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Strategy

Future Visions and Planned Obsolescence: Implementing 30-year Horizons in Defense Planning

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By Travis Reese and Dylan Phillips-Levine

This is the third and final part of Travis Reese’s CIMSEC Readiness Series. Read Part 1 on properly defining joint readiness, Read Part 2 on how Defense Department planning horizons can better avoid strategic surprise.

The False Dilemma

“Necessity, especially in politics, often occasions false hopes, false reasonings, and a system of measures correspondingly erroneous.” —Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 35, 1788. 

“Innovation is [sic] an exercise in risk management, a balancing act between the promises of a new capability and the perils of losing older ones.”—Kendrick Kuo of the Naval War College.

Current readiness and future requirements can be synchronized in DoD, reconciling the tension between contemporary force employment and future force design with the proper framework. The debate on how to balance the paradigms and viewpoints of what are often termed “traditionalists” and “futurists” is something which many national security practitioners appreciate, but little has been done to rectify. Both paradigms of traditionalists and futurists are equally unhelpful to delivering a clear-eyed assessment of the security environment when looked through that singular lens. The misunderstanding between these diametrically opposed paradigms has been historically regarded as an “either-or” statement: the choice is adaptation of existing and legacy means or developing future-minded innovation which may be at the root of this phenomenon. Both camps staunchly dig their heels into the sand and are either reticent to change existing solutions to answered problems or overly enthusiastic about advocating for solutions to potential problems based on the allure of technological promise.

The whole concept of traditionalists and futurists is a little comical given the fact that what is tradition now was once future and what is future assumes that older solutions are merely inadequate because they are old. People in one camp or the other are either reticent to change by disposition or overly enthusiastic about the future sometimes suppressing discussion of risk by overvaluing opportunity.

Despite the entrenched viewpoints between both camps, two complementary models will be detailed in this article that define how to apply the principles of the Horizons of Innovation. These models bridge the gap from traditionalists to futurists and provide a framework to develop the transition from “as is” into the “to be.” These models are designed to help overcome the temptation to remain fixated on the static logic of a traditionalist or futurist point of view. They provide clear criteria to frame objective discussion within the two camps as they assess the implications of the future horizons model on preserving legacy capability or shifting to future means. Horizons of Innovation models create an objective framework to reconcile the current environment with the future before making the risky decision between sustaining the “old” or adopting the “new.”

The First Horizons Application Model shows the level of detail that should populate appropriate timeframes depicted in the Horizons of Innovation. The Second Horizons Application Model accounts for the dynamic response by adversaries to potential innovations and how DoD can gain the most utility from a range of potential capability investments before adversaries respond with effective countermeasures. The Second Model is a framework that minimizes the institutional shock to capability replacement and succession.

Horizons of Innovation Recap

The Three Horizons model introduced by business strategists around the turn of this millennia serves as the inspiration to develop the Horizons of Innovation Model. The operating definitions in this article for innovation and adaptation are derived from remarks by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford: Innovation is doing new things in new ways with new means and concepts. Adaptation is using current means and applying them to new or emerging challenges.

Figure 1: The Horizons of Innovation Model. 

Horizons of Innovation Model is represented in Figure 1. The Horizon Innovation model provides a framework for three horizons. The Y-axis, labeled “solutions” spans the spectrum from unsuitable to perfect. The X-axis, labeled “time” spans from the present into the future. Solutions are constrained by the positively sloped “innovation” line and negatively sloped “adaptation.” All solutions constrained in the angle formed between adaptation and innovation are acceptable where the bisecting dashed line represents the best performance. Solutions that exist below the adaptation line are unacceptable while solutions that exist above the innovation line are unattainable. DoD force planners should look at the limiting lines of innovation and adaptation across the three different horizons of 10, 20, and 30 years to develop the framework to address future challenges.

The historical length of time required to develop technological innovations or adopt new concepts informed the 30 years timeline. This timeline of 30-years from conception to adoption of innovative solutions is a consistent trend (opposed amphibious assault for example) for modern military capability development and precedes many modern bureaucracies. The misguided belief that modern information and manufacturing compresses technology advancement and is only stifled by institutional processes or bureaucratic hinderances to develop or adopt new capabilities is not reflected reality. Recent analysis by the GAO identified the necessity to improve and secure the defense industrial base and confirmed that synchronizing capability development with the needed modifications to industrial capacity to meet future demands is a matter of extreme forethought. Famed futurist Bran Ferren said it best: “We don’t do strategic or long-term thinking anymore. If anything, we may do long-term tactical thinking and call it strategic, but it’s really just a spreadsheet exercise…That’s not a survivable model.”

The issue is not process improvement or increasing efficiencies. The issue is the need to adopt strategic horizons that correspond to the realities of technology development and concept adoption. Defense “professionals” constantly surprise themselves every time a new institutional horizon is established for consideration under a national defense strategy only to discover that industrial base and resources are not prepared for the new problem set. This phenomenon tends to exacerbate the tension between traditionalists – who reflexively hedge by advocating for “tried and true” capabilities – and the frustrated futurists who don’t understand why their certain vision of the future isn’t accepted and quickly translated into physical reality.

First Model: Framework for detailed future projections and reconciling emergent challenges

The hardest thing about future analysis is to reconcile projections with current, or emergent, challenges. In 2014 the discovery of large gaps in defense capacity due to Russian and Chinese development over the Global War on Terror (GWOT) years created a need to energize “innovation” and pursue “disruption”. Those buzzwords proliferated in the new defense jargon around the 3d Offset Strategy and the supporting Long Range Research and Development Plan initiatives The use of the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) to cover emergent Combatant Commander-identified gaps along with the creation of DIUx to better integrate with America’s technology base were direct reflections of the mindset forming around how to sponsor and conduct defense innovation. As the reality of future capability needs found itself at odds with the timeline to see true technology development occur, the rift between traditionalists and futurists only grew. As a result, strategists did not develop a process or method to reconcile transition from old to new as a matter of managed risk around a set of common criteria that would satiate the conflict between “as is” traditionalist and “to be” futurists.

However, as the reality of future capability needs settled in along with an appreciation of how long it takes to see true technology development occur, the confrontation between how to manage current and future by traditionalists and futurists was never resolved in defense culture or process. One reason why was that there was no clear engagement on how the continuum from current to future should be managed nor what level of detail should populate long range projections compared to near-term realities. Worse, there is still a lack of direction on how to manage normal capability succession if an unanticipated adversary capability is identified that may pre-empt planned investments or divestments, especially if the problem is severe or urgent enough that it requires redirection of re‐ sources. The First Model below provides clear steps to introduce a process to reconcile legacy and future requirements. 

Figure 2: The First Model and levels of detail to inform planning in the Horizons of Innovation Model.

The model above shows the level of detail that should inform discovery, learning, experimentation, and investment for different planning horizons. This model reads from right to left. Planning conducted in the 30-year block on the far right is broken into 5-year increments. Its focus is on the conceptual framework that underpins plausible security situations in 30 years, derived from long-term trends to include: demographics, economics, technology projections, and other factors. The effort of the 30-year period shapes a future defined by the projected operating environment and captures potential threats and opportunities to U.S. security interests. The 30-year projection then gives way to the 20- and 10-year horizons. Finally, this model shows that emergent or unmitigated gaps discovered in the Annual Joint Assessment of the current environment, for which there is no near-term resolution, can be referred to future analysis.

If no solution exists to mitigate a gap with current capabilities, the solution becomes an object of future consideration. The level of risk determines how soon a gap must be filled. As a caveat, this is not a form of “backcasting,” which is often used in future disciplines to define a future state and then identify how in the contemporary environment that desired outcomes should be achieved. This is decidedly not path determinant in that manner, it is simply a guide to the level of detail that should populate strategy and planning activities in each Horizon. Long-term projections are necessary to shape sustained development efforts, but not at the discounting of emergent conditions. Conversely, the emergent pressures of the “now” should not divert all attention from the future as it may set a detrimental course that will impact long-term security.

To develop an effective understanding of the future as it may impact the security environment must be a continuous effort. That future environment is often depicted in the form of defense planning scenarios. However, tension often arises about how much detail a scenario should have. Regardless of the detail requirements, the model effectively shapes 30-year projections through a process of assessment and then, with increasing details, converts assessment into an actionable criterion for defense strategy. Future projections are reconciled to the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) process of force design (five-15 years), force development (two-seven years), and force employment (zero-three years) for the Joint Force synchronized with the Services. The Annual Joint Assessment conducted as part of the JSPS quantifies the capacity of the Joint Force to address current challenges and identifies any newly revealed and emergent threats from adversaries that were not anticipated in Force Design. These emergent concerns are considered and referred to the Joint Staff and Services for resolution. If an arriving capability fills the gap in an acceptable period, then transition can continue. If an emergent challenge is significant enough and a near-term solution can be delivered within two years, then the adjustment to timelines and budgets must be made. If, however, an emergent challenge cannot be mitigated in the near term and is expected to be a continuing challenge with long-term impacts to Joint Force effectiveness, it needs to be allocated to a horizon timeline with corresponding priority where research and experimentation can begin, even if it offsets other newly recognized lower priority efforts.

The First Model also helps to create cognitive space between current programs and future programs to enable honest assessments in each timeframe. It keeps these time periods from being conflated thus, avoiding unnecessary confusion between traditionalists and futurists when it comes to assessing the utility of legacy or future capabilities. It shows how to sustain a constant flow of future projections that mature in detail the closer one gets to the period under question while also accounting for near-term risks. This model establishes the level of detail that can feed a future projection and corresponding defense planning scenario based on its relevant timeframe thus impacting the level of analysis that can contribute to programmatic decisions.

For example, analysis in the 20-year timeframe may only be able to inform decisions to investigate a broad range of solutions or pursue basic or applied research vice selection of specific projects or solutions. Analysis in the 10-year timeframe should be more detailed and aligned with the current operating environment to inform final acquisition decisions and capability transition. Allowing current force commanders to contribute to future analysis in the 10-year horizon can prevent chaining DoD to an exclusive fixation on current concerns at the expense of future readiness while serving to eliminate any anchoring and availability bias in DoD planning and programming.

DoD struggles with how to weigh the consequence of emergent discoveries against other anticipated threats that have been matured and modeled over years. Posture hearings and testimony in front of Congressional committees play this drama out repeatedly as lawmakers question Department staff, Combatant Commanders, and Service leaders over which problem is the greatest and where to focus resources. Often the consequence of immediately allocating resources to an emergent problem is not reconciled against the impact for long-term shaping of force design efforts. The First Model both mends the rift between traditionalists and futurists while clarifying the depth of detail to inform multiple planning horizons. This model provides a solution to end the long-standing chasm between traditionalists and futurists misunderstanding through a mutually beneficial model with clear and common appreciation of the framework from which they view security challenges and remedies.

Second Model: Material and Technology Obsolescence vs Threat Obsolescence

Many proposed future capabilities are increasingly complex technologically both from a hardware and software perspective. Many extant capabilities, having proved their worth in previous generations, become the paradigm of successful means despite indicators that they may not be effective in the future. It is tempting in DoD to avoid re-assessing the efficacy of a capability against an adversary once it becomes a program of record regardless of whether it is an evolutionary or revolutionary capability due to the length of investment of time, money, and institutional alignment around the acquisition effort. Threat information contained in requirements documents introduce a single appreciation of the adversary once signed. Ironically, the need to re-assess increases the longer the capability dwells in development. Potential shifts in adversary capability throughout the capability development and acquisition process is something that demands updating. The Second Model illustrates the importance of a continuous assessment for adversary capabilities during a capability development to assess current legacy systems or their future programmed replacements.

Figure 3: The Second Model and material and technology obsolescence versus threat obsolescence.

In the Second Model depicted above, the Y-axis, labeled “capability,” spans the spectrum of our relative capability against an adversary. The X-axis spans time from the present to the future. Every capability DoD produces moves along the negatively sloped “Own Capability” line from useful to useless as it materially degrades over time. In the “Own capability” line, current capabilities are useful to provide overmatch, followed by neutral or parity as materiel condition over time, then followed by disadvantage as materiel condition and lack of sustainment render the current capability as useless. To exacerbate the entropic “Own capability” line, adversaries also decrease the time of usefulness of “own capability” since adversaries have their own negentropic positive sloped “Adversary capability” line. For each “Own capability,” adversaries adapt and introduce their own means to decrease time to make our “own capability” transition from useful to useless. The intersection of “own capability” and “adversarial capability” creates a point of competitive parity where sustained “own capability” beyond competitive parity generates an unnecessary risk to force and mission.

DoD generally does not consider of the ways that an adversary could respond after the decision to commence research and development of a new capability. The Services generally presume they will start from a position of overmatch and replace the capability as a technology improvement creates an advantage that makes retiring a system worthwhile compared to the expense of its development. The Second Model demonstrates that the adversary capability shift from disadvantage to overmatch may happen faster than the Services project. This template delivers an objective case for how both futurists and traditionalists can bridge the gap from their respective biases when they consider the adversary capacity to overcome either evolutionary or revolutionary means. Depending on the overmatch-disadvantage and present to future deltas, both traditionalists and futurists can assess feasibility of any capability opportunity and whether long-lead technology or a rapid and cheap adaptation is better in the face of an ever-changing adversary.

Peer and near-peer threats seemed less likely just 10 years ago, which afforded the luxury of capability introduction and replacement to be based on self-assessed warfighting improvements that dominated the approach to acquisition and sustainment. This self-assessment helped facilitate multi-mission exquisite platforms and was based on what the U.S. wanted to do or achieve given the low probability, or even lack of consideration, of a peer competitor. The perceived economy of multi-role platforms was derived from the need to have optionality in functions vice specificity derived from a single, or potent grouping, of comparable adversaries. The U.S. largely enjoyed the luxury of time for making features of the systems the dominant design variable rather than the threats they were devised for. A capability was threat informed but largely for adversaries expected to lack the capacity or means to rapidly respond with an effective countermeasure. The Services honored their invested preferences by sustaining capabilities as long as possible either in their original form or through ad-hoc adaptations that did not require major revisions to stave off obsolescence. Spiral development approaches of single systems informed this method with notable examples include the M2A2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle or most of the Navy’s weapons programs and ship construction. In the years of the GWOT, most adversary capabilities, although potent, did not stress the ability of the acquisition system to provide a capable response, just the willingness of the bureaucracy to accept the demand and energize appropriately.

In recent years the U.S. and its allies have seen the ability of adversaries to offset their capability overmatch. Near-peer adversaries are now capable of operating in environments that defy or limit the use of many primary systems to affect conventional deterrence or that present credible high-end capabilities that may achieve an overmatch to U.S. means and systems. With adversaries devoted not simply to regional concerns but limiting U.S. and allied efforts to check their global influence, the moment a capability is introduced, there should be an expectation that an adversary will develop a countermeasure; both symmetrically and asymmetrically. The cost imposing strategy of responding to a well-developed measure with a cheap countermeasure should cause DoD to change the timeframe the Services should expect utility from capabilities and consider replacements. 

Honoring sunk cost and assuming good stewardship of resources based on giving the taxpayer a “return on investment” by merely sustaining or adapting a capability is no longer a viable economy in the face of expected countermeasures for all but a few systems or platforms given the capacity of adversaries to respond technologically and materially. For this reason, force developers and force designers should meet often to develop clear appreciations of what capabilities or concepts will resolve adversary capacity at the point they achieve parity. More importantly, it should give pause to consider many long-lead programs if the time of utility is dramatically less than expected or if the proposed capability gap can be filled by a significantly cheaper and more risk-worthy option before parity is achieved.

Although the U.S. will be unlikely to see very many capabilities that will truly be useful for 30 years that are worth enormous time and capital investments, those that are pursued for 20 years with an expected service life of 20 or 30 years need to have assumptions of their utility validated during the development cycle with a dynamically considered adversary, and not one statically anchored. Only a concerted effort to develop an objective framework offered by the Second Model can help the critical traditionalist versus futurist debate into an actionable accord that delivers platforms and solution.

Conclusion

There should be no false boundary between those who choose to be either traditionalists or futurists. True defense professionals appreciate both perspectives and understand that each is subject to assessment of the claims advocated by either side. One method to address this challenge in DoD culture is to adopt an approach to capability development that treats current and future as a part of a continuum. The Horizons of Innovation illustrate that principle supported by the two subsequent detailed models. From the Horizons, institutional strategists, capability developers, and acquisition professionals can better identify when a capability will face obsolescence, not just due to material degradation but also to adversary response. Merely improving the bureaucracy is insufficient alone to accelerate the choice between innovation and adaptation.

The key process for DoD to gain maximum advantage is to adopt a longer-range strategic scan and continually update and compare multiple horizons against each other. More importantly, the ability to make a compelling case between sustaining current technology or adopting future technology depends entirely on developing measured and accurate models of future concerns that are more right than wrong which can only occur through sustained institutional learning and study.

Travis Reese retired from the Marine Corps as Lieutenant Colonel after nearly 21 years of service. While on active duty he served in a variety of billets including tours in capabilities development, future scenario design, and institutional strategy. Since his retirement in 2016 he was one of the co-developers of the Joint Force Operating Scenario process. Mr. Reese is now the Director of Wargaming and Net Assessment for Troika Solutions in Reston, VA. 

Dylan Phillips-Levine is a naval aviator assigned to a tactical air control squadron. His Twitter handle is @JooseBoludo.

Featured Image: Busan, Republic of Korea (Feb. 23, 2023) Tugboats assist the Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine USS Springfield (SSN 761) as it pulls into port in Busan. (U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Adam Craft)

Ethics

Hard Truths: The Navy and Marine Corps Need Another #MeToo Moment, Pt. 3

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Read Part One, Read Part Two.

By Captain John P. Cordle, USN (Ret) and K. Denise Rucker Krepp 

Part Three

When these authors’ previous “Hard Truths” articles were published, there were two goals. The first was to encourage senior leadership to talk about the problems of sexual harassment and sexual assault, and the second was to challenge mid-grade leaders to take tangible actions to prevent it. In our focus on statistics and the process, however, an important part of the equation was missing: the human cost and the broken process’s impact on victims.

As a result of the “Hard Truths” articles, numerous victims reached out with their stories. Although we sometimes refer to them as victims, we prefer to call them survivors as this creates a standpoint of empowerment; readers will note this choice mainly in the vignettes. Among the survivors’ stories we heard, there were some common and familiar themes, some of which certainly deserve an explanation in this forum. But some were revelations, and based on additional research, they deserve closer scrutiny. This third part in the series breaks these lessons into three categories: mental health, victim blaming, and the justice system.

John: First of all, mental health. Much has been written about the challenges encountered by servicemembers seeking mental health treatment. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) himself shared in 2022 that it took him six weeks to get into treatment. It is well-known that the nation and the Navy are challenged in this area, but what seems to be missing from many of the official reports is the almost 100 percent correlation between sexual assault and sexual harassment victims, and their need for mental health resources.

Currently, no demographics sources examine the overlap in suicidal ideation and suicides and sexual assault/sexual harassment. However, many of those who came forward anonymously shared that they had experienced such thoughts, in some cases even acted upon them. Several reported a diagnosis of PTSD, or other syndromes that resulted in not only the need for ongoing treatment, but also negative impacts to their professional career, both tangible and intangible. In several cases, the need for mental healthcare, combined with their status as a victim, led them to become a “burden” to the command, and they were often sent to remote workstations, sometimes alone, to remove them from the hostile environment that was causing them stress. This placed them in more danger of self-harm and isolation by removing their support system. Others reported being denied orders or community transfers due to the treatment for mental illness—the very condition caused by the original trauma of the assault.

The takeaway here is that a complete re-thinking of the process is necessary. It should be automatically assumed that the victim of sexual or other forms of harassment or assault will need immediate and continuing mental healthcare. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) instruction allows for 30 days of “convalescent leave” in such cases, but this barely scratches the surface. 

Denise: Second, victim blaming. Another common thread was that in almost every case of those with whom we spoke, they became the target of significant questions about their professionalism, performance, and behavior after they reported the sexual harassment and/or sexual assault. From the survivors’ perspective, their commands were attacking them in an attempt to protect the command and the perpetrator instead of solving the problem.

As a young Coast Guard officer in 1998, I witnessed the victim blaming. In 2014, female veterans testified at Congressional hearings about the victim blaming that had occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, and it still continues in 2023. Powerpoint slides will not stop the victim blaming because to most folks the victim is someone they do not know, someone that they cannot relate to. The most effective way we have found to stop the victim blaming is to hold conversations and ask people what they would do if their spouse, partner, sister, brother, mother, father, grandmother, or grandfather were sexually assaulted and then blamed for it. Creating a hypothetical that is relatable makes people better understand the problem and changes their perspective when they, too, are notified of sexual harassment or sexual assault in their command.  

John: The third issue was the justice system itself. One victim described it as “a chess game, where the victim has the white side of the board and has only pawns; the accused and their defense team have the black side of the board with all of the knights, bishops, kings and queens able to move much more nimbly than the victim” – with the result an almost unavoidable “checkmate.”

In Part Two, we discussed the relatively small number of prosecutions that result from unrestricted reports. In looking into a unique aspect of the legal system, however, we discovered an incredibly blatant loophole. Unlike civilian defendants who are charged with a crime, the UCMJ allows the defendant to choose between trial by jury of his peers and trial by judge. We decided to do some digging at one regional legal office to determine the outcomes of cases under trial by judge and trial by jury. The results were astounding.

In one major fleet concentration area, defendants who chose trial by a judge are acquitted at a rate of 100 percent over the past five years, while the conviction rate for those who chose trial by jury was closer to 50 percent. This presents a wide-open door for assailants to drive through using the legal process on a path that almost ensures acquittal. Although the data is not fully available, we found enough open-source information to cause concern. From what we can tell, there are no female judge advocate court judges currently serving on the bench, which not only creates a lack of diversity, but also the opportunity for inherent bias. We included this information to increase transparency and advocate for this disparity to be investigated further. Table 1 demonstrates these acquittal rates: 

Year               Judge G*     Judge NG    Jury G      Jury NG 

2018                  0                    0                     3                     2 

2019**              0                   1                      4                     6 

2020                 0                   0                     0                     2 

2021                  0                   1                     0                     3 

2022                 0                    3                    3                      1 

Total              0                    5                  10                  14 

Table 1: Results of General Courts Marshall for Sexual Assault in Regional Legal Service Office , 2018-2022. G=Guilty; NG = Not Guilty. Source: https://jag.navylive.dodlive.mil/Military-Justice.

*Note that between 2017 and 2022, at least one Region Legal Service Office (RLSO) has never ruled Guilty on a Sexual Assault (Article 120) in any Judge Alone case.  

**Note: In 2019 there is one Judge Alone case where a service member was found Guilty; however, it was not for Sexual Assault. It was for providing alcohol to a minor. 

Denise: Another common thread was the dearth of legal advisement available to victims compared to perpetrators. The victims—survivors—we spoke to were often told by both legal and Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) personnel that they would have to “recuse themselves” from providing advice because they were assigned to the command where the alleged offense took place. When the victims went to the RLSO, they found that they were often relegated to a line almost akin to a suspect with no resources, who has to take the “next public defender” available.

The defendant, on the other hand, could normally avail themselves of all the resources assigned to the parent command, and often—the majority of alleged assailants being senior to the victims—has the financial resources to seek outside counsel, often in the thousands of dollars per month to fight their case. Some good news here: in July 2023, SECNAV announced that sexual harassment victims will have access to the same legal resources as sexual assault victims—a significant improvement in the process—but more needs to be done.  

Before we move to recommendations, we want to share a few vignettes from those who reached out to us after Part Two. We have changed them slightly to protect the individual while also maintaining their accuracy.  

Denise: I joined the sexual assault community 30 years ago. I have lived with the pain of crime for over half my life. The crime that occurred in the summer of 1993 influenced my decision-making processes when I served as the Maritime Administration Chief Counsel. In the summer of 2011, I was approached by a whistleblower alleging sexual assaults of students at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (the fifth federal service school) and at sea.

I immediately requested an Inspector General investigation into the crimes and I was forced to resign my job for making the request. The Secretary of Transportation banned me from the Department of Transportation headquarters building. I suffered a miscarriage after being forced to resign and I did not have additional children because I was not sure if I would have the financial means to support them. The job market for me was bleak because everyone in the industry knew that I was persona non grata. But the crimes in the military and the maritime communities continued, so I testified twice before a Congressionally mandated panel in 2014 and at a 2019 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights hearing. I advised Congress and I have written extensively on the issue. In a 2014 essay I wrote on how failure to act would impact the overall health of the military. It is a message I continue to share today because men and women will not join the six services if they fear becoming yet another sexual assault victim. 

Survivor #1: As a second tour Division Officer, I was running the pre-commissioning detachment in San Diego while everyone else in leadership was in Maine at the shipyard. The Command Master Chief came out often and he always had inappropriate comments and questions for me. Because this was the 90s and “handle at the lowest level” was pounded into us, I confronted him and told him to stop. He did. Or so I thought.

Fast forward to nearly a year later, and the XO calls me into his office because I was the Legal Officer. He’d found a First Class crying in berthing during the Berthing Inspection and it came out that the CMC had been steadily harassing her for months, and while she confided in one of her fellow First Classes (who worked for me!), they didn’t think they could do anything because he was the CMC. Thankfully and unsurprisingly for my leadership, they took immediate and dramatic action to protect that First Class and, as it turns out, a handful of other females. It also turns out that he had started with the one female Department Head, worked his way through the DIVO and the two female Chief Petty Officers, all of whom “handled it at the lowest level” and moved on until he found victims that didn’t think anyone would do anything.

That XO and CO did the right thing. But what if I had told them a full year before? I didn’t tell them not because I didn’t trust them, but because I thought I was doing what I was supposed to do.  

Survivor # 2: I was sexually assaulted by a peer at my last command, and there was a trail of harassment and abuse that led to it that I ignored and minimized because that is what I was trained to do. Since I was singled out by my Chain of Command and retaliated against for making the report against such a “highly regarded” peer, I chose not to file a formal report as it seemed like there was just no chance of justice. It has been two years since then and I’m doing much better at my current command, but I haven’t stopped hearing stories like my own and the experience hasn’t stopped influencing my career in (primarily) negative ways. My assailant is still out there and will likely do it again. 

Survivor #3: I joined the Navy in 2017 with dreams of becoming an officer. By 2019 I was a second class being accepted into Officer Candidate School. My dreams were coming true! However, while I was enlisted, I was left by my division at a command function black-out drunk. An E-7 told the security guards that he would take me home, and he did not. I was sexually assaulted and dropped off at my car bruised and not fully clothed. The next day my best friend picked me up and took me to get a safe kit done. I was very scared and thus filed restricted. The SAFE kit crew did not perform a toxicology report on me.

When I received news that I was accepted to OCS, I went unrestricted with my case. Naval Criminal Investigative Service had performed a wiretap on the accused and my chain of command began retaliating against me, to include isolation in a warehouse. In a general court martial under Article 120, the accused has the right to choose between a jury trial and a judge alone trial, a fact that I believe is exploited by the defense in such cases, and a path that almost always leads to an acquittal. I do not plan on going into the details of the Court Martial except to say that the man who raped me was found not guilty, so my assailant is still out there and will likely do it again.

Where to from here? 

It bears mentioning that each of these survivors went on to report significant mental health issues, ranging from PTSD to Conversion Disorder to feelings of anxiety and even suicidal ideations. All cited the lack of a formal mental health recovery plan as part of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) process. 

In addition to the important recommendations of the independent review committee report, we would like to add the following:    

  1. Fully capture and disclose the Navy-wide breakdown of judge versus jury results using an independent body like the GAO.
  2. Remove the option for trial by judge from the UCMJ. Make the accused face a jury of their peers. 
  3. Revise the OPNAV instruction to require immediate referral to mental health resources for all victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault. 
  4. Remove the limit of 30 days’ convalescent leave.
  5. Mandate a blood test for the presence of date rape drugs and blood alcohol level for any rape kit test at all military treatment facilities.
  6. Set a requirement that legal counsel for the defense must have equivalent years of bench experience to that of the defendant’s team. Set up a legal advice hotline for defendants to seek counsel and ask questions about this complex process.
  7. Rescind the policy of handling sexual harassment at the “lowest level.” It is against the law; treat it as any other crime and prosecute it. 
  8. Add a requirement for a formal mental health assessment and treatment plan for all victims of sexual assault and sexual harassment.
  9. Review and change Article 120 of the UCMJ to include language that protects inebriated and black-out drunk Sailors. The current Article only covers incapacitation and most judges rule against exploring the interpretation of this law. 

Most striking to us was the extreme commonality between the stories of those who spoke out. Victimized by a shipmate or supervisor, they found themselves victimized again by a system stacked heavily against them, with little hope for justice, or even fairness. This leads us to make one final recommendation to anyone who finds themselves a victim of sexual harassment or assault, one that we found to be the most common advice on a website for victims: call 911. “Don’t leave your fate in the hands of those who facilitate the behavior” was the advice we heard over and over, “to a chain of command with unprepared personnel and overly complex process. Sexual assault is a crime – let the police handle it.” That is probably not the best answer in the long term, but after this journey, unfortunately it is the advice we would give our children if they were in the military. One additional story from a victim of abuse provides an interesting and slightly different perspective. 

Survivor #4: My name is Olivia Stahle, and here is my story.

The Navy saved my life. When I joined at the age of 24, I was trying to improve my family’s situation. I thought if I changed the circumstances, changed the location, and changed the trajectory of our current environment everything would be ok. It was not. 

What my command did not know was that I was in a terrible domestically violent marriage and had been at that point for a few years. They also did not know that one of the very first programs I became familiar with in the Navy as a C school student was FAP, or family advocacy program. It certainly was not my desire.   

The reason I did not tell anyone was because I was embarrassed. Here are comments I’ve heard – “If he beats you, why do you stay with him?” “If your marriage was really that bad, you would have left him already.” “You seem like such a smart girl. Why would you stay in something like that?” “Just leave him. He’s an anchor dragging you down.”

I have answers to those questions now that I did not have before. I stayed with him, because I was afraid of him and what he would do when he found me once I had left. You see, I tried before, quite a few times actually, to leave. But every time I did, one of two things happened – either he would convince me he would get help, or he actually figured out where I was staying and long hours ensued. There is also the aspect of love, children, financial circumstances, religious belief involving divorce, and the sheer legal consequences of a divorce. I was too embarrassed to tell my shipmates, colleagues, and leadership because I feared these questions. I didn’t have good answers at the time, because I was always anxious and afraid. I didn’t feel I deserved a better life, because I didn’t make the best choices initially. It turns out, I have a real talent for being an electronics technician, and I earned the respect of those around me. I would have been mortified for anyone to think less of me. So, how did the Navy save my life? 

I finally got the courage to divorce my husband, but he had not yet moved out of our house on base. One night, my neighbor called the military police after she witnessed my former husband’s abusiveness. I’ll never forget what the MP asked me. “I just have one question for you. Do you want him to stay, or do you want him to go?” Without skipping a beat, I answered I want him to go. They took his ID, and he couldn’t get back on base. It was late in the night before I realized, for the first time, I was safe in my house. He couldn’t get to me. The Navy saved my life, my future, and my family just by the mere circumstance of me being safe on base. It took a while for that security to fully set in, but once it did, I never looked back. I’m still proud to call myself a United States Sailor.

Conclusion 

This concludes Part Three, which we provide in the hope that leaders at all levels will take the time to truly assess the system and the data, truly engage with their people, and take what we both feel are the drastic actions needed to drive a cultural course correction, where such actions as sexual harassment, sexual assault, and by extension domestic abuse are not tolerated, facilitated, or dismissed but instead vigorously and competently prosecuted.

Our work does not end there. Below we have provided an immediate action checklist we assembled with some of the survivors with whom we spoke. We are also including another resource for survivors, one that offers a comprehensive, care-based approach for survivors of sexual assault and sexual harassment. These resources are part of a larger conversation that needs to happen, especially as news stories about sexual assault in the maritime community continue to break. But with conversation comes action, action for every survivor making their way through indescribable pain. We end this series with that call to action, and we also dedicate our words to all survivors–we see you, we hear you, we support you.

Leaders: it is time to course correct.

IMMEDIATE ACTION CHECKLIST
IF YOU ARE SEXUALLY ASSAULTED:

  1. Do not shower or change clothes.
  2. Go to a medical facility – insist on a rape kit and toxicology screen.
  3. Write down what you remember in as much detail as possible.
  4. Decide on Restricted or Unrestricted Report.
  5. Unrestricted: Call 911 and/or report to Military Police.
  6. Unrestricted/Restricted: Inform Victim Advocate and/or SARC.
  7. Confide in a trusted friend.
  8. Seek legal counsel/aid. 
  9. Seek an appointment for mental health counseling.
  10. Do not blame yourself. Ever. 

John Cordle is a retired Navy Captain who commanded two warships, was awarded the Navy League John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership, and the 2019 US Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS Author of the Year.

K. Denise Rucker Krepp spent several years on active duty in the U. S. Coast Guard, graduated from the Naval War College, and served as Chief Counsel for the U.S. Maritime Administration. Krepp also served as a locally elected Washington, DC official and Hill staffer. She is a longtime advocate for the rights of sexual assault and harassment victims.

Featured Image: CHARLESTON, S.C. (May 14, 2022) Sailors stand at attention during the commissioning of the Navy’s newest Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. (DDG 121) in Charleston, S.C. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Dylon Grasso)

Ethics

What I Have Learned Teaching Ethics to Midshipmen

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By Bill Bray

For nearly three years now, I have taught “Ethics and Moral Reasoning for the Naval Leader” to sophomore midshipmen (“youngsters”) at the U.S. Naval Academy, my alma mater. This is a core requirement for all midshipmen and course instruction is a collaborative effort. One of five philosophers on staff teach ethical theory on Mondays, and in the remaining two classes of each week active-duty or retired officers teach case studies and foster seminar-style discussions.

What I often wonder—and am often asked—is if this formal ethics course at least correlates to better ethical behavior and decision-making by midshipmen and Naval Academy graduates in the fleet. That is the Academy’s stated reason for the course: to “prepare future officers for the difficult moral decisions that they will have to make during their careers.” Otherwise, it would be hard to justify the course as core. Anyone can memorize ethical concepts and become casually familiar with the thinking of some of the greatest ethicists, ancient and modern. Just doing that will make one better at trivia, but it will not make him or her a more ethical leader.

The age-old question of whether virtue can be taught needs no reexamination here. Socrates believed as much, which is good enough for me. The more direct question concerns this course and if it, and similar college-level courses taught elsewhere, does, in the aggregate, produce more ethical leaders. This is not a question that can be definitively answered, given the multitude of factors for which any long-term analysis would have to control, never mind the challenges of collecting valid data. In fact, academic attempts to determine the efficacy of ethical instruction have not been encouraging, although some recent studies have shown some positive effect.

Many valid questions cannot be proven to empirical satisfaction. This is one of them, and merely claiming the course at least cannot hurt is insufficient. It should give these future officers some knowledge about the philosophical tradition of ethics and moral reasoning they did not already have and inspire reflection on how they would navigate ethically fraught situations—those in which the right decision is not immediately clear and require leaders to slow down and deliberately consider all aspects of the situation.

History of the Course

Ethics and Moral Reasoning for the Naval Leader was put into the service academies’ core curriculums following the December 1992 electrical engineering cheating scandal at the Naval Academy by members of the Class of 1994. West Point and the Air Force Academy teach the course to seniors, closer to their commissioning. The Naval Academy teaches it to sophomores on the premise that it is better for them to consider this material before they enter junior year and commit to the minimum service obligation after graduation (referred to as “two-for-seven night”, meaning they have served two years as midshipmen and are committing to seven more years of service—two more as midshipmen and at least five as a commissioned officer).

The 1992 cheating scandal forced some collective introspection among both Navy and Naval Academy military and civilian leaders. After several investigations, all outlined in a January 1994 Naval Inspector General report, ultimately 133 midshipmen were implicated (about 15 percent of the class). Nearly 30 were expelled. It remains the worst cheating scandal since the Academy adopted its Honor Code in 1951. In addition to implementing the Ethics course, following the scandal the Academy revised the Honor Code. Of note, in 2021 the Naval Academy experienced another cheating scandal, this time in Physics, that implicated 105 midshipmen, all sophomores (approximately half were taking the Ethics course at the time they cheated on the Physics final in December 2021; the other half took the course in spring 2022). Twenty-eight were separated.

While the 2021 scandal was disappointing, it did not receive the press coverage the 1994 scandal generated. Yet, it would be fair to ask how this could happen again, especially with midshipmen who were taking the Ethics course at the time. On the other hand, one of the biggest incongruities with the origin of the course and its stated goal (at least since I have taught it) is that it is not designed to prevent midshipmen from cheating on their exams. They should already know not to do this! While the course was borne of an academic cheating scandal, cheating is a clear right-vs.-wrong issue. As such, I do not think the 2021 Physics cheating scandal reflects directly on the course’s purpose or efficacy.

A better measure of the course would be how Naval Academy graduates since the late 1990s have fared in the complex and often ethical gray zones of military operations, particularly combat operations. To prepare midshipmen for the challenge of making the best ethical decisions in these situations, the course must assume midshipmen are not liars and cheaters. No such study exists, however, or probably could exist in the near future.

That leaves only the observations I and others who have taught the course can offer on how midshipmen perform in the course—how they receive and interact with the material, and what that may mean for their future as commissioned officers.

Course Structure

The course includes four blocks of instruction: Moral perception (two weeks), moral deliberation (five weeks), moral excellence (five weeks), and Just War Theory (three weeks). Moral perception concerns how to better recognize morally fraught situations, as they often are not clear initially. This section includes reading on how people from different cultures often view the same issue differently, as religion and culture shape moral perception differently.

During moral deliberation, midshipmen are instructed in a sequential process (roadmap) to navigate decision-making in morally complex situations, including those that include an ethical dilemma. They should consider the following factors in turn: moral constraints, consequences, character/virtue, and special obligations. They are introduced to, among other things, Immanuel Kant’s three formulations of the categorical imperative (moral laws or duties that bind all of us—the due respect, universalization, and mere means tests), common rationalization and socialization strategies people use to justify unethical behavior, Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine of Double Effect to help determine if a decision with both good and bad consequences should be taken, the concepts of waiving and forfeiting rights, and justice and equity. Case studies include the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq, collateral damage estimations in bombing missions, and considerations of justice and equity in administering nonjudicial punishment.

Consequential reasoning is introduced next, with some cautionary reminders that even the best consequential outcomes cannot override clear moral constraints. Among the cases studied, the midshipmen read commentary on the mid-2000s U.S. debate surrounding the use of enhanced interrogation (torture) techniques on unlawful combatants (today’s midshipmen had barely been born yet). The special obligations discussion includes voluntary and involuntary special obligations and a reading on Constitutional ethics—what the oath really requires in terms of balancing one’s duty with personal views and beliefs. Critically, how an officer should resolve a conflict between his or her deeply held personal belief (conscience) if they find it in conflict with the requirement to follow a legal order.

Character and virtue deserve their own four-week block. When the scope of the 1992 cheating scandal became apparent, some contended the root of the problem rests with American society—it was producing less ethical midshipmen. This claim is unprovable, and always struck me as reactionary and a version of buck-passing. The bulk of this block focuses on how to cultivate virtue (for Aristotle virtue [excellence] involved knowledge and habit, with a heavy emphasis on habit—virtuous people repeatedly do virtuous things). The midshipmen are reminded that in considering how to make the best ethical decision in a difficult situation, they should think beyond just what is technically acceptable to how the decision will reflect on their character in the long term. How do they want to be remembered? No one thinks of virtue as a transactional or transitory trait. When we think of virtuous people to emulate, we do not think they are virtuous at certain times but not others, or in certain situations and not in others.

Just War Theory—what is commonly referred to now as the traditional theory—include the principles of Jus ad Bellum (justice of war) and Jus in Bello (justice in war). The history of U.S. warfare presents countless case studies for this section, both good and bad. This may seem rather elementary to a college philosophy major, but hardly any midshipmen were introduced to just war concepts in high school and moreover will be far more likely to put philosophical theory into professional practice.

Three Types of Ethics Students

In addition to being asked about the course, Naval Academy graduates from my generation (around my 1988 class) often ask my general impression of the midshipmen today. The question is often, though not always, freighted with generational bias, the implication being that today’s midshipmen are not as tough, not as patriotic, etc. I find no evidence of this, however. On the contrary, I find the quality as high as ever. These are some of the best and brightest young men and women the nation has to offer.

That said, while most of my students have been excellent as far as completing the coursework and writing good exams, they vary when it comes to what they bring to the class in terms of genuine interest and engagement. To broadly frame this variety, I can identify each student I have taught into one of three types: a cynic, a calculator, or a seeker.

Cynics comprise, thankfully, a small group, but I have had at least one in each section. Cynics believes the Ethics course is largely a waste of time. Ethical decision-making is mostly common sense, and midshipmen either have that or they do not. Cynics do the minimum amount of course reading and only superficially participate in class discussions. Cynics do not seem to appreciate the fact, demonstrated repeatedly in case studies, that good officers regularly fail to recognize ethical blind spots in making weighty decisions. They are convinced that will never be them.

Calculators form the next biggest group, although still slightly in the minority (again, thankfully). Calculators are transactional students—what do I need to do to get an A in this course? Calculators do more of the reading and participate more regularly in class discussions. But they tend to do so less out of a genuine interest in the material, and more in the interest of checking the boxes needed to get the highest grade possible. They want the discussion to give them the “right” answers to ethical dilemmas, so they can deliver them back on tests and papers. The process of working out the best decision in ethical gray areas is far less important than knowing what the right answer is. Calculators occasionally ask for their papers to be reviewed in draft form, to see if they are indeed “on the right track.” They prefer short, discrete exam questions to long essays that are scored heavily on how they apply what they have learned in thinking through the problem. They often give feedback that the course is graded too harshly. If they can get an A in an engineering class, there is no way they should get anything less in an Ethics course.

Seekers are the best students, although they do not always get the best grade. They are less concerned with their grade-point average and class standing and far more with the immense leadership challenges they will face in just a few short years. They read well. They bring great energy and curiosity to the class discussions. They are not afraid to speak their minds on sensitive topics. They are humble before the awesome responsibility that awaits them. They appreciate that Ethics is not a science. There is rarely certainty. There is almost always complexity and ambiguity. They recognize their chosen profession will demand nothing less than their best judgment.

I have enjoyed the privilege of teaching and knowing all my students, but the seekers keep me coming back. I cannot wait to get to class to hear their thoughts on a reading assignment or a video shown in class. Their papers are not pro forma—they often read as if the student is bearing the burden of the choice herself. Seekers are reflective and thoughtful. Many are deeply faithful. All respect different viewpoints and backgrounds, religious and secular. Much more than wanting to avoid mistakes, seekers want to be better.

This three-tiered classification is hardly rigorous and certainly not set in cement. Some students display characteristics of a seeker and a calculator. Many will (hopefully) grow, and with maturity become seekers. Some will experience an ethical “close call” as a young officer and find in it an epiphany they take to heart in becoming seekers. Regardless of the journeys these midshipmen take, all will face difficult ethical choices as officers. Some will be of the life-and-death variety. Many will be immensely consequential, especially for those who choose to make the Navy or Marine Corps a career and ascend to command.

Whether better studies someday shed more light on the efficacy of ethics instruction, I believe the Naval Academy’s Ethics course reinforces the seekers and plants seeds for growth in the other students. Someday, in the crucible, these future officers will have to rely on their knowledge and character to make the best decision in an agonizing situation. When that moment comes, they are on their own.

Bill Bray is a retired Navy captain. He is an adjunct professor at the U.S. Naval Academy.

Featured Image: ANNAPOLIS, Md. (May 18, 2020) The United States Naval Academy holds the fourth swearing-in event for the Class of 2020. (U.S. Navy photo by Kenneth D. Aston Jr/Released)

Force Development

No Longer on Defense: Building the Offensive Destroyer Squadron

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By Jason Lancaster

Introduction

The modern destroyer squadron (DESRON) is unable to attack effectively first. It is primarily a defensive organization designed to protect the carrier from surface threats and submarines. There are many trite maxims like a good defense is a strong offense, but without a greater number of improved offensive weapons, there will not be an ability to improve the offensive capability of the DESRON or deploy offensive SAGs.

There has been some movement to create offensive SAGs to reach out and attack the enemy first, but these concepts have several issues. The Carrier Strike Group does not have the number of assets needed to protect the carrier in wartime, where providing for the defense of capital ships may prove too powerful of a demand signal to allow a meaningful number of surface ships to go on the offensive. Not only are there too few ships, but those ships need better offensive weapons to successfully conduct offensive missions. It is easier to kill the archer than the arrow, but the enemy archer in the form of Russian and Chinese assets heavily outranges the U.S. surface fleet. Addressing these shortfalls requires longer-range anti-ship weapons, a medium-range ASW aircraft, and better manning for DESRONs.

The State of Anti-Surface Warfare

The Soviet Union lacked significant carrier-based aviation and had to compensate by heavily investing in the development of powerful and long-range anti-ship missiles that were compatible with a wide variety of naval force structure. The theory was to use heavy bombers, submarines, and surface forces to launch large salvos of these long-range missiles to overwhelm U.S. carrier battle groups. The substantial lead the Soviet Union gained in anti-ship missile technology persists to this day.

Russia still has multiple surface-launched anti-ship missiles, many of which are supersonic and long-range. The most modern is the Zircon hypersonic missile deployed aboard Grigorovich-class corvettes. Newer Russian ships boasting the Kalibr system can also deploy the SS-N-26 Strobile or SS-N-27 Sizzler supersonic anti-ship missiles, while the older Soviet-era ships deploy the SS-N-22 Sunburn, SS-N-12 Sandbox, SS-N-19 Shipwreck, SS-N-26 Yakhont anti-ship missiles. The Russian Navy also has subsonic missiles like the SS-N-25 Switchblade and the older SS-N-2 Styx, as well as an anti-submarine rocket, the SS-N-14 SILEX, that also has an anti-surface mode. Russia sold many of these missile types to China, who also fields a wide variety of anti-ship missiles, including land-based ballistic missiles such as the DF-21 and DF-26.

A warship of Russia’s Pacific Fleet fires a Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) anti-ship cruise missile at a mock enemy sea target in the Sea of Japan, in this still image taken from video released March 28, 2023. (Via Russian Defence Ministry)

The variety of Russia’s and China’s different missiles complicates U.S. Navy options for hardkill and softkill countermeasures. Different missiles have different terminal maneuvers and signatures designed to confuse and challenge terminal air defenses. Softkill options rely on decoys and electronic warfare to distract, jam, or seduce enemy missiles away from the targeted ship, but increasingly capable multimodal seekers are diminishing the utility of softkill countermeasures. This wide array of advanced anti-ship missile capability means that U.S. ships must devote more magazine space to defensive countermeasures, reducing the amount of space available for offensive weapons. In order to change the dynamic, the U.S. needs to rapidly develop and field a greater multitude of offensive surface and air-launched anti-ship missiles to better threaten rival naval forces and force them onto the defensive.

As an ensign, I noticed the discrepancy between our Harpoons and the plethora of missiles Russia and China had developed. I asked my executive officer about this state of affairs, and he said the U.S. Navy relied on carrier-based naval aviation to strike enemy ships, and our ships protected the carrier and did not need large numbers of surface-to-surface missiles to attack the enemy. This doctrine may have been slightly more appropriate for a time when Cold War-era carrier aviation had much longer reach than it has today and when opposing surface warships had far less capable air defenses. But the balance of advantage has become much different.

Unfortunately, naval aviation’s primary anti-surface weapons are the Harpoon and the JDAM. U.S. naval aviation has predominantly relied on JDAMs for their strike missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the small 15NM range easily allows modern warship air defenses to threaten archers before they can fire arrows. Naval aviation is replacing the Harpoon with the Joint Stand Off Weapon (JSOW) glide bomb with an advertised 62NM range and the Long-Range Anti-Surface missile (LRASM) which has an estimated range of 300NM, but neither is in the fleet in large numbers, and it will take years to build enough inventory.1,2 Naval aviation cannot be reasonably expected to shoulder all of the burden of employing the U.S. Navy’s anti-ship missile firepower, and surface warships will be needed to alleviate this burden and open new options for maritime strike.

Air Test and Evaluation (VX) 23’s Salty Dog 122 releases a Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) during a flight test. (U.S. Navy photo by Erik Hildebrandt)

The U.S. is only recently starting to field replacements for the ship-launched Harpoon missile. The Naval Strike Missile is a modern sea skimmer and its 100NM range is slightly better than Harpoon, but still far less than many adversary weapons and it is not compatible with vertical launch cells.3 The Navy is also fielding the SM-6 and Maritime Strike Tomahawk for anti-surface work, but the Navy possesses a limited inventory. Both missiles have alternative missions in air defense and land-attack strike respectively that might take priority over anti-surface missions. But with the end of the War on Terror’s major campaigns, the U.S. Navy should be able to reduce the number of Tomahawk missiles carried for land-attack missions and increase the amount of magazine depth devoted to maritime strike.

Anti-Submarine Warfare

U.S. forces are heavily challenged by enemy submarines. China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have 208 submarines combined of various age and capability.4 Chinese and Russian submarines field advanced anti-ship missiles with ranges in excess of 200NM. The modern carrier strike group will struggle to defend itself against this threat, especially when submarines can slip past screening warships and aircraft. The U.S. Navy needs a new medium-range aircraft organic to the strike group to assist in ASW defense. Surface ships also need a longer-range anti-ship rocket (ASROC) to engage detected submarines much farther from the strike group or SAG. This combination of capability will extend the scope of ASW defense and better allow surface warships to go on the offensive in other missions.

During the Cold War, the S-3 Viking was tailor-made to support ASW and ASuW missions. These aircraft had the endurance to travel several hundred miles from the strike group and remain on station while hunting submarines for hours. But the S-3 Viking was retired without a similar platform to replace it, and now the only ASW aircraft organic in the carrier strike group is the much shorter-ranged MH-60R helicopter. They are designed for terminal classification and engagement, not for wide-area searches that are critical to early warning in ASW.

The Navy needs to develop aircraft to fill the roles once provided by the S-3 Viking, but it does not need to develop a new airframe and new sensors. The Navy already has highly capable sensors in the P-8 and MH-60R. Fielding those sensors in an airframe like the MV-22 Osprey, or using an unmanned aircraft like the MQ-9B Sea Guardian, would greatly extend the classification, identification, and engagement area (CIEA) for ASW. An MV-22 variant could utilize sensors from the P-8A and the MH-60R, provided it can handle the added electrical load. A vertically-launched medium range ASW aircraft could also be sold to the wide variety of allies and partners that operate flattops. Other countries such as the Philippines might be able to use a medium-range ASW aircraft and launch it from austere airfields to control ASW chokepoints.

The MQ-9B Sea Guardian is an unmanned aircraft that has operated during exercises. It is capable of conducting ASW within a 1,200-mile mission radius with significant on-station time. It is capable of carrying 120 sonobuoys in two sizes.5 Recent tests have proven that the MQ-9 is capable of short takeoffs and landings, which would enable the ARG-MEU to deploy with significant anti-submarine capacity.

With the growing numbers and capabilities of rival submarines, it is time to invest in improving ASW capabilities, and specifically with an eye toward extending the possible ranges of detection and engagement. Longer-range ASW weapons for surface ships and new ASW aircraft will drastically improve the Navy’s defensive capability against hostile submarines.

DESRON Manning

The modern destroyer squadron is configured to operate as an administrative and tactical command and is supposed to be manned as such. Yet when one looks at DESRON manning and who is standing watch, there are significant shortfalls. I once trained a Boatswains Mate Chief Petty Officer to stand watch, and we deployed at only 50 percent manning, which subsequently increased to 85 percent with plus-ups from various Third Class Petty Officer Operations Specialists to fill the voids of First Class Petty Officer Operations Specialists. This lack of experience reduced the ability of the staff to properly execute mission command-type orders, among other challenges.

A deploying DESRON staff needs to be allowed to focus on naval warfare. The staff needs to turn all of its maintenance duties over to Surface Forces or a Maintenance Surface Squadron that then allows deploying DESRONs to focus on preparing for naval warfare. The announcement of new Surface Group (SURFGRU) readiness squadrons is a step in the right direction, but it will take time for the DESRONs to offload habitual responsibilities to focus more on warfighting. Typically during the maintenance and basic phases, the DESRON staff focuses on the ships and not enough on themselves. There are few opportunities for the DESRON can conduct tactical training, let alone conduct enough of it. When I was stationed in Norfolk, we went to Tactical Training Group Atlantic only several times, and only managed to train on our CVN once prior to SWATT. This greatly impaired the development of the DESRON’s tactical readiness and our understanding of the DESRON’s warfighting functions.

The DESRON needs a dedicated basic phase to develop its abilities to wage offensive and defensive war at sea, and to build its tactical warfighting skill and know-how. A deploying DESRON could be called a Tactical Squadron to differentiate itself from other DESRONs. The proposed TACRON manning chart below is designed to build a naval staff capable of sustained planning and operations, with a focus on putting warfighting first and foremost.

A manning construct for a tactical destroyer squadron (TACRON). (Author graphic)

Conclusion

For generations, the primarily defensive roles of the surface fleet and the lack of long-range anti-ship weapons have sapped the offensive spirit of the Surface Warfare Officer community. As ships begin to utilize the SM-6 in anti-surface mode, an offensive spirit is beginning to build. The surface warfare enterprise needs to continue to invest in longer-range weapons to put the enemy on the defensive and to put our own ships on offense. SM-6, LRASM, and the Maritime Tomahawk, combined with new over-the-horizon targeting techniques, have placed the Navy on the right track for ASuW. However, the lack of a medium-range ASW aircraft still limits the ability of flattops to defend themselves, and threatens to pull surface warships away from their growing offensive potential and into the resource-intensive ASW fight. Yet new capability will not be enough to fill these gaps. Surface warfare officers – from watchstanders to operational commanders and especially DESRON staffers – will all need to rediscover the offensive spirit that is fundamental to striking effectively first.

LCDR Jason Lancaster has served as Operations Officer at DESRON 26 during their 2020 deployment workups and a portion of deployment. He has also served aboard all manner of surface ships including USS STOUT (DDG 55), USS NEW YORK (LPD 21), USS TORTUGA (LSD 46), and USS AMERICA (LHA 6). Ashore he has served in the N5 at Commander, Naval Forces Korea and OPNAV N5. These views are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official views of any U.S. government department or agency.

References

1. “AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW),” U.S. Navy Fact File, September 27, 2021, https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2166748/agm-154-joint-standoff-weapon-jsow/. 

2. David B. Larter, “Pentagon’s weapons tester gives update on Navy’s new long-range anti-ship missile,” Defense News, January 21, 2021, https://www.navytimes.com/naval/2021/01/14/the-pentagons-weapons-tester-has-an-update-on-the-navys-new-long-range-anti-ship-missile/.

3. “Naval Strike Missile,” Kongsberg, https://www.kongsberg.com/kda/what-we-do/defence-and-security/missile-systems/nsm-naval-strike-missile-nsm.

4. “Submarines by Country,” World Population Review, https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/submarines-by-country.

5. “MQ-9B SeaGuardian,” General Atomics, https://www.ga-asi.com/remotely-piloted-aircraft/mq-9b-seaguardian.

Featured Image: June 2016 – Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyer USS Spruance (DDG 111) (front) steams in formation with USS Decatur (DDG 73) and USS Momsen (DDG 92). (U.S. Navy photo by MC2(SW) Will Gaskill)