO association of Canada).
As the Marine Corps prepares to contest the regional superiority of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Indo-Pacific alongside the Navy and the joint force, the service must strengthen its organic killchains and ensure that each new capability acquisition aligns to the concepts that the service must execute. While joint integration will rightfully remain critical to successful campaigns, the Marine Corps – as the isolatable forward edge of the joint force in the Indo-Pacific – must ensure that its presence adds credible theater combat capability even when joint sensing, communication, and fires cannot support the stand-in force. The Marine Corps should therefore focus on acquiring platforms that present a different risk profile than the joint force; prioritize organic ownership of all components of certain killchains from sensor to shooter; value resilient, risk-worthy platforms over the highly capable but expensive; and focus on diversity and depth in the types of munitions it brings to the fight.
Strategic Context
Over the past five years, the Marine Corps has confidently and rapidly altered its force structure to meet changing national strategic priorities. As articulated in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and echoed in its 2022 sequel, the United States must meet the 2020s as a “decisive decade” and defend U.S. national security interests by effectively deterring its adversaries, using the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a benchmark to measure the pace of advancement. In an August 2024 report, the Commission on the 2022 NDS charted the Marine Corps’ modernization progress to date, stating “The service deserves high marks for displaying the agility that DoD often yearns for but rarely achieves.” The report further lauded the Marine Corps’ Force Design efforts as a “coherent way for the Marine Corps to operate in the Indo-Pacific against the pacing threat while retaining the ability to serve as the nation’s emergency response for crises as they materialize.”
However, the 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance recently reinforced that modernization remains a “righteous” but incomplete journey. Using the service’s Concept for Stand-in Forces as a yardstick, recent acquisitions overestimate and over-rely on the availability of joint and national capabilities in the highly contested environment in which they must perform. Equally, other acquisition and force design decisions seem fundamentally misaligned to stand-in force imperatives like footprint, signature, and risk minimization.
The value proposition of stand-in forces best manifests in the context of a hypothetical PRC campaign to achieve reunification with Taiwan by force, in which the PLA will leverage its significant regional firepower advantage to assert all-domain superiority well East of the first island chain. Confronted by an adversary capable of devastating maritime precision strikes, the joint force will likely withdraw the preponderance of its high-end capabilities beyond the range of PRC threats. Further, Chinese capabilities will be focused on disrupting the long-range communications networks necessary for these high-end capabilities to close killchains from safer distances.
Nonetheless, the joint force will still require the ability to contest Chinese all-domain control in the first island chain. Enter the stand-in force, positioned on forward locations throughout the battlespace. Fighting as an extension of the fleet and joint force, the stand-in force will leverage disaggregation to create reconnaissance and targeting dilemmas for adversaries reliant on precision strike regimes. Stand-in forces will employ asymmetric capabilities and tactics to hold adversaries at risk in multiple domains, ultimately preventing the accumulation of regional superiority.
The Marine Corps’ perspective on how to execute A Concept for Stand-in Forces has evolved since the project began in 2020. The services Force Design annual updates allow us to trace this evolution. Foundational Force Design guidance initially prioritized the development of “smaller but better-connected formations that organically possess a complete killchain appropriate to echelon.” However, the 2022 Force Design Annual Update walked back this vision “from an initial focus on generating organic lethal capabilities…to a more balanced focus that includes persisting forward in a contested area to win the [reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance] battle and complete joint kill webs.” The 2022 annual update also raises unresolved questions about what this balance might look like, reiterating that “certain capabilities must be organic to our Stand-in Forces, such as organic sensors and long-range precision fires to close kill webs when external capabilities are not present or available.”
Based on this guidance, the stand-in force’s risk of isolation from the joint force clearly persists. How intensely should the Marine Corps hedge against this risk, and how should the service define the balance it seeks? Recent service acquisitions suggest that the Marine Corps has overinvested in capabilities that are inappropriate for a stand-in force, at the expense of building robust organic killchains that provide a guaranteed capability baseline in the event of isolation.
The Value Proposition of Organic Killchains
The disaggregated nature of stand-in force formations and the tyranny of distance imposed by the littoral operating environment combine with the nature of the PRC threat to illustrate the value proposition of organic killchains. For example, consider the dependence of the combined joint all-domain command and control (CJADC2) concept on the resilience and availability of joint information networks. Under CJADC2, the joint force and partners seek to project all-domain effects by seamlessly closing killchains comprised of national and joint sensors, processors, and shooters. CJADC2 represents a legitimate integration challenge, and to date the services have been inching towards minimum viable capabilities.
The 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance articulates how the Marine Corps sees its contributions to CJADC2: “Marines will act as the ‘JTAC of the Joint Force’ – sensing, making sense, and communicating to the rest of the Joint Force with an ‘any sensor, any shooter’ mindset.” Until recently the Marine Corps has followed in the wake of other services’ initiatives through participation in the Navy’s Project Overmatch and the Army’s Project Convergence, both of which have sought to develop and exercise the interconnectedness and interoperability required for the joint services to share information and close killchains. The Marine Corps has successfully exercised acquiring and maintaining custody of targets with organic sensors while passing this information to joint command-and-control applications, recently at Exercise Valiant Shield, which included an Indo-Pacific Command-level exercise of its Joint Fires Network. These initiatives and exercises represent obvious technical progress, but as demonstrations of concepts, they risk overestimating the reliability and availability of joint information networks in a way that unbalances the Stand-in Force in favor of brittle kill webs.
This imbalance becomes especially evident in the context of how the PLA plans to prosecute future conflicts. The PLA believes that modern warfare is not “a contest of annihilation between opposing military forces, but rather a clash between opposing operational systems.” The PLA’s derived concept – Systems Destruction Warfare – prioritizes attacking “the flow of information within the adversary’s operational system.” Under this paradigm, if the joint force envisions CJADC2 as a fundamental center of gravity that enables hard-hitting joint killchains, the PLA must view the same system as the joint force’s critical vulnerability and deploy proportional operational resources to target and disrupt it. What is the value proposition of the stand-in force if joint information networks must be available to unlock its contribution to potent joint capabilities?
A U.S. Marine Corps AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar is deployed during exercise Resolute Dragon 24 in Okinawa, Japan, July 31, 2024. The radar was deployed to support training with enhanced sensing and targeting data between the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment and the JSDF during RD 24. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Matthew Morales)
To deliver on its value proposition, the stand-in force must retain the capability to hold the adversary at risk with credible killchains in contested environments when the rest of the joint force cannot. When CJADC2 is uncontested and operating at its peak it will make extensive use of C2 platforms in the air and space domains. However, the questionable survivability and persistence of these platforms is in part the impetus of the stand-in force concept. Thus, reliance on these high-end joint networks introduces a contradiction in the stand-in force’s conceptual framework.
Earlier this year, the Marine Corps initiated Project Dynamisas a service bid to gain initiative in shaping contributions to CJADC2. The Marine Corps should leverage this opportunity to refocus command and control modernization to better align the service’s balance of information capabilities with the stand-in-force concept. The service should specifically refine robust, diverse information capabilities that enable the stand-in force to contest adversary all-domain control in ways that multiply combat power through the availability of joint networks, but crucially do not require them. Further, the end-to-end organic ownership of certain critical killchains by the stand-in force has the dual benefit of providing a credible means of contesting all-domain control when the joint force cannot be present and providing an alternative information path for the joint force inside contested areas.
An Organic and Asymmetric Munitions Mix
If spectrum-diverse information networks provide the connective linkages for an end-to-end organic killchain, a deep and varied arsenal of service-owned munitions must provide the kinetic edge. Though the Marine Corps has long constructed capabilities around a variety of indirect fire munitions, the 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance prioritized the service’s first ever acquisition of a ground based medium-range anti-ship missile. The service’s portfolio has since grown to include Naval Strike Missiles, long-range anti-ship missiles, and Tomahawk cruise missiles, each in different phases of acquisition and with varying concepts of employment. While these munitions will provide the stand-in force with the capability to hold high-value targets at risk, they also represent relatively high-cost, low-density investments. Deriving estimates from total program acquisition costs published in the Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request, the Naval Strike Missile (90 units), Tomahawk (34 units), and long range anti-ship missile (91 units) carry units costs of $2.32M, $3.09M, and $7.02M respectively.1
The per-shot expense of these munitions raises questions about whether the Marine Corps will have the magazine depth to necessary to sustain a protracted sea denial campaign. Additionally, the many lower-tier maritime targets that the stand-in force could easily hold at risk may not rise to the threshold of significance necessary for engagement with low density munitions; if the stand-in force cannot engage these targets it forgoes opportunities for credible sea denial contributions. The acquisition of exquisite medium-range munitions should not be abandoned, but greater diversity and depth in the Marine Corps portfolio of munitions could enable the service to operate more effectively as a stand-in force.
For example, a large arsenal of relatively low-cost loitering munitions will provide the stand-in force with an asymmetric advantage against littoral targets, since a single operator can control multiple munitions that cooperatively overwhelm adversary air defenses. Practical munitions trade-offs could also reduce the volume of information exchange necessary to execute killchains. For example, capabilities imbued with a layer of autonomy, such as kamikaze drones and suicide surface and sub-surface vehicles may reduce the required frequency and fidelity of sensor and operator inputs compared to traditional munitions, unburdening limited network resources. The Marine Corps should therefore intentionally balance its high-cost fires systems with deep magazines of effective yet relatively inexpensive loitering and one-way attack munitions.
Matching Capabilities to Concepts
As the Marine Corps considers the appropriate balance of organic and joint investments, the service should also consider how well its future platforms align to the concepts the service must execute. The 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance clearly defined the types of platforms appropriate to future amphibious and stand-in forces: “We must continue to seek the affordable and plentiful at the expense of the exquisite and few when conceiving of the future amphibious portion of the fleet.” Equally, stand-in forces must “confront aggressor naval forces with an array of low signature, affordable, and risk-worthy platforms and payloads.” The latest 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance suggests that the service has not wholly altered this philosophy, reiterating that the service must “not design our own exquisite low volume platforms.” However, considerations of affordability and riskworthiness do not receive explicit mention.
The Marine Corps should not compromise on cost and risk here. As the service constructs killchains, it should avoid the pattern of investing in expensive, exquisite, and excessively overengineered platforms that directly mirror or present the same risk profile as existing joint capabilities. The service should instead focus acquisitions on platforms that diversify the risks faced by the joint force. Marine Corps platform attributes should closely resemble the original value proposition for Force Design and A Concept for Stand-in Forces: highly expeditionary, risk-worthy, operationally and logistically supportable in protracted conflict, and respectful of the fiscal realities faced by the service.
General Atomics, perhaps sensing that the service lacks compelling alternatives, appears ready to upsell the Marine Corps on the more capable but likely far more expensive MQ-9B in the near future. At present, while the MQ-9A may serve as an invaluable enabler in competition, the platform appears too rare, too capable, and too imminently targetable to persist and survive as the stand-in force transitions to conflict.
U.S. Marine Corps Captain Joshua Brooks, an unmanned aircraft system representative, and Master Sergeant Willie Cheeseboro Jr., an enlisted aircrew coordinator with Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1, prepare to launch and operate the first Marine Corps owned MQ-9A Reaper on Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Ariz. Aug. 30, 2021. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)
Consider instead the application of a different solution paradigm to the same problem: the acquisition of high numbers of comparatively low-cost medium-size semi-autonomous unmanned aerial systems (UAS) like Shield AI’s V-BAT or the Platform Aerospace Vanilla UASto support surveillance, command and control, and targeting missions. Distributed throughout contested areas, launched from austere locations under vertical/short takeoff and landing regimes, and operated in swarms with a different payload on each airframe, these platforms could support or heavily augment large, low-density systems like MQ-9A in conflict. In one-to-one comparisons, medium UAS clearly cannot match the capability of larger systems like MQ-9A. However, when operated at scale and especially when integrated with other long-range littoral sensors, medium UAS platforms can provide an acceptable solution to the stand-in force’s surveillance and command and control requirements while presenting an asymmetric cost and targeting dilemma to adversaries.
While we have focused on the MQ-9, the Marine Corps portfolio is replete with platforms that carry similar contradictions when examined through the Force Design and stand-in force lens. Instead of replicating the acquisitions of the past, Marine Corps should specifically develop capabilities around diverse, risk-worthy, high-density, and relatively low-cost platforms and consider reducing investments in highly capable but overly precious and concentrated capabilities that mirror those in the joint force.
The Future of Force Design
The 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance reiterates that “Force Design remains our strategic priority and we cannot slow down.” Force Design provides the Marine Corps a unique opportunity to differentiate itself from past operating concepts and acquisition decisions while building an asymmetric value proposition in the joint fight against peer adversaries. The Marine Corps cannot afford to own every node of every kill web, but selective end-to-end ownership of specific killchains will enable relevant and credible service contributions to the joint force in competition and at the onset of a protracted conflict. Moreover, a Marine Corps with enhanced magazine depths and a plethora of affordable, risk-worthy platforms operating forward in first island chain will challenge adversary all-domain control and set conditions for US domination in the later stages of any maritime campaign. Likewise, any improvements that the Marine Corps makes in the alignment of its expeditionary capabilities to threat-informed concepts will concurrently prepare the service to effectively fulfill its role as a crisis response force, primed for contingencies in support of national mission objectives in accordance with the shifting realities of modern war.
Major Aaron Barlow, Captain Patrick Reilly, and Major Sean Harper are currently serving as operations research analysts assigned to the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration in Quantico, Virginia.
These views are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official views of any U.S. government entity.
Notes
1. Data reported for USN. USMC specific data not available for FY2024.
Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Terrell Chandler, left, and U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Melvin Monet, both low-altitude-air defense gunners with 3d Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, 3d Marine Littoral Regiment, 3d Marine Division, set security with an FIM-92 Stinger during Marine Littoral Regiment Training Exercise (MLR-TE) at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, Jan. 28, 2023. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Israel Chincio)
