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Fiction Week

False Flag

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Fiction Week

By Tyler Totten

880 km south of Midway Atoll, 11:15 (GMT-11)

“… tensions continue to escalate, some say war is inevitable. White House Press Secretary Jones insisted talks between US and PRC officials still show signs of progress. Despite the official sentiment, the stock market has less confidence, dropping another 5% in the third straight week of losses. The weight of reciprocal sanctions from both sides had already pushed the IMF to revise GDP predictions globally into negative territory. Further escalation…”

“Sir.” Captain Bryan Herera’s video feed paused automatically as the priority communication filled his headset. “Incoming message traffic.”

“Thank you, Lieutenant. On the way.” He closed the comm with a frown. Any priority traffic could mean war. He was across the small cabin and down the short passageway to the CIC in ninety seconds. His stealthy command frigate was small and used space very efficiently. While SAG-58 was a powerful squadron collectively, each ship was relatively small and specialized.

“Decryption status, Lieutenant?”

“Finishing now, Captain.” Herera scanned it quickly and visibly relaxed, feeling each of his CIC crew glancing his direction in what they thought were discrete glances. Seeing his relaxation, they relaxed in turn.

“New orders, interdiction.” Herera pushed the relevant section to the squadron for their situational awareness. Simultaneously he pinged each ship’s captain for their availability. Seeing each respond green, he launched the squadron-wide conference.

“Morning. I’ve pushed our latest orders, nominally a simple interdiction mission. With the likely initiation of hostilities, commercial traffic has been fleeing WESTPAC. Most have headed towards the Indian Ocean but a few have also headed towards the US West Coast. ONI has flagged ships of interest for inspection and potential boarding. We’ve been assigned two containerships.

“First, the Liberian-flagged Great Wind owned by a Singapore-based company, out of Hong Kong, and reports she is headed to Hawaii and then Long Beach. Second is Pacora, Panamanian-flagged and owned. We don’t have details on why but ONI saw something of note.”

“Our orders are to interdict and inspect these vessels before they reach Hawaii. We will execute a sprint south, with surveillance support provided out of Hickam if available. They’re a little tight on available assets right now so I’ll rate that as doubtful.” Herera looked to where Casablanca’s captain was on his screen.

“Gil, I’ll want your birds over the top of both. How’re we looking to provide continuous coverage?”

“They’re about 300 kilometers away now, so we can start now and still have a few birds for armed overwatch of the boarding actions. I can have a bird for each off the deck in 30, sir.” Commander Gilbert Grahm’s gravely voice portrayed the smallest degree of tension.

“Very well, do it.” Herera nodded. “Sherry, I’ll want to push the boarding teams and armed escort out before we get within visual range. I assume that’s no challenge?”

“No sir, no challenge at all.” Commander Sheryl Gibbons tapped at her controls a moment. “We’ve still got about 5 hours to reach launch point. My people will be ready.”

“As for the rest of you.” Herera looked across the captains of his gun and missile-armed ships, the ones that provided his group with their air defense, strike, and anti-surface capacity. “We don’t know what to expect beyond what’s in our orders so I want us watching all domains. The PLAN could be trying to sneak a sub under these commercial ships or the ships themselves could be the threat. We don’t know what to expect so we’ll be ready for anything. General quarters and ready for action in four hours. Understood?”

“Yessir.” His lieutenants commanding the gun-armed Hedgehogs and VLS-armed Arsenal vessels responded crisply.

400 km west of Hawaii, 16:43 (GMT-11)

“Pacora, Pacora. In accordance with international treaties and your approach to the United States of America’s economic exclusion zone, you are ordered to stand by for boarding and inspection. Please respond.” Lieutenant Thorne turned, clearly concerned. “Fourth time now sir, no response.”

Herera’s frown deepened and he nodded in acknowledgement. Pacora was still steaming directly towards Hawaii. The ISR drone showed nothing unusual and they could make out crew on the bridge.

“Time until overwatch is in place?”

“Three minutes.” Thorne tiled the CIC main screen to show the plot, ISR feed, and the armed overwatch drone feeds. “Boarding teams will be on approach six minutes after that.”

Herera felt like he was missing something but didn’t know what. All he knew for sure was that there was a pit forming in his stomach.

“Activity on Pacora Captain.” Thorne maximized the feed showing Pacora.

For a moment, it looked as if the container stacks were shifting before Herera realized dozens of container tops were lifting on hidden hinges. Plumes of fire and smoke engulfed the ship as dozens of fires ignited at once and in an instant he knew.

“Defensive weapons free, squadron control to Roark. Continue closing on target vessel.” Herera freed his forces defensively and centralized control of the squadron to Roark’s automated combat system. “Roark, send flash warning, all stations.”

Roark’s computer sent the automated message push before its acknowledgement tone even sounded in Herera’s ear, far faster than any human could have done the same. Seconds would count here.

A flurry of acknowledgements flew in as the status board showed each ship report transfer of control. Roark’s combat system immediately began shifting stances, shifting Casablanca and Oyster Bay to the rear and moving the Hedgehogs forward.

“Fifty launches so far.” Thorne reported as the angry red symbols were plotted. “Heading zero-nine-zero and going supersonic. Target appears to be Hawaii and surrounds.”

“Ensure our feed is continuously transmitted to the net,” Herera ordered. He checked the intercept geometries and noted sourly that none of his ships could hope to down the missiles racing away from them towards Hawaii. He’d just have to make sure the total number launched were kept to a minimum. “Roark, strike mission anti-ship.”

“Target?” Roark’s computerized voice had an electronic growl but was clear in his ear.

“M/V Pacora. All weapons available, assume moderate defensive fire, ensure destruction in one salvo. Prioritize time to impact over munition conservation.” Roark would plot the strike faster and more reliably than his people could do on their own.

“Mission prepared. Twelve NSM in flights of four, one axis most direct route. Ready for authorization. Approval for strike on civilian vessel required.” Herera reviewed it, not expecting much complexity given SAG-58 and the containership were the only contacts for forty kilometers.

“Fire mission approved, civilian target authorized.” Herera also thumbed in his fingerprint authorization for the official log in addition to the audio recording he knew was being captured.

“Firing. Palisade, Bulwark, and Redoubt engaging.” Herera saw the three Arsenal-class ships obscured in smoke as they fired the naval strike missiles authorized by his command. The missile salvos flight would be short, launched from just under twenty kilometers.

“Sir, they’re dumping containers!” Thorne pointed at the screen incredulously. Herera looked up from his command display to see empty containerized missile launchers being hauled over the side linked by heavy wire rope. He wasn’t sure why until he saw the next layer of containers opening in turn and starting their launch sequence. Herera realized with horror that the ship could still contain dozens of additional missiles.

Sixty seconds after launch they went terminal. Pacora launched chaff and flares from hidden dispensers but the networked missiles ignored them and continued their dive. Distributed along its length, arriving nearly simultaneously, fourteen-hundred kilograms of explosive detonated as one. The entire ship shuddered and her propulsion power died as engineering was shredded and fuel set afire. Further forward, the explosions found more energetic cargo. The second row nearly expended, Pacora’s third missile layer was still ensconced in their containers. Three NSMs struck among them and added the mass of unexpended ordnance to the conflagration.

Aboard Roark, they watched in morbid fascination as the massive blast tore out the massive ship’s midsection. Hull steel rippled like water on a pond before the explosive energy finally tore the ship in half. Riddled with holes, the ship settled quickly as seawater rushed into the savaged hull. A minute later, both halves disappeared beneath the waves. Only debris and burning oil remained.

“How many launches?” Herera asked, knowing he wouldn’t like the answer.

“Eighty-five, sir.” Thorne refocused on his screens. “Air defenses engaging and Hickam’s CAP is moving to intercept.”

“Some are still going to get through.” Herera said darkly. He brought his attention back to the plot quickly. “Are we seeing anything suspicious from Great Wind?”

“No sir, but there wasn’t much warning here either.”

“Hail them. They are to come about to heading two-seven-zero immediately and reduce to steerage or we’ll consider them an enemy combatant.” Herera said stonily.

Thorne stared for a second, shocked before hailing Great Wind.

“Captain Grahm, time for armed overwatch to Great Wind?” Herera brought all his captains onto the conference without waiting for their confirmations. They needed to move quickly and as one here.

“Started moving them when we saw Pacora’s launches. They are approaching station now.”

“Boarding team and escort drones also enroute Captain.” Captain Gibbons added. “Thirty minutes to be ready to execute.”

“Very well. If Great Wind does not comply with our instructions, I want her disabled. We’ll try not to sink her but we must prevent any additional losses. Objections, concerns, questions?” Herera swept the faces of his officers. None spoke but he saw the range of emotions; shock, frustration, anger. All appeared in agreement.

315 km west of Hawaii, 17:28 (GMT-11)

“Boarding team approaching. Great Wind is still at heading two-seven-zero and five knots.” Thorne reported, his voice shaky but clear. The nervousness was wearing on them all.

“Took them long enough,” Herera grumbled, still glaring at the big ship. Her captain had tried to argue around it, offer all sorts of excuses to delay compliance. Herera had been sure he would have to disable her but the captain had finally complied after one of the escort drones detonated a rocket a hundred meters off her bow. Now the squadron, within ten kilometers of Great Wind, had interposed itself between the ship and Hawaii. The island had already taken a number of hits and at least one of the radar stations was no longer operating. He didn’t know if they were completely offline or just down temporarily. He’d endeavor to find out the damage after the task at hand was complete.

The net of armed drones flew and floated around her, every camera and sensor staring. They could see shadowy faces of the crew looking out but little else. Herera continued to watch the multiple feeds and threat indicators as the boarding team closed on the ship.

When a targeting radar lashed out from a series of hidden conformal arrays buried in the container stack the watching humans were momentarily taken by surprise. The further addition of electronic jammers reduced the quality of the feeds but were still below the level required to truly jam the massively redundant net of the SAG. The squadron’s automated system, however, reacted instantly. Already set weapons free on any hostile emissions or launches, the circling overwatch drones pivoted as they came to a hover. Two drones on opposite sides of the ship loosed anti-radiation missiles at the offending emitters. The network did not feel satisfaction but it sounded no additional warning. Everything was prepared and it was ready to engage the expected weapon launches heralded by the targeting radars. It could not have anticipated what happened next.

Small charges blew the lids off a hundred containers as one. Having barely flown free, a veritable cloud of objects emerged from the now open lids. They spread on every axis away from the ship even as additional hatches opened on additional containers atop Great Wind’s tall stacks.

“Drone launches, reports are merging. Roark can’t distinguish them individually.” Thorne paused momentarily to squint and interpret the data he was seeing. “At least eight-hundred drones.”

“Recall the boarding teams.” Herera relied on Roark to handle the defensive systems, any orders he gave would be late at this point. Even as he thought it, Roark’s own VLS rumbled as missiles thundered away and the 57mm deck gun rotated from its housing and roared into action at maximum fire rate. All across the horizon, every ship in his squadron was doing the same with every weapon. He saw the detonations in the dark clouds of drones all around the Great Wind both with his own eyes and on the drone feeds.

“Boarding teams withdrawing but heavily pursued.” Thorne’s report brought his attention to their feed. He noted that one of his overwatch drones was already offline and another was maneuvering hard to evade the pursuing drones. They were a mix of small missiles, pusher propellers, and even basic quadcopters. While they had been building speed, SAG-58’s drones had been hovering and had to transition to forward flight to escape. For some, it cost too much time.

315 km west of Hawaii, 17:36 (GMT-11)

“They’re still closing!” Corporal Ogdon snarled into the comm as she continued to play her minigun across the swarm. She was downing dozens of the little quadcopters but dozens more still pursued the four RIBs of the boarding team. Each boat poured fire into the swarm but all were losing ground.

“Unbox the Buster!” Lieutenant Cooper ordered. Private Collins scrambled from his seat, hauling a long case from under his seat. Quickly flipping the latches and opening the case revealed the long cylindrical weapon inside. Vaguely rifle shaped, it looked vaguely like a blunderbuss.

“Pulse out!” He called, bracing himself on the gunwale and rapidly stroking the trigger. The effects were immediate and drones dropped in clusters as their delicate unshielded electronics failed.

“Reloading. Fuck” Ogdon cursed, continuing under her breath as she and another private scrambled to reload the minigun. But they didn’t have the time.

Finally catching closing, quadcopters spiraled onto their fleeing prey. Despite their losses, the dozens remaining were still overkill. Multiple struck each boat, small warheads tearing through the thin craft and their occupants. Engine power died while secondaries finished the destruction.

None escaped.

In the air, their overwatch faired little better. The speed and maneuverability advantage provided some protection but half of the squadron’s airborne assets were overwhelmed. The rest, forced to flee at speed, had little left to contribute. Their human operators could only look on impotently as Great Wind’s containers began to launch missiles at the squadron’s ships.

315 km west of Hawaii, 17:38 (GMT-11)

“Vampire, vampire.” Thorne’s unsurprising report was still unwelcome. “Roark still directing defensive fire.”

Roark’s crew were little more than passengers now. Herera had been forced to helplessly watch his boarding team die. Now, he had to watch as his own fate was decided. The initial defensive fire had wiped out the remaining drones, those that hadn’t succeeded in striking their own targets, but Great Wind was launching heavier missiles now.

Short-ranged interceptors sprinted from launchers in a constant ripple while deck guns sent hundreds of rounds roaring downrange. The detonations, smoke trails, and flashes were impossible for the human mind to follow in real-time but he knew all were tracked and the intercepts choreographed by Roark’s computer. Every minor turret adjustment, every midcourse update, all happening in milliseconds to best defend the squadron.

“Fire mission request. Target Great Wind.” Roark’s generated voice filled his ear as the plan appeared on screen. The computer couldn’t fire offensively without permission but knew sinking Great Wind was a logical step and acted accordingly. Herera saw the plan was similar to the strike on Pacora, effective but not creative. Just as he’d expect.

“Approved.” Herera wasted no time. There was no telling how many munitions or other launchable effects Great Wind held.

Moments after approving, Roark’s answer to the enemy attack roared downrange. Seemingly undetected this time, the NSMs faced no defensive fire or decoys. Herera thought perhaps the outdated EW that Great Wind had employed in the opening act had been this ship’s only systems. Or at least the missile detection gear had been among what was destroyed when the anti-radiation missiles did their work before the drone swarm. Tearing into the massive ship, Great Wind died much the same as her apparent sister an hour earlier, leaving little more than a burning oil slick on the surface to mark her passing.

But she didn’t die alone. Two ships of the squadron burned along with her, Redoubt and Saber had both taken hits. Saber seemed only lightly damaged but Redoubt was a total loss. The small anti-ship missile had struck her amidships and the resulting secondary detonation of her VLS magazine had broken the ship’s back. She hadn’t quite split in half but her bow sat at an ugly angle relative to the stern and she had only a meter of freeboard remaining. Stiletto had maneuvered astern and launched her single RIB to search for sailors in the water but none were showing on the man overboard systems. The stern section was ablaze with an intensity that didn’t look survivable. As bad as he felt, he knew his people were feeling the pain as well. He’d led them into this little trap but he also knew it wasn’t intended for them. He thumbed on the command line to the surviving ships of the squadron, knowing his CIC crew would hear his words as well.

“As soon as we complete SAR, we’ll head for Pearl. Vessel statuses ASAP, priority superseded only by SAR and crew injuries. I know we’re all still processing what just happened but keep in mind, those drones were meant to follow-up Pacora’s strikes on Hawaii. We stopped them.” He said simply, taking the logical leap. He kept his darker thoughts to himself.

Not a great start. And the war is just getting started.

Tyler Totten is a naval engineer who has supported several Navy and Coast Guard programs, including LCS, DDG(X), and PEO Ships Futures Directorate with a deep interest in international and specifically maritime security. He is also an amateur science fiction writer published on Kindle. He holds a B.S from Webb Institute in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering. He can be found on Bluesky at @azuresentry.bsky.social and X/Twitter at @AzureSentry.

Featured Image: Art created with Midjourney AI.

Capability Analysis

Land Force Integration: The Army’s Contribution to Deterring China

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By Major General James B. Bartholomees III 

Chinese Coast Guard vessels are ramming Philippine Coast Guard ships at an alarming rate in the South China Sea. Chinese military planes are increasing dangerous intercepts with U.S., Allied and partner planes over the international waters of East Asia. While the high-profile use of military ships and planes is concerning, China is building and training a joint military force designed with one overarching objective in mind—to seize land areas from its neighbors. 

U.S. naval and air forces have been contesting China’s maritime and air threats for years. But they alone cannot deny China the ends of its military strategy either through gray zone tactics or use of force. With significant U.S. Army investments in long range fires systems, and lessons of harsh ground combat in the war in Ukraine, the role of land forces in the Indo-Pacific is becoming more apparent. To deter China from seizing terrain as part of the long-term strategic competition, while assuring our regional allies, U.S. Army Pacific is complementing maritime and air forces by improving the ability to defend key terrain, including the sovereign territory of the United States and its Allies. This can be accomplished by increasing the scale and frequency of campaigning activities forward in the region involving long-range fires systems, pre-positioning equipment and supplies, and capitalizing on favorable policy developments.

U.S. Army Pacific is strengthening its multi-domain capabilities to support joint operations in the Indo-Pacific region. By increasing the scale and frequency of campaigning activities, namely regional exercises that involve long-range fires systems, the Army aims to bolster Allies’ and the joint force’s abilities to counter maritime and air threats. This approach, developed through the U.S. Army’s multi-domain operations doctrine and implemented by newly formed Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs), integrates land-based offensive and defensive capabilities with space, cyber, electronic warfare, and information operations.

Recently a Multi-Domain Task Force deployed its new Typhon Mid-Range Capability to Northern Luzon in the Philippines. Typhon is a mobile land-based anti-ship missile system capable of launching the Navy’s SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles. Typhon offers complementary capability to the Philippines’ BrahMos antiship missile batteries coming online. The deployment demonstrated U.S. commitment to a mutual defense treaty ally faced with escalating threats. This is particularly important as the Armed Forces of the Philippines shifts its focus from counterinsurgency operations in Mindanao to a new strategy of comprehensive archipelagic defense. MDTFs are also employing terrestrial sensors, high-altitude balloons, and deep-sensing platforms in the Indo-Pacific.

A Mid-Range Capability (MRC) Launcher from Charlie Battery, 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, Long Range Fires Battalion, 1st Multi-Domain Task Force arrives as part of the capability’s first deployment into theater on Northern Luzon, Philippines, April 7, 2024. (U.S. Army photo by Capt. Ryan DeBooy)

This new formation is applying lessons from recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East to drive experimentation with advanced technologies. This strategy enhances U.S. military effectiveness and empowers Allied nations with capacity to develop their own land-based long-range fires capabilities—critical for defending their sovereign areas—contributing to a more robust regional defense posture against potential adversaries like China.

U.S. Army Pacific is positioning critical sustainment equipment and supplies in Allied nations so that the U.S. is ready to meet its mutual defense treaty obligations and support U.S. joint forces. The tyranny of distance from the Continental United States to the “First Island Chain” of Japan – Taiwan – Philippines requires positioning essential equipment and supplies before any fast-moving crisis. For contingency purposes, the Army has pre-prepositioned stocks across the globe in locations such as the Middle East, Poland, Japan and Korea. These pre-positioned stocks provide a unique set of sustainment capabilities to the joint force to include Common User Land Transport (CULT), ship-to-shore fueling capability, bulk water purification and storage, vertical and horizontal engineering, field feeding, maintenance services, contracting and large-scale medical capabilities across a host of disciplines.

The Army also provides watercraft and causeways that the joint force relies upon for intra-theater sealift as well as ship-to-shore movements. U.S. Army Pacific is equipped with purpose-designed, theater-enabling commands to run these functions in support of the joint force, Allies and partners. For exercises and deployments, pre-positioned equipment and supplies in critical locations reduce commercial vessel movement costs and support the economies of vital U.S. Allies. Pre-positioning equipment and supply in the Philippines and Australia, for example, rather than on ships at sea, also enables the U.S. joint force to respond faster and more effectively to their international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief needs during natural events such as cyclones, typhoons, floods and landslides. Investment in pre-positioned equipment and supplies on our Allies’ soil allows the U.S. military to provide a range of options to protect and safeguard our friends in the region.

The U.S. Departments of Defense and State have matured existing policy agreements with many countries allowing the Army to tangibly improve the joint force’s ability to meet Mutual Defense Treaty obligations. The new reality of China’s land seizure capability combined with their increasing ties with Russia have informed our diplomatic and military support to allies and partners. Current agreements provide sufficient authority to increase exercise scope and duration as well as storage of military equipment and supplies, but often nations choose to support agreements based on their political will. 

Persistent engagement, collaboration, and routine communication are critical to earning and maintaining our allied and partner militaries’ trust. From information sharing with the Philippines on maritime threats to their economic exclusion zones, to network development with the Japanese in command post exercises and missile defense, the U.S. Army is building trusting relationships. In stark contrast to China’s bullying tactics, the U.S. Army works with local populations and governments to gain and retain freedom of action in the competitive space, giving joint and combined forces an edge should they have to transition to crisis or conflict.

Members of the Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) conduct operations. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Philip Velez)

Critics will question why allies and partners would be willing to grant access and basing short of a crisis. Because they will seek support when we least expect it – and we must be strategically vigilant in positioning forces and equipment ahead of a crisis. In competition short of war, land forces translate political legitimacy into military advantage through campaigning: the logical and sequential arrangement of operations, activities, and investments. These recommendations position U.S. Army forces to support Allies in anticipation of their requests for assistance, and at the invitation of the host nation under existing agreements. These simple actions strengthen our critical alliances – a value that China fails to bring into any of its transactional relationships.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General (retired) Mark Milley believed that “preparing for war is expensive,” but “there is nothing more expensive than fighting a war.” The forementioned costs would be far less than U.S. blood and treasure spilled in conflict with China. General Flynn, Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific, often reiterates that “our goal is no war.” To protect our allies and prevent another future conflict, U.S. land forces must complement maritime and air forces by increasing the scale and frequency of exercises involving long-range fires systems, pre-positioning equipment, and capitalizing on policy developments. U.S. air and sea power alone will not deter. Controlling physical land areas and nonphysical areas (e.g., human and information dimensions) directly supports freedom of the seas, in times of competition, or command of the sea in wartime. Alongside Marine Corps stand-in forces and U.S. special operations forces, Army forces can help secure key terrain in maritime Asia. Land force integration is essential to preventing war and winning the long-term strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.

Major General James B. Bartholomees III currently serves as the Chief of Staff of U.S. Army Pacific. He previously served as the Operations Officer of U.S. Army Pacific and his previous commands include the 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) and 2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. MG Bartholomees holds a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering from the United States Military Academy and a Masters in National Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

References

ADM Samuel J. Paparo, USN, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Change of Command speech, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, (May 3, 2024). 

Josh Luckenbaugh, “Army Has Role to Play in Air Force’s Agile Combat Concept,” National Defense Magazine (September 12, 2024).

General Charles Flynn and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Devine, “Mobilize Land Power to Contain China’s Maritime Ambitions” USNI Proceedings (September 2024). 

“2022 National Defense Strategy,” U.S. Department of Defense. 

Doll, A., et al., The Backbone of U.S. Joint Operations: Army Roles in the Indo-Pacific, Rand (May 5, 2023).

Frederick, B. et al. Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces, Rand (February 4, 2020).

Chris Panella, “The US Army put on a sudden show of force out on the far edge of Alaska to send the message it can as Russia and China partner in the Pacific,” Business Insider, (September 14, 2024).

Watts, S., et al., Assessing the Value of Overseas Military Campaigning in Strategic Competition, Rand (December 13, 2022).

Wong, J. P., et al., New Directions for Projecting Land Power in the Indo-Pacific: Contexts, Constraints, and Concepts, Rand (December 20, 2022).

Featured Image: Soldiers observe a live fire during Rim of the Pacific 2018 at Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands. (Sgt. 1st Class Claudio Tejada/Army)

Capability Analysis

The Caspian Challenge: A Fleet in Being for Kazakhstan’s Sea Lines of Communication

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By Bakhtiyar Askaruly

Kazakhstan is the largest landlocked country, relying heavily on a resource-exporting economy, with the main route to international markets going through Russian territory.1 For many years, Kazakhstan did not experience any interruptions while exporting its resources, but the Russian invasion of Ukraine now challenges Kazakhstan’s economic and security stability. Russia has blocked Kazakhstan’s oil exports by shutting down a pumping station in the Black Sea port to draw Kazakhstan into its advantageous political stance vis-à-vis Ukraine. Kazakhstan is now exploring different routes for its resource exports. The Caspian Sea offers a promising option but will require sea lines of communication (SLOC). Kazakhstan should build a “Fleet in being” to protect its lines of communication, guaranteeing access to the Caspian Sea.2

80 percent of Kazakhstan’s GDP comes from oil and gas exports.3 90 percent of those oil exports go to European markets through Russian territory via pipelines.4 Kazakhstan’s reliance on energy exports places the country in a vulnerable position that is now being exploited by Russia. In 2022, Russia shut down oil transportation several times in response to Kazakhstan’s chosen foreign policy. On March 20, 2022, high seas in the Black Sea allegedly damaged the oil pumping station, but under nefarious circumstances. During the two-week disruption, Kazakhstan lost up to 300 million dollars in revenues.5 Before this event, reports surfaced that Kazakhstan chose not to send troops to Ukraine to fight alongside Russian forces.6 On June 20, 2022, Russia shut off its oil pumping station in the Black Sea a second time due to discovered malfunctions. The second disruption coincided with Kazakhstan’s Presidential announcement of non-recognition of Russian-occupied Ukraine territories on June 17, 2022.7 The third interruption occurred on July 6 when a Russian local court halted exports under the guise of an oil spill.8

In response to the oil export interruption, on July 7 Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev urged the development of alternative routes for oil export. He directed a study to examine the construction of an underwater pipeline and the use of an oil tanker fleet in the Caspian Sea.9 Similar proposals for an underwater pipeline took place in the 1990s but remained blueprints and mockups. In the 1990’s U.S. companies undertook the Transcaspian gas pipeline project, which was aimed to transport gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and later from Kazakhstan to European markets. The Clinton administration created a new position in the State Department for Caspian gas and oil projects. In turn, Russia appointed two high-level government representatives to address the Caspian issues. Moscow also agreed with Iran for strategic energy cooperation in the region, meant to block any efforts for a trans-Caspian pipeline not under Russia’s control or influence.10 Both countries used the unresolved status of the Caspian Sea to impede any further development of energy transfer options.

A map depicting energy infrastructure and deposits in the Caspian Sea. (Graphic via U.S. Energy Information Administration)

In 2018, the Caspian Convention regional countries signed a pact to exclude Russian and Iranian vetoes over a trans-Caspian gas pipeline.11 This new legal status for the Caspian Sea allows Kazakhstan to diversify its oil export transit options. This project’s completion remains uncertain due to Russia’s opposition. Another option for Kazakhstan is to build a tanker fleet and expand port capabilities. In the future, a Caspian oil tanker fleet could move up to 30 percent of oil exports through the Caspian Sea.12 However, oil tankers in the Caspian remain vulnerable to adversaries’ provocations without appropriate protection offered by the Corbettian concept of a “Fleet in Being,” providing security to a friendly fleet, and defending against unwarranted attacks.

The military balance of power in the Caspian Sea is shared between five countries: Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. Russia holds “local command” of the Caspian Sea with its relatively significant fleet for this isolated body of water. The Russian Caspian flotilla consists of 28 warships, including two guided missile frigates, eight corvettes, four patrol boats, seven minesweepers, six landing craft, and a gunboat.13 Iran’s fleet comprises one frigate, two corvettes, and ten patrol boats. Azerbaijan possesses one frigate, four submarines, and dozens of patrol boats. Kazakhstan’s fleet comprises two missile boats, two patrol boats, and one minesweeper. Turkmenistan’s fleet is even smaller.

Kazakhstan’s present naval fleet remains inferior compared to the top threat. Russian and Iranian cooperation further compromises Kazakhstan’s already precarious position. Kazakhstan’s fleet only patrols the littorals and provides security for offshore oil extraction.

In the face of new challenges, namely developing new export routes through the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan should build a “Fleet in Being” to ensure the denial of adversaries. The main task of Kazakhstan’s fleet should be focused on quick reaction to any provocation on its SLOCs, which are approximately 300 kilometers in length. This could be resolved by three to five corvettes and dozens of smaller high-speed boats with effective firepower, such as anti-ship cruise missiles. More significantly however, a naval buildup might stimulate further militarization and an arms race in the Caspian Sea. To mitigate these risks surface ships numbers should be enough to present a credible threat, but appear defensive.

The missile boat Mangystau of Kazakhstan’s Naval Forces arrives in Baku, Azerbaijan. (Photo by Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan)

To ensure that any adversary’s action in the sea would be defeated, Kazakhstan might acquire ISR systems and loitering munitions. This capability combination proved effective in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War.14 ISR systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) would be able to provide locations of ships and targeting information, while loitering munitions could deliver precision strikes, similar to current operations in Ukraine. The main requirements for such platforms can include UAVs that are able to operate beyond an adversary’s effective range while being able to relay the target’s location. Loitering munitions should feature enough explosives to cripple a corvette-sized vessel. For instance, the Harop drone could be used as a loitering munition designed to locate and strike with 23 kg of high explosive. It also can be safely landed and relaunched.15

The combination of UAVs and loitering munitions can avoid an unnecessary arms race in the Caspian Sea. It is also cheaper to acquire and maintain them. Another advantage of this combination is that they can be used in other tasks in different locations. Loitering munitions can be operated in low altitudes above the sea surface, making them highly survivable. They can an effective range of 1,000 km and 9 hours of flight endurance.16 Units that operate this system could train in any location in the vast steppe of Kazakhstan. In concert with the abovementioned ship capabilities, they can also provide a credible deterrent.

Conclusion

In the face of geopolitical challenges, Kazakhstan is positioned to diversify its oil exports through the Caspian Sea. However, the country’s naval power might not be able to provide secure lines of communication since it was designed to patrol seashore and offshore oil production, more like the functions of a coast guard. To ensure SLOC security, Kazakhstan should build a “Fleet in being.” That capability could consist of additional corvettes armed with cruise missiles, as well as ISR systems and loitering munitions. This combination promises to be an effective deterrent while not provoking an arms race in the Caspian Sea.

Bakhtiyar Askaruly is a pseudonym for a military officer of a Central Asian nation.

References

1. https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/kazakhstan-transport-and-logistics (accessed 4-30-2023)/

2. Sir Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press Reprint, 1988), 165. This passage describes what is meant by this term, a force than can “dispute” command of the sea.

3. https://oec.world/en/profile/country/kaz#:~:text=Yearly%20Trade,-%23permalink%20to%20section&text=The%20most%20recent%20exports%20are,and%20Germany%20(%243.82B) (accessed 4-30-2023)…

4. https://russianstudiesromania.eu/2022/07/23/russia-could-stop-the-transit-of-kazakh-oil-to-europe/ (accessed 4-30-2023).

5. https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/uscherb-ot-avarii-na-ktk-nazval-ministr-finansov-466764/ (accessed 4-30-2023).

6. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/russia-ukraine-live-updates-n1289976/ncrd1289985#liveBlogCards (accessed 4-30-2023.

7. https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-russia-frictions-over-ukraine-war-go-public (accessed 4-30-2023).

8. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russian-court-suspends-oil-flows-through-caspian-pipeline-2022-07-06/ (accessed 4-30-2023).

9. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/kazakhstan-needs-diversify-oil-supply-routes-tokayev-says-2022-07-07/ (accessed 4-30-2023).

10. Fiona Hill, “Pipelines in the Caspian: Catalyst or Cure-all?” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Winter/Spring 2004): 17.

11. Robert M. Cutler, The Trans-Caspian Is a Pipeline for a Geopolitical Commission, Energy Security Program Policy Paper No. 1 (March 2020: NATO association of Canada).

12. https://astanatimes.com/2023/03/kazakhstan-on-its-way-to-oil-supply-diversification/ (accessed 4-30-2023).

13. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/august/caspian-flotilla-russias-offensive-reinvention

14. John Antal, 7 Seconds to Die, (Oxford, UK: Casemate Publisher, 2022).

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

Featured Image: A Russian Navy Caspian Flotilla warship fires a Kalibr-NK cruise missile during naval drills. (Photo via Russian Ministry of Defense)

2027 War Readiness Week

Deterrence 2027: Keeping the Threat at Bay

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By James Wirtz

The year 2027 has been designated as a “year of maximum danger,” especially for the inhabitants of the island of Taiwan. This is not the first time, however, that a critical benchmark has emerged for American strategists and planners. Amid the shocks of the early Cold War, National Security Council Report-68 (NSC-68), drafted in April 1950 by a committee led by Paul H. Nitze, also identified a year of maximum danger, 1954.1 Nitze, who was the Director of Dean Acheson’s State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, estimated that this was the year that the Soviet Union would possess the capability to launch a disarming nuclear strike against U.S. forces, tempting the Kremlin “to strike swiftly and with stealth.” “In time,” noted Nitze, “the atomic capability of the U.S.S.R. can be expected to grow to a point where, given surprise and no more effective opposition than we have now programmed, the possibility of a decisive initial attack cannot be excluded.”2 History does not repeat itself, but the reader might be forgiven for thinking that it does seem to rhyme.

Nitze’s time horizon was a bit longer than ours today and the nuclear threat he foresaw was more extreme than the circumstances generally associated with a People’s Liberation Army assault on Taiwan. His response to the looming threat of the 1950s, however, also was significantly different than today’s call to better prepare to engage in hostilities about three years hence. Nitze suggested that the United States should not focus on prevailing in a coming war; instead, he called for preventing the outbreak of war in the first place by making a significant effort to bolster the West’s deterrent posture.3 This raises two relevant questions. If there is little enthusiasm today about engaging in a naval showdown in the Taiwan Strait, why not concentrate on altering Beijing’s perception of the military and political setting so that the prospect of hostilities appears unattractive? Why do we not do everything in our power to bolster our maritime deterrent to spare the world a potentially catastrophic conflict in the western Pacific?

Wanted: A Maritime Deterrent Strategy

Several ideas come to mind when explaining why talk of “warfighting” and prevailing in a possible conflict has crowded out planning for deterring, thereby preventing, the outbreak of a clash over Taiwan. One is that the Biden administration’s ambitious quest to “integrate deterrence,” creating a whole-of-government, whole-of-alliance, program to synchronize deterrent activities among multiple warfare domains and across the conflict spectrum remains largely aspirational.4 Another is that an overstretched U.S. Navy has yet to devise a maritime deterrent strategy for the western Pacific, although commentators have identified the need and even the outlines of what such a strategy might look like.5 As a result, it is hard for naval officers to suggest logistical, tactical, and operational ways to strengthen deterrence, without at least a rough, agreed upon outline, of what the Navy is trying to deter and the type of deterrence strategy (deterrence by denial, deterrence by punishment/coercion, deterrence by retaliation, the role of pre-emption) that will be adopted to deter war. Implementing a deterrent strategy in the western Pacific requires changes in daily maritime operations and a fundamental shift in the mindset of operators and planners.

From a deterrence perspective, the outbreak of war in the Pacific highlighted by the notion of a “year of maximum danger” constitutes a catastrophic strategic failure produced by the inability of the joint and maritime force to prevent conflict. Planning for war implies that we are already back on our heels, so to speak: the Chinese have shifted the onus of escalation onto us, leaving the Navy to engage in an attritional battle (against the People’s Republic, no less) to restore the pre-war status quo. If war breaks out, and the fleet manages to dodge the opponent’s opening salvo, it remains unclear how the Navy and the rest of the joint force would turn back the clock and “free” Taiwan.

Now some observers might object to this line of reasoning about the Navy’s failure to take deterrence seriously. Navy policy proclamations at least pay lip service to “deterrence” and reference the Navy’s contribution to deterring the outbreak of war. It also would be wrong not to acknowledge the decades of human and material resources the Navy has devoted to maintaining nuclear powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles as a leg of the U.S. nuclear triad.6 By supplying this secure second-strike capability, the Navy is the centerpiece of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. It is the service that supplies America’s ultima ratio regum. The Navy is no stranger to deterrence; the idea is a classic tenet of naval strategy.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, the Navy has been preoccupied not with deterring war, but with fighting major wars and other engagements at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Humanitarian operations, freedom of navigation operations, anti-piracy patrols, counter-proliferation intercepts, escort duties, policing “no-fly zones,” executing small precision strikes, mounting missile defenses, and delivering massive air and missile assaults, have been a fixture of the Navy’s day-to-day activities. It might not be an exaggeration to say that most of the Navy is not involved in deterring anything but is instead fully and continuously engaged in actual hostilities, e.g., ongoing operations in the Red Sea. As a result, deterrence is a concept that does not seem to correspond to maritime realities for officers today. To them, deterrence is an idea that appears if not incredible, then somewhat farfetched – a figment of academic imagination.

Deterrence is not just an alien concept to today’s officers; however, it also appears disturbing or ill advised. Although the Navy has been continuously engaged in warfighting for decades, its operations usually appear to be circumspect, measured, and precise. Efforts are made to minimize collateral damage, to avoid harm to third parties, to not place personnel or assets in harm’s way unnecessarily, and to minimize the risks of escalation by friend and foe alike.7 By contrast, deterrence is all about risk, or as Thomas Schelling put it, deterrence is a competition in risk taking.8 Deterring an attack on Taiwan is not just about engaging an amphibious assault before it can establish some beachhead. It also is about undertaking operations that create a perceptible risk of a wider regional, global, and even nuclear war. Indeed, it would be prudent to treat a high-intensity conventional battle between two nuclear-armed competitors as a nuclear war, even though few Americans think much about the potential nuclear dimensions involved in the defense of Taiwan and no one has suggested that nuclear weapons should be introduced in the tactical or operational defense of the Island. 

Get Serious about Deterrence – Today

The Prussian theoretician and historian of war Carl Von Clausewitz offers a bit of advice for those contemplating 2027 as a year of maximum danger: “the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish… the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”9 Following Clausewitz’s writ is no small matter; nevertheless, maritime strategy is what supplies us with a description of future war, how to deter it, and how to prevail in the event of deterrence failure. It remains unclear, however, how a Navy that still appears captured by capabilities-based planning and the dreary routines of budget preparation will devise this maritime strategy. 

The starting point for this new strategy is establish its initial objective: to deter an “all domain” amphibious assault on Taiwan that could well escalate into a pan-Asia war. Additional objectives should be added as the strategy is fined tuned. The Navy’s nascent “hellscape” initiative could provide a sea denial capability that would form the basis of a deterrence by denial strategy in the waters around Taiwan, while the Navy’s sea control forces could undertake assurance of allies, prevent the isolation of friends and allies in the event of hostilities, and prepare to engage in deterrence by punishment/coercion in the event of deterrence failure.

This bi-modal maritime deterrent strategy is in keeping with the general thrust of the Navy’s ongoing force development efforts and would provide a way for the Navy to synchronize modernization efforts that are already underway.10 What is especially attractive about adapting a bi-modal maritime deterrent strategy is that it can have an immediate impact on the strategic situation in the western Pacific. If Beijing is paying attention, actions taken now can quickly bolster deterrence. Ship movements, exercises, especially with friends and allies, force deployments, war games, and experiments could send opponents back to the drawing board for weeks, months, or maybe even years. A bi-modal maritime deterrent strategy will not be perfect at the outset; effectiveness depends on continuous change and evolving capabilities. By contrast, procurement programs require at least a decade to field a new capability – if war breaks out in 2027 it really will be a “come as you are” affair.

Conclusion

It remains unclear how the Navy might shift its corporate attention toward devising a maritime deterrent and how such a strategy might be promulgated across the service. Today, ideas that depart from routine are sometimes acknowledged and pushed aside, not out of malice but out of an inability to direct them to “the right office.” Without a senior advocate to sponsor change, it is difficult to discern a pathway forward to gain broad acceptance for a new emphasis on deterrence, or the acceptance of a bi-modal maritime deterrent strategy. Nevertheless, we need to put capabilities and operations in place so that Beijing decides that the game is not worth the candle. Maybe the greatest advantage offered by a bi-modal maritime deterrent is that we can begin to put it into practice quickly, before Beijing’s 2027 countdown to a showdown.

James J. Wirtz is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

Endnotes

1 Samuel F. Wells Jr., “Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat,” International Security Vol. 4, No.2, (Fall 1979) pp. 116-158.

2 A Report to the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC68), April 15, 1950, p. 37. https://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSC-68.pdf 

3 NSC-68 was intended to influence positively the Truman administration’s decision to develop thermonuclear weapons to bolster quickly the U.S. deterrent posture.

4 James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, “Wanted: A Strategy to Integrate Deterrence,” Defense and Security Analysis, pp. 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2024.2352943

5 James J. Wirtz, “A Maritime Deterrence Strategy: The Key to an Overarching Navy Warfighting Concept,” CIMSEC, 2 October 2024. https://cimsec.org/a-maritime-deterrence-strategy-the-key-to-an-overarching-navy-warfighting-concept/

6 “Big Navy” has always maintained a rather nuanced relationship with its nuclear deterrence mission see James J. Wirtz, “The SSBN and US Nuclear Strategy: The Future of the Maritime Deterrent,” in Rory Medcalf, Katherine Mansted, Stephen Fruhling and James Goldrick (eds.) The Future of the Undersea Deterrent: A Global Survey (Acton: The Australian National University, 2020), pp. 16-18.

7 Alan Cummings, “Reinvigorate Risk: The United States need to focus on manipulating adversary risk,” USNI Proceedings Vol. 148/3/1, 429, March 2022. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/march/reinvigorate-risk

8 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 92-125.

9 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 88.

10 “A Maritime Deterrence Strategy.”

Featured Image: A J-10 fighter jet attached to an aviation brigade with the PLA air force under the Chinese PLA Southern Theater Command taxis on the flightline during a flight exercise on October 31, 2024. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Wang Guoyun)