This past week CIMSEC featured writing submitted in response to our Call for Articles on readiness for Pacific war in 2027.
Authors covered a wide variety of topics, including force design, operational concepts, and strategic deterrence. Each of these efforts offers some possibility for improving advantage in the near-term. But with 2027 being only a few years away, it remains unclear whether defense institutions will act with the appropriate sense of urgency and clarity of purpose.
Below are the articles and authors that featured during the topic week. We thank them for their excellent contributions.
“Any conflict with a peer opponent would be global, and historically navies find that they never have enough ships to cover all tasks that surface in the course of a major conflict. Using the shipping container, the building block of the maritime world, represents a relatively quick and easy method of creating additional naval capacity to improve warfighting advantage.”
“A denial strategy focused exclusively on Taiwan is not a true strategy but rather a subsidiary campaign objective. Zoom out and assess the broader implications of countering destructive revisionist powers. Western aligned nations must begin expanding military power and cooperation immediately and address the dilemmas that define effective force design and deterrence posturing globally.”
“Unknown factors of American public support, Taiwanese political will, and Taiwan’s ability to sustain resistance may mean that decisive sea control may come too late to supply and support Taiwan within the shrinking window of opportunity. The U.S. must carefully consider how to provide logistical support to a besieged island deep within an adversary’s weapon engagement zone and with little enabling sea control.”
“Force Design should be modified to embrace this mission by adding Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) to the core mission sets of MLRs. The MIO mission is currently assigned only to Marine Expeditionary Units, but the MLR’s low signature, platoon-sized maneuver elements with organic operational mobility, combined with a “mothership” such as an Expeditionary Mobile Base (ESB) and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), could make the MLR ideally suited for large-scale MIO.”
“While it remains improbable that China would seek to contest the Western Hemisphere theater with the United States by 2027, the combination of these hybrid tactics could severely undermine the United States’ position in the very region most critical for U.S. physical security.”
“If there is little enthusiasm today about engaging in a naval showdown in the Taiwan Strait, why not concentrate on altering Beijing’s perception of the military and political setting so that the prospect of hostilities appears unattractive? Why do we not do everything in our power to bolster our maritime deterrent to spare the world a potentially catastrophic conflict in the western Pacific?”
Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].
Featured Image: PLA Navy Type-055 guided-missile destroyer Xianyang (Hull 108) attached to a naval destroyer flotilla under the Chinese PLA Southern Theater Command steams to a designated sea area during a multi-subject maritime drill on October 20, 2024. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Zhou Tianyu)
The year 2027 has been designated as a “year of maximum danger,” especially for the inhabitants of the island of Taiwan. This is not the first time, however, that a critical benchmark has emerged for American strategists and planners. Amid the shocks of the early Cold War, National Security Council Report-68 (NSC-68), drafted in April 1950 by a committee led by Paul H. Nitze, also identified a year of maximum danger, 1954.1 Nitze, who was the Director of Dean Acheson’s State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, estimated that this was the year that the Soviet Union would possess the capability to launch a disarming nuclear strike against U.S. forces, tempting the Kremlin “to strike swiftly and with stealth.” “In time,” noted Nitze, “the atomic capability of the U.S.S.R. can be expected to grow to a point where, given surprise and no more effective opposition than we have now programmed, the possibility of a decisive initial attack cannot be excluded.”2 History does not repeat itself, but the reader might be forgiven for thinking that it does seem to rhyme.
Nitze’s time horizon was a bit longer than ours today and the nuclear threat he foresaw was more extreme than the circumstances generally associated with a People’s Liberation Army assault on Taiwan. His response to the looming threat of the 1950s, however, also was significantly different than today’s call to better prepare to engage in hostilities about three years hence. Nitze suggested that the United States should not focus on prevailing in a coming war; instead, he called for preventing the outbreak of war in the first place by making a significant effort to bolster the West’s deterrent posture.3 This raises two relevant questions. If there is little enthusiasm today about engaging in a naval showdown in the Taiwan Strait, why not concentrate on altering Beijing’s perception of the military and political setting so that the prospect of hostilities appears unattractive? Why do we not do everything in our power to bolster our maritime deterrent to spare the world a potentially catastrophic conflict in the western Pacific?
Wanted: A Maritime Deterrent Strategy
Several ideas come to mind when explaining why talk of “warfighting” and prevailing in a possible conflict has crowded out planning for deterring, thereby preventing, the outbreak of a clash over Taiwan. One is that the Biden administration’s ambitious quest to “integrate deterrence,” creating a whole-of-government, whole-of-alliance, program to synchronize deterrent activities among multiple warfare domains and across the conflict spectrum remains largely aspirational.4 Another is that an overstretched U.S. Navy has yet to devise a maritime deterrent strategy for the western Pacific, although commentators have identified the need and even the outlines of what such a strategy might look like.5 As a result, it is hard for naval officers to suggest logistical, tactical, and operational ways to strengthen deterrence, without at least a rough, agreed upon outline, of what the Navy is trying to deter and the type of deterrence strategy (deterrence by denial, deterrence by punishment/coercion, deterrence by retaliation, the role of pre-emption) that will be adopted to deter war. Implementing a deterrent strategy in the western Pacific requires changes in daily maritime operations and a fundamental shift in the mindset of operators and planners.
From a deterrence perspective, the outbreak of war in the Pacific highlighted by the notion of a “year of maximum danger” constitutes a catastrophic strategic failure produced by the inability of the joint and maritime force to prevent conflict. Planning for war implies that we are already back on our heels, so to speak: the Chinese have shifted the onus of escalation onto us, leaving the Navy to engage in an attritional battle (against the People’s Republic, no less) to restore the pre-war status quo. If war breaks out, and the fleet manages to dodge the opponent’s opening salvo, it remains unclear how the Navy and the rest of the joint force would turn back the clock and “free” Taiwan.
Now some observers might object to this line of reasoning about the Navy’s failure to take deterrence seriously. Navy policy proclamations at least pay lip service to “deterrence” and reference the Navy’s contribution to deterring the outbreak of war. It also would be wrong not to acknowledge the decades of human and material resources the Navy has devoted to maintaining nuclear powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles as a leg of the U.S. nuclear triad.6 By supplying this secure second-strike capability, the Navy is the centerpiece of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. It is the service that supplies America’s ultima ratio regum. The Navy is no stranger to deterrence; the idea is a classic tenet of naval strategy.
Since the end of the Cold War, however, the Navy has been preoccupied not with deterring war, but with fighting major wars and other engagements at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Humanitarian operations, freedom of navigation operations, anti-piracy patrols, counter-proliferation intercepts, escort duties, policing “no-fly zones,” executing small precision strikes, mounting missile defenses, and delivering massive air and missile assaults, have been a fixture of the Navy’s day-to-day activities. It might not be an exaggeration to say that most of the Navy is not involved in deterring anything but is instead fully and continuously engaged in actual hostilities, e.g., ongoing operations in the Red Sea. As a result, deterrence is a concept that does not seem to correspond to maritime realities for officers today. To them, deterrence is an idea that appears if not incredible, then somewhat farfetched – a figment of academic imagination.
Deterrence is not just an alien concept to today’s officers; however, it also appears disturbing or ill advised. Although the Navy has been continuously engaged in warfighting for decades, its operations usually appear to be circumspect, measured, and precise. Efforts are made to minimize collateral damage, to avoid harm to third parties, to not place personnel or assets in harm’s way unnecessarily, and to minimize the risks of escalation by friend and foe alike.7 By contrast, deterrence is all about risk, or as Thomas Schelling put it, deterrence is a competition in risk taking.8 Deterring an attack on Taiwan is not just about engaging an amphibious assault before it can establish some beachhead. It also is about undertaking operations that create a perceptible risk of a wider regional, global, and even nuclear war. Indeed, it would be prudent to treat a high-intensity conventional battle between two nuclear-armed competitors as a nuclear war, even though few Americans think much about the potential nuclear dimensions involved in the defense of Taiwan and no one has suggested that nuclear weapons should be introduced in the tactical or operational defense of the Island.
Get Serious about Deterrence – Today
The Prussian theoretician and historian of war Carl Von Clausewitz offers a bit of advice for those contemplating 2027 as a year of maximum danger: “the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish… the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”9 Following Clausewitz’s writ is no small matter; nevertheless, maritime strategy is what supplies us with a description of future war, how to deter it, and how to prevail in the event of deterrence failure. It remains unclear, however, how a Navy that still appears captured by capabilities-based planning and the dreary routines of budget preparation will devise this maritime strategy.
The starting point for this new strategy is establish its initial objective: to deter an “all domain” amphibious assault on Taiwan that could well escalate into a pan-Asia war. Additional objectives should be added as the strategy is fined tuned. The Navy’s nascent “hellscape” initiative could provide a sea denial capability that would form the basis of a deterrence by denial strategy in the waters around Taiwan, while the Navy’s sea control forces could undertake assurance of allies, prevent the isolation of friends and allies in the event of hostilities, and prepare to engage in deterrence by punishment/coercion in the event of deterrence failure.
This bi-modal maritime deterrent strategy is in keeping with the general thrust of the Navy’s ongoing force development efforts and would provide a way for the Navy to synchronize modernization efforts that are already underway.10 What is especially attractive about adapting a bi-modal maritime deterrent strategy is that it can have an immediate impact on the strategic situation in the western Pacific. If Beijing is paying attention, actions taken now can quickly bolster deterrence. Ship movements, exercises, especially with friends and allies, force deployments, war games, and experiments could send opponents back to the drawing board for weeks, months, or maybe even years. A bi-modal maritime deterrent strategy will not be perfect at the outset; effectiveness depends on continuous change and evolving capabilities. By contrast, procurement programs require at least a decade to field a new capability – if war breaks out in 2027 it really will be a “come as you are” affair.
Conclusion
It remains unclear how the Navy might shift its corporate attention toward devising a maritime deterrent and how such a strategy might be promulgated across the service. Today, ideas that depart from routine are sometimes acknowledged and pushed aside, not out of malice but out of an inability to direct them to “the right office.” Without a senior advocate to sponsor change, it is difficult to discern a pathway forward to gain broad acceptance for a new emphasis on deterrence, or the acceptance of a bi-modal maritime deterrent strategy. Nevertheless, we need to put capabilities and operations in place so that Beijing decides that the game is not worth the candle. Maybe the greatest advantage offered by a bi-modal maritime deterrent is that we can begin to put it into practice quickly, before Beijing’s 2027 countdown to a showdown.
James J. Wirtz is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
Endnotes
1 Samuel F. Wells Jr., “Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat,” International Security Vol. 4, No.2, (Fall 1979) pp. 116-158.
2 A Report to the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC68), April 15, 1950, p. 37. https://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSC-68.pdf
3 NSC-68 was intended to influence positively the Truman administration’s decision to develop thermonuclear weapons to bolster quickly the U.S. deterrent posture.
4 James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, “Wanted: A Strategy to Integrate Deterrence,” Defense and Security Analysis, pp. 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2024.2352943
5 James J. Wirtz, “A Maritime Deterrence Strategy: The Key to an Overarching Navy Warfighting Concept,” CIMSEC, 2 October 2024. https://cimsec.org/a-maritime-deterrence-strategy-the-key-to-an-overarching-navy-warfighting-concept/
6 “Big Navy” has always maintained a rather nuanced relationship with its nuclear deterrence mission see James J. Wirtz, “The SSBN and US Nuclear Strategy: The Future of the Maritime Deterrent,” in Rory Medcalf, Katherine Mansted, Stephen Fruhling and James Goldrick (eds.) The Future of the Undersea Deterrent: A Global Survey (Acton: The Australian National University, 2020), pp. 16-18.
7 Alan Cummings, “Reinvigorate Risk: The United States need to focus on manipulating adversary risk,” USNI Proceedings Vol. 148/3/1, 429, March 2022. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/march/reinvigorate-risk
8 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 92-125.
9 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 88.
10 “A Maritime Deterrence Strategy.”
Featured Image: A J-10 fighter jet attached to an aviation brigade with the PLA air force under the Chinese PLA Southern Theater Command taxis on the flightline during a flight exercise on October 31, 2024. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Wang Guoyun)
The United States’ foundations as a global great power rest in no small part on its status as a regional hegemon. No single country in the Western Hemisphere can make a serious bid to balance Washington’s economic and military might, to say nothing of competing with the close but often-overlooked bonds of trade, culture, and family which constitute vital elements of U.S. strength in the region. Because they are so easily forgotten however, the United States has shown an alarming willingness to take its position in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) for granted. The 2022 National Security Strategy proudly proclaims that “No region impacts the United States more directly than the Western Hemisphere,” but the U.S. defense posture in LAC is at risk of being outflanked by extra-hemispheric competitors, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) first among them.
While the PRC has led with economic engagement in its approach to LAC countries, military considerations have not been far behind. China has funded dual-use civilian and military infrastructure, most notably ports and satellite ground stations throughout the region. Today, Chinese-owned or operated ports dot the coastlines of LAC countries, secretive satellite ground stations collect signals intelligence in Argentina, and potentially Cuba, and PRC-supplied weapons have made their way into the hands of dictatorial regimes like Venezuela. In the event of a Pacific War, these capabilities and more would likely be leveraged by China to collect intelligence on and disrupt U.S. operations within the Western Hemisphere, as well as leverage its soft power within the region to court influence and keep LAC governments neutral or even sway some towards overt support of Beijing’s position in the conflict. While it remains improbable that China would seek to contest the Western Hemisphere theater with the United States by 2027, the combination of these hybrid tactics could severely undermine the United States’ position in the very region most critical for U.S. physical security.
Fortunately, the next three years present a number of opportunities for the United States to meaningfully strengthen its southern flank. Specifically, the United States should prioritize better coordination between its Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and strengthen ties with regional allies such as Colombia and Argentina. Finally, any strategy aimed at countering China’s expansion in LAC must incorporate a resource-backed counteroffer to PRC investment in strategic sectors like ports, telecommunications, and power generation.
Why LAC Matters to the PRC
China’s relations within its own “near abroad” understandably figure heavily in mostanalyses of potential Indo-Pacific conflicts and their outcomes. To a lesser extent, scholars have also looked to Africa and the Middle East as regions that would be critical to secure China’s energy imports during a conflict. Even less understood, however, is the importance that the Western Hemisphere holds for the PRC and its ability to wage war from an ocean away. This is a major blind spot, as LAC has emerged over the past two decades as a keystone region for China’s economy and industry, exemplified by Brazil’s longtime status as the single largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment.
LAC, and particularly South America, is a vital source of natural resources to China. While the Middle East is crucial for China’s energy supply, the Americas are a linchpin of China’s food and mineral imports. In 2022, Brazil alone accounted for nearly 23 percent of China’s food imports, and nearly 60 percent of its soybean imports in particular. Maintaining access to LAC’s rich agricultural industry will be critical for China to continue to feed its 1.4 billion inhabitants in the event of a major conflagration.
LAC is also a key supplier of critical minerals to China, especially copper and lithium. Chile and Peru together accounted for half of China’s copper imports in 2022, while as of May 2024 Chile and Argentina provided a staggering 97.7 percent of China’s lithium carbonate. These minerals are essential for China’s economy as a whole, but also its defense sector as they are instrumental in everything from high-capacity batteries used to sustain fleets of autonomous systems, to the wiring and interconnects needed for basic vehicles and communications systems. More high-end capabilities depend on a staggering variety of rare minerals and metals, such as niobium, a critical component in advanced aeronautics and hypersonic missiles. Brazil sits roughly 94 percent of global niobium reserves, leading the PRC to assiduously cultivate an ownership stake over roughly a quarter of Brazilian niobium production.
Finally, China, like Russia, has almost certainly realized the benefits that a presence within the Western Hemisphere can accrue in terms of capacity for horizontal escalation. Moscow, under the so-called Primakov Doctrine has practiced this frequently, pursuing military maneuvers in the Western Hemisphere as a tit-for-tat escalation in response to U.S. support for Ukraine. In July 2024 for instance, Russia dispatched two naval flotillas to Cuba and Venezuela in direct response to U.S. easing of restrictions on long-range strikes by Ukraine into Russian territory. For China, the cultivation of dual-use infrastructure, combined with support for anti-U.S. authoritarian regimes like Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, would surely prove an asset in the event of war in the Indo-Pacific.
Understanding the Risks
China’s current position in the Western Hemisphere presents three key wartime risks for the United States: (1) control over ports and maritime choke points, (2) dual use of space infrastructure to degrade U.S. space capabilities and threaten the homeland, and (3) disinformation and diplomatic pressure towards U.S. allies and partners.
The first risk is potentially the most proximate and decisive in the event of a major conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese state-owned or based firms currently own or operate at least twelve ports across the LAC region. This includes the ports of Balboa and Cristobal, located on either side of the Panama Canal. The ports are leased and operated by Hutchison Ports, a Hong Kong-based private company which acquired the sites in 1997. While even at the time observers raised concerns over the potential for the Chinese government to exercise undue influence over Hutchison’s operations along this critical maritime artery, over the past decade the PRC’s steady erosion of Hong Kong’s independence only elevates this risk. Indeed, in 2017 a slew of laws, notably the National Intelligence Law, National Defense Mobilization Law, and National Defense Transportation Law, underscored that the Chinese government can enlist the services of any private company for the purpose of nebulously-defined national security interests. Two PRC state-owned companies, the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC), were also part of the winning bid to build the $1.3 billion fourth bridge over the canal, a major undertaking which (after serious delays) has at last begun to move forward.
The confluence of PRC infrastructure and China’s impressive soft power influence in Panama opens up a potential nightmare scenario for the United States in the event of an Indo-Pacific war. In such a scenario, China could either directly, or through a proxy, sabotage port infrastructure on either side of the canal, disrupting or entirely preventing transit through the choke point for a period of time. Not only would this serious impact U.S. trade and shipping, it would cripple the United States’ ability to quickly shift forces between Atlantic and Pacific theaters. With current wargames suggesting the first phases of a naval clash would result in major losses, the added weeks it would take for reinforcements to transit around the Strait of Magellan rather than through the Canal Zone could prove decisive.
Maritime traffic backed up near the Panama Canal in August 2023. (NASA photo)
While loss of the Panama Canal is one of the most clear-cut risks presented by China’s power position in LAC ports, it is by no means the only way China could leverage maritime infrastructure to its advantage. Ports by their nature collect massive amounts of data on the shape and flow of international trade. The PRC’s planned port and special economic zone in Antigua, together with other PRC-controlled ports, may grant Beijing a one-of-a-kind window into commerce moving throughout the eastern Caribbean and the sea lines of communication which run through it. In the case of ports directly owned or operated by PRC-based firms, like the Brazilian port of Paranaguá or the planned Peruvian megaport of Chancay, this intelligence-gathering capacity could be turned into an operational capability by strategically delaying or seizing key shipments to snarl supply chains for key goods and apply economic pressure on the United States and allies. Finally, presence in regional ports may allow the PRC to carry out more sensitive sabotage operations targeting associated maritime infrastructure, particularly the undersea cables which comprise the backbone of global internet communications. While perhaps not decisive in their own right, China’s position in LAC ports could accord it a host of benefits that are currently underappreciated in planning around a potential Pacific conflict.
Ports are not the only dual-use infrastructure of note. In recent years, reports have highlighted a proliferation of PRC-operated space infrastructure stretching from the very tip of the Southern Cone through Venezuela, and potentially even into the Caribbean. Most notable among these is the Espacio Lejano Research Station operated by the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) and located in Neuquén, Argentina. Authorized in 2014 under the government of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the site has become notorious as a “black box” which even Argentine government authorities struggle to gain access to. To date, two inspections have been conducted of the facility, one in 2019 and another more recently under the Milei administration in April 2024 – indicating that serious political will is needed to gain access. In both cases, the Argentine delegation coordinated with the Chinese embassy prior to arrival, and the overall inspection process was relatively perfunctory, doing little to assuage U.S. or Argentine concerns about the facility’s potential for military use.
Neuquén was notably also the first ground station operated by the PRC outside Chinese territory and capable of providing telemetry tracking and control (TT&C) which enables the maneuver and operation of satellites and other orbital vehicles. The facility’s strategic location in the southern hemisphere was also particularly important to supply TT&C capabilities for China’s Chang’e 4 and 5 lunar probes. Neuquén, and similar ground stations in turn compliment China’s growing space presence in Antarctica where in 2023 the PRC announced plans to begin construction of a new dual-use satellite ground station at its Zhongshan research base. TT&C is not just important for satellites and other scientific craft, it is vital for the operation of hypersonic glide vehicles, which conduct complex maneuvers that depend on ground data links for guidance and to better evade missile defenses. China, which according the Congressional Research Service, has conducted 20 times as many hypersonic weapon tests as the United States, could use this network of ground stations in the event of a conflict to strike at the United States from the south, in doing so evading U.S. missile defenses which are primarily concentrated on northern approaches. Chinese space infrastructure in LAC could furthermore help the PRC collect key data on the orbits and locations of satellites in doing so enabling PRC anti-satellite warfare capabilities during a Pacific war scenario.
The final risk involves PRC use of diplomatic influence alongside dis- or mis-information campaigns to shape the political environment in LAC to its favor in the event of a war with the United States. Key targets in such a scenario would likely be the seven LAC countries which still recognize Taiwan instead of the PRC. Beijing would undoubtedly seek to isolate and pressure these countries to shift their recognition prior to or even during a PRC invasion of the island. China could cooperate with other U.S. adversaries to magnify the effect of its disinformation campaigns. According to one report, in Argentina, Chinese and Russian media outlets work in concert with one another to produce “a virtuous cycle of disinformation.” Critically, these efforts would not need to actively sway countries into fully backing China’s campaign (with the exception of those regimes like Venezuela and Nicaragua likely predisposed to do so already), but would instead merely need to convince governments to remain on the sidelines.
China could also use its economic heft as the number one or two trading partner for a majority of LAC countries to ensure neutrality, if not support from countries in the region. Again, the case of Russia proves instructive of how an authoritarian regime can deploy messaging and economic pressure to compel LAC governments. Shortly after his inauguration, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa proposed selling $200 million in legacy Russian and Soviet weaponry to the United States in exchange for new equipment (the United States would presumably pass the weapons it received along to Ukraine). Moscow retaliated by threatening phytosanitary restrictions on Ecuadorian banana imports, while launching a media push to claim that if the deal moved forward, Ecuador would make itself a belligerent on the side of Ukraine. The pressure worked, Noboa relented, and Ecuador’s banana exports continued apace. China, which carries significantly more economic weight in the region than Russia could prove a frightening prospect indeed for any government considering taking a vocal stance against the PRC in wartime.
Taken together, the PRC has quietly amassed a host of capabilities within the Western Hemisphere to give it both tactical and strategic advantages against the United States in the event of a crisis or conflict in the Indo-Pacific. The United States, for its part, has been slow to react to the scope of this threat and adjust priorities in LAC accordingly.
Bolstering Readiness in the United States’ Shared Neighborhood
There are a number of steps the United States can and should take between now and 2027 to gird itself and its regional allies in preparation for potential conflict with China.
Better Integrate SOUTHCOM in Pacific War Planning: A lack of integration across U.S. combatant commands risks cultivating a myopic view of Pacific war. Given the PRC and PLA’s global ambitions, any future conflict with China is unlikely to be restricted solely to one theater. As the above sections have illustrated, there are a number of areas where China could pursue a horizontal escalation strategy to gain an edge against the United States. Fostering greater exchange and intelligence sharing across combatant commands should be a priority to ensure the United States is ready to fight and win a war on multiple fronts. One early step could be to create a designated role for SOUTHCOM in key Pacific exercises like the Rim of the Pacific maritime warfare exercise. LAC militaries such as Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, already participate in this exercise. Carving out a greater role for SOUTHCOM could help bolster U.S. defense ties with regional militaries and build closer partnerships across combatant commands.
Another area for increased cooperation could be a cross-cutting effort across SOUTHCOM, INDOPACOM, and partner governments to tackle illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, a threat which plagues communities and ecosystems across the Pacific. While not directly applicable in a warfighting scenario, such an effort would serve to build greater partnership and information sharing between combatant commands, and build goodwill among partners throughout the Pacific domain.
Double Down on Defense Cooperation: While China has made headway in defense cooperation activities, the United States remains by far the preeminent security partner for the vast majority of LAC countries. However, more can be done to strengthen these ties and build partner capacity to respond to potential malign PRC activity in the hemisphere. One easy step would be to amend the Department of Defense’s Section 312 and 321 requirements that foreign military education training focus on “developing countries.” The Department of Defense’s current standards for designating a country as “developing” prevent partners like Chile, Panama, Uruguay, and most recently Guyana, from benefiting from U.S. training programs. Amending these to include a more nuanced standard would open the door to a much wider array of military-to-military engagement.
Furthermore, the United States should seek to rise to the occasion in cases where LAC governments have already expressed interest in a closer security partnership. Ecuador, which is currently contemplating reversing a constitutional prohibition on foreign military basing to allow for a reopening of the former U.S. naval base at Manta could be a key ally in this effort. Argentina, which is currently pursuing an ambitious military modernization effort, and has expressed a desire to rise to NATO Global Partner status, could be another.
Harden Allies Against Chinese Economic Coercion: China’s investments in critical infrastructure throughout the region pose risks not only for the United States, but its LAC allies and partners as well. For instance, two PRC based companies, China Three Gorges Corporation and China Southern Power Grid International, now collectively control the entirety of Lima, Peru’s power supply. Combined with the forthcoming port of Chancay, China has a number of vectors through which it can apply pressure against a Peruvian government seeking to pursue a policy against Beijing’s interests. The State Department could lead a regionwide effort with allies and partners to map and evaluate risks posted by Chinese investments in critical infrastructure. The findings of this review should also be passed along to the U.S. Development Finance Corporation for review and to help prioritize investments aimed at reducing the amount of influence China can wield over LAC government through its infrastructure projects and trade links.
Conclusion
Future conflicts will not be constrained to a single geographic region. In the event of a Pacific war between the PRC and United States, LAC will almost undoubtedly find itself a zone of contention, whether it wishes it or not. Failure to incorporate this understanding into U.S. contingency planning for such a conflict therefore creates risks not just for the United States itself, but also its regional allies and partners who may find themselves in the crosshairs of PRC coercive efforts. There is still time to patch key vulnerabilities in the region, but a recognition LAC’s important role in future global crises cannot come soon enough.
Henry Ziemer is an Associate Fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His research focuses on great power competition, transnational organized crime, as well as security and defense in the Western Hemisphere. His writing and commentary have been featured in CSIS, War on the Rocks, the Financial Times, and The Wall Street Journal.
Featured Image: The Panama Canal. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)
U.S. Central Command poses an opportunity for the Marine Corps. During his March 2023 testimony to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), CENTCOM commander General Erik Kurilla stated, “God forbid there’s ever a conflict with China, but we could end up holding a lot of their economy at risk in the CENTCOM region.”1 In the same testimony he pointed to how “72 percent of all Chinese oil is imported. That can make them vulnerable.”2 Then General Kurilla zeroed in on the sea lanes within the Middle East adding, “98 percent-plus goes through by ship. That makes them vulnerable.”3
The Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) could be the contact and blunt force that is tasked with the mission of holding key Chinese imports at risk in the Middle East. Force Design should be modified to embrace this mission by adding Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) to the core mission sets of MLRs. The MIO mission is currently assigned only to Marine Expeditionary Units, but the MLR’s low signature, platoon-sized maneuver elements with organic operational mobility, combined with a “mothership” such as an Expeditionary Mobile Base (ESB) and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), could make the MLR ideally suited for large-scale MIO.4
Force Design has received varying levels of critique, such as that from former Senator and Secretary of the Navy Jim Webb for charting a course that could “eliminate many of the Marine Corps’ key capabilities and permanently reduce the long-standing mission of global readiness.”5 Another criticism levied the concern that “A force tailored to fight in a specific region of the world may find itself unable to operate effectively in a markedly different climate. The Marine Corps cannot afford to have a significant portion of its fighting units dedicated to only operating in a specific area of the world — in this case, the Indo-Pacific region.”6 Adding the MIO mission to MLRs could represent common ground. By expanding the mission of the MLRs to provide greater utility outside the Indo-Pacific region, the Marine Corps can still address great power threats while enhancing global readiness.
During a PRC invasion of Taiwan, U.S. INDOPACOM could unleash a “Hellscape” of thousands of unmanned platforms to swarm the Taiwan Strait and keep China’s military off balance until more assets arrive.7 Meanwhile in the Middle East, a more nuanced mission of MIO requiring skills akin to those proposed by Major General Dale Alford, USMC, (ret.) in his 2021 article titled, “The Four-Block Littoral Force,” could fall to the Marine Corps. Marines could be called upon to rapidly help CENTCOM impose economic costs on China by boarding high-value ships, plucking them from nearby maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea approaches to the Suez Canal, and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.
October 10, 2020 – Sailors and Coast Guardsmen prepare to recover a rigid-hulled inflatable boat (RHIB) while conducting small boat operations aboard the Independence-class littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10). (US Navy photo)
This force would form the nucleus of the prize crews that will keep the ships from reaching Chinese ports. MLR Marines would maintain control and security of the prize vessel and could be augmented by seasoned mariners with expertise in seamanship, navigation, and engineering. This additional seafaring expertise might come from members of the U.S. Coast Guard or a modern version of the U.S. Maritime Service (USMS) such as that proposed by Wade Heath who recently suggested that the USMS be codified as a full-fledged uniformed service, on par with the U.S. Public Health Service or National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.8
In his reimagination of General Charles Krulak’s Three Block War, General Alford describes the “Four-Block Littoral Force” as emphasizing “operations in the littorals, especially maritime chokepoints.”9 General Alford’s Block 1 requires a littoral-focused gray-zone contact force with Marines operating persistently in maritime chokepoints, prepared to support the fleet.10 After Block 2 (the crisis response force), his Block 3 requires a blunting force of platoon, company, and battalion-level units that “could come from one, two, or perhaps even all of the following: a permanent base, an expeditionary advanced base, an amphibious ship, or perhaps even from non-standard, improvised commercial vessels.”11 General Alford concludes with a Block 4 (destroying force).
The contact (1) and blunting (3) blocks align well with the use of MLR Marines as a cadre of highly-trained boarding parties that feature an appropriate balance of quality and quantity for the mission. The combination of both quality and quantity is where the Marine Corps excels, making Marines better suited for a large-scale MIO mission over boarding parties formed by surface fleet sailors or special operators. The former lack both proficiency in seizing territory and the ability to use a variety of boarding team delivery platforms, to include helicopter insertion. The latter lacks the numbers that would be required to strangle an impactful portion of the Chinese maritime economy. There have simply never been enough resources to sufficiently train shipboard VBSS teams to excel using a variety of insertion techniques for what has almost always been a collateral duty mission for surface sailors. Meanwhile, SEAL Teams can truly excel at small numbers of these boardings, but there are just not enough of them to address the numbers of vessels required of this campaign. MLRs are also better suited for folding seized vessels into the broader littoral terrain and operations that MLRs focus on.
PACIFIC OCEAN (Sept. 23, 2015) Maritime Raid Force Marines prepare to board a rigid-hull inflatable boat. (U.S. Navy photo)
A MLR operating from an amphibious warfare ship or expeditionary mobile base (ESB) and conducting distributed operations across several LCSs might be capable of fielding upwards of 20 Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) teams. CENTCOM already operates the forward-deployed ESB, USS Lewis B. Puller, and plans are well underway to forward deploy four Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) to Bahrain beginning in 2025.12 Although ostensibly planned to replace mine warfare vessels, these LCSs can be expected to ply the same constrained, littoral waters the MLRs could use and perhaps some efficiencies could result. The MLR could also benefit from aspects of Expeditionary Advance Base Operations and naval integration such as operating from foreign vessels, non-standard vessels, and vessels of opportunity that are routinely being tested and experimented upon, like the embarkation of Marines on LCS-class ships.13,14 Beyond the boarding mission, MLR Marines would be useful for the close-contact, gray zone encounters that frequently occur in steady state operations across theaters.
Conclusion
In his June 2023 update on Force Design, General Berger reported that “The Navy and Marine Corps will continue to prioritize our sea-based expeditionary forces to maximize their forward presence as a keystone of our contribution to integrated deterrence. To deter or respond, we must be postured forward, operating from the sea.”15 Employing MLRs in maritime interception operations that can rapidly seize merchant vessels, form the nucleus of subsequent prize crews, and inflict pressure on great power rivals across multiple theaters can contribute significantly to deterrence. MLR Marines could be the professional teeth that hold Chinese maritime commerce at risk in the Middle East and elsewhere. As defense leaders look for creative yet feasible options to deter China from a 2027 invasion of Taiwan, the vulnerability of critical Chinese energy imports to maritime interdiction by agile MLR Marines could be part of the solution. It is time for Force Design to make the MIO mission a core contribution of the Marine Littoral Regiment.
Commander Clay Robinson is a retired U.S. Navy surface warfare officer with over twenty- five years of experience in naval operations and strategic planning. He is currently an adjunct instructor with the U.S. Naval Community College.
References
[1] Hunt, Edward. “In the Middle East, the U.S. Holds China at Risk,” Foreign Policy in Focus, May 16, 2023, https://fpif.org/in-the-middle-east-u-s-holds-china-at-risk/
[2] Hunt, Edward. 2023.
[3] Hunt, Edward. 2023.
[4] Headquarters Marine Corps. “Marine Littoral Regiment,” The Official U.S. Marine Corps Public Website, January 11, 2023, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2708146/marine-littoral-regiment-mlr/
[5] Webb, James. “The Future of the U.S. Marine Corps,” The National Interest, May 8, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/future-us-marine-corps-152606?page=0%2C2
[6] Wilson, Gary, Woods, William, and Wyly, Michael. “Send in the Marines? Reconsider Force 2030 beforehand,” Defense News, August 4, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/08/04/send-in-the-marines-reconsider-force-design-2030-beforehand/
[7] Rogin, Josh. “The U.S. military plans a ‘Hellscape’ to deter China from attacking Taiwan,” The Washington Post, June 10, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/06/10/taiwan-china-hellscape-military-plan/
[8] Heath, Wade, “Reestablish the U.S. Maritime Service,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2024, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/october/reestablish-us-maritime-service
[9] Alford, Dale, “The Four-Block Littoral Force: The Infantry’s attack toward Force Design 2030,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 2021, https://buff.ly/3jjNZpD
[10] Alford, Dale. 2021.
[11] Alford, Dale. 2021.
[12] Renfroe, Shannon. “LCS Quartet being lined up by Navy for Middle East Mine Operations,” Stars and Stripes, May 17, 2024, https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2024-05-17/lcs-mine-countermeasure-ops-13875628.html
[13] Shelbourne, Mallory. “Moving Marines Across the Pacific Could Be Littoral Combat Ship’s Next Mission,” U.S. Naval Institute News, September 28, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/09/28/moving-marines-across-the-pacific-could-be-littoral-combat-ships-next-mission
[14] Reiher, Dan and Cuomo, Scott. “The LCS Advantage for the Navy-Marine Corps Team,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/lcs-advantage-navy-marine-corps-team
[15] Headquarters Marine Corps. “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf
Featured Image: Arabian Gulf (July 26, 2019) Marines with the Maritime Raid Force, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) climb a tactical assault ladder to board the amphibious transport dock ship USS John P. Murtha (LPD 26) during a visit, board, search and seizure training exercise. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Matthew Teutsch/Released)
