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Costs vs. Capabilities: Canada’s National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy

By Andrew Chisholm

The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) is supposed to re-fit Canada’s Navy and Coast Guard fleets and breathe long-term life into Canada’s domestic shipbuilding industry. The program has been widely supported by political, academic, and media players, but now controversy is growing on both the financial and policy fronts. Like all military procurement programs the NSPS is a question of costs vs. capabilities. Perhaps unsurprisingly the initial promise has dimmed somewhat and, as Eric Lerhe recounts most programs have already seen unit and capability reductions and others are likely to.

The Joint Support Ship (JSS) program will produce two ships, not three, with less than half the fuel capacity of Canada’s current supply ships and no room for Army vehicles or landing craft. Plus, a Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) report released in February found that due to the complexity of the project and the higher rate of inflation for naval production (7%-11%, not the standard 2.7%), two ships would cost approximately $3.28bn not the $2.6bn budgeted, perhaps squeezing capabilities further. The Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship (A/OPS) program will almost certainly produce six ships rather than eight and has already seen a reduction in top speed from 20 to 17 knots while the Polar Class Icebreaker program will produce only one ship, not the previously envisioned two.

Presenting the NSPSThe Canadian Surface Combatant program, replacing Canada’s 15 frigates and destroyers, may be in trouble as well. Production is being delayed until the A/OPS are completed to allow shipyard skill development (likely a 2020 start) so no design has been chosen. Nevertheless, Brian Stewart has reported that defence sources believe replacing the 15 ships with “like” vessels will probably cost between $30bn and $40bn. In short, the budgeted $26bn will either have to increase or the number of ships will have to be reduced. Also, the established funding structure does not allow for increases with inflation so purchasing power will be eroded over time, a factor which applies to all programs.

There is controversy beyond the number of ships and their capabilities as well in particular concerning the A/OPS program. Terry Milewski reported last week that Irving Shipbuilding has been awarded a $288 million contract to refine the A/OPS design based on Norway’s Svalbard design, purchased by the Canadian government. Irving responded that its “definition” contract includes advanced modeling, pre-ordering of engines and radar, and $38 million in HST, while noting that Canada’s ships will be larger and house more crew than those of other countries.

It has also been questioned whether the vessels to be acquired, with or without reductions, fit Canada’s needs or if different ships would be better and cheaper. A report from the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA) argues that in trying to fit both the Arctic and offshore patrol roles the current A/OPS design falls short on both counts, with range too short and hull too light for full-range operations in the Arctic as well as being too slow to effectively perform an offshore patrol function. The CCPA also argues that the A/OPS program’s Arctic requirements increase costs severely and that an increased (and armed) icebreaker capability combined with non-Arctic patrol ships would better fill both roles at a lower cost.

It is suggested that that lower cost can be achieved through purchasing an “off-the-shelf” design for patrol ships, potentially from the US or Australia, rather than using a based-in-Canada design. In fact, A/OPS design is being partly subcontracted to overseas firms, necessary because Canada is essentially creating a shipbuilding capability from scratch; having to buy these skills offshore is an important contributor to the high-cost according to maritime security analyst Ken Hansen. Outside the A/OPS program the same debate exists. In fact, France’s Fremm-Class frigate was recently showcased to Defence Minister Peter Mackay and pitched as a cost-saving option.

To be sure, the benefits of the NSPS extend beyond the program itself. Some have projected domestic builds to cost only 7% more than foreign options while creating many Canadian jobs and developing design and construction ability within Canada’s shipbuilding industry, hopefully setting Canadian shipyards on the path to prosperity in years to come. Also, Public Works Minister Rona Ambrose has disputed the PBO’s estimate and said that if program adjustments need to be made they will be worked out between government, shipyards, the Navy, and the Coast Guard. Nevertheless, with costs in the tens of billions, any adjustments will undoubtedly be significant whether they involve increased investment or further reductions in capability. Only time will tell.

Andrew Chisholm is a Junior Research Fellow at the Atlantic Council of Canada and graduate of the University of King’s College with a B.A., Combined Honours, in Political Science and History. Andrew focuses his writing on contemporary Canadian foreign, defence, and security policy. This article was re-published by permission and appeared in original form at The Atlantic Council of Canada.  

Wrapping Up Alternatives to DDG Flight III

Last month we challenged contributors to take their best shot (or really any shot, so long as it was interesting) at articulating alternatives to the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class DDG Flight III. We originally intended the series to run a week, but never ones to reject late-but-coherent thoughts, we kept it going as long as the submissions kept coming in. The results were quite interesting, challenging force structure/projection assumptions, as well as following the assumptions in the chain of reasoning leading to the Flight III as currently conceived:

  • The U.S. needs to conduct ballistic missile defense (BMD)
  • U.S. BMD needs a sea-based component
  • The sea-based component needs to fit on a surface ship

Most of the hard looks questioned whether the (yet-to-be awarded) Air and Missile Defense Radar is the best way forward for the BMD mission and if so, whether the Flight III DDG is the best platform on which to base it.

Here are some parting shots that focus not on the BMD side of the house, but on ways to generate more of what a Flight III would accomplish with the rest of its mission set toolbox:

LT Patrick Kiefer, USN:

“One thing that we need more of on the destroyers is more helicopters… why we stop at 2 is a little baffling and then only a carrier has more…why not look to put 4 or 6 with simultaneous takeoff and landing? And when you look at everything the MH-60 brings, it is really a force multiplier that brings significant capabilities to the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and surface warfare (SUW) missions, especially counter-swarm, and provides some limited support to anti-air warfare (AAW) and STRIKE.”

Sebastian Bruns, Germany:

The selection of the Flight III DDG or an alternative needs to be explained to the American people. Thoroughly. It is a grave irresponsibility to not lead a public discourse about the value of sea power in general, and the value and uses of certain platforms over others in particular.

More than a joke in need of a punchline: How many MH-60Rs can you fit on a DDG?
More than a joke in need of a punchline: How many MH-60Rs can you fit on a DDG?

It follows from this that there must be a coherent policy – means selected to accomplish aims with due respect to timing and costs (“strategy”). This would serve as national security contract underpinning the use of the Navy (and Marine Corps and Coast Guard) for the better of the nation. What do you want from a (probably Aegis-equipped?) ship? FIghting pirates off Somalia or intercepting ICBMs in the Mediterranean? Counter-narco ops in Mexico or deterrence of regional rouge states? This approach is easier said than done, but one needs bold characters and ideas to really make a strategy deserving of its name (as opposed to yet another doctrine, white paper, document, etc. that’s more platitudes than substance). Vague “AirSea Battle” concepts don’t buy public support, and they rarely serve as a 10- or 20-year outlook. 30-year shipbuilding plans, on the other hand, don’t mean much to many people (in fact, as a Hill staffer, I attended a hearing where the value of a three-decade plan was questioned and IMHO misleading arguments were made for a 10- or 20-year shipbuilding plan).

U.S. shipbuilding must get its act together, along with a trimmed procurement bureaucracy at the Pentagon and a coherent Congress that sets its priorities straight. This last item might, above all, be the most “wishful” of all my thinking, as politics will always be politics. But consider for a moment the extensive list of design failures, cost-overruns, ideas scuttled at the drawing board, and procurement problems vs. the “successes” of the past 25 years. There’s quite a negative imbalance, from the perspective of an outside observer. Competitiveness must be improved. Perhaps the U.S. needs to finally look abroad for designs that could be adapted for the U.S. Navy. A joint design, perhaps, with a trusted allied partner nation from Asia or Europe?

I am under the impression that the current pace of events (and, quite frankly, developments not really in favour of a strong defense budget) might well quickly overtake the discussions that naval specialists lead among themselves, rendering these conversations irrelevant. The end state? Pooling and sharing, leading from behind by default and necessity, without the negative political connotations.

LT H.Vic Allen, USN:

The ability to base 2 helos is non-negotiable. Helos expand a great deal – from situational awareness (SA) to the weapons systems envelope to flexibility; you name it. The capabilities of the MH-60R brings a ridiculous amount of SA to the CO/warfare commander.

Rethink the bridge watch team, a la LCS. For the vast majority of the time, there’s no reason why fly-by-wire and autopilots can’t do the work of a bridge team that is probably 200% too big.

Keep VLS. Even a 32-cell install is very useful.

Hybrid power plants that support kinetic and directed energy weapons. GTGs won’t cut it anymore.

Incorporate a wide array of UAVs. Undersea unmanned vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) don’t provide enough bang for the buck – a DDG is very visible, so stealthy insertion of UUVs isn’t going to help, and USVs just don’t have the range/speed necessary to make them competitive with UAVs. I foresee close-in (<10nm), local (10-100nm) and long-range (>100 nm) UAVs as assisting DDGs with their missions.

Note: The views expressed above are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their governments, militaries, or the Center for International Maritime Security.

X-47B Sea Trials – A BFD

X-47
                                                                           Taking flight

 

My twitter feed was abuzz today with statements lauding this morning’s launch of the U.S. Navy’s X-47B unmanned carrier air system from USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77):

“…another great first for naval aviation…History has just been made…Momento histórico…History has just been made…the Next Era of Naval Aviation…Launch Catapults Naval Aviation into the Future…New era in warfare…MOMENTOUS…Watershed…a pivotal milestone in naval aviation…game-changing technology,” etc.

There is a bit of truth in all of these.  Though perhaps the event is best summarized in the words of Vice President Biden.

 

This article was re-posted by permission from, and appeared in its original form at NavalDrones.com.

Patos, Logos, Etos and the LCS Design Trap

Not the Prince of Survivability
Prince of Wales: Victim of survibability or the changing operational environment?

Bloomberg News recently again raised the issue of LCS survivability. Survivability is justifiably important as it is one of the key characteristics that differentiates warships from commercial vessels. Yet there is something wrong with the debate about LCS survivability. In general, the arguments fall into one of three broad categories — patos, logos, or etos. These Greek words refer to our emotions, rational mind, and values. In discussing LCS survivability patos dominates over logos. When there is strong disagreement on a specific issue, it is sometimes useful to state the reasoning carried to its extreme in order to mark the boundaries of common sense. This lets us reconsider the validity of the initial assumptions and is a loose variation of the reductio ad absurdum method. We can say also that this is an emotional way of applying logic, justified in cases when pure logic is viewed does not satisfy emotional positions.

Consider whether the following statement is TRUE or FALSE:

“Level 3 ships are NOT survivable.”

It is always the possible to offer examples to support a TRUE assertion. An aircraft carrier will hardly survive the explosion of a nuclear torpedo under her keel. A more realistic and historical case is discussed in D. K. Brown’s “Nelson to Vanguard“, in which the battleship Prince of Wales – designed to withstand 1,000 lb. explosives – was sunk by aerial, light torpedoes with 330 lb. warheads. Nonetheless we consider ships designed according to the best contemporary practices as “survivable.” This simply demonstrates that survivability cannot be determined without defining the predicted level of threat. It is stated both in OPNAVINST 9070.1A and its predecessor. I find especially useful the threat- and conflict-level classification proposed by Rear Admiral Richard Hill (RN) in his paper Medium Power Strategy Revisited. Normal conditions with operations like constabulary work, disaster relief, and presence

  • Low intensity operations when “escort by surface combatants may be required.” “Cover by high-capability forces may be required, to deter or if necessary counter escalation.” These operations “are subject to the international law of self-defense, often include sporadic acts of violence by both sides, and have objectives that are predominantly political in nature”.
  • Higher level operations with combat at the far end of the continuum. “The definition of ‘higher level’ includes ‘use of major weapon systems’, that is to say combat aircraft, major surface units, submarines, and extensive mining; missiles from air, surface and subsurface can be employed.”

Sail frigates and later cruisers were designed to be a scouts and to operate on commerce shipping lines, but were never intended to survive a clash with an enemy’s battle fleet. Royal Navy WWII destroyers were surely designed according to naval rules, but in the 1st year of the war they were exposed to a threat level unimaginable a few years earlier and suffered a loss of 124 ships sunk or damaged out of the 136 in service at the outbreak of war.

I also offer this statement for consideration:

“It is possible to design and construct 300-ton Fast Attack Craft with Level 3 survivability.”

Theoretically the statement is TRUE, but it is enough to recall the transformation of HMMWVs into MRAPs, which could be described as improving Level 1 survivability to Level 2, to understand the technical and economic limitations to such an endeavor. There was an interesting paper presented last year to the Royal Institution of Naval Architects – Balancing Survivability, Operability and Cost for a Corvette Design. It offers interesting insights into unavoidable compromises, and a not-so-surprising conclusion that the best way to increase survivability is to increase the length of the ship. From this point of view both LCS are of good design, but LCS also falls into a design trap. Longer and bigger ships lead to criticism of being underarmed. Up-arming the ship would lead to higher costs and reduced affordability. This in turn means a smaller fleet and an increased gap between force-structure requirements and reality. Such a gap leads to questions of whether it can be filled by smaller ships. But these are in turn “not survivable”. Vicious circle closed.

Ship survivability is a complex issue, including such things as the probability of being hit, tolerance to damage, and recoverability. I cannot judge whether LCS is survivable or not. The better question to ask is if it is survivable enough – taking into account its size, mission, and the projected threat level in its intended operating environment. Such a discussion is vital to every class of ships and calls for carefully balanced patos and logos.

Przemek Krajewski alias Viribus Unitis is a blogger In Poland.  His area of interest is broad context of purpose and structure of Navy and promoting discussions on these subjects In his country