This week, CIMSEC is excited to feature Project Trident’s second topic, ocean governance, presented in partnership with Stable Seas, a program of One Earth Future. Continuing the trend from Project Trident’s first topic, we will be extending the topic into a second week in order to accommodate the high number of quality submissions.
As an element of maritime security, ocean governance has traditionally been seen as the purview of law enforcement agencies and coast guards; however, the authors featured this week challenge this basic assumption, noting that challenges to long-established international norms from non-state actors and nation states (and the hybrid of both) threaten to upend global geopolitics. From false flags to illegal fishing to “grey areas,” the authors examine potential flashpoints in ocean governance that could dictate the future of international maritime security.
Authors note that while piracy and smuggling remain key issues around the world, ocean governance is becoming a major driver of regional economies as international actors vie for resources below the seabed of contested waters. Nowhere is this competition more on display than in the rapidly evolving Arctic; however, competition for energy and other economic resources will soon be in full swing in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.
Below is the lineup of articles featuring during the topic week, which will be updated as more publications are finalized.
Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.
Featured Image: Coast guard vessels from Japan and Taiwan dueled with water cannons after dozens of Taiwanese boats escorted by patrol ships sailed into waters around the islands. (Yomiuri Shimbun/AFP/Getty Images)
CIMSEC had the opportunity to discuss commanding the USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) stealth destroyer with commanding officer Captain Andrew Carlson.
In this wide-ranging discussion Capt. Carlson describes the goals of this unique warship, what it is like to experiment and field advanced new capability, and what the legacy of the ship may be for preparing for great power competition.
What would you say are the unique challenges of leading this ship and crew compared to most other ships?
Certainly, managing the maturation process in automation, integrating advanced technologies with legacy programs of record, and the minimal manning model all come to mind. However, none of those challenges are especially unique to Zumwalt.
The truly unique set of challenges for Zumwalt has really been orchestrating the path toward reaching an initial operational capability (IOC). Not only because of in-stride adjustments and acquisition decisions for certain systems but mainly navigating the dual-delivery approach prescribed in the Acquisition Decision Memorandum signed December 22, 2007 by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.
DDG 1000-class ships undergo a two-phased activation approach, separating hull, mechanical, and electrical delivery (encompassing propulsion and support systems for safe navigation) from combat systems activation. DDG 1000 was originally delivered from the shipbuilder, Bath Iron Works, in May 2016. Since our arrival in San Diego in late 2016, the crew has coordinated with Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) for completing systems installation, activation, and testing, while subordinate to operational direction from the U.S. Third Fleet, and operating under the manning, training, and equipping functions of Commander, Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet. This blending of delivery timelines and program milestones with fleet certification requirements and operational schedules presented a complex command and control relationship with shifting phases of supported and supporting efforts between the numbered fleet commander, the type commander, and NAVSEA.
Despite the challenges inherent in this approach, the benefits realized include an ability to achieve progress in each of the support roles to the different chains of command. Provided the ship systems met readiness levels, and the crew maintained training certifications under surface force guidance, Zumwalt was able to conduct operations at sea necessary for initial operational test and evaluation milestones as well as meet crew training and proficiency requirements while satisfying Third Fleet operational tasking. The best example of this was a Spring patrol in early 2019 after Zumwalt completed critical tier-1 certification requirements and eventually sailed over 9000 nautical miles, conducting first-in-class trials in Alaska, supporting engagement and security cooperation events with our Canadian partners in Esquimalt, British Columbia, and completed a transit to Pearl Harbor, all while conducting combat systems activation events and crew training sustainment.
Split delivery, though a necessary decision at the time, has been a challenging framework to operate in, though in retrospect, I am encouraged that the coordination between the fleet and NAVSEA has resulted in a meticulously managed progress toward achieving IOC, while providing opportunity for the crew to gain competence and confidence in operating Zumwalt and meeting operational tasking for the Pacific Fleet.
The Navy established a Surface Development Squadron that includes the Zumwalt. What is it like to lead a ship whose focus is experimentation, rather than, say, preparing for a traditional deployment?
I would adjust the framing of the question a bit to address the opportunity to experiment more explicitly, in addition to preparing for a deployment. The main focus of the ship is completion of developmental and integrated at-sea testing and achievement of initial operational capability. Along the way, because of first-in-class privilege, the crew also has the opportunity and even the obligation to experiment with the ship. The newer technologies in computing architecture, hull form, electric drive, and increased automation present incredible opportunity to experiment not only with technology and newer systems but in basic ship operations and tactical development applied to the class, and perhaps the fleet of the future.
The Surface Development Squadron establishment (created in May 2019 and now up and running today) and alignment of the Zumwalt hulls under one immediate superior in command furthers the opportunity DDG 1000 already enjoyed as a lead ship by positioning each ship under a commander charged with, among normal command duties, the rapid experimentation and developmental operations for technology and procedures. At the root of our training, maintenance, and operations, we are always looking for proficiency and the application of basic-through-advanced surface warfare disciplines in order to be ready for deployment.
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (Apr. 2, 2019) Sailors aboard guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) man the rails as the ship pulls into Pearl Harbor. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist 2nd Class Jonathan Jiang)
The privilege of leading a first-in-class ship that gets to experiment was already a great job. Under a boss who supports, enables, and encourages experimentation, I have even more license and support to push the envelope in all facets of surface warfare. And this is all framed under a mindset of “preparing for a deployment” as it also includes developing the concepts of employment, adjusting and refining the training and certification models for this ship class, and proving out the best methods for integration with fleet and joint operations.
For a ship that will probably not experience a traditional deployment or reach its full capability soon, what keeps the crew interested and motivated?
Zumwalt Sailors have a long view. They have a problem-solving tenacity undeterred by ambiguity. And they understand that deploying is not synonymous with operating. We are able to operate, and need to operate, for testing, development, and validation so that subsequent ships and fleet units are ready when we do deploy. That is motivation enough to stay on top of readiness, training certifications, and maintaining proficiency in the very perishable skills of doing routine things in the maritime environment that, though dangerous, need not be unsafe.
The crew stays interested as well through first-in-class moments. We have the opportunity as the lead ship to live in the grey area and determine the way ahead for the ship class. Among our grading criteria is this path we pave for follow-on work. For example, the Zumwalt-class destroyer Michael Monsoor (DDG-1001) should meet or exceed many of our production, activation, testing, and qualification metrics. We absolutely measure our effectiveness more so by their successes rather than our own. Additionally, what we learn and experience has value to the current operating fleet as well as the ongoing research and development for future ship classes.
Finally, we focus on our team, our culture. Onboard Zumwalt we value civility, humility, teamwork, honesty, and integrity. We necessarily do this because those are characteristics of high-performing professional organizations, but we also make them a priority because they solidify our own crew as a team ready to lean in to the challenges involved in bringing a new ship class to life, and ushering in a new capability to the fleet. We are interested and motivated in each other, and that surpasses the challenge of succumbing to hard or wicked problems, and also counters dealing with the tedious nature of some of the more mundane things we do.
How would you describe the progress and process of the combat systems integration?
Challenging and rewarding, often simultaneously. In addition to ushering in advanced technology inherent in the Zumwalt design, we are poised at the intersection of legacy programs of record and new systems functionality that requires extensive testing beyond simple installation and testing on other hulls that have already passed through the crucible of being a part of a new ship class. Our situation has led to fascinating discussions and discoveries between design teams, engineers, industry leads, and fleet Sailors as we install, test, repair, modify, and operate various equipment and systems of systems onboard.
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (April 2, 2019) Capt. Andrew Carlson, center, commanding officer of the guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), speaks to Rear Adm. Kristen Fabry, left, director of logistics, fleet supply and ordnance, for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Rear Adm. Jim Waters, director of Maritime Headquarters at the U.S. Pacific Fleet, during a tour of the ship. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jonathan Jiang/Released)
It is necessarily detailed and deliberate, and certainly tests one’s patience when testing identifies a flaw or corrective action, but each time the collective team of government civilians, industry leads, and Sailors punches through to a successful test or validation of system integration there is a tremendous sense of accomplishment and increased motivation to move forward. In some cases, our in-situ feedback can be turned around into rapid changes that affect not just the Zumwalt ship class but other fielding efforts across the fleet. We are also well-positioned to inform discussions on future ship classes with operator perspectives to aid acquisition deliberations.
What can this ship teach the Navy about preparing for great power conflict?
Logistics and self-sufficiency are not only critical enablers for prompt and sustained combat operations at sea, but need to be factored into requirements definitions, and design and acquisition decisions. We have spent many hours reviewing and modifying our ability to conduct repairs and improve self-sufficiency within the lifelines of the ship. Adequate repair parts storage, critically evaluated parts allowances, and onboard repair capabilities should always be part of ship design. This includes not only traditional hull, mechanical and electrical repair capability, but with the continuing shift of key components in systems and the networking of engineering control on par with sensor and weapon control, the reliance on network health and security, fiber optic repair, electronic redundancies, and computer architectures will require increased reliability and failsafes to ensure our ships and their systems can remain available in a sustained fight.
Including margin in space, weight, power, and cooling in our ship systems aids longevity of design and permits agility in our procurement to adjust to a dynamic strategic and operational landscape. Patience and prudent decision-making along the way are key components of a steady strain to deliver capability to the fleet that has not existed and will be game-changing in great power conflict. Investment in time, fiscal resources, intellectual capital, and deliberate maturation of critical technologies are key to the long view in procurement.
Significant advancements in maritime warfare capabilities like automation, stealth, and high power systems are expensive and require clear articulation of cost and risk balances. Once we have determined that these advancements are necessary to tip the scales in favor of our national interests, we have to be disciplined and principled to effectively follow through. But this is not a call to blind loyalty or to obstinate determination in the face of invalidated assumptions, or changing fiscal, strategic, or operational realities.
When we need improved and advanced capabilities, including ones the Zumwalt class brings, we will find that those capabilities are not something we can quickly surge if they do not already exist in the fleet. We will be glad that we committed in advance to gaining the advantages Zumwalt brings, especially in technologies and tactics that usher in new capability across the fleet. There’s a great quote from the movie Spy Game from Robert Redford’s character, Nathan Muir. His assistant, Gladys, (brilliantly played by Marianne Jean-Baptiste) muses whether or not he is being paranoid as she watches him prepare for foreseen challenges he expects to face. Muir’s response as a seasoned intelligence operative resonates with me: “When did Noah build the ark, Gladys? Before the rain…before the rain.”
Closer to my wheelhouse, I believe the more I sail and operate with an advanced warship like Zumwalt, the more I am convinced that technical competence and system expertise, procedural compliance built on a foundational knowledge of basic principles, and tenacity in solving hard problems remain timeless requirements of service at sea.
What do you think the legacy of the Zumwalt class will be?
Power, stealth, and people. More explicitly, power generation, redundancy, and smart power distribution regimes will become the norm across the future force. We will continue to see increased demand for high voltage systems, integrated power, and balanced distribution of power across a variety of inductive loads that include sensors and weapons, and even propulsion systems of the future.
Regarding stealth, the nature of our ship and her inherent stealth design has thrust forward into our tactical development an emphasis on signature control and emissions discipline that is not only supremely effective in the employment of this ship class, but is immediately exportable to other ship classes. A crew that can appreciate the use of the electromagnetic and acoustic spectra in the routine doesn’t need to be on a stealth destroyer to realize the advantages therein. Put another way, one doesn’t have to be invisible if you don’t let people see you to begin with.
I would hope for a stealth destroyer legacy that engenders a renaissance of basic warfighting disciplines in emissions control, operational deception, anti-submarine tactics, and an application of offensive capability distributed across the battlespace to not only decrease our detect-to-engage sequence timelines, but also complicates and reduces the decision space of an enemy.
Eastern Pacific Ocean (Apr. 28, 2019) The guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) conducts class-specific testing while underway off the coast of California. (Internal U.S. Navy photo)
Finally, the privilege of leading a concentrated grouping of talented, mature, and resilient Sailors reinforces continued appreciation for the maxim that Sailors mean more than systems onboard a warship. John Paul Jones had it right when rating the capability of a ship.
Any final thoughts to share?
Facing similar challenges to those faced by today’s Navy, our ship’s namesake entered office as the 19th Chief of Naval Operations. With defense spending declining and a steadily aging fleet, Admiral Elmo “Bud” Zumwalt saw it as his job to ensure the Navy remained capable of meeting the current and future threats. Zumwalt’s embrace of innovation resulted in a number of new programs, such as the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate, the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine, and the F-14 Tomcat, all of which had lasting impacts on the Navy’s warfighting readiness. We are similarly poised with advanced capability requirements, but constrained resources, and we need to fearlessly apply a pioneering mindset while critically evaluating the effectiveness and integration of new capabilities.
More important than fleet capability development, Admiral Zumwalt knew the primary force-multiplier of the Navy continued to be Sailors and, as a social reformer, began quality of life improvements for the fleet and the institutionalization of equality for minorities and women in the Navy. There is still much work left in both the modernization of our naval capabilities and making actionable progress in the area of equality. We are privileged onboard Zumwalt to uphold a legacy of ushering in new naval capability, but more so, to reinforce ideals the admiral voiced in Z-gram 66, that “there is no place in our Navy for insensitivity. We are determined that we shall do better…ours must be a Navy family that recognizes no artificial barriers of race, color, or religion. There is no black Navy, no white navy, —just one Navy—the United States Navy.”
Captain Carlson is a 1995 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He previously commanded the legacy destroyer USS Higgins (DDG 76), the U.S. Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System in Romania, and a trio of coastal minehunters. He holds Navy subspecialties in space systems engineering and national security. The views here are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Department of Defense. You can follow him on Twitter @ruminantswo.
Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.
Featured Image: Jacksonville, Fla. (Oct. 25, 2016) The guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) transits Naval Station Mayport Harbor on its way into port. (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Timothy Schumaker/Released)
Maritime chokepoints and littorals remain strategic areas of interest in global strategy and potential warfighting campaigns. CIMSEC contributors pointed to a number of themes that can shape strategic calculations with respect to these critical geographic features.
Chokepoints and littorals magnify the influence of nearby states, who often by other measurements of national power are seen as lesser nations relative to major states. Yet in times of conflict or crisis, it is major states who could very well come to depend on these littoral nations for critical support and access, nations whose political sensitivities can powerfully constrain diplomatic and warfighting options for great powers. Even non-state actors, such as insurgents or pirates, can force multinational responses and contingency planning through small-scale actions in a chokepoint of global import.
Another major theme authors touched upon was the role of strategic chokepoints and littorals in emerging American warfighting concepts, particularly those of the U.S. Marine Corps that encompass archipelagic defense. As the Marine Corps transforms into a stand-in force that can hold the line against a great power while enabling follow-on access from friendly forces, it will have to master schemes of fire and maneuver across the vast array of chokepoints and littorals within Western Pacific island chains. Some authors envisioned the Marines as an anti-shipping force, with a few touching on the vital role mine warfare in particular can play in contesting chokepoints and manipulating an adversary’s avenues of access, while also bemoaning U.S. naval forces’ longstanding lack of interest in offensive mining. As U.S. forces develop new warfighting concepts for the Pacific, it is clear that open-ocean combat and fighting for chokepoints and littorals are two sides of the same coin. As 21st century great power competition begins to take shape, one can look to the world’s coastlines to find its major contours.
Authors also challenged traditional ideas of chokepoints being fixed geographic areas, whose influence is as supposedly permanent as their location. And yet the world is witnessing major changes that are redefining the chokepoint and its value. The Arctic is melting away, revealing a complex mosaic of chokepoints and littorals that will lend themselves toward new lines of communication for global commerce, as well as new zones of competition. Chokepoints may also emerge not as geographic features, but as more abstract zones that develop within the seams of operational concepts, intelligence collection abilities, diplomatic clout, and even in in the information environment. Their constraining effect remains the same, but the ability to adjust to their influence becomes much more complex than simply being in the right place at the right time.
Strategic chokepoints and littorals will continue to have major influence on world events, both in peace and in conflict. Today as thousands of ships sail through these narrow channels and naval forces traverse nearby waters, the access these zones create may have become an assumed feature of global activity. But should that access come under threat or become outright contested, the vital importance these areas will hold will become all too apparent, and in the form of consequences that could ripple across the globe.
Below are the articles that featured during the extended topic week, with excerpts. We thank these authors for their excellent contributions.
Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges (ret.), former commander, U.S. Army Europe, stops by the podcast to discuss lessons learned from the exercise Defender 2020, Russia’s Black Sea strategy, and the importance of the Black Sea to NATO.
Since 1936, the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, hereinafter referred to as the Montreux Convention, has allowed for the peaceful flow of commerce through the Turkish Straits. However, recent calls from Turkish and Russian policy circles for revisions to the Montreux Convention should be cause for concern, as these proposals threaten to either spur a naval arms race in the Black Sea region or look to exploit the Straits as a geostrategic chokepoint.
The cornerstone of this power projection complex in the western Pacific is forward deployed military forces, which are in turn enabled by the availability of proximate and friendly basing in theater. However, the ability of the United States to sustainably conduct expeditionary operations in the strategic chokepoints and littorals of Asia could crumble in the absence of the allied access it has come to rely on.
While DMO and EABO provide the essential building blocks of sea control and denial, their deterrent power can be exponentially increased through the integration of mine warfare. Whether deployed between EABs by ExMIW companies, activated from UFPs and maneuvered into place as the situation dictates, or fired into shallow waters with the modified Quickstrike-ER and moved as required by C2 systems, MIW is the most promising yet underdeveloped capability for today’s maritime strategists.
Military strategists often speak as Fisher did of strategic chokepoints, believing them to have significant geopolitical value and act as epicenters for maritime strategy, where the control of which is considered vital for success in maritime conflict. But are these chokepoints truly strategic? Does the success of a nation’s maritime strategy actually hinge on the control or loss of control of these narrow seas?
The ongoing transformation of the Arctic from an inaccessible frozen wasteland to an accessible and untapped reserve creates not only a new contested space, but will create new strategic chokepoints and littoral operating environments. The United States, in concert with its allies, will need to invest in the ability to access and secure this environment in order to maintain sovereignty and security in this new world.
The INDOPACOM AOR continues to be a primary focus of U.S. naval forces, and the area is of central importance to China. This map describes the strategic importance of Southeast Asian littoral geography to China’s interests. By studying the map the user sees correlations between China’s diplomatic and economic investments and chokepoint geography.
Much can be gained, then, by conceptualizing chokepoints more broadly as areas of temporary advantage that may be created or destroyed through the application of either new capabilities or existing ones in ingenuous ways to create an outsized advantage. In the case of the Battle of the Atlantic, these types of chokepoints resulted in the greatest strategic effect.
The chokepoints and littorals surrounding Indonesian and Philippine waters would make for excellent forward positioning for a Marine Corps stand-in force. It would provide a critical bulwark for U.S. force posture in the Pacific by facilitating access for follow-on forces from allied Australia, and access into the South China and Philippine Seas.
Major General Pat Donahoe, Deputy Commander for Operations, U.S. 8th Army, and Prof. Don Chisholm of the U.S. Naval War College join us to discuss why the 8th Army is known as “the Amphibious 8th,” the campaign through the southern Philippines in World War II, Admiral Daniel Barbey, and the different amphibious cultures that emerged during the war.
The drone circling overhead continued to pace them, repeating its message, its demands growing increasingly terse and harsh. The ship’s master counted no less than three times his vessel was threatened with lethal force with never a blip on the radar to indicate a closing vessel or aircraft. Open seas, open skies, and toothless demands. Twenty-five minutes after the initial challenge, two long-range anti-ship missiles, their telemetry continually updated by the overhead drone, slammed into the Píng Jìng De Hǎi Yáng.
Strategic chokepoints and littorals are the arena of current and future power struggles. Great power competition is layered within these maritime and littoral domains. To a lesser extent, but still consequential, are the potential actions of regional and non-state actors capable of causing disruption along maritime chokepoints and littoral zones. The United States will be required to address multi-layered challenges to its maritime dominance in these areas while also fulfilling the role of humanitarian and the facilitator of free and open commerce.
Many a discussion of the Bab Al Mandeb Strait starts with the translation from the Arabic name (Gate of Tears) as an introduction to the chokepoint’s woes. They are not wrong to do so. The Gate of Tears seems to be a place of permanent melancholy, surrounded by a depressing miasma of conflict, state failure, famine, crime, and now global pandemic. Unfortunately for all concerned, it is also the key trading route between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.
The Arctic is changing physically and the security dimensions of the region are changing along with it. The region will not be ice-free overnight, and the United States is not without partners in addressing those changing strategic considerations. It behooves the United States to not pursue a hardline balancing arrangement against Russian militarization and instead pursue what it has been doing for some time, preparing for the potential of Arctic operations across all service branches.
My cinematic reveries were interrupted when it became apparent that 1997’s Tomorrow Never Dies, starring Pierce Brosnan as the titular hero, was a lot closer to our current reality than I had ever expected. Themes of great power competition, technological proliferation, state and non-state conflict, media manipulation, and conflict in the strategic waterways and littorals, which may have seemed somewhat out of place in 1997, feel all too prescient in 2020.
Naval mines have the ability to shape the battlespace, manage vertical escalation of hostilities, act as cost-effective force multipliers, and are a proven coercive diplomatic tool that can have deep psychological and strategic impact. With advancements in naval mines and the changing naval threat environment, the USMC should reconsider the role of mine warfare to explore how it may complement nascent force development and warfighting concepts.
Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at content@cimsec.org.
Featured Image: SUEZ CANAL (March 16, 2013) The aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) transits the Suez Canal. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Kameren Guy Hodnett/Released)
CIMSEC received a tremendous response to our call for articles on strategic chokepoints and littorals, issued in partnership with U.S. Marine Corps University’s Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity, and as a part of Project Trident. Because of the high volume of excellent submissions received, this topic week will be extended through June 12.
The authors took insightful and creative approaches toward exploring the significance of strategic chokepoints and littorals. One major theme is that chokepoints, usually thought of as fixed areas, are becoming more flexible in definition and function. Whether it be new chokepoints emerging in the Arctic as the ice thaws, or more abstract chokepoints flowing from gaps in operational concepts, it is clear that the nature of the chokepoint itself is evolving. What remains consistent is that the final value of influencing chokepoints and littorals is not defined by simply controlling adjacent geography, but whether economic and military access is ultimately preserved and sustained.
Another critical theme the authors point to is how great power competition is affecting the role of chokepoints and littorals. Chokepoints and littorals have often been considered as an arena for mainly competing against non-state actors or third-rate states in the developing world. But with great power competition on the rise, chokepoints and littorals are emerging as the front line in potential battlegrounds. Authors looked at the role of new technology and warfighting concepts in contesting chokepoints and littorals in great power conflict, especially through the lens of emerging constructs such as U.S. Marine Corps’ stand-in forces and expeditionary advanced bases.
Below is the lineup of articles featuring during the topic week, which will be updated as more publications are finalized.
